Punch the Biggest Guy in the Face: Why and how Russia could decide to use a nuclear weapon against the United States… and get away with it.

An opinion piece by?Jason Ziebold.

Speculation about Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling centers on “tactical” nuclear weapons in Ukraine or a demonstration in the Black Sea.?Should Russia use a nuclear device, these options remain the most likely.?However, there has been little discussion, at least publicly, about the Russians opting to strike first in the United States with a strategic weapon.?To be clear, Russia launching a nuclear weapon against the United States is highly unlikely.?However, we do not truly know Putin’s mental state or the depths of his desire to remain in power or secure some kind of legacy.?The Russian state's stability is declining as on one side, those wanting peace become more vocal, and on the other extreme, those wanting increased aggression against Ukraine and the West increase their vitriol.?While valid for any form of potential or enacted violence, shaping an adversary's perceptions and mitigating psychological factors are vital to maintaining nuclear deterrence.?Everyone, including leaders capable of authorizing use of nuclear weapon, filter events through their perception of the world.?Culture, education, moral foundations, a person’s current situation, and individual personality shape how individuals perceive the world.?That perception drives a person’s actions.?What one person sees as “black,” another may see as “white,” and yet another sees “grey.”?Depending on the combination of inputs, Putin, or a more aggressive successor, may elect to use a nuclear weapon against the primary reason Russia's current Ukraine adventure is faltering.?While unlikely, a Russian attack against their perceived biggest threat, the United States, cannot be completely ruled out.

Years ago, a phrase was going around about what to do in case a person goes to prison.?The saying went that if someone goes to prison, they should immediately find the biggest inmate and punch him in the face.?The reasoning: if the new convict manages to win, he immediately gains a significant amount of power.?If the new convict fails to win the fight, it will still show the other inmates that he is crazy enough to try hurting someone more powerful, even at the expense of significant injury.?The shock of a rapid increase in violence coupled with the choice of target deters other would-be aggressors.?The new guy gains a measure of safety and may even attract those seeking to align against the “big guy” or others.?This is an example of an “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy:?rapidly increase violence, carefully target the violence, and communicate to external audiences that more and greater violence will follow should anyone cross specified lines.?This line of thinking is also a Russian way of thinking.?As Russia’s Ukrainian adventure unravels, it is possible that Russia may lash out at the United States instead of Ukraine or an empty patch of ocean.?Should Putin decide to cross the nuclear threshold, he may elect to punch the biggest guy instead of someone smaller.

Arguably, the United States is the primary reason why the Russians failed to take Kyiv and force a Russia-friendly government on the Ukrainian people.?This statement is by no means intended to belittle the Ukrainians’ courage and competency.?They have performed brilliantly, but they would not have had the success to date without Western weapons.?Initial success in stopping Russian advances with Javelins and NLAWs turned into heavier weaponry and vehicles.?Ukraine proved to the world that they would fight, they would fight hard, and they would fight smarter than the Russian invaders.?Success begat success as more advanced, capable, and reliable weapons flowed to Ukrainian forces.?To date, the United States is the primary supplier of advanced weapon systems and munitions to the Ukrainians.?While systems like the British-Swedish NLAW and various artillery systems have greatly assisted the Ukrainians, the preponderance of assistance has come from the U.S. Furthermore, the United States transports a significant portion of non-U.S. provided weapons and ammunition.?Critically, political pressure from the U.S. persuaded other countries to provide increasingly lethal munitions to the Ukrainians.?Finally, the U.S. has also been a primary facilitator of NATO’s expansion through the pending inclusion of Finland and Sweden.?Remove the United States from the equation, and the result is the Ukrainians fail and Russia retains its ability to intimidate the Finns and Swedes into a neutral position. These facts must be in the forefront of Putin’s mind as well as in his inner circle.?The United States is the central support in the whole NATO system and in Ukraine.?So why should Putin not deal directly with the fundamental cause of Russia’s problem????

It is important to note that the Russian psyche is often alien to Western mindsets.?Russians, as a whole, have cultural and moral foundations that are significantly different than the rest of Europe.?The development of Russia, from the days of the Kieven Rus’, through the Tsars, through the atheistic rule of Communism, to today, are largely governed by strong authority figures that often ruled through terror rather than through institutions and law.?Serfdom, a form of slavery, was disbanded only in 1861.?The Russians lost a staggering number in World War 2, many through their own leadership’s decisions.?The Russian experience through the centuries developed a mentality of accepting hardship and obeying, or at least not overtly disobeying, strong authority figures.?Authority is to be followed and suffering is an unavoidable result.

