RADICALIZATION AS A CAUSE OF TERRORISM - THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Оriginal bibliography reference: ?ikman, M. (2020). Radicalization as a Cause of Terrorism - The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In. ?aleta, D. & Powers, J. (Eds). Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as a Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection, (65-80). Ljubljana: Ministry of Defence Republic of Slovenia, Joint Special Operations University from Tampa, and Institute for Corporative Studies, https://dk.mors.si/Reader/Cyber_Terrorism_and_Extremism.html.

Mile ?ikman

 Abstract: In the most general sense, radicalization is regarded as one of the causes of terrorism. However, in order to accept this view, several prerequisites must be met. First, radicalization must be understood as a process of adopting a view that violence is a justifiable way of achieving the set goals. In this sense, terrorist radicalization is discussed and distinguished from other forms of radicalization. Secondly, radicalization must be aimed at achieving the goals of a terrorist organization, including terrorist-related behaviors (recruitment for terrorism purposes, terrorist training, and so on). Thirdly, in accordance with the multifactorial approach to explaining every crime, including terrorism, other factors (individual and external) leading to the behavior referred to as terrorism should be taken into account as well. This paper applies the theoretical concept of radicalization to the practical cases of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which terrorist radicalization has contributed to terrorism in BiH, including BiH citizens who leave for Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State terrorist group.

Keywords: radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism, terrorist, terrorist act.       

1 INTRODUCTION

The term radicalization has a broader practical application than a theoretical determination. This is the main reason why this phenomenon is very often understood broadly and vaguely. Such an approach may result in negative effects, especially when it is associated with a socially negative phenomenon such as terrorism[1]. For this reason, it is necessary to offer a clear theoretical concept of radicalization, and subsequently associate it with the concept of terrorism. Thus, the criteria of considering a particular process to be socially unacceptable would be established, while at same time avoiding the dangers of misunderstanding certain social processes. In the context of criminal law, this is also necessary because codified behaviors must be prescribed on which coercive measures may be imposed, at the same time guaranteeing human rights and freedoms. Additionally, the issue of radicalization is important in a globalized world where people from around the world are connected and share ideas (particularly via social media and the internet), because the increased connectivity makes it more likely that an individual will be exposed at some point to extremist ideology (by chance or choice) and also facilitates the exchange of information, propaganda and socialization with other extremists (Hendrickson, 2014: 2).

Although the initial forms of terrorism (e.g., left-wing or right-wing terrorism) could have been regarded as radical[2], this phenomenon is generally associated with the global jihadist movement[3] and terrorism which has been manifesting itself since the 1990s. Specifically, a radical ideology emerged during this period, which was based on the recruitment of individuals around the world to fight against the proclaimed enemy, be it home or abroad, to achieve the set goals[4] (cf. Hegghammer, 2011: 73; Kohlmann. 2004). Al Qaeda was the first global terrorist network under whose umbrella radicalized individuals began to gather and commit terrorist acts around the world[5]. Subsequently, this problem escalated when the Islamic State was established in the area of Syria and Iraq, with more than 40,000 people from over 120 countries[6] joining the Islamic State between 2012 and 2017. Even though the method and goal have remained the same (the recruitment of individuals around the world, the formation of a caliphate), terrorism now manifests itself in a much deadlier, more dangerous and brutal way[7]. Finally, according to the latest data by the Institute for Economics and Peace (2019), there is an increase in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, suggesting that the Taliban became the deadliest terrorist group in the world during 2018 (Institute for Economics & Peace [IEP], 2019: 2). Thus, we currently have a paradoxical situation – although the Islamic State’s caliphate has collapsed in Iraq and Syria and the influence of al Qaeda has been completely weakened, there may now be four times as many Jihadists as there were in 2001[8] (Clarke, 2018). According to Colin Clarke (2018), it suggests that: ''The global jihadist movement is alive and well, even if it is currently more fractured and atomized than at any point in recent memory'' (Clarke, 2018). As a result, the concept of radicalization, as a cause of terrorism, is widely used to refer to the process of individuals joining extreme and violent movements, with an emphasis on the recruitment and mobilization to the cause of global jihad (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Kaderbhai, 2017: 13).

The literature on radicalization and terrorism is quite extensive and diverse[9]. It ranges from viewpoints that radicalization is a process which has a direct causal relation with terrorism (Laqueur, 1999; Hegghammer, 2011; Kohlmann, 2004; Burke, 2009), through viewpoints that the concept of radicalization has been misused in order to draw attention away from the real causes of terrorism such as poverty and Western foreign policies (Kundnani, 2012; Silva, 2018) to viewpoints that the concept of radicalization should be replaced with another concept, for example, "fanaticism" as an introduction to terrorism (Schuurman, Taylor, 2018: 14). Therefore, it could be said that the concept of radicalization follows the fate of terrorism regarding the conceptual definition (Lali?, ?ikman, 2018). Unquestionably, radicalization always manifests itself at the level of attitudes[10], and it does not necessarily have to result in violence, whereas terrorism always results in terrorist behavior (Marret, Feddes, Mann, Doosje, Griffioen-Young, 2013: 125) . It is for this reason that these different viewpoints need to be taken into consideration when considering such a complex issue as the impact of radicalization on terrorism.

The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical concept of radicalization and to determine the extent to which this factor has contributed to the manifestation of specific forms of terrorism in BiH. The terrorist attacks carried out in BiH and BiH citizens who leave for Syria and Iraq to become foreign terrorist fighters are examined. Thus, this paper continues to deal with these issues, based on previous research results (see more: ?ikman, 2018; ?ikman, 2016).

2 THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF RADICALIZATION

In the most general sense, Leksikonu stranih re?i i izraza[11] (2002) defines the term radicalism (Lat. radicalis) as ''rootedness, thoroughness, complete consistency in advocating understanding or the implementation of a program'', while the term radical (Lat. radicale) is defined as “radical, complete, fundamental, deep-rooted,” '(Vujaklija, 2002: 772). Similarly, radicalization is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ''the action or process of making somebody more extreme or radical in their opinions on political or social issues'' (Oxford University Press, n.d.). However, even though it is generally used in a negative sense when describing the process leading to terrorism, the concept of radicalization may also be used in a positive sense.

