Reflection of the Russian military experts on the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (2021)

In this re-read/re-post type article, are provided key Russian military experts insights from their study of the experience of the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The article "The main trends of development of Ground Forces tactics (according to the experience of the military conflict in Nagorny Karabakh)" written by three Colonels of the Russian Army (P. A. Dulnev (ret.), S. A. Sychev, A. V. Garvardt) was published in Russian military journal "Voyennaya Mysl", November 2021.

Although, the authors identify new trends in the tactics of the Land Forces, and define the main features of advanced combat operations methods in order to raise the effectiveness of implementing combat capabilities of combined arms formations of the tactical level. In my opinion, Russian authors reveal and explain a silver bullet of successful military operations of Azerbaijan Armed Forces (AAF), which includes not only the widespread use of reconnaissance-strike UAVs (esp. "Bayraktar"), which is widely known and emphasized in the West reflections, but also the introduction of non-standard land military formations for offensive operations, including Mobile Groups and Raid Units, Blocking Groups and Assault groups, and Artillery groups.

In short, according to Russian experts, the success of AFF's offensive operations was based on the ability to attack the Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh (DA NKR) defensive positions in a synchronized manner from the depth with infiltrated Mobile Groups and Raid Units and at the front line with a mix of Blocking and Assault Groups. Main aspects/elements of AAF's offensive operations "silver bullet":

1. Large scale use of reconnaissance-strike (fire) complexes, formed on the basis of massive use of different type UAVs;
2. Creation of Artillery Groups intended to engage DA NKR with fire in the directions of the main strikes of combined arms formations;
3. Widespread use of Mobile groups and Raid Units equipped with light weapons and designed to infiltrate into the depths of DA NKR defenses and to conduct active hostile combat operations there;
4. Raiding operations of Special Operation Forces to capture populated areas, dominant heights and road junctions in order to destroy the advancing DA NKR reserves;
5. Use of Blocking Groups and Assault Groups, operating on foot with the support of artillery fire and UAV strikes with the task of capturing DA NKR strongpoints, that offered stubborn resistance and were well fortified;
6. Wide involvement of illegal armed groups, operating on off-road vehicles, in order to destroy guarded crossing points, outposts and develop the offensive.

At the same time, it forces us to rethink our operational art and/or tactical readiness to fight effectively with non-standard military formations, designed to infiltrate into the depths of defense and conduct military operations there, to protect our troops from UAVs' strikes in our defense rear and at the same time to repel active attacks of regular military formations on the front edge of the defense, which can lead not only to loss of initiative but also to the defeat in front lines. At least, in my opinion, it is worth to wargame it.

More details, operational pictures (sketches) of combat operations and practical recommendations are in the summary below.

Main features of Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict: (1) mountainous terrain limited the maneuverability of motorized infantry and tank units, forcing them to move on the roads and preventing the achievement of surprise, as well as did not allow in a short time to concentrate forces and assets in areas unpredictable for the enemy; (2) a significant difference in the levels of modern military equipment of opposing sides [from the perspective of Sixth Generation Warfare theory (developed by Russian Gen. Vladimir Slipchenko) it could be classified as 4th generation vs. 6th generation warfare, accordingly Armenia, including DA NKR, with frontline defensive or offensive operations and AAF with precision guided munition]; and (3) widespread use of illegal armed groups, including others states.

Successful first 10 days of armed conflict for the Armenian army and DA NKR. Realizing that AAF has a significant superiority in the main directions of the attack, the commanders of DA NKR formations actively used Armored Groups, consisting of 6-12 armored vehicles (tanks T-72 and BMP-2), which were concentrated at a distance of 2-3 kilometers from the front line of defense. During the transition to the offensive of the AAF formations, these Armored Groups moved to prepared firing lines and with direct fire in cooperation with subunits occupying strongpoints and prepared defense areas and with artillery support repelled attacks. With an insignificant penetration by the AAF, Armored Groups carried out counterattacks, which made it possible to restore control over the captured strongpoints.

However, later, with deeper penetration of the AAF, such tactics became ineffective for the following reasons. Firstly, the combat capabilities of DA NGR Armored Groups no longer made it possible to defeat attacking units of AAF, while larger mobile reserves, concentrated at a distance of up to 15 km from the forward edge, could not reach the deployment lines and the transition to counterattacks in a sufficiently organized and timely manner since their advance in a short time was revealed by AAF reconnaissance and a powerful fire defeat was inflicted on the columns of equipment in narrow mountain passages. Secondly, the tactics of AAF changed radically. Considering high losses and limited success of the offensive (just 1.5 km into a depth during 10 days), AAF stopped frontal attacks of Coy or Bn tactical groups whose combat operations were aimed at the consistent seizure of DA NKR strongpoints and populated areas.

