A Real World-class Navy

A Real World-class Navy

Why does the United States need a world-class navy? Simply put as the world’s largest economy, a superpower economically, politically, and militarily the United States is a maritime power, and we cannot ignore the influence of sea power upon our history. This is a need and not a want. Alfred Thayer Mahon’s thesis on sea power is as valid today as it was when written. The littorals are but extensions of the sea, not stand alone as many have suggested over the past twenty years of Global War on Terrorism.

Recently Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday released the US Navy’s revised Navigation Plan 2022, which is the Navy’s strategic plan for the next 20 – 30 years in terms of ships, aircraft, organization, and manpower. All of which are critical to the success of the Navy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and ultimately the Nation. Two key tenants of that plan were to “maintain technological superiority” over the Russian Navy and “match” the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (the Navy of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge for the US Navy. This plan included a requirement for 350 ships plus unmanned surface vessels, unmanned subsurface vessels, and unmanned aerial systems. Great goals and certainly achievable goals but not a goal that can be achieved in the next five years or so. The Navigation Plan also ignores the fact that the PLAN and the Chinese Coast Guard are developing and deploying more vessels and clearly intend to be a very much larger force that the US Navy.

But the PLAN has already outpaced the US Navy at currently 350 ships and continued expansion and ship building plus an armed coast guard with more and newer cutters entering service monthly. The US Navy has but 300 ships (USS and USNS). To be fair to the US Navy, the Navy clearly outclasses the PLAN in aircraft carriers (11 to 2) plus 3 Ford class under construction to the PLAN’s two ski-jump carriers with a new build launched (a CATOBAR), for a third aircraft carrier. The US Navy is ahead in nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines when compared to the PLAN but at a disadvantage when the Russian Navy is considered in the mix. The PLAN is ahead in conventionally powered attach submarines as the US Navy has none. The US Navy excels in large amphibious ships. However, the PLAN is closing the gap here with both LPD and LHA/D-type large amphibious multi-use platforms. Where the PLAN is accelerating beyond the status quo are surface combatants with a solid mix of corvettes, frigates, and destroyers. Some open-source reports are indicating that the PLAN is working on a large cruiser-type platform. These are multi-mission assets that are capable of anti-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine operations, and may very well have a hypersonic offense weapons systems in place. In short, good open ocean escorts. The cruiser gap is interesting as the US Navy wishes to rid itself of its current cruiser force, despite heavy and recent investment in numerous upgrades to the cruiser fleet. The US Navy is saddled with an aging cruiser force that is still viable and a number undergoing modernization (although the Navy does which to shed this class and plans to decommission five in 2022), Agis-equipped destroyers, and the Littoral Combat Ships of two distinct classes that the Navy wishes to shed due to cost, lack of the needed mission modules, and mechanical and structural issues. The LCS’s are known throughout the fleet as “Little Crappy Ships”. Of course, senior leadership won’t use that term but that is what many sailors think of the type. The bottom line is that neither LCS types have the sufficient mission models required to do much of anything other than show the flag and go fast. The Navy does have a new frigate type, the Constellation class, to replace the LCS and is intended to be primarily an anti-submarine platform with air defense capabilities. The US Navy has the Zumwalt Destroyers (four). The world’s most advanced surface combatants that are stealthy. The fact that none of four has a viable weapons system seems to escape most discussions. The type shall require extensive costs and upgrades to incorporate the new hyper-velocity weapons systems as was recently announced.

Before launching into a discussion of ship types and organization for the US Navy, several basics and assumptions need to be understood and acknowledged. First is the fact that the US Navy is indeed a five-ocean navy with assigned missions to each of the geographic combatant commanders and US Strategic Command. That places each naval platform as high-demand, low-density assets, and a very high demand on logistic support vessels (US Naval Ship or USNS, which are Navy owned, civilian crewed) to keep the Navy at sea and extensive infrastructure to maintain those ships and sailors.

Second point is that no matter where the hot-spot or conflict may be within those five oceans, the US military must get there before engaging in the land or air fight. The only way to lift lots of supplies, personnel, and equipment is by ship. That means a sea fight in simple terms. Think of the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. The Allies almost did not win that one against the Germans. The Pacific was a different story because the Japanese sought out Allied combatant ships and not the vital logistics vessels. On the other hand, the US Navy sought out the Japanese logistics ships bringing raw materials to Japan and the ships bringing supplies to the Japanese Army in the field, to destroy the Japanese ability to wage war. The US Navy’s Submarine Force sank more tonnage and vessels than any other force in WWII. Which brings us to the question: Why did the Soviet Union expend so much effort and resources on a very large submarine force during the Cold War? To win the third Battle of the Atlantic is the obvious answer. If NATO could not reinforce and supply from the US and Canada, then the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact won. The situation has not changed in the thirty years plus since the end of Cold War by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact. Which is why the US and NATO expended quite a bit of capitol on anti-submarine warfare. Historical note at the out break of WWII, the largest submarine fleet was not Nazi Germany’s but the Soviet Union. Much of that force resided in the Black Sea around Sevastopol Crimea and in the Baltic Sea. Sort of as it does today with exceptions. Might add a bit to the current conflict in the Ukraine. The Cold War Soviet submarine fleet was also tasked with locating, neutralizing, and eliminating the US Navy’s ballistic missile fleet. Something that the US submarine fleet was tasked with doing against the Soviet ballistic missile fleet.

