‘A RED, WHITE AND BLUE BREXIT ?’ ‘A PUTIN-PLACEMAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE ?’ NO. BUT…

In November 2018, a number of posters appeared in London (or as some wags have termed it ‘Londongrad’ or ‘Moscow-on-Thames’). One poster, in Stoke Newington, in north London, pictured a winking Vladimir Putin waving a (red, white and blue tricolour) Russian flag alongside the caption “Let’s celebrate a Red, White and Blue Brexit”. This was clearly a parody of Teresa May’s statement, in December 2016, that she was aiming to achieve a “red, white and blue Brexit: that is the right Brexit for the UK, the right deal for the UK.” Another poster, in Bethnal Green, in east London, pictured Boris Johnson on a zip-wire, holding Russian flags, beside the text: “Thank you! Boris”. The posters were claimed to be the work of a group calling itself ‘proudbear.ru’ and ‘#proudbear’; describing itself as a “collective of Russian GRU [military intelligence] officers”.

The moniker ‘Proud Bear’ echoed that of ‘Fancy Bears’, identified in 2018 by the United States Special Counsel as representing two GRU cyber espionage units known as ‘Unit 26165’ and ‘Unit 74455’. The ‘Proud Bear’ name was clearly coined in order to bring this real group to mind.

The posters appeared only a matter of months after genuine GRU operatives had used the nerve agent Novichok to poison former Russian GRU member Sergei Skripal and his daughter, in March 2018. It was an attack which also resulted in the death of a woman with no connection to the Skripals and nearly killed her friend and an investigating police officer. The city of Salisbury UK was thrown into chaos by the attack.

‘PROUD BEAR’, THE UK’S RUSSIA REPORT & BREXIT

Back to the Proud Bear posters and their accusation of Russian interference in the political process in the UK; especially regarding the 2016 EU Referendum. In July 2020, the Russia Report of the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) stated that “we have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference…” This was “…in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election”. As the ISC noted, the intelligence agency MI5 had been determined not to be drawn into a “contentious” area of UK politics. The ISC press release went further, in stating that “the government did not take action to protect the UK’s process in 2016”. The ISC then recommended that the UK’s intelligence services should “produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum” and should publish a summary of its findings that was open and unclassified. The UK government rejected this advice. Clearly, there are some stones that are not to be lifted in order to discover what might be lurking beneath.

RUSSIA, THE USA AND THE MUELLER REPORT

In 2019, the Mueller Report in the USA had not found evidence which amounted to a criminal conspiracy between the presidential election campaign of Donald Trump and Russia, but asserted that the Kremlin interfered in the presidential election of 2016, in what could only be described as “a sweeping and systematic fashion”. This was because “the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome.” The report asserted that the Trump presidential campaign “expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts…” However, significantly, “the investigation did not establish that the [Trump] Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.”

DID RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE LEAD TO BREXIT & TRUMP?

So, did Russian security service interference swing the Brexit vote in the UK or the election of Donald Trump in the US? The answer is: no. These events, whatever our view of them, occurred due to the internal politics, history and culture of these two countries. Russian promotion of both these causes (and promulgation of misinformation) was clearly occurring on social media and via other means, but that is not the same as having the power to significantly influence outcomes. To conclude otherwise, rather overestimates the organizational capacity and impact of such campaigns, given the range of other causal factors. It also assumes a coherent and coordinated approach by the Kremlin; when the reality was (and is) a mixture of officially sanctioned interference (conducted by Russian security operatives), alongside cyber activities (by private-enterprise and semi-official individuals and groups) which may attract official endorsement and encouragement – but is harder to trace to the Kremlin.

However, as my recent book (The Secret History of Soviet Russia’s Police State, Robinson of London, July 2020) explores, the promotion of both these causes was clearly perceived (within the Kremlin) as being attractive propositions and in line with current Russian foreign policy objectives. That is the point to ponder. Brexit and Trump were clearly regarded by the Kremlin as outcomes that should be encouraged in order to divert, distract, disturb and weaken the unity of Europe and the West generally. Other activities include support for right wing nationalist groups across Europe, and cyber-attacks on neighbouring states. In all these activities the actions of the Russian security services have benefitted from divisions within Western democratic societies and the rise of right wing nationalist feelings in the wake of the 2007-2008 economic crisis, heightened concerns over immigration and national identities, and antagonism towards supranational bodies (such as the EU).

This does not mean that Russia actively threatens the peace of the West. Despite the extreme rhetoric of a tiny minority of Russian nationalists, nobody of influence wants actual conflict. Rather that – in the context of Western triumphalism following the fall of communism, the breakup of the USSR, the humiliating chaos of the 1990s, the eastern advance of NATO membership and EU influence into areas Russia considers its ‘back yard’, and Western opposition to Russian interventions in former regions of the old USSR – mischief-making, which distracts and weakens the West, is definitely on the agenda. It also plays well with the current Russian regime’s nationalist presentation of Russia as a nation standing defiant in the face of a hostile world. Hence the Russian support for Brexit and for Trump. Both being positive outcomes, from the perspective of the Kremlin.    

 Now, whether the Trump-outcome is as useful as it was once perceived to be in Moscow, is a moot point. But the USA is in turmoil as a result – and that may suffice. And rarely, since WWII, has the USA seemed so estranged from its European allies. The Brexit outcome is turbulent, still undecided, and has absorbed masses of time in Whitehall and in Brussels. So, the Russian security-service operatives (and associated cyber free-lancers) involved may well feel that the time and effort spent promoting these causes was a worthwhile investment – even if not a decisive one.

THE SOVIET PAST CASTS A LONG SHADOW

Back in the Russian Federation, the influence of the security services has been enhanced by the political dominance of members of the siloviki (‘persons of force’); holders of political power who were once members of the military or the secret police. The secret police has certainly come of age in a country whose head of state is an ‘ex-Chekist’ and who surrounds himself with ‘ex-Chekists’. And using the name of Lenin’s secret police in a modern context is not an anachronism, as great efforts have been made to rehabilitate the image of the ‘heroic Chekists’ and their successors, including the current FSB. They have been presented as defenders of Russian security, stability and national interests. Since 1999 earlier investigations into ‘Chekist crimes’ have been halted. As a result, the term ‘Chekist’ is once again used by the security services and 20 December (termed ‘Chekist Day’ in the old USSR) is once again a professional holiday for the security services. Since 1995 it has officially been termed ‘Day of the Members of the Security Services’ but the old name is the one most commonly used. In 2017 the centenary of the founding of the Cheka was celebrated.

This has accompanied a more positive view of Stalin. In April 2019, a survey by the independent Levada Centre revealed that fifty-two per cent of Russians thought Stalin had played a ‘more positive’ role in the nation’s history and eighteen per cent an ‘entirely positive’ role. That seven out of ten modern Russians appear to have such a positive view of the man behind the Soviet secret police state is noteworthy. This has benefitted the image of the contemporary secret police. And it has accompanied an increase in their activities both at home and abroad.

In 2020, the Cheka and its successor organisations (GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MGB, MVD, KGB, FSK, FSB, as well as the SVR-RF and GRU) continue to cast a long shadow across Russia, Europe and the world. It is a shadow that falls across phenomena as diverse as Brexit and the USA of Donald Trump. That is an extraordinary legacy. The ‘Proud Bears’ may have overstated its influence, but its existence and activity is beyond dispute. We live in interesting times…