After the first 10 days, AAF's main emphasis was placed on the widespread use of Mobile Groups and Raid Units (MbG-RdU). To create MbG-RdU, consisting of one-two Plts to a Bn size, AAF used almost all the special forces at their disposal, including fighters from the Syrian province of Idlib trained by Turkish instructors. The total number of soldiers, according to various estimates, ranged from 1,500 to 3,000 in these groups. MbG-RdU equipped with small arms, light mortars, anti-tank and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, using hard-to-reach areas unoccupied by DA NKR units, bypassed its' strongpoints, blocked communications, set ambushes, adjusted artillery fire and UAV strikes, and under favorable conditions, together with combined arms units captured important targets, attacking them from the rear. DA NKG whose tactics were based on positional defense with well prepared in engineering terms system of defensive areas and the readiness of tank formations to destroy wedged enemy by counterattacks, became unable effectively counteract numerous MbG-RdU in their rear. As a result, it was necessary to use practically all combat-ready reserves to fight them, limiting the abilities to support units defending on the front line, which allowed AFF to seize the general initiative.

From September 29 to October 5, MbG-RdU of AFF seized urban terrains and dominant heights along the Araks (Aras) river by raiding actions and bypassing DA NKR combat troops of the 9th Defense Area from the flank. The success of the raid operations was facilitated by the occupation of weakly guarded fortified posts by special operation forces at night, followed by crushing of formations of the 9th Defensive Area by side and rear attacks. This allowed AAF to move along the Horadiz-Soltanli road to a depth of 17 km and establish control over the Soltanly-Jabrail road (see Fig.1, AAF in blue, DA NKR in red). At the same time, as the analysis of combat operations shows, the effect of MbG-RdU significantly depended on the capabilities of their supply and support with artillery fire. This explains the relatively small depth of their actions, which rarely exceeded 20 km, and periodic tactical pauses during active phases. Later, by the end of October 9, while DA NKR was forced to fight with infiltrated MbG-RdU, AAF motorized infantry units operating on the front line moved 18 km into the depth and sized dominant heights in front of Jebrail city.

According to the authors, AAF's success in the offense was achieved by implementing the following tasks: (1) bypassing DA NKR strongpoints by infiltration and the occupation of dominant heights in the rear by MbG-RdU, (2) destruction of identified fire positions by artillery fire and UAV strikes ensuring the secure advancement of Coy or Bn tactical groups to the objectives of attacks, (3) capture of DA NKR strongpoints by attacks from several directions, (4) securing captured strongpoints and repelling counterattacks, restoring the combat capability of troops or replacing them and (5) preparation for subsequent ops.

In areas where the use of MbG-RdU was difficult due to the well-established defense and difficult terrain, Blocking groups (BlcG) and Assault groups (AssG) were created to capture strongpoints, supported by artillery fire and UAV strikes. Tanks and IFVs, in this case, were included in BlG, to support AssG (operating on foot) from the firing positions. To develop the success, illegal armed groups were widely used, which, maneuvering in off-road vehicles, destroyed the guard posts and outposts of DA NKR and advanced at a high rate into the depth of their defense, without getting involved in protracted battles. The strongholds that offered stubborn resistance were subsequently destroyed by regular military formations of AAF (see Fig.2, AAF in blue, DA NKR in red).

Along with the actions of MbG-RdU, BlG and AssG, widespread use of reconnaissance-strike (fire) complexes, consisting of different type UAVs, was another key aspect of AFF offensive success. At the same time, the UAVs were in the air, as a rule, as part of groups of mixed composition. With the help of Turkish military specialists, a new tactic for UAV employment was developed, which was based on massive use of light and relatively cheap reconnaissance and strike UAVs together with heavier reconnaissance drones. For the reconnaissance and strike operations from the air, AAF used a mixed group of UAVs: reconnaissance drones "Hermes 900", reconnaissance-strike drones "Bayraktar" and "loitering ammunition" type drones "SkyStriker", "Harop" and "Orbiter" (see Fig. 3, AAF in blue, DA NKR in red). The result of operating UAVs in mixed groups was the destruction of almost all the "Osa" and "Strela-10" air defense systems of DA NKR already in the initial period of the conflict. Such disorganization of the air defense system made it possible to concentrate the main efforts of UAV groups on the destruction of ground targets, which was carried out continuously around the clock. Unimpeded attacks by UAVs on motorized rifle, tank and artillery units inflicted significant losses and contributed to a decrease in the morale of the troops even before they entered the battle.