Third point, our (the US) crisis or conflict is not necessarily a conflict or crisis for our allies or other friendly nations. We may find ourselves alone, much as Great Britain did after Dunkirk. Another good example of this was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US Navy blockaded Cuba and prevented the Soviet Union from introducing more nuclear equipped missiles into Cuba. No other nation, even NATO, joined in that effort. Some interesting results of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that the Soviets started a massive naval building program, and the Soviet Navy became a true blue-water navy present in all the world’s oceans and towards the end of the Cold War could challenge the US Navy at an on-par basis in many naval tactical situations. The Russian man of the hour was Hero of the Soviet Union, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov; he must have been a reader of Mahan. The second outcome was that our NATO ally, France, under the leadership of President Charles De Gaulle, withdrew from the military arm of NATO (although France remained in the political arm of NATO). De Gaulle is often quoted as saying “would the Americans be willing to trade Washington for Paris”. In his opinion, the answer was a “no”, which is why France developed a nuclear triad like the US nuclear triad. In the years since the end of the Cold War, France has rejoined the military arm of NATO and has eliminated one arm of its nuclear triad, retaining the sea launch option of fleet ballistic missiles and air delivered nuclear weapons. Our allies may not necessarily come to our aid when first needed. Fighting a holding action may be the only thing that we can do, such as Britain did in the Atlantic and we did in the Pacific during the early days of WWII.

Fourth, the corollary of the above is that our enemies’ friends or allies are not necessarily our enemies. A good example of this is Spain during the Second World War. Even though Hitler and Mussolini had helped Franco gain power in Spain, Spain never joined the Axis and even resisted overt attempts to be forced into the alliance with Germany, Italy, and Japan. Understanding the evolving situation is important. Not making wrong or incorrect assumptions, even more so. Post WWII, Franco became a US ally but kept Spain out of NATO. Once the monarchy was restored, Spain did join NATO.

Understanding these basic points and assumptions enables us to understand our actual naval (and even other military) needs. As we all tell our children, wanting something is quite different than needing something. If the above four points and assumptions are accepted as factual (which I believe that they are), then it becomes apparent that the US naval forces (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, and Space Force (not a naval service but an important partner and capabilities provider that is part of the discussion)) must possess a full naval capability across the entire spectrum of naval warfare and in sufficient quantities to simultaneously conduct (and win) naval operations in all five of the world’s oceans. (For those counting on your fingers, the fifth ocean is the newly recognized Southern Ocean). The full spectrum includes surface, subsurface, aerial, amphibious, logistics (naval including merchant marine), advanced naval base operations (to include seizure and defense), unmanned assets/systems, mine warfare, space-based systems to include intelligence, surveillance, targeting, command and control, ballistic missile (and hypersonic) defense at the theater and national strategic and theater operational levels, and perhaps most importantly naval shipyards capable of rapid repair. I am sure that my Navy friends will tell me that I missed something here and that needs to be included as well.

Today’s naval goal is for a 350-ship navy that includes a mixture of unmanned systems capable of autonomous and integrated operations with manned assets. At the height of the Cold War during the Regan Administration, the goal was a 600-ship navy. That goal was missed ever so slightly in the eight years of the Regan Administration. The argument is that automation, artificial intelligence, and other technology advances will reduce the need for more ships. What this argument ignores is the fact that we currently overstretched and over deployed with the current numbers in a non-combat environment and that in a combat environment, attrition will be a major factor in success or failure. As the last major naval engagement fought, the Falklands Conflict is a great example with both sides losing major naval assets. Only British pluck, determination, and grit allowed the Brits to pull victory from the jaws of defeat. Even then, the use of ship killing sea-skimming missiles proved significant for the Argentinians and their Exocet missiles. These missiles were shown again in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq-Iran conflict when an Iraqi Exocet hit and disabled the USS Stark (FFG-31). Then the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) struck an Iraqi mine. During Operation Desert Storm the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) also hit an Iraqi mine. The losses of the Russian Navy in the current Ukrainian conflict/war are good examples of cheap anti-ship missiles and other actions eliminating significant naval assets. Anti-missile defense and mine countermeasures and mine sweeping are critical areas that must be accomplished to protect naval assets. It is a war of attrition and given the very long lead times for operational capable warships, “we run what we brung” to any future conflict. Now is the time to be building what we need in the future, not tomorrow.

