Recurring Crisis Between Two NATO Allies - What Should NATO Do?
As Europe is saying goodbye to its hottest summer on record, the political temperature does not decrease. Ukraine is still the number one hotspot but recently, tensions have risen again between Turkiye and Greece. Earlier in September, Turkish President Erdo?an blamed Greece for occupying some remilitarized islands in the Aegean Sea and threatened to “do what is necessary” (Tastekin 2022). On the other hand, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis accused Ankara of constant and unjustified provocation (Politico 2022). The main Turkish opposition leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, criticized both leaders for diverting attention from the actual problems of the ordinary people and playing on the card of “war” before the upcoming elections in both countries in 2023 (Ulusal 2022).
The escalation was not just on the discourse that revealed itself in the exchange of denunciatory words. Ankara accused Athens of locking on to Turkish jets with S-300 air defense systems and more recently, for targeting a cargo vessel (Aljazeera 2022). According to Ankara, on 10 September, Greek coastguard opened fire on the cargo ship which was sailing in international waters - 20km southwest of the Turkish island of Bozcaada (ibid.).
The disputes between two allies result mainly from divergent views on the status of the islands and islets in the Aegean sea. In the view of Athens, Greece owns “full exclusive economic zone and continental shelf entitlements” for the islands situated in the Aegean Sea as well as for Cyprus (Yuksel 2022). Ankara believes that “such entitlements should be restricted to territorial sea zones” (ibid.). Additionally, Ankara objects to the efforts of Greece and Greek Cypriots in opposing/preventing Turkiye’s hydrocarbon activities around the island of Cyprus, stating that the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriot community should also be protected (ibid).??
The positions and main arguments of both sides have not changed drastically under the leaderships of? Erdo?an or Mitsotakis. What has changed is the increased isolation of Turkiye due to; 1) Ankara’s quest for attaining strategic autonomy from the West, 2) its political and security-related cooperation with Russia including the purchase of S-400 air defense systems, and 3) its assertive and militarized foreign policy attitude in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece did not only gain more support from the traditional allies within the EU — such as France which will deliver additional 24 Rafale jets, totaling up to 40 by 2025 — but also could enhance its defense cooperation with the US, as witnessed in the activation of new US bases/units in Greece, and in Athens’s securing of the provision of up to 40 F-35 jets plus the upgrade of 84 of its F-16s (Tastekin 2022). Furthermore, in recent years, Greece has taken part or initiated some economic or political platforms — such as the East Mediterranean Gas and Philia forums — and developed its ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Israel. Ankara has recently taken some steps to break its isolation and reconcile with these four important regional countries however, none of these countries appear to have the “intention to break their partnerships with Greece for the sake of mending fences with Erdogan” (Tastekin 2022).
For NATO, both Greece and Turkiye are valuable partners as recently stated by the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (NATO 2022). NATO previously established a deconfliction mechanism where Ankara and Athens could diplomatically engage, exchange information and more importantly, ensure cooperation to “deconflict any dangerous situation or behavior” (NATO 2022). Any further escalation or any sudden and accidental incident in the Aegean Sea could lead to an undesirable situation, negatively impacting NATO’s spirit of alliance.
In the worst case scenario, although not likely, a severe crisis between Turkiye and Greece may damage NATO’s reputation and prestige, reduce its effectiveness in current and future operations, and undermine its efforts to counter the threats emanating from Russia in the eastern flank. Moreover, a crisis in the southern flank of the alliance may disrupt NATO countries' reliable access to energy resources in the Mediterranean in the mid to long term. Finally, such a conflict can be exploited by Russia in a variety of ways, such as using it as a propaganda tool to damage NATO’s credibility and solidarity.
What Should NATO Do?
NATO should closely monitor the situation, keep the deconfliction mechanisms active and take additional reconciliatory measures if tensions further escalate between the sides. It is really crucial to avoid the occurrence of an accidental incident which could trigger unexpected and unwanted reactions from both parties. In this context, NATO should continue inviting both Turkiye and Greece to act within the framework of international law and keep the communications channels open to resolve their problems.