Artillery groups (ArtG). Successful UAV strikes led to a significant increase in the effectiveness of field artillery, multiple launch rocket systems and tactical missile systems, which were able to hit enemy targets on a time scale close to real, with minimal involvement of army and attack aviation. The peculiarity of the use of artillery subunits consisted in the creation of artillery groups intended for fire destruction of the enemy in the directions of the main strikes of combined-arms formations. So, all AFF existing self-propelled artillery installations were brought together into a separate artillery brigade, which supported the motorized infantry units advancing in the Jebrail direction. As a rule, artillery units performed their tasks from firing positions beyond the reach of the main fire weapons of DA NKR motorized infantry and tank units.

What did DA NGR do wrong? On the one hand, Russian experts claim that in the situation of the massive use of UAVs, artillery, MbG-RdU operating in the rear and synchronized attacks by BlG and AssG on the front edge of the defense, the combat units of DA NGR were unable to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces and conduct a battle in encirclement for a long time.?However, here's a different way of looking at this situation, emphasizing DA NKR's neglect of the rich military experience gained during the conflicts of the last decade. As a result, these military mistakes were made: (1) strongpoints were equipped without taking into account AAF's modern reconnaissance and destruction means, (2) tactical camouflage measures were carried out routinely, and in some cases were completely ignored, (3) no shelters and hidden routes from/to firing positions, (4) ?Insufficient density and depth of mine obstacles, (5) number of avenues approach were not covered by engineering obstacles system, (6) use of tanks in larger than a Coy formation and (7) routine and predictable actions.

Recommendations for improving the methods of combined arms operations, based on the experience of combat actions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:

1. Tendency: introduction of massive use of UAVs, their combat effectiveness, simplicity and affordability. Recommendation: develop forms and methods for how to use and counter massive use of tactical UAVs.
2. Tendency: increasing depth of tactical operations. Recommendations: (a) formation, training and use of autonomous tactical groups, capable to conduct independent (semi-autonomous) military ops in isolation from the main forces and neighboring units, but remaining in close cooperation and synchronization of actions with other forces, (b) creation of reconnaissance-strike (fire) complexes of various compositions, allowing to act on enemy targets in real-time, and (c) working out the methods of integrating different forces to inflict damage on the enemy throughout the entire depth of its defense.
3. Tendency: transition from linear to the domain and depth-oriented battle formations. Recommendation: to develop combined arms formations with functional specialization of the elements of the battle order, based on the tasks performed:?Assault echelon with the tasks of capturing (holding) objects, that determine the stability of the enemy's defense;?Strike-maneuver echelon designed to develop success, create an active front behind enemy lines, cover the flanks, conduct ambushes, maneuver defense and combat the enemy's airborne sabotage forces; Complex action echelon with the main tasks to reduce the enemy's combat potential to a level that ensures the fulfillment of the assigned tasks with minimal losses of own forces; Support echelon which purpose is to ensure combat, logistical and medical support; and Air echelon for close air support to ground forces and the most urgent need - UAV strikes.
4. Tendency: the increasing role of reliable protection of troops from air attack, and in the future from missile attacks. Recommendation: to create a well-prepared anti-jamming air defense system in the tactical link of the ground forces, which should be comprehensive (anti-aircraft, anti-missile, anti-space) and effective for destroying small air targets at low altitudes, including by setting up anti-aircraft ambushes in hard-to-reach terrain.
5. Tendency: increasing importance of intelligence, command, navigation and information support systems for combat operations, especially for the armies of the world's leading states due to widespread integration of information technologies. In this regard, the desire to achieve information superiority over the enemy is becoming one of the main conditions for the successful conduct of military operations.?Recommendation: developing new technologies and equipping military units of ground forces with modern weapons and military equipment systems, high-precision weapons, electronic warfare equipment, information and C2 systems.

Recommendations for ground forces combat operations:

1. disorganization of the enemy's efforts by the use of the modern weapons against critical targets, the defeat of his main forces in a short time by the synchronized actions of assault, raid, reconnaissance and search and outflanking detachments, as well as tactical airborne assault forces operating in an expanded battlefield;
2. organization of effective air defense systems and tactical camouflage, providing reliable cover for troops from air attacks;
3. realization of advantages in the speed of implementation of the "reconnaissance-destruction" cycle, situational awareness, organization and maintenance of interaction of various forces;
4. supplementing the capabilities of ground forces with the use of autonomous (robotic) systems of various functional purposes, especially when performing tasks associated with a predictably high level of losses;
5. formation of new elements of the battle order, taking into account the specific conditions of the situation;
6. increasing the survivability of troops and systems by individual means;
7. organization of an effective system of all-around support for the actions of ground forces.

Reference: P. A. Dulnev, S. A. Sychev, A. V. Garvardt, "The main trends of development of Ground Forces tactics (according to the experience of the military conflict in Nagorny Karabakh)",?Voyennaya Mysl?11, 2021, p. 49-62, https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/ljRu2qkJR5.pdf.

All photos are taken from?Voyennaya Mysl?Journal (Russian military journal).