In this sense, it corresponds to the term extremism (Lat. extremus) used to denote "overbearing, intransigence, irreconcilability (regarding an attitude or viewpoint)" (Vujaklija, 2002: 268). Although the term extremism is encountered in culture, sports, art, and religion, its destructiveness is most pronounced in the area of politics (?ori?, 2012: 47). Extremism is often described as the end result of the process of radicalization, whereas violent extremism is described as the acceptance of, and involvement in, violent activity as a result of radical or extremist views (Hendrickson, 2014: 2; Bjelopera, 2013: 11,12). Hence the connection between radicalization, extremism and terrorism, as a distinct form of political violence. The term "connection" is used because it clearly distinguishes these phenomena (radicalism, extremism, terrorism), but at the same time a certain causality may be found. Finally, the concepts of fundamentalism and fanaticism are also mentioned within the conceptual-categorical apparatus closely related to radicalization as a cause of terrorism. Fundamentalism (Lat. fundamentum) is predominantly related to religion and signifies a tendency to return to the fundamental postulates of that religion within certain religious teachings (?ori?, 2012: 50). Thus, fundamentalism explains the phenomenon of violence caused by religious teachings, with the addition of the term religious fanaticism[12]. Fanaticism (Lat. fanum) is also one of the terms related to religion, which is used to explain the behaviors leading to terrorism (see: Laqueur, 1999), particularly some of its forms such as suicide terrorism. Specifically, fanaticism provides a behavioral perspective on whether and when extremist beliefs can lead to terrorist violence, a key element in distinguishing it from radicalization (Schuurman and Taylor, 2018: 13). Thus, radicalization is a term which is not synonymous with related concepts because it differs from them concerning certain elements. These terms should not be confused because religion-based terrorism (as a form of extremism) or religious fanaticism is not the same as the process of radicalization leading to terrorism. Therefore, Randy Borum (2012) rightly argues that radicalization, more precisely, involvement in terrorism – can best be seen as a set of different processes (Borum, 2012). This is also the first issue that needs to be clarified regarding radicalization as a cause of terrorism.

The academic debates on this notion, which, as already stated, are quite divergent[13], have influenced the institutional framework of radicalization as a cause of terrorism in many respects. In defining the concept of radicalization, the United Nations generally refer to academic opinions on this issue[14]. Additionally, the report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (2016a), paragraph 14, states that: "A further conceptual challenge to our understanding of the" radicalization process "through which individuals adopt violent extremist ideologies that may lead them to commit acts of terrorism, or that make them vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations '' (United Nations [UN], 2016a: 6). A more detailed approach to the conceptualization of the concept of radicalization was given by UNDP (2015), stating that the participants at the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Conference arrived at an agreed view, which reads as follows: '' Radicalization is a process marked by departure from generally accepted social norms and values; the objective of those using radicalization as a tool is to pressure others to subscribe to the worldview itself. The methods used to convert others to the same worldview may take a coercive form, including outright violence. Radicalization is a phenomenon characterized by aggressive and exclusive imposition of one’s identity on others, consequently constraining or denying space for the expression of other identities. The uncompromising imposition of one belief system onto another through violent means characterizes processes of radicalization that lead to violent extremism. This form of absolutism requires compliance (with no exception). Radicalization can manifest itself in the form of physical violence, in systems (including laws, regulations, etc.) and the broader denial of rights. It is largely context-specific and, therefore, subject to local driving factors which contributes to the challenge of establishing a common definition.’’ (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015: 3). The European Union ascertains radicalization as: ‘’a phased and complex process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology or belief that accepts, uses or condones violence, including acts of terrorism within the meaning of the Directive on combating terrorism, to reach a specific political or ideological purpose’’ (European Commission, n.d.). The Council of Europe (2016) u Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism defines: ‘’violent extremism as behaviour promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy. This may include the violent opposition to core democratic principles or values. Radicalisation to violence is the dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. Indicators of violent extremism exist. These are evidence-based behaviours that reveal an increasing commitment to an ideology that supports the use of violence, the increasing intention to act in a violent manner to achieve ideological goals and/or actual participation in unlawful violent action in support of political, religious, social or other ideological objectives’’ (Council of Europe, 2016: 9). Finally, it is worth mentioning the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has embraced the concept of terrorist radicalization to mean: ‘’a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action’’ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 2014: 21).

In order to answer the question of radicalization as a cause of terrorism, taking into account the above points, we may conclude that there are three common denominators related to the concept of radicalization. First, we agree that radicalization is an individual and systemic, social-psychedelic process consisting of adopting particular views and beliefs based on extremist views. As such, this process has its own timeline, the moment when it occurs, the time of manifestation and the phase when it ends (cf., Borum, 2012c: 58). Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process: it may be accelerated, possibly slowed down and in some cases reversed (OSCE, 2014: 37). However, this is not a linear process; the transition from one stage to the next is individual and depends on a number of circumstances. In this case, the focus is on those conceptualizations of radicalization that see it as a cognitive process of increasing adherence to radical views which is then implicitly or explicitly tied to involvement in terrorism (Schuurman, & Taylor, 2018: 13). Specifically, many individuals may have radical ideas but the vast majority of them never act on them (Moskalenko, McCauley, 2009: 257; Borum, 2012a: 2). The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of a number of circumstances, which is why, according to Brian Jenkins (2010), there is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, nor is there a single path to radicalization (Jenkins, 2010: 7). The key difference is the adoption of views that violence is a justifiable way of achieving the set goals. Following the model used by Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley (2009), we draw a distinction between an individual's willingness to engage in legal and non-violent political action (activism) and an individual's willingness to engage in illegal and violent political action (radicalism)[15] (Moskalenko, McCauley, 2009). In this sense, we discuss terrorist radicalization, which differs from other forms of radicalization (including those with a positive meaning).

