Quick Take: Indonesia’s Sovereign Halo Part 1
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Quick Take: Indonesia’s Sovereign Halo Part 1

[Note: My Quick Takes are my personal commentaries and do not represent IWIRC Indonesia. I have moved in February 2025 to Acrostics Asia.]

By Eveline Danubrata

Indonesia has overhauled a law governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), giving birth to Danantara—a new investment fund inspired by Singapore’s Temasek—along with questions on how SOEs will operate from now on.

I’ve written since November 2024 about the reason for Danantara’s existence, the gameplan for the fund, and why its architects had to amend the existing SOE law to lay its legal foundation. I also flagged last month that the establishment of Danantara was picking up pace after a delay. (Please click here for my Quick Takes Library).

So when the Indonesian parliament passed the law on Tuesday (4 February 2025), I wasn’t surprised and I went on doing my own thing. But over the weekend, one of my friends sent me an article that reported a key point: Clause 4B in the latest SOE law states that “profits or losses incurred by SOEs are the profits or losses of the SOEs.”

“The capital and wealth (modal dan kekayaan) of SOEs belong to the SOEs and all the profits or losses incurred by the SOEs are not the profits or losses of the state,” the clause said. An editor at local newspaper Kontan wrote, citing a legal practitioner, that the revision to the SOE law seems to encourage officials to be “bolder in making decisions and not be intimidated by the prospect of state losses.”

Why is this significant?

All along, SOE officials have been operating in fear of being accused by the state auditor of realizing state losses, which may even lead to criminal prosecution. As I wrote last year, state-owned bankers preferred rolling over defaulted loans rather than taking principal haircuts, especially if they inherited legacy credit from their predecessors.

So the decoupling of SOE and state losses would be positive if these state-owned banks can now write off the zombie loans in their books and deploy the capital to better borrowers or more productive sectors. However, the flip side is it raises questions among investors and lenders on who will be responsible for SOE losses.

First of all, there seems to be a misperception that the government provides a blanket backstop to all SOEs. The reality is all SOEs are equal, but some are more equal than others. The first offshore bond with a direct guarantee from the government was issued in 2020 by Hutama Karya, which is building the Trans-Sumatra toll road – a key project in former President Joko Widodo’s infrastructure drive.

Many investors believe that energy company Pertamina and power distributor Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) are strategic SOEs and the government will never let them default. Even though some of their debt may not carry any government guarantee in black and white, these SOEs have been able to raise billions of dollars from the market because of what a second friend calls the “sovereign halo”.

With the creation of Danantara, rating agencies will also have to decide how to assess this entity if it issues debt at the holding company level. As I pointed out in December 2024, the typical option of pegging certain SOEs below the sovereign rating may not work if Danantara’s debt is classified outside the government’s balance sheet.

Now that the SOE law has been passed, lawyers and analysts will likely get calls on the potential implications.

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Edward Gustely

Managing Director of Penida Capital Advisors Ltd

2 周

always appreciate your "Quick Take" Eveline!...by way of background, Indonesia's Finance Ministry is the shareholder of SoEs and is under no obligation to "back-stop" creditors for any loan losses to these SoEs, including SoE banks lending to SoEs...the first clean-up step involves cataloging the losses (both assets and liabilities) individually and between SoEs, and then transferring any distressed assets/loans to PPA (with PPA crystalizing any losses incurred from their eventual disposal) ...the cleaned-up SOEs can then be transferred to Danantara's portfolio or be excluded...a key issue for generating market bids from private financiers & investors will be the independent appraisal and valuation of these SOEs...it took nearly 3yrs for GOI and Freeport McMoran to reach agreement on the valuation and transfer price of the latter's interest to GOI...Indonesia has over 400 SOEs (this includes subsidiaries) and will need to move much quicker if it aims to scale market interest and competition among bidders...

Andrew Kinloch

Specialist advice on infrastructure finance in Asia

2 周

In fact, the “sovereign halo” for SOEs such as PLN is more tangible than you suggest. The 1945 Constitution article 34(3) and BUMN law 19 of 2003 article 66 require the government to provide appropriate services to the people (the Public Service Obligation) which, in the case of power supply, it does via PLN. PLN, being a BUMN, is required to be profitable so, if these services are not profitable, the government is required to reimburse PLN for the shortfall (no matter how large!) and, under MOFR 174 of 2019, the MOF has been doing just that on a monthly basis. Thus, PLN has been able to tap capital markets out to 30 years with investors happy to earn a modest premium to the sovereign issues with no need of further guarantees.

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Jon Lindborg

International Development and Finance

2 周

Thanks Jim. And appreciate your sharing the article and your kind words.

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Jon Lindborg

International Development and Finance

2 周

Very helpful! This could be a game changer, either positive...or negative.

Joel Hogarth

Founder and Managing Director at Eliot & Luther

2 周

Great article Eveline Danubrata. There is a long-standing view at SOEs that any ‘losses’ are potentially criminal offenses against the state. This leads to all sorts of artificial loss ‘avoidance’ - usually ways to avoid (or defer indefinitely) accounting losses by all sorts of artificial devices. Real perfomance issues are covered up rather than recognized and addressed. This compounds the problems over time and leads to major business failures / restructurings. Is the solution to fix the accountability for losses? I don’t know. I suspect it is a better policy to be honest about failures early (without consequences) so the problems can be fixed - rather than encourage sweeping problems under the carpet. It should be backed with a more proactive management stepping in and addressing issues when they arise.

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