The Russians have a long history of sacrificing their own to get desired, or at least acceptable, ends.?Russians relied on winter and sheer numbers against Napoleon.?Stalin was quite content with throwing millions of under-trained and often ill-equipped Soviet citizens at the Nazis.?Premiers Stalin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev sent untold thousands into gulags or executed them for some perceived slight to secure their power and maintain rule of the state.?The Soviet government, heavily populated by Russians, was fine with shoddy equipment and operations in Afghanistan.?The Russian government, including Putin, allowed for conduct in Chechnya that is considered criminal.?This conduct included allowing for simplistic, brutal, and often inept Russian forces causing outsized Russian fatalities as well as in both Russian and adversary civilian populations.?The Russian way of war is brutal.?It mirrors their view of suffering and obeying authority.?Putin, his circle, and his supporters are the sons and daughters of this mindset.?It filters how they receive the words and actions of others and creates the context in which they then act.?As such, Westerners must not project Western values and logic when attempting to discern Russian motives and behaviors.

As long as Putin or a nationalistic successor perceives a path to Russia’s success or at least a path to maintain power, losing tens or hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens is not out of line with the Russian mindset.?Furthermore, Putin and his circle’s probable view of American and Western populations as being mentally and culturally “soft” erodes barriers to using a nuclear weapon.?The mental calculus inside Putin and his circle’s brains weighs the traditional value of the average Russian life, their perception of the U.S., and their evaluation of the U.S. President and the President’s advisors.?Love him or hate him, President Biden’s words and actions since his ascension to office do not portray a strong leader that Russians respect.?Biden’s behavior, comments, gaffes, and the disastrous Afghanistan exit contribute to a Russian perception of American weakness.?And Americans chose this weak leader.?Which makes Americans weak.?The ruling American party also supports values that run counter to traditional Russian values, which adds to the perception of weakness for those with traditional Russian values.?The result is that Putin and his inner circle may determine that President Biden and American society will not retaliate in order to avoid a second strike. Using this logic, strong, direct, violent, yet limited action should cause Americans to cease their support to Ukraine.?It would also be possible that a direct strike could cause a severe weakening of NATO as well.?Moscow would have to factor in that significant portions of the United States would scream for Russian blood.?However, another significant portion should demand a cessation of hostilities and an end to supporting Ukraine.?The Russians could logically expect massive internal chaos in the U.S., as the current divisions within American society create a massive “blame game," countering the unifying trend an attack on the U.S. would cause. This chaos would take time to mitigate, creating opportunities for Russia in Ukraine and domestically.

The pressure on Biden to retaliate would be massive. Politicians on both sides of the aisle would press for retaliation or force the President to face severe political consequences. Others would be advocating for no response out of fear of further attacks in their states or districts. It is this second group that the Russians would calculate to force the White House to accept the strike or to convince Biden to soften any retaliation. Putin may be calculating that many of the same Americans that have tolerated American military deaths in faraway lands over 20-plus years of war will not have the stomach to see American cities turned into burnt out, radioactive husks.?Americans have been used to the military sacrificing themselves. A Russian strike on a suitable target could result in many Americans thinking, "Wow, that is horrible that the smallish, isolated base and nearby towns were destroyed, but if Biden authorizes retaliation, my city may be vaporized. My family and friends could be killed or injured." With a nuclear strike on an American target, the war is now directly on every American’s doorstep.?As escalation occurs, Americans could count on strikes on more populous areas, not tailored, targeted, and limited strikes.

