The Quest for the SuperApp: Wechat, the Interface for the World Around

“Shake” read the prompt, as a sketch of a phone held by a hand in motion ???? illustrated the action. I had a crack at it. The display changed to a Shazam-like radar for a couple seconds, then it vibrated: I had been matched to someone nearby using Shake ?? at the same time. After some chatting ?? facilitated by a handy translator, I was challenged to a game of dice ?? a feature built into WeChat that speaks to the gambling culture in China. I won and to my surprise, I got a money transfer right in the chat: one tap and Wechat Wallet went live with my 3 yuan earnings. It’s 2016 and hours into my China stint, I had inadvertently entered the financial system because I beat a stranger ?? at dice

This is a two part-series on superapps, and today I’m diving into Weixin/WeChat , China’s proxy to the internet ?? Launched in 2011 as an instant messaging app, it transacted north of $370Bn just a decade later through its 3.7M mini programs and 20M official accounts. For perspective, that’s the GDP of Vietnam. Today, the app boasts 1.4Bn monthly active users (MAU) and is used by 97% of China’s population ???? ( CGTN Europe , 2024)

It can be hard to fathom how pervasive Wechat has and continues to be for people and businesses in China. In 2020 as trade tensions ran high, Donald Trump attempted to ban Wechat on grounds of national security. The ban failed, but it did ruffle feathers ?? across the Pacific. Weibo, aka Chinese Twitter, ran a poll asking respondents if they’d stop using iPhones if WeChat was banned in the US. 95% said they’d ditch their iPhones. It’s that pervasive ??

?Two crucial conditions, turbocharged by a maximally utilitarian product philosophy, lay the groundwork for the app’s rise. One: smartphone adoption at scale. In 2009-12 the number of 3G mobile users soared 1400% from 13M to 212M, making China the top smartphone market??despite 3G penetration of 20% [1]. Digital penetration in China was low when WeChat launched. Andreessen Horowitz partner Connie Chan remarks on the state of digital adoption at that time:

“[It] looks really different from the US. It's hard to believe, but back then, the majority of people in China didn't use email regularly. They didn't even have an e-mail address. When WeChat came on to the scene, messaging wasn't a fragmented problem. Messaging was a very much needed product when people started using smartphones. In that sense, it was able to very quickly become the dominant communication platform in China” [2]

Two: foreign social platforms like WhatsApp , Facebook , Twitter and 谷歌 were blocked in the early 2010s. Superpose the newly laid pipeline for mobile internet expanding at breakneck speed and the absence of global competitors in a context of incipient digitization. Wechat had a unique opportunity to claim the entire pie ?? To succeed, they had to be practically minded and measure engagement not by session duration but by the number of times users came back to the app

1/ Our friend the user: 腾讯 , Wechat’s parent company, was already successful in pre-smartphone China with QQ, an MSN Messenger or AOL Instant Message stand-in. Rather than squeezing the existing PC product into a cell phone, they decided this new tech offered more than meets the eye and called for a full reimagination of the messaging experience. They tasked two teams to build it to then pick the better one. The result: a truly emancipated spin to mobile native. One that dared to try fun, new things like Shake or dice roll. Or voice messages: typing out in Mandarin on a touchscreen keyboard is laborious because users need to write in pinyin i.e. the Western alphabet representation of Chinese monosyllabic sounds for a shortlist of characters to appear. Recognizing this friction led to voice notes ?? driving the app’s early success ??

In 2012, WeChat introduced video calls, four years ahead of WhatsApp, and Moments, a blend of Facebook and Instagram, adding use cases for text ?? and media ?? broadcasts plus interactions ????The subscription feature was key, enabling users to follow official accounts without the risk of spam. Capped at 4 notifications per month and folded away from personal inbox, the feature illustrates the principle of treating the user as a friend ?? applied to ID management [3]

Wechat had been protective of users’ privacy while expanding use cases for one-to-many communication ?? The key: limited disclosure. Usernames registered in the signup process are the only info needed to exist in Wechat. Users can unsubscribe from accounts any time and rest assured neither their mobile number or email address are retained. Same goes for interest-based group chats. One can join communities of like-minded people freely because personal data is not on the line. I used expat groups on Wechat to buy second hand appliances to furnish my Beijing home. These groups thrive because users feel in control of their interactions

2/ Multi service orientation: Wechat Pay launched in 2013 as the app reached 300M users, becoming central to the cashless society. They also launched the first mini game. Product folks in the West might recoil at the idea of splitting focus in areas as divergent as payments ?? and games ?? But Wechat’s journey from messaging app to service ecosystem tractioned because its deep understanding of users’ daily life and needs led them to create services that felt natural and indispensable, rather than logically aligned from a functional perspective

And they were all about open-sourcing the internet. Third-party developers could create fully customized official accounts and since 2017, near fully functional mini programs, and leverage the traffic ?? Wechat already had. Founder Allen Zhang’s unique character cannot be underplayed. In his 4-hour speech at Tencent’s 2019 annual conference, he kept it simple:

“Words and phrases like first-order logic, model, traffic flow, from a macro sense, tactics, strategy, theory, philosophy didn’t get one mention. Instead, he said “user” and “friends” over a hundred times, and repeated words like “slowly advance” and “patience.” He is also not afraid to admit mistakes, declaring that “we haven’t done well enough” three times.” [4]??

