Radicalisation & Deradicalisation

Radicalisation

While radicalism poses a threat, extremism, particularly terrorism, is the main concern as it involves active subversion of democratic values & the rule of law. Radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism is context specific. It thrives in an environment characterised by a shared sense of injustice, exclusion & real or perceived humiliation.

Radicalisation is usually a gradual, phased process. The incubation period underlying radicalisation often lasts months & usually years, although there are exceptions to this rule. One of the first models depicting the process of radicalisation was developed by Randy Borum in 2003. It lists 4 steps of radicalisation to terrorism:

1. Recognition by the pre-radicalised individual or group that an event or condition is wrong. - (It is not right)
2. This is followed with a framing of the event or condition as selectively unjust. - (It is not fair)
3. The 3rd step occurs when others are held responsible for the perceived injustice. - (It is your fault)
4. The final step involves the demonization of the other. - (You are evil)

Wiktorowicz (2004) suggested that negative personal events such as social alienation induces a “cognitive opening,” a receptiveness to new & potentially violent ideologies. This is the moment in time when an individual who has been trying to make sense of his or her existence suddenly sees the light, exchanging an old view of the world for one considered more true. Studying a broad range of British Muslim extremists, Wiktorowicz found that it was not the most knowledgeable in Islamic theology that were vulnerable to radicalisation but those who had only a superficial religious background.

People can be radicalised by family members or friends, through direct contact with extremist groups or through the internet. Radicalisation usually happens when 2 conditions are present:

1. There has to be a person or group that holds a specific point of view & wants to recruit people to support them or take action on their behalf. 
2. The individuals being targeted will more often than not share common characteristics or circumstances. There have been many studies around this, but one of the more consistent factors is that the individual has some form of vulnerability, such as a mental illness or unmet psychological needs for belonging or status, that can be exploited & used by those trying to radicalise them.

One perennial question is what motivates individuals to become involved in violent extremism. According to (Kruglanski et al., 2009 2013 & 2014), one motivational impetus underlying radicalization is the “quest for significance,” namely, the universal need to be someone & to be respected by others that matter. This significance quest usually becomes an important goal when significance is lost such as when people experience personal failure, rejection, & humiliation.

Socio-political inequality as a driver of radicalisation is more relevant than economic inequality. The perceived (subjective) or the real (objective) unjust distribution of valued outcomes, resources, power & opportunities is often cited as one of the main structural drivers impacting the path to radicalisation of certain individuals. Research has found that people who perceive themselves as unequal are more likely to become radicalised than people who live in the same conditions, but who do not consider themselves as unequal. Subjective inequality may thus be more relevant as a driver of radicalisation than objective inequality.

Social alienation or the feeling of detachment from social & cultural participation is another form of significant loss that has been discussed as a cause of radicalization. The literature on social alienation suggests that it is a “sign of personal dissatisfaction with certain structural elements of society. . . related particularly to economic and political elements”. It is a psychological state that stems from feeling ostracized & not having genuine bonds with others, but it can also be actively sought by rejecting society’s values & excluding oneself from the community. As a result, socially alienated individuals feel disconnected from the values of society & other citizens are typically less interested in public affairs, & do not identify with political figures.

(Shmotkin & Litwin, 2009) suggests that social alienation is a devastating feeling that is strongly associated with loss of personal worth & purpose. The 3N model of radicalization proposes that when significance is lost, individuals become motivated to restore it. One way to restoring significance is by retaliating against the source of the threat or seeking out new groups that can provide camaraderie & purpose. Similarly, it has been proposed that individuals feeling consistently neglected & living on the fringe of society can be potential recruits for terrorism, especially if there is no outlet for their frustration. When individuals experience a loss of significance, they tend to gravitate towards a group sharing core beliefs to restore significance by redressing the presumed injustice, dealing with a common enemy & highlighting the grievance suffered by the group as a legitimation for their acts & beliefs. There is some evidence showing that people who fail in life are more disposed to embrace an ideology. Failure seems not only to shift an individual’s mindset away from an independent to an interdependent way of thinking, but it also fuels his efforts to engage in collective action. Some studies give further details about how self-identification with a group might trigger empowerment, sacrifice or encouragement to fight against the group’s enemies.

Anyone can be at risk. Age, social standing & education do not necessarily matter as much as previously assumed. All kinds of people become radicalised, from young men & women with learning difficulties to adults in well-respected professions. What is clear is that, the more vulnerable the person, the easier it is to influence their way of thinking.