President Biden is the only one that can authorize a retaliatory strike against the Russians, nuclear or otherwise.?Recently, the President stated, "I don't think there's any such thing as the ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.”?That statement, viewed one way, President Biden could be stating a warning that once the nuclear taboo is broken, it will escalate to a large-scale nuclear exchange.?An alternate mindset could interpret the statement to mean that Biden is reluctant to retaliate with a nuclear weapon in order to avoid Armageddon.?Continuing the logic, if Russia uses a weapon against the U.S. in a rapid escalation, Russia must explicitly warn the U.S., immediately before or as the weapon is being launched, that nuclear retaliation would force a larger, second nuclear strike against more valuable targets in the United States.?NATO countries and other countries allied to the U.S. would also receive warnings.?Even if the U.S. was willing to continue supporting Ukraine, European states may elect to cease support, including American transit through their territories.?Even if the U.S. did respond, the Putin regime could develop acceptable offramps, in Russian terms, to escalation.?In addition, there could be opportunities to portray to Russian domestic and selected foreign audiences that Russia is the victim in the event of American strikes.?So for the Russians, the next step is to determine probable American responses and Russian counters.???

Through the Russian filter, messaging from the United States shows a reluctance to use nuclear weapons.?This reluctance could extend to a limited, tailored nuclear strike.?Even if that analysis is incorrect and Biden directed a nuclear retaliation, it would most likely be against a military-related target, away from a significant population center, resulting in little loss of life in the context of the wider, ongoing conflict.?For Russia, cessation or curtailment of American support to Ukraine is a victory, even with losing people to an American counterstrike. Conventional strikes could do harm to the Russian military, but another round of nuclear strikes could be threatened should the Russians perceive an attempt to occupy Russian territory or if the strikes unacceptably destabilize the regime.?Russia could also threaten nuclear strikes against selected NATO partners.?Afterall, if the Russians struck the U.S., hitting Slovakia, Poland, or Italy would be an easy call.

Putin would need to let the U.S. “vent” to some extent.?Counterstrikes, as long as they are limited, could actually aid in the Russian goal to end hostilities in a manner favorable to Moscow.?Humiliating Russia's enemies may be a desire for some in Moscow, but that line of thinking could increase the risk of escalation.?Sacrificing some Russians to allow the U.S. the perception that they have “gotten even” with Russia is worth the ends of a defeated or marginalized Ukraine, a weakened U.S., and potentially severe erosion of the NATO alliance. Russia would surely experience additional pain after crossing the nuclear threshold, but Russia is used to suffering.?And the pain would be felt by everyday Russians, not Putin, not his inner circle, and with a reasonable probability that the worst pain could be mitigated in the areas where his supporters live.?With this line of logic, launching an attack seems reasonable.?The choice of target will be a critical driver in the U.S. response.?Which target and how big a warhead??

Target selection is the final, essential task.?The strike must clearly communicate to the U.S. that it must stop all support to Ukraine while also minimizing the size and scope of an American response.?There are several things that cannot be done for this to work:?the attack cannot kill "too many" Americans; it cannot create perceived, unrecoverable long-term effects on the economy or population; and it cannot give the perception that the attack is meant to decapitate the government or prevent control of its nuclear forces.?If the Americans perceive any of those factors, the U.S. could respond with nuclear strikes that could escalate beyond control.?The punch must be strong enough to get the message across without threatening an immediate, uncontrollable brawl.?“Off-limits” targets are heavily populated cities with significant financial and/or cultural value, concentrations of federal government, and nuclear related bases.?Examples of these locations include New York, Washington D.C., Los Angeles, San Francisco, nuclear weapons related sites, and large bases with nearby large populations (e.g. Norfolk, Virginia).?Likewise, hitting empty grazing land in eastern Montana or a desolate patch of desert in Nevada does not create enough “pain” to the Americans.?The violence is below the escalate-to-deescalate threshold and may actually lead to further exchanges.?

Ideally, any attack needs maximum visibility to drive home psychological effects to the world.?Media coverage of the fireball and/or potential mushroom cloud, from a distance, would reinforce the messaging of the attack.?Ideally, destruction of the target would also degrade the ability to support operations in Europe, should the overall goal of the attack fail, and the Americans continue support.?There are several targets that fit this description.?Scott Air Force Base, Illinois contains United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Air Mobility Command, and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command as well as tanker aircraft.?All of the commands coordinate and synchronize logistics for the Department of Defense, including deliveries of weapons to Ukraine.?The civilian side of the facility also houses a Boeing facility dedicated to military aircraft.?While the largest employer in St. Clair County, it is largely surrounded by corn and soybean fields.?Total casualties could remain under 90,000, most likely less, even factoring in injuries and deaths in nearby towns.?The fireball and mushroom cloud would be visible from St. Louis, just to the