Treating users as friends -Zhang argues- resonates more deeply and sustains long-term engagement, rejecting purely data-driven optimization ?? in favor of empathetic and intuitive design ???? [5]. He advocates for a careful, deliberate approach rather than rapid iteration and highlights the importance of patience ?? in product development. KPIs are secondary and focusing on traffic ? a distraction from creating the best products. His views on Product Management: Zhang has repeatedly claimed that PMs should be “literary and artistic youth” (文艺青年 wényì qīngnián) not just “logic driven”

Mind you, Wechat’s rise has relied on living inside of Tencent as that insulated them from the pressure of turning a profit - for a long time it didn’t. Tencent’s long-term vision around messaging and social allowed Wechat the breathing space to make atypical bets ??

3/ Wallets and the gamification of money: QR scanning became the medium to complete payments, bridging the offline and online. Wallet balance could be drawn automatically from linked bank accounts, or not be linked at all. Users used it to pay for things when interacting with businesses inside the app as official accounts supported ecommerce. Vending machines, hotels ?? and restaurants began adopting it too. Wechat Pay enjoyed frictionless authentication on the back of default trust on the Tencent brand - it was the Trojan horse ?? that allowed mass onboarding of payment credentials ?? to then unlock monetization opportunities for the entire ecosystem [6]

In 2014 Wechat introduced red packets ?? the digital embodiment of monetary gifts handed out during holidays or special occasions like weddings ?? Users could send these in group chats, with recipients claiming random amounts ?? Chinese New Year 2015 saw $160M transferred via red packet. By then, Wechat had over 1Bn registered users, almost all in Asia, and 550M MAU. One year later, 94% of China’s smartphones had the app and Wechat Pay alone had been set up in 300M accounts

The app has permeated every realm of interaction. Using Wechat users can purchase the same clothes ?? an actor was wearing on a TV drama ?? and shake their phones to vote songs ?? into a live concert’s playlist. Toymakers sell bluetooth-enabled stuffed animals ?? that integrate with parents’ Wechat to send voice notes or pre-recorded bedtime stories?

4/ The relevance paradox: In 2018, the app hit 1Bn MAU and 4yr later it posted $17Bn in revenue, 20% of Tencent's. Its ARPU stands at $7, 7x higher than WhatsApp’s. But not all is rosy: the short-form video feature launched to rival TikTok in 2020, didn’t displace them as top online destination for the younger market despite its 200M DAU and enhanced ecommerce capabilities. There are concerns about Wechat’s ability to engage youth as its unification of the personal, professional and social spheres has led to content designed to establish an online persona, one that conforms to social norms and doesn’t rock the boat. Those young enough to be unencumbered by careers seek spontaneous content that help discover the wider world. Chinese commentator Zhang Yuan remarks:?

“WeChat is a “one-avatar only” social network, and has, for a long time now, not fulfilled young people’s desires to express themselves in different ways. Of course, this doesn’t mean they’re going to give up WeChat anytime soon, but as far as they’re concerned, WeChat will atrophy into some communications instrument like a telephone, an instant messenger, fulfilling nothing more than the role of a tool to connect society. However, realizing your sense of identity and discovering kindred spirits won’t be something WeChat has to offer” [7]

Wechat has set its sight on AI integration, VR/AR experiences and health services, from telemedicine to trackers. But the ocean ?? is not nearly as blue as in 2011. Chinese apps like TikTok , Temu , SHEIN or 美团 are success stories of their own and make for tough competition locally and overseas. The next chapter for WeChat will be crucial in defining its legacy in the tech world. Perhaps embracing the fate of the telephone is not a bad prospect

[1] Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, The Development and Evolution of China’s Mobile Phone Industry (2013)

[2] Business Breakdowns, Wechat: China’s operating system (2023)

[3] Wechat’s founder and lead developer Allen Zhang has long held this as the north star of every core decision. One example of this is his refusal to run popup ads in Wechat because of how disruptive they are on a mobile’s slim build

[4] The China Project, China Business Corner: WeChat founder Allen Zhang and the Tencent conference (2019)

[5]?Andreessen Horowitz, Four Key Products Principles from Wechat Creator (2019)

[6] Andreessen Horowitz, When one app rules them all: the case of Wechat and mobile in China (2015)

[7] TMT Post, As WeChat has lost its “original driving force,” can Allen Zhang find a new “engine”? (2019, in Chinese)