Events which can trigger the radicalisation process are often related to identity issues (King & Taylor 2011, 611) & religious seeking (Wiktorowicz 2004b). In the search for identity & community amongst the Muslim diaspora youth in Europe (Cilluffo et al. 2007, 9), radical Islam might provide an answer in the form of a coherent belief system & an ummah identity (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 800; CI 2008, 37). Positive identification with Islam has been found to offer stability in a time of uncertainty (Slootman and Tillie 2006, 54) mentions how a Muslim identity crisis can lead to a shift to more radical interpretations of Islam. The following engagement with radical & extremist discourses on religious issues already gradually migrates into the digital domain (Ghaffar & Saltman 2014, 38).

The role of the Internet in violent radicalisation

Technology is an extension of almost everything we do which has provided those who want to radicalise & groom others an avenue for communication & a level of influence that was not present before. Extremist groups often target young people via the internet & social media to avoid detection. Encrypted communication greatly complicates law enforcement efforts. A smartphone & a social media platform are all that is required to start to propagate dangerous ideas & information with zero cost. It has provided the recruiter with unique advantages: they can contact a target any time of day or night & stream propaganda directly to them. Ideas can now be spread at the touch of a button & with very little technical knowledge.

Social Network Mechanisms

Social media platforms are full of groups of people looking for help & support. Those looking to exploit this vulnerability can easily join these groups & befriend someone. Offers of support, friendship & belonging are all used to gain influence & control. Despite the best efforts of social media providers & platforms, the sheer volume of web traffic means that questionable content can still be uploaded & distributed. 

Interaction with like-minded others & natural group dynamics amplify personal grievances & intensify social bonds, resulting in the formation of an echo chamber (Sageman 2008b). Extremist messages or membership of an extremist group can offer a sense of purpose, community and identity which may be appealing, especially if someone is experiencing challenges in their life. Teenagers can be at greater risk because they are more independent, exploring new things & pushing boundaries as they grow & discover more about their identity, faith & sense of belonging. Wiktorowicz (2004a, 12; 2005) highlighted the importance of social networks in “high risk activism” & movement’s recruitment efforts through preexisting kinship & friendship architectures. He also acknowledges the relevance of socialization in terms of gradual indoctrination & identity construction (Wiktorowicz 2004b, 1). As radical ideas flow through those networks, small clusters of individuals turn to processes of groupthink, which Silber & Bhatt (2007) incorporate in their last stage, ‘jihadization.’

The Internet has greatly influenced terrorist communication, recruitment & financing. Cyberspace has featured in every instance of homegrown terrorism in the West since 2002, leaving a “digital footprint” (King & Taylor 2011). Brachman (2006) claims that it has “enabled Al-Qaeda to radicalize new recruits by shaping their general worldview.”

The process may involve:

• being groomed online or in person
• exploitation, including sexual exploitation
• psychological manipulation
• exposure to violent material & other inappropriate information
• the risk of physical harm or death through extremist acts

However, it should be emphasised that becoming radicalised does not automatically mean that a person is engaging, or will engage, in violent or dangerous behaviour.

Nonetheless, all forms of radicalisation exhibit the following characteristics:

• Individuals who feel left behind in the progress of mankind & resent injustice are more prone to radicalisation. Kinship, friendship, group dynamics & socialisation all trigger an individual’s association with radicalisation.
• Individuals involved in terrorism come from a variety of social backgrounds. The use of violence involves a limited number of individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation.
• Profiling to identify possible terrorists is not productive, as no profiling measures fit all variables at work. It is possible to identify several positions which individuals may move towards or away from radicalisation or de-radicalisation.
• Preventive strategies require tailoring to specific terrorist activity drivers & specifics of the groups involved.
• The constant use of ideology helps consolidate violent ideas & attitudes which reduces potential moral inhibitors in order to generate a sub-culture of violence.
•  Propaganda is key as it offers doctrinal arguments that legitimise extremist positions. Radical/terrorist propaganda is generally framed around ideological, utilitarian, emotional & identity considerations.

At a macro level, governmental action may affect an extremist or already radicalised behaviour by supplying signifiers to a given radical group or individual, & thus foster radicalisation. If its policies match the narratives used by a given group, it can justify the latter’s narratives.

Impact of Covid-19

The short-term impact of COVID-19 on radicalisation & violent extremism are multifaceted & complex, resulting from the immediate impact of response to the pandemic - social distancing & restrictions of day to day activities. Such responses have been seized on by radical ideologues to validate their world views.

Deradicalisation

Deradicalisation programs focus on those who have not yet committed an act of terror. Such programs are not conceptually new, being hybrid versions of rehabilitation programs for returning jihadists initiated by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen after the Soviet–Afghan war. It has gained popularity & can be considered a fallout of military policies.

The resilience of terror groups coupled with instances of resurgences in more than one theatre & the failure of the military operations in ending these conflicts, has pushed governments to pursue alternative methodologies in fighting extremism, moving away from a military-led approach.

Over the last few years, opinions on government-promoted deradicalisation programs have been divided. These programs have yielded varying levels of success, which establishes them as formidable deterrents.