So, what is it that we truly need and not just want? Clearly a five-ocean navy that is capable of the full spectrum of naval operations, the logistics force to support that operational requirement, and the infrastructure that is necessary to both build and repair that naval force. That is a tall order and a costly order to the American taxpayer. But if we don’t invest now and in the correct types and quantities, we will be too late.

Capital ships are clearly the need. Priority for the Navy (as defined in the Navigation Plan 2002) is and should be the Columbia-class SSBN’s. Part of the nuclear deterrent that is survivable. It is necessary to replace the current aging fleet of SSBN’s for no other reason than the age of those vessels. Continued acquisition of the Virginia payload class of attack submarines (SSN). An absolute necessity to replace the aging Los Angeles class of attack submarines. Parity of technology advantage with Russia and the PRC is the end state here.

Aircraft carriers is always a discussion with some saying that carriers are yesterday’s war as the carrier is but a target. The carrier is a target but one that can be hidden on the oceans and is survivable. Carriers bring a lot of firepower to any hot spot around the world and more importantly are a single spot of American sovereignty immune to any other nation’s demands, needs, or wishes. During the Regan years at the height of the Cold War the discussion centered on 14 or 15 carriers. That was what was needed to accomplish a 2 ? war scenario. Given the move back to that scenario, the current arguments for 9 or 10 carriers have been overcome by events and are too simple in the statement. The need exists for 15 carriers. The other end of the argument on carriers is to invest in smaller carriers to do the additional missions. Not a new idea and one that has been tried out several times. In WWII, the Navy had six escort carriers that were used by all Marine Air Groups that provided close air support to the landing force during amphibious operations in the Pacific. The escort carriers were developed to provide anti-submarine aircraft capabilities to both the Atlantic and Pacific fleet convoys and fleet operations. This freed up the larger fleet carriers for purely offensive operations. The escort carriers were also used to provide Combat Air Patrol protection for the fleet, again to free up offensive capability for the fleet carriers. Of course, the Harrier Carrier was a concept being used by the British, Spanish, Italians, Thai’s, and even the US. That concept is now the Lightning carrier with all these allies (except Thailand) adding VTOL F-35B Lightnings. The USS Tripoli (LHA 7) is currently deployed testing this concept with an all F35 Marine airwing. The US Marines also provided a squadron for the first operational deployment of the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth. Great idea but the F35B has limitations, and the VTOL carrier has limitations in terms of deck space, no airborne early warning capabilities, no long-range antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, and limited space for munitions. Which compounds the need for logistics support. The fact is that even adding our allies F35 carrier capabilities (Japan and South Korea as well), these ships must operate under the cover of the CATOBAR carrier and task forces. The CVN has not only utility but requirements that cannot be replaced.

Destroyers, the great open ocean multi-purpose ships of the Navy. Adding the new mission of ballistic missile defense is a new mission set that testing has shown to be not only viable but easily integrated for the Navy and our allies such as Korea and Japan. A great new mission. Short coming here is the fact that this mission is a national-level mission that will shift these vessels from a force mission/protection posture to a national protection mission and thus these destroyers will not be part of the naval task force and they cannot do the other missions of the destroyer force other than self-protection. This is sort of as in WWII during the Okinawan Campaign when destroyer escorts (DE’s) were used as radar pickets to detect waives of Japanese Kamikazes attacking the US fleet supporting the Okinawa landings. The Kamikazes were the hyper cruise missiles of the day. Same concept, different technology. This is a good mission and one that should not be abandoned by the Navy but for every destroyer added to the ballistic or hypersonic missile defense, another destroyer or cruiser must be kept in service or added to the force to do the other naval force missions. Hence an argument for more ships, not less.

Which brings us to the Zumwalt (DD1000) class destroyers. The future is here with tons of new technology but no weapons as the advanced gun systems just don’t work and are being replaced with vertical launch systems. These ships are not destroyers as they displace more than the current cruiser classes of any navy but when compared to Russia’s cruisers are significantly less capable in terms of weapons systems. The four Zumwalt’s are excessively expensive, and the question must be asked “do they bring utility and capabilities to the battlespace that warrant the expense?” Not sure that the question was answered in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). Perhaps the N8 staff has a better answer. What is apparent is that the class is in an experimental squadron to evolve techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP’s) for the type. In other words: how does the Nave fight this ship? What is its real purpose for existing of the class?