Secondly, radicalization must be aimed at pursuing the goals of a terrorist organization, including terrorist-related behaviors (recruitment for terrorism purposes, terrorist training, and the like). Thus, the process of radicalization does not only refer to the adoption of views and beliefs that justify violence, but also to a process which imposes and shapes such views (Borum, 2012a: 2). It is always an interactive process (even with the minimum degree of interaction) between individual and external influences, including those inciting terrorism and those seeking to recruit others for terrorism. The terms "self-directed" or "self-initiated" radicalization are often used when there is a minimal degree of interaction with people actively seeking to radicalize them (OSCE, 2014: 38). Therefore, Vergani et al. (2018) point out the need to focus more on the interaction between push, pull, and personal factors, both cognitive and behavioral radicalization and specific conditions that develop the occurrence of different types of these factors in certain contexts (Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar, & Barton, 2018).

Thirdly, in accordance with the multifactorial approach in explaining crime, including terrorism, other factors (external and internal) leading to behavior, referring to as terrorism, should be considered. To accept radicalization as the only cause of terrorism, which is sometimes referred to as "mainstream" radicalization, is not only wrong but overstates the explanatory potential of this phenomenon while leaving other causes underemphasized (Schuurman and Taylor, 2018: 13). Additionally, the process of radicalization itself is multifold; it is triggered and sustained by more than one cause (Borum, 2012c: 57). Radicalization involves both internal and external factors, and the causes of radicalization can be equally socio-economic, ideological, personal or psychological[16], as well as a number of other components, including, for example, socialization with the group (Hendrickson, 2014: 2). These triggers are complex, multifold, interconnected, and closely linked with structural elements of the environment, which may favor radicalization and eventual violent extremism (UNDP, 2016). Therefore, radicalization should be understood as a complex phenomenon including individual, group, and societal level dynamics (Ozer, Bertelsen, 2018: 654), depending on the circumstances surrounding each individual case.

3 RADICALIZATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Radicalization in BiH began in the early 1990s, with the outbreak of the 1992 conflict, and has continued through at least three stages (see more: ?ikman, 2018: 121). The first was marked by the arrival of foreign terrorist fighters from Afghanistan and other countries (Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and so on) who, driven by the idea of global jihad, fought in the 1992-1995 war in BiH[17] while actively spreading the radical fundamentalist ideology known as the global jihadist movement[18]. These were the first instances of radicalization through this ideology in Europe (Kohlmann, 2004), which, among other things, manifested the aggressive imposition of their views and behavior publicly, as well as intolerance towards the members belonging to the same religion (Lebl, 2014: 4, 13). The second stage (1995-2012) included the establishment and development of radicalization among the local population, the formation of the first Salafi communities in isolated and remote villages in which BiH citizens gradually began to arrive[19]. Finally, the third stage (2012 to date) is characterized by BiH citizens who leave for Syria and Iraq to join the ISIL and participate in terrorist activities (?ikman, 2018: 121-125).

Each of these stages is characterized by a pronounced process of radicalization, based on the concept described in the previous chapter. In terms of the manifestation of radical views (behavioral component) and the commission of specific terrorist acts, radicalization was first manifested at the attitudinal level (cognitive component) and then at the behavioral level. Each of these cases was caused by a different set of circumstances and the offenders’ personal characteristics in specific cases.

The following section gives a brief overview of the offenders of terrorism offenses, with reference to the degree of their radicalization (cf. ?ikman, 2018; ?ikman, 2016). Due to the limited space, other characteristics such as the age of the offender, family and personal circumstances, or social status will not be addressed. Certainly, in order to gain a deeper insight into the problem of radicalization, it would be necessary to consider the mentioned factors as well, consequently the research results may be regarded as partial.

3.1 The offenders of terrorism offenses in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Although foreign fighters – mujahideen were involved in numerous incidents following the Bosnian war, the first terrorist attack was carried out in Mostar in 1997, when a car bomb was activated in the city district[20]. Three foreign nationals, who came to BiH led by the global jihad ideology and were directly linked to al-Qaeda, were charged for this terrorist attack (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen). Although charged with terrorism, they were convicted of the offence of endangering the public on the basis of the reduced charge (Lucic, 2001: 133), which does not detract from the fact that they acted as radicalized individuals in order to achieve the global goals of the global jihadist movement. This is further supported by the fact that the first defendant managed to escape from BiH[21]. However, he was arrested in 2001 and extradited to the United States and was detained at the military base in Guantánamo Bay. The second defendant stated that he, being a member of al-Qaeda, completed military training in Afghanistan and in 1992 arrived in BiH as a fighter in the El Mujahid Detachment, subsequently promoted to company commander (Glavonjic, 2009). The third defendant was wanted by the Italian judiciary for the offense of terrorism, but the domestic courts rejected to extradite him and he was subsequently released (Lucic, 2001: 132).

One of the terrorism proceedings was conducted in 2001 at the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), in the case of "Algerian Group" made up of six Algerian nationals[22]. Acting as an organized terrorist group and in coordination with an al-Qa'ida terrorist network officer, they were accused of jointly attempting to carry out a terrorist attack against the facilities and staff of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo (Hecimovic, 2001). Since the FBiH Supreme Court did not have sufficient evidence to conduct criminal proceedings against them, they were handed over to the US Government which transferred him to Guantánamo Bay in January 2002, where they were held as enemy combatants[23]. Upon being released from prison, they were returned to BiH (?ikman, 2018).

The next incident occurred in 2002, in the village of Kostajnica near Konjic, when a member of the Salafi community, motivated by ideological and religious fanaticism, committed a triple homicide and attempted the fourth. Although he was charged with the offense of aggravated murder, rather than the offense of terrorism, the more serious charge was applied because the offense was committed out of ideological and religious reasons[24]. As a result, the defendant was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment by the Mostar County Court.

Subsequently, in 2005, two defendants arrived in Sarajevo from Sweden and Denmark, with the intention of carrying out a terrorist act in BiH or other European country to force the BiH authorities or another country’s government to withdraw their forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Thereafter, they contacted the third defendant who had procured explosive substances (about 20 kilograms) they used to prepare the so-called "suicide belt" (ready to be activated). They videotaped all this and recorded an audio message announcing the attacks[25]. This suicide terrorist attack was prevented and in 2007, the defendants were convicted of the offense of terrorism before the Court of BiH (see more: ?ikman, 2016: 169). As noted in the court judgment, the defendants were also in contact with radicalized individuals against whom the criminal proceedings for terrorism were pending in their home countries. The defendants maintained contact with those individuals via the Internet from BiH, and their intent to commit a terrorist act was clear (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina [Court of BiH], 2007: 49). Their loyalty to radicalism is evidenced by the fact that the first defendant, after serving his prison sentence, had attempted to join the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, while the third defendant succeeded and became a member of the Al-Nusra terrorist organization[26].

Then in 2009, three individuals were accused of plotting terrorist attacks in BiH. As members of the Salafi community, they formed a terrorist group and underwent training in handling and using firearms and explosives; they possessed and prepared components for the production of explosive devices; they owned videos tapes showing the magnitude of terrorist attacks around the world and undertook other actions aimed at committing a terrorist act in BiH from 2007 to 2009. It should be emphasized that while carrying out these activities they acted from the standpoint of ethnic and religious extremism and radicalism, advocating that a sharia state should be established in BiH[27]. In 2011, the same persons were convicted of the criminal offense of terrorism at the Court of BiH (Sud BiH, 2011). Additionally, they recruited other persons to 'fight against the dissenters', propagating that 'unbelievers should be killed', while at the meetings, they explained what jihad meant and what their goals were. During searches, the defendants were found in possession of video recordings of combat operations at different locations, files containing propaganda material promoting and justifying the mujahedeen's fighting, and promotional video recordings of al-Qaeda's actions (Sud BiH, 2011: 23).

In 2010, a terrorist attack was carried out near the Bugujno police station. The defendants planted and activated an improvised explosive device close to the Bugojno Police Station building in the early morning hours, which killed a police officer, injured several officers, and inflicted damage to the facilities. The mentioned case is closely related to a planned terrorist attacks, since the defendant participated in the meetings discussing Sharia and Jihad and the establishment of a sharia state in BiH[28] (Sud BiH, 2013: 103). It should be emphasized that in this case the Court found particularly aggravating circumstances on the part of the defendant, which can be regarded as the consequences of his radicalization. Thus, he demonstrated his long-time determination to commit such a serious crime, with the aim of causing graver consequences (by choosing to carry out the attack when a larger number of police officers were present at the mentioned police station). Furthermore, as an aggravating circumstance, the Court found the defendant's behavior after the offense had been committed (e.g., a threat that the next time there would 9 tons of explosives rather than 15 kilos) and his behavior toward the injured parties, on the basis of which the Court additionally concluded that the defendant was unscrupulous and cruel, who showed no remorse for this tragic act during the course of a three-year trial and failed to offer his condolences to the injured parties for the grave and tragic consequences of his act (Sud BiH, 2013: 126, 127).

In 2011, a terrorist attack was carried out in front of the U.S. Embassy building in Sarajevo by a defendant who was moving in the immediate vicinity of the embassy building and firing at the building with an automatic rifle, subsequently injuring a police officer and inflicting material damage to the embassy building (see more: ?ikman, 2016: 169). The aim of this terrorist attack was to extort a concession by demanding that NATO forces leave Afghanistan. The defendants were members of the Salafi community in BiH and it was this terrorist act that expressed their dissatisfaction and an attempt to forcibly achieve their goals. They continued to express their views during the course of the trial (e.g., contempt of court[29] or commitment to the idea[30]), which remained particularly striking during the closing argument of the first defendant[31]. The second defendant was acquitted; he subsequently joined the Islamic State in Iraq and died during the 2014 suicide bombing. Regarding the third defendant, he was also acquitted of the charges and joined the terrorist group in Syria (?ikman, 2018).

In 2015, the criminal proceedings were conducted against the defendant charged with the offense of incitement to terrorism. In this case, as stated in the judgment, the defendant was a member of the so-called Salafi community in BiH, which was organized outside the official institutions of the Islamic Community of BiH. During 2013 and 2014, as a religious authority in the so-called Salafi community, he premeditatedly carried out these actions in several BiH cities (Velika Kladu?a, Cazin, Bu?im, Gornja Mao?a in order to propagate and spread Islamic radicalism (Sud BiH, 2015: 2)[32]. Following such a public incitement, the Court found that a large number of the members of the so-called Salafi community in BiH – BiH citizens – left BiH and joined the Islamic State terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. While participating in the terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq, they carried out actions with elements of terrorism offenses; a number of them died, while others continued to participate in the activities of the terrorist organization they have joined (Sud BiH, 2015: 4).

In 2015, two terrorist acts were committed: a terrorist attack against the Zvornik Police Station during which one police officer was killed, and a terrorist attack on the members of the BiH Armed Forces in Sarajevo during which two members were killed. In both cases, the offenders of these terrorist acts died (in the first case, the offender was fatally shot during a confrontation with police, while in the second case, the offender committed a suicide). Both offenders were members of, or closely related to, the Salafi communities (?ikman, 2016: 170; ?ikman, 2018: 124).

From mid-June 2017 to 10 April 2018, two defendants planned and prepared the procurement of weapons (M84 machine gun, hand grenades, ammunition and shells) to carry out terrorist attacks in BiH (against the building of the BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency in Sarajevo and the building of the Ministry of the Interior of the Tuzla Canton). To this end, the first defendant had repeatedly come into contact with the members of the radical Salafi movement in BiH, including the second defendant. After obtaining the weapons to carry out the planned terrorist act, he recorded a video Jihad death note and demanded that it be released in the media after the commission of the act (Sud BiH, 2019).

Additionally, through the process of radicalization, a number of BiH citizens have gone to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other terrorist groups since 2012. All of them have been indoctrinated with Salafi ideas, either by radical self-proclaimed leaders or via the Internet; they advocated the ideas of religious radicalism in para-jamaats and as such went to Syria and Iraq (Shikman, 2018). Some of them took their wives and children to Iraq and Syria, some died in combat, while a number of them returned to BiH. A number of them were charged with terrorism-related offenses (the offenses of organizing a terrorist group and joining foreign paramilitary and parapolice forces) and tried in BiH (see more: ?ikman, 2018). However, this did not diminish the degree of their radicalization, because not only did they disobey government authorities, including the court adjudicating the case, but some of them continued to express radical views, either by radicalizing other prisoners or even by attempting to return to Syria and Iraq (?ikman, 2018: 132).

The common thread in all cases of terrorism in BiH is the adherence to the rigid ideology of the global jihadist movement. This thesis is confirmed by the data that the individuals who were active members of the so-called Selafi communities in BiH were involved in all terrorist attacks carried out in BiH, expressing views typical of such an ideology (cf. Be?irevi?, 2016: 18).

4 CONCLUSION

Although the concept of radicalization is not theoretically grounded, it may serve to understand the process leading to terrorism. There is a concensus that radicalization as such has two basic dimensions. The first is expressed at the attitudinal level and the second at the level of behavior. Clearly, the cognitive dimension of radicalization encompasses a wider range of individuals and many of them will probably never be involved in a terrorist act. However, caution should be exercised since terrorism today also encompasses public views inciting others to engage in terrorist activities. On the other hand, the behavioral dimension of radicalization means a specific behavior caused by extremist views. It usually involves the manifestation of violent actions to achieve the set goals as a result of the extremist ideas adopted. However, as Marco Nilsson (2018) points out, the causal path may also run the other way, with radical behavior leading to increasingly radical beliefs: ''this exemplifies the complexity of jihadiship as a process whereby ideas merge and problems seeking solutions arise in encounters with new circumstances'' (Nilsson, 2018: 8). This concept also includes the influence of other factors (individual and external) that lead to terrorism in their interaction. If we view radicalization in this way, we can explain some of the behaviors concerning radicalization and terrorism, which have manifested themselves in BiH over the past 30 years.

In this respect, it is evident that the process of radicalization in BiH began to manifest itself in the early 1990s with the arrival of foreign nationals to participate in the global jihadist movement. These individuals internalized both the cognitive and behavioral dimensions of radicalization as they actively participated in spreading extremist beliefs, on the one hand, and in using violence as a method of achieving goals, on the other. The rigidity of this ideology is supported by the fact that violence was not only aimed at enemies, but also at fellow-nationals who refused to accept the proclaimed views. Radicalization gradually spread and was accepted by a small portion of the local population, who gradually adopted the established patterns of belief and behavior. This led to the formation of separate communities, organized according to strictly defined lifestyles and activities (the so-called Salafi communities). These communes were the nucleus of terrorist activity in BiH. This is confirmed by the fact that all terrorist attacks carried out in BiH were perpetrated by members of these communities. Therefore, many international authorities, local authorities in BiH, as well as court judgments pointed to the danger of these radicalized communities. Moreover, not only has the problem not been resolved, but it has escalated since 2012, resulting in a large number of BiH citizens traveling to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State terrorist organization.

Thus, the above-mentioned concept of radicalization in BiH is at its peak– the gradual and long-time process of adopting extremist views and beliefs (cognitive radicalization) and the manifestation of specific behaviors, including those which are violent in nature (behavioral radicalization). Additionally, it manifested itself through reverse radicalization in such a way that radical behavior led to the adoption of radical beliefs. The best examples of this are the isolated Salafi communities, which, through the process of "socialization" of new members, created and strengthened their beliefs in the correctness of their activities. Some of them went a step further and carried out terrorist attacks or joined the Islamic State, thus contributing to the achievement of the set goals.

5 REFERENCES

1.      Azinovi?, V. (2007). Al Kai’da u Bosni i Hercegovini: mit ili stvarnost. Sarajevo: Radio Slobodna Europa.

2.      Be?irevi?, E. (2016). Salafism vs. Moderate Islam: a Rhetorical Fight for the Hearts and Minds of Bosnian Muslims. Sarajevo: Atlanska inicijativa. Retrieved January 28, 2018, from https://www.atlantskainicijativa.org/bos/images/2015/dokumenti_i_publikacije/Salafism_vs._moderate_islam-web.pdf

3.      Bjelopera, J. (2013). American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Congressional Research Service. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf

4.      Borum, R. (2012a). Rethinking Radicalization. Journal of Strategic Security 4(4), 1-6.

5.      Borum, R. (2012b). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Strategic Security 4(4), 7-36. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1

6.      Borum, R. (2012c). Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research." Journal of Strategic Security 4(4), 37-62. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2

7.      Burke, J. (October 27, 2009). Think Again: Al Qaeda. Foreign Policy, Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/think-again-al-qaeda-4/

8.      Bunker, D., Dilegge, R. (2016). Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: Al Qaeda And Islamic State Networks Focus: A Small Wars Journal Anthology. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://books.google.ba/books?id=3HCdCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT652&dq=Al-Qaeda:+The+True+Story+of+Radical+Islam&hl=sr-Latn&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjrp7P--9DnAhWOMewKHf7jBdAQ6AEISzAE#v=onepage&q=Al-Qaeda%3A%20The%20True%20Story%20of%20Radical%20Islam&f=false

9.      Byman, D. (2015). Al Qaeda, the Islamic state, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What everyone needs to know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

10.  Centar za istra?iva?ko novinarstvo (Novembar 19, 2019). Terorista. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5JZBVuu_kug

11.  Clarke, C. (December 11, 2018). The Future of the Global Jihadist Movement After the Collapse of the Caliphate. The RAND Blog. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/12/the-future-of-the-global-jihadist-movement-after-the.html

12.  Council of Europe. (2016). Council Of Europe Handbook For Prison And Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation And Violent Extremism. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://rm.coe.int/16806f9aa9

13.  ?ori?, M. (2012). Teorijsko odre?enje ekstremizma, Kultura polisa, 9(17), 45-62.

