Reducing Incidents by Managing Unconscious Drift
Clive Lloyd
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In my experience there is almost always a gap between how leaders imagine their teams go about completing tasks, and how the tasks are ACTUALLY performed by the teams. This disparity evolves over time - usually unconsciously - and is actually a fairly normal and common occurrence sometimes referred to as drift.
The human propensity for type 1 (unconscious) thinking means we tend to seek out the path of least resistance - indeed, our brains are largely wired for this. The resulting drift is not necessarily a bad thing, as we may discover more expedient ways to perform and complete tasks, while expending less cognitive effort.
The problem is, where this gap exists, our risk mitigation processes, for example, Job Hazard Analysis tools (JHAs) based on “work as imagined” are no longer appropriate for drift-affected “work as done”. I believe that many incidents occur due to this unmanaged gap, and the larger the gap, the potential for more (and more severe) incidents increases.
Of course, after an incident, the subsequent investigations will likely identify the gap, and (more often than not) put the blame squarely on the “offender” for "violating" safe work practices. Given that drift is a natural process, such a retributive reaction makes little sense, and only serves to further exacerbate the problem.
We can blame or we can learn!
Wouldn’t it be better if we had processes whereby we could readily identify emerging gaps, and then learn why the drift made sense, and adjust the JHA to suit? This can be done by performing regular analyses of “work as done” versus “work as imagined” with the full involvement of the work teams.
Of course, to make this process meaningful, useful and authentic, leaders will need to have created Psychological Safety within their teams, otherwise team members may be reluctant to disclose any known drift due to fear of negative consequences.
Where the teams trust their leaders, and know there will be no punishment for drifting from specified procedures, learning can occur. The result can be a modified JHA for a more expedient work method, or a better understanding of why drift occurred and what can be done to better manage it.
Regularly “minding the gap” in this way can enable leaders and work teams to identify unmanaged drift BEFORE an incident, rather than the dreadful alternative.
Read more about proactive ways to improve safety performance in my new book, "Next Generation Safety Leadership: From Compliance to Care" which can be purchased as a hardback or (Kindle) e-book here.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Clive Lloyd is an Australian psychologist who assists high-hazard organisations to improve their safety performance through the development of trust and psychological safety and by doing Safety Differently. He is the co-director and principal consultant of GYST Consulting Pty Ltd, and developer of the acclaimed Care Factor Program.
Clive was recently named among the top 5 Global thought leaders and influencers on Health & Safety by Thinkers360, and is the author of the Amazon best-selling book "Next Generation Safety Leadership: From Compliance to Care".
For further information about the Care Factor approach please contact us at:
- Email: [email protected]
- Office: +61 7 5533 2103
- After Hours: +61 447 114 040
- Snail Mail: PO Box 1229 Nerang Qld 4211
Website: www.gystconsulting.com.au
Safety I Compliance I Assurance I
3 年Spot on Clive. I observe that there may well be a "three way difference" between:- 1. what leaders imagine is happening 2 what is happening; and 3 what organisational documentation says ought to be happening (if the latter is comprehensible). Commitment to building and maintaining current documentation that is in form and substance meaningful to and actually used/owned by those doing the work (as distinct from "shelfware" conceived to tick a management system/audit box) is, in my opinion, a critical enabler of trust.
Specialised coaching as a means to improve reliability of critical controls and prevent workplace fatalities.
3 年Great stuff Clive. The key point is “full involvement of the work teams”. A very large proportion of my field coaching is helping leaders perform gap analysis WITH the work teams instead of ON them. This does not come easy for the leader or the teams as the psychological safety and trust is usually damaged. It takes patience and adjustment by both parties to overcome the dynamics of past ‘inspections’ and more genuinely engage. I find after about the fourth attempt, the trust starts to emerge and authentic, high functioning disclosure and discovery also emerges. I now insist on (at least) 4 field coaching opportunities or I don’t take the work.
Owner-Operator gnaut.nl B.V. / Maritime inspections /STS Certified Drone Pilot.
4 年If workfloor teams who actually have to perform the jobs are involved and heard when setting up procedures...good chance you manage to create more motivation, better understanding and less drift.
Director - CIRAS - confidential reporting for safety
4 年Thanks Clive - interesting. Something we find through the confidential reports we receive from frontline staff is that there are pockets in organisations where practice has 'drifted' to use your words. Perhaps one worksite, or a handful of teams where the culture is misaligned from the company one. These might go unnoticed until the staff member is exposed to practice on another site - but at least being able to speak up about them confidentially provides a safety valve if they don't feel psychologically safe enough to speak out locally.