Deradicalising terrorists in custody requires not only identifying how they became radicalised, but also determining whether the process can be reversed & how government-led initiatives can help ensure that committed terrorists will avoid criminal activity after they are out of custody.

One of the main reasons that Muslims are often seen as potential extremists from the standpoint of the deradicalisation policies is due to the lack of understanding of the practice of Islam & an increased suspicion of Muslims to the point that their normal religious practices are enough to spark fear and distrust.

The period between contemplating an act of violence & actually committing it is considered the most opportune time for law enforcement, community, deradicalisation programs & other similar mechanisms to interfere by design.

Malaysia - deradicalisation success

Counterterrorism strategies can be made more effective by incorporating deradicalization measures. Deradicalization is a key element of Malaysia’s counterterrorism & violent extremism strategy. Malaysia’s initiatives are directed at addressing the problem of radicalism due to religious misconceptions, with the specific purpose of rehabilitating & subsequently reintegrating detainees into society.

Malaysia’s main deradicalization initiative is the Religious Rehabilitation Program, which is based on re-education (correcting political & religious misconceptions) & rehabilitation. Family members of detainees are engaged & supported financially while the militants are in detention. Subsequent to their release, militants are assisted in reintegrating into society.

Malaysia’s experience with deradicalization & rehabilitation programs has revealed some promising pathways & has exposed some persistent obstacles to making further progress in combating violent extremism in Muslim societies. 

• In order to fight against terrorism, various methods should be applied & tailored to specific backgrounds & understandings of Islam among the Muslim population.
• Interactions with militant detainee-participants in deradicalization & rehabilitation programs have demonstrated that the root causes of worldwide Muslim grievances have not been addressed. Military action taken by the US & Israel have been perceived by radical Muslims as a war against Islam & have stirred not just popular resentment but sparked vendettas.
• Work in the field of radical Islamism & religious terrorism suffer from a knowledge gap.
• It is crucial to understand the core problems faced by Islamic communities. Among the issues that should be taken into consideration by various parties is the curriculum of Islamic subjects being taught in schools & universities. The true meaning & exact concept of jihad as well as the broader understanding of jihad should be implemented to avoid misconceptions to take root & spread.
• Unambiguous distinction should be drawn-out between moderate & extreme in understanding Islam. Moderate muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia & Brunei, have shown their ability to accept contemporary issues in their daily life without jeopardizing their beliefs. The majority of Muslims in these countries hold moderate beliefs & wish for peace & harmony. Only a small fraction of Muslims here are involved in terrorist activities. However, such activities carried out by these individuals tarnish the image of all Muslims & create misconceptions about the true nature of Islam.

The UK - deradicalisation failure

Extremism in prisons is not a new concern. In 2016, Ian Acheson led a review commissioned by Justice Secretary Michael Gove into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation & youth justice. The review found that Islamist extremism in prisons was growing & called for a central strategy to monitor & counter this extremism.  

The ineffectiveness of deradicalisation programs in UK prisons has come under increased public scrutiny. Government, parliament & criminal justice agencies have discussed the programs’ efficacy following recent UK terrorist attacks.  

In December 2019, 2 people were fatally stabbed near London Bridge. The attacker was a convicted terrorist who had recently been released from prison & had attended 2 counter terrorism programs during his 8-year prison sentence & following his release. 

In February 2020, police in Streatham, London, shot Sudesh Amman, a convicted terrorist who had recently been released from prison. He attacked & injured 3 people in his rampage. The BBC reported that while in prison, Sudesh refused to engage with attempts to turn him away from violence. In its response to this attack, the government has once again focusing on the length of time a terrorist offender spends in prison. In the case of Sudesh, he spent just over a year & was released automatically at the midway point of his sentence.

There are several deradicalisation programs in the UK for those who have been involved in extremist activity. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned an evaluative study of deradicalisation programs. The study, which was conducted by the Behavioural Insights Team, reported that 95% of deradicalisation programs were “ineffective”. 

Many have argued it is time for the UK government to put time, energy & resources into what happens inside prison, as well as how long offenders should be locked up. No matter when an individual is released & with the exception of a limited number of the most serious cases, they are all going to have to be released eventually. Nazir Afzal, a former chief prosecutor in the north-west, said that without an effective rehabilitation process, delaying release of a prisoner is just delaying an inevitable attack. It is now acknowledged that there is a real problem with deradicalisation & disengagement programmes which been largely underfunded & poorly executed. This is the impact of austerity on the probation service.

The Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 became law in February 2020. The purpose of this Act was to ensure that terrorist offenders were not automatically released on licence before the end of their custodial term without the Parole Board’s prior agreement. During the 2nd reading debate in the House of Lords, peers highlighted a need to keep the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs under continuous review.  

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Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation. He is also a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, business continuity, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in SE Asia.