14.  European Commission. (2018). High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R). Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180613_final-report-radicalisation.pdf

15.  European Commission. (n.d.). Prevention of radicalization. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/radicalisation_en

16.  European Parliament. (2015). Report on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations, (2015/2063(INI)). Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2015-0316_EN.html

17.  Federalna televizija. (Novembar 1, 2019). Krvni delikti, 01.10.2019. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.federalna.ba/bhs/vijest/289514/01102019

18.  Federlana uprava policije. (n.d.). Ahmed Zuhair – Zbog terorizma. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.fup.gov.ba/?p=843

19.  Glavonji?, Z. (Januar 14, 2009). Ali Hamad potencijalni svedok srpskog tu?ila?tva, Radio Slobodna Evropa. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1370074.html

20.  Hardy, K. (2018). Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism Policy. Journal for Deradicalization, 15, 76-110. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/150/119

21.  He?imovi?, E. (Decembar 21, 2001). Al Ka'ida u humanitarnoj pomo?i, Dani br. 237. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.bhdani.ba/portal/arhiva-67-281/237/t23702.shtml

22.  Hegghammer, T. (2011). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalization of Jihad, International Security, 35 (3), 53–91.

23.  Hendrickson, J. (2014). Counter-Radicalization: Combating Terrorism at The Core A Study Of The Motivations And Inspirational Leaders Behind Radicalization To Violent Extremism And The Programs Designed To Combat Them. Master Thesis, Johns Hopkins University. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38096/HENDRICKSON-THESIS-2014.pdf

24.  Institute for Economics & Peace. (2019). Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GTI-2019web.pdf

25.  Jenkins, B. (2010). Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.

26.  Kohlmann, E. (2004). Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network. New York: Berg Publishers

27.  Kundnani, A. (2012). Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept’, Race and Class, 54 (2), 3–25.

28.  Lali?, V., ?ikman, M. (2018). Teorijski i prakti?ni aspekti koncepta radikalizacije koja vodi terorizmu. In: ?erani?, P. (Ed), Regionalna saradnja u suzbijanju prekograni?nog kriminala: savremeni izazovi terorizma i migrantska kriza (pp. 47-66). Banja Luka: Fakultet bezbjednosnih nauka Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci.

29.  Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford University Press.

30.  Lebl, L. (2014). Islamism and Security In Bosnia-Herzegovina. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2014/ssi_lebl_140523.pdf

31.  Lu?i?, I. (2001). Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism. National Security and the Future, 2 (3-4), 111-142

32.  Marret, J. L., Feddes, A., Mann, L. Doosje B., Griffioen-Young, H. (2013). An overview of the SAFIRE Project: A Scientific Approach To Finding Indicators Of And Responses To Radicalisation. Journal EXIT - Deutschland: Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur, 1 (2), 123-148.

33.  Media Gerila (Febrary 18, 2013). ZAVR?NE RIJE?I_JA?AREVI? I OSTALI_ obra?anje optu?enog Ja?arevica.flv. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vMENz-0zeU&t=279s

34.  Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Kaderbhai, N. (2017). Research Perspectives On Online Radicalisation A Literature Review, 2006–2016. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICSR-Paper_Research-Perspectives-on-Online-Radicalisation-A-Literature-Review-2006-2016.pdf

35.  Ministarstvo bezbjednosti BiH. (2017). Informacija o stanju sigurnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini u 2016. godini. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from https://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/info2017.pdf

36.  Moskalenko, S., McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21 (2), 239-260, DOI: 10.1080/09546550902765508

37.  Neumann, P. (2013). The trouble with radicalization.International Affairs,89 (4), 873–893

38.  Nilsson, M. (2018). Jihadiship: From Radical Behavior to Radical Beliefs, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1538092 Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1538092

39.  Nimac, D., ?urkovi?-Nimac, J. (2014). Religija kao socijalni kapital u kontekstu sigurnosne politike suvremenoga europskog dru?tva, Bogoslovska smotra, 84 (1), 111 –136.

40.  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2014). Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true

41.  Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/radicalization

42.  Ozer, S. & Bertelsen, P. (2018). Capturing violent radicalization: Developing and validating scales measuring central aspects of radicalization. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 59, 653– 660. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12484

43.  Price, E., Schmid, A. (2010). Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-radicalization from Terrorism: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles published since 1970. Perspectives on Terrorism, 4 (2), 58-76

44.  Schmid, A. (2015). Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues. Retrieved January 25, 2018, from https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighter-Estimates-Conceptual-and-Data-Issues-October20152.pdf

1. Schuurman, B., Taylor, M. (2018). Reconsidering Radicalization: Fanaticism and the Link Between Ideas and Violence, Perspectives on Terrorism, 12 (1), 3-22.

46.  Silva, Derek M.D. (2018). "Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept’’ revisited. Race & Class, 59 (4), 34-53

47.  Simeunovi?, D. (2009). Terorizam. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.

48.  SINCE 9/11 (n.d.). Terrorism Timeline. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://since911.com/explore-911/terrorism-timeline#jump_time_item_411

49.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2019). Presuda S1 2 K 025597 18 K od 4.7.2019. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/3877/show

50.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2015). Presuda S1 2 K 017968 15 K od 05.11.2015. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/3379/show

51.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2013). Presuda S1 2 K 002596 11 K (veza X-K-10/995) od 20.12.2013. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/2744/show

52.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2012). Presuda S1 2 K 007723 12 Kod 06.12.2012. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/3158/show

53.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2011). Presuda S1 2 K 003342 10 K (veza broj:X-K-09/670-1) od 10.11.2011. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/2644/show

54.  Sud Bosne i Hercegovine. (2007). Presuda X-K-06/190 od 10.01.2007. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/predmet/2431/show

1. ?ikman, M. (2018). Return of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters – Criminal Persecution and Deradicalization. In: ?aleta, D., Robinson, C. (Eds.). Violent Extremism and Radicalization Processes as Driving Factors to Terrorism Threats (pp. 109-136). Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense of Slovenia, Joint Special Operations University from Tampa, USA and Institute for Corporative Security Studies.
2. ?ikman, M. (2016). Foreign Terrorist Fighters – Different Points of View. In: ?aleta, D., Shemella, P. (Eds.). Comprehensive Approach to Counter Radicalism and Extremism – Future Challenges for Counter Terrorism Process (pp. 161-176). Ljubljana: Institute for Corporative Studies. 

57.  United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime. (2018). Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for South and South-East Asia. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Ebook.pdf

58.  United Nations, General Assembly. (2016a). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, A/HRC/31/65. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://undocs.org/A/HRC/31/65

59.  United Nations, General Assembly. (2016b). Report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. A/HRC/33/29. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/162/55/PDF/G1616255.pdf?OpenElement

60.  United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. United Nations Development Programme A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper---preventing-violent-extremism-through-inclusiv.html

61.  United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Framing The Development Solutions To Radicalization In Africa. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Radicalization%20in%20Africa%20-%20summary%20consultation%20report%20-%20Draft%20Final%20Oct.pdf

62.  Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., Ilbahar, E., Barton, G. (2018). The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686 Retrieved February 21, 2020, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686?scroll=top&needAccess=true

63.  Vujaklija, M. (2002). Leksikon stranih re?i i izraza. Beograd: Prosveta

[1] According to the European Parliament Report (2015), terrorism and religious radicalization are often perceived through the prism of stereotypes, resulting in hate crimes and hate speech driven by racism, xenophobia or intolerance toward different opinions, beliefs or religions. In this respect, it is important to emphasize: ‘’that it is the perverse misuse of religion, and not religion per se, that is one of the causes of radicalisation’’ and ‘’radicalisation is not to be associated with any one ideology or faith but may occur within any of them’’ (European Parliament, 2015).

[2] Because, according to Simeunovi? (2009), terrorism, like any other political violence: ''Can be related to ideology in at least three ways: first, in the sense of the system of value orientations that encourages terrorist activity; secondly, ideology can act as a guide when choosing goals, methods, and types of terrorist activity, and thirdly, ideology justifies what has been done - the interpretive function of ideology '' (Simenunovi?, 2009: 123).

[3] Daniel Byman has written a book on the global jihadist movement entitled Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know, which was published in 2015 by Oxford University Press (Byman, 2015).

[4] According to Jason Burke (2009): '' In 1987, when Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue for modern Sunni Muslim radical activists, called for al-qaeda al-sulbah (a vanguard of the strong). He envisaged men who, acting independently, would set an example for the rest of the Islamic world and thus galvanize the umma (global community of believers) against its oppressors’’ (Burke, 2009). This is actually the essence of the global jihadist movement ideology and the main reason why it has existed for over 30 years

[5] Foreign terrorist fighters are known to have been in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Thereafter, they participated in conflicts in BiH (1992-1995), Somalia (1993 - 2014), Chechnya (1994 - 2009), Afghanistan (2001-2014), and Iraq (2003-2012) (Schmid, 2015: 3). At the same time, al-Qa'ida members carried out individual terrorist attacks, such as a suicide attack against the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (more than 200 casualties), the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 (2977 casualties), the 2002 Bali terrorist attack (202 casualties), the 2004 Madrid terrorist attack (192 casualties), the 2005 London terrorist attack (52 casualties), the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks (130 casualties), the Nice terrorist attack (86 victims), and so on (see more: SINCE 9/11, n.d.).

[6] According to the United Nations reports, Islamic State, as part of its overarching aim to build a global Islamic caliphate, ISIL has announced the establishment of a number of provinces outside of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic (in the Middle East: Libya, Yemen, Egypt—Sinai and Saudi Arabia and beyond: North Caucasus, Algeria, Nigeria and on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border), while more than 50 terrorist groups around the world have pledged allegiance to ISIL (United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime [UNODC], 2018: 5).

[7] Additionally, the Islamis State has demonstrated capabilities that al-Qaeda never possessed: forming state governments in large areas inhabited by millions of people (Bunker, Dilegge, 2016).

[8] The total number of jihadists is currently estimated at 230,000 militants spread across approximately 70 countries, with the lion’s share currently located in Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Clarke, 2018). The number of them in Europe is not negligible; for example, according to estimates by the European Commission, in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany alone, there are more than 51,000 radicalized individuals who pose a potential security threat (European Commission, 2018: 1).

[9] The best review of the selected literature on radicalization and deradicalization in the context of terrorism was provided by Eric Price and Alex P. Schmid in the journal of Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 4, No. 2 (May 2010) (see: Price, Schmid, 2010), while in their paper entitled ‘’The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization into Violent Extremism’’, Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar and Greg Barton, presented the findings of the first systematic scoping review of scientific literature on radicalization into violent extremism, obtained between 2001 and 2015 (Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar, Barton, 2018).

[10] Scholars such as Peter Neumann (2013) emphisize that: ''The principal conceptual fault-line is between notions of radicalization that emphasize extremist beliefs ('cognitive radicalization') and those that focus on extremist behavior ('behavioural radicalization')'' (Neumann, 2013: 873).

[11] Lexicon of Foreign Words and Phrases.

[12] Thus, in addition to religious fundamentalism, violent-terrorist connotations are emphasized to create a social opinion that religious communities play a major role in these acts and should be viewed and condemned as such. That is why we accept some scolarly opinions that the terms ''religious'' and ''fanaticism'' can in no way be placed under the same umbrella (Nimac, ?urkovi?-Nimac, 2014: 126).

[13] Many academic definitions of the term radicalization can be found in the literature. One definition was proposed by Randy Borum in his paper entitled 'Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories', including certain criminological theories that may be helpful in studying this research problem (Borum, 2012b).

[14] For example, see Report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism (2016b) Chapter III: ‘’Domestic law and policy developments in the area of preventing and countering violent extremism’’ (UN, 2016b: 7-10).

[15] Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley (2009) published a paper entitled Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism, which addressed willingness to participate in legal and non-violent political actions in relation to willingness to participate in illegal or violent political actions. They reached a conclusion that a smaller number of radical activists have intentions and willingness to pursue their goals by violent means (Moskalenko, McCauley, 2009: 257).

[16] According to Keiran Hardy (2018), the predominant causes of radicalization, though not pure types (e.g., overlapping political and idiological causes) can be divided into ideological (e.g., demonizing enemies, promising heroic merit), psychological (the lack of self-esteem or sense of identity), social (group dynamics), political, economic and technological (spreading terrorist propaganda via the Internet) (Hardy, 2018: 82-90).

[17] During 1992, they acted independently, while from mid-1993 as the squad “El Mujahid” as part of the 3rd Corps of the BiH Army, headquartered in Zenica (cf. Lu?i?, 2001: 127; ?ikman, 2018: 122).

[18] This was done within a training which also included the religious education of local people who joined them. Additionally, as Edina Becirevic states ’’the Salafi ideology that arrived in Bosnia during the war was more rigid than the version that spread in Western European countries, and even more rigid than the version preached in Saudi Arabia, the home of Salafism’’ (Be?irevi?, 2016: 36 as cited in ?ikman, 2018: 123).

[19] The BiH government authorities identified their activities as a method of spreading radical religious idology and recruiting new supporters, therefore characterizing them as the epicenter of extremism and radicalism (Ministarstvo bezbjednosti Bosne i Hercegovine [MB BiH], 2017: 30).

[20] In this terrorist attack, 50 people were injured and substantial material damage was caused (a large number of parked vehicles were damaged, including the surrounding housing units).

[21] On August 7, in 2007, upon the order of the Municipal Court in ?ep?e, an international arrest warrant was issued for the commission of terrorism offense, Article 146, Paragraph 1 of the former FBiH Criminal Code (see: Federalna uprava policije, n.d.)

[22] These persons arrived in BiH in the period between 1992 and 1997 and they had BiH citizenship. One of them was a member of the El Mujahid Detachment, while the rest of them came to BiH after finishing their job, as "Islamic missionaries". (He?imovi?, 2001).

[23] The importance of this anti-terrorist action is demonstrated by the fact that the US President, in his speech to sessions of Congress, praised the cooperation of the BiH authorities in the fight against terrorism and invited other countries to follow this example (Azinovic, 2004: 91).

[24] In the documentary "Blood Delicts" shown on Federal Television, the defendant stated the following: "They ruined our Bajram, I know how I felt at the time, so I decided to ruined their Christmas Eve", on the basis of which it was concluded that this crime was motivated by national and religious hatred, which adds substantial weight to this crime (Federalna televizija, 2019).

[25] According to the judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the audio recording contained the following message: '' Allahu Ekber. This is where the brothers are preparing for the attacks. They show us things they are going to use to attack. These brothers are ready to attack and, inshallah, they will attack Al-Qufar who kill our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Afghanistan, Shishan, and other countries. These weapons will be used against Europe, against those whose forces are in Iraq and Afghanistan. These two brothers have sold their lives to please Allah, to help their brothers and sisters. They are Muslims. Their hours are approaching. They're ready to attack, so don't think we forgot you. We are here and we plan and have everything ready. This is the message for you'' (Sud BiH, 2007: 3).

[26] He was one of the first BiH citizens to go to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist organizations. According to the documentary "Terrorist" produced by the Center for Investigative Reporting, he died fighting for this terrorist organization, while according to the Prosecutor's Office of BiH, he was a commander of "Jaysh Muhammad Qa'atiba" military unit made up of Bosniaks from the Balkans (Centar za istra?iva?ko novinarstvo, 2019).

[27] The witness in the criminal proceedings against the defendants explained that the purpose of these actions would be "to unite jamaats, to make everything as Allah commands" and "the Mujahideen to fight in the way of Allah", the aim was "to establish the law of Allah in BiH, that is, the fight to the death until the Sharia State is established ”(Sud BiH, 2011: 60).

[28] This is supported by the statements of witnesses (who practiced faith in the same way as the defendant): ''That he no longer has to wait, his time is passing and that he is old, that if he waits any longer, he will not be able to do anything for Islam, that something will happen in Bugojno, a punishment from Allah, that this people is pagan and he had repeated that he was going to blow up the police station”(Sud BiH, 2013: 82).

[29] At the beginning of the trial, the defendants refused to stand up, which is a statutory obligation, and they wore caps on their heads, which the Court could associate with clothing details marking religious affiliation. The defendants stated that they honored only the court of Allah and did not wish to participate in the rituals acknowledging the earthly court of law, confirming that they did not intend to stand up and show respect to the court they did not acknowledge (Sud BiH, 2012: 24).

[30] In the course of the criminal proceedings, the first defendant demonstrated commitment to the idea, stating the following: ''a Muslim fights in the way of Allah, and a non-believer in the way of Shaitan. I am Allah’s protégé, you are Shaitan’s protégés because you are not Muslims'' (Sud BiH, 2012: 27).

[31] In his closing argument at the trial, the first defendant spoke in a calm voice, in terms of firm beliefs, rather than threat: ''Do you really think that you will, if you sentence me to a milder or harsher sentence, this will stop no one. He is prepared to die, he leaves his family, he leaves everything ... do not put everything on my shoulders to stop it, it won't help anyone'' (Media Gerila, 2013: 2.36-2.53).

[32] Specifically, the defendant gave speeches at the gatherings attended by the members of the Salafi community, which were posted on YouTube, and sent public messages aimed at inciting the members of the so-called Salafi communities to join the ISIL organized terrorist group and, as the members of that group, participate in its activities by sending them public messages quoted in the court judgment (Sud BiH, 2015: 3).