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) two different types of the class and neither is being overly successful due to hull and mechanical issues. The Navy wishes to rid itself of one type entirely and is even suggesting that the vessels be sold to allies. Dumb question time: why would those allies wish to buy or even accept our problems? Sort of like buying a used car with no warranty. A professional opinion: any senior Naval officer associated with this program should be court martialed for incompetence and relieved of command and certainly not given an award to recognize performance. But there is a potential place for these vessels that may support the Marines’ concept of operations as high-speed transports with embedded command and control and direct and indirect fire systems to support the raid force. Much like the fast attack transport destroyers used with success during WWII to support Marine Raiders in the Pacific. These vessels are aviation capable and that would add armed helicopters and medivac to the Raid force package. Something to consider. Any excess vessels should be scrapped.

Amphibious shipping, the Navy says 28 large deck ships, the Marines say 31, and Congress says 31. But that number just addresses amphibious needs of a two front conflict and just barely. More is needed and perhaps of several different types. The current mix is LHA/LHD aviation platforms, LPD (San Antonio class), and the Whidbey Island LSD class. The latter is to be replaced by an improved version of the San Antonio LPD class. Then there are the semi-amphibious classes of Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) ships and the Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) ships. Not truly amphibious assault ships but more of connectors and support vessels. Both types are commercial vessels converted to military uses. The hulls are built to commercial standards and not naval ship standards. The goal is to reduce the variety of platforms to something more manageable than the seven class types of the Cold War (LCC, LPH, LHA, LPD, LSD, LST, LKA). This is a goal to reduce construction and operating costs as well as training requirements. The conflict is, in colloquial terms, putting all of one’s eggs in the same basket. In a war of attrition, a serious issue. The Amphibious Command Ships (LCC’s) are the Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge. Both are very old and in need of replacement.

The Marines and Navy plan to develop and deploy the Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ship. A light ship that is capable of open ocean transits and of placing Marines directly ashore in uncontested scenarios. This would be about a company size organization with basic organic equipment. This supports the Marines’ latest concept of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The concept has met considerable resistance from retired senior Marines for a variety of reasons but primarily as it sheds traditional Marine missions and ignores requirements in most geographic combatant commands other than the Indo-Pacific Command. Reasonable counter arguments to the current plan that, based upon media reports, is being ignored by Headquarters Marine Corps planners. The plan does meet the objective of more ships, reducing the impacts of large deck losses. But the issue seems to ignore several realities of operating within the Pacific, Indian, Artic, and Southern Ocean areas. Big oceans, lots of miles between anything and lots of rapidly forming bad weather. These light ships are not exactly the best seakeeping vessels. It takes sailors to man, operate, and maintain. Perhaps more than the US Navy can muster. The second issue is one of lack of fire support, command and control, and other functions for the type. And there must be consideration of the ability of the ship to survive. The LAW is a target as well. Susceptible to mines, torpedoes, aerial attack, missile attack, and even surface vessel gunfire. The class is detectable and therefore targetable. Small size (displacement) is an advantage and disadvantage. When comes to fighting damage and keeping the vessel afloat, there simply may not be enough crew, watertight spaces, and buoyancy to do so. The Marines state in open-source media that the concept is successful in simulations and training and that the Chinese PLAN are “worried” about the concept and the broader concepts of warfighting that the LAW supports. Simulations can easily be designed to show any concept as being successful. Unless the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity has a HUMINT asset within the PLAN that can verify that the PLAN is worried or concerned about the Littoral Combat Regiment and LAW concept, this a doubtful claim. There is utility, but the liabilities need to be fully understood. The Corps is very guilty of putting all of their eggs in a single basket in this case.

The discussion must turn to the auxiliary and logistics fleet. This is the unglamourous part of the Navy along with shipyards, ports, and facilities. It is also the most critical part of the Navy because without the logistics and support vessels, the big flashy ships cannot operate. But the breadth and depth of this axillary fleet is rather astounding and takes quite a large piece of the personnel, logistics, and support available. Even with civilian manning of the logistics fleet, the manning and maintaining evolutions are significant. This would include such ships as ocean going tugs, salvage ships, mine sweeping and countermeasures, hospital ships, fleet replenishment (oilers from the days of old), ammunition ships, combat stores, submarine tenders, survey ships, repair ships, intelligence collection ships, and quite a few more. The US Navy has ignored this unglamorous fleet for some time. The need for recapitalization is a must now. Not included in this discussion is immediate need for the Coast Guard to build and deploy heavy icebreakers (two oceans with the requirement/need) that are capable of full integration with Navy and Marine operations along with the remaining cutter force. Our Merchant Marine is a sham from years of neglect. Action must be taken to improve and increase the number of US flagged ships and merchant mariners.

The bottom line take home for Congress, the White House, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Chief of Staff of the Space Force is that building a naval force that is world-class takes a lot of time. The winds of war are blowing harder from China, Russia, and other countries on daily basis. What we have when war breaks out (not if but when) is what we, the United States, will have. It is as it was during the Cold War, a “run what you brung” war. Time is short, action is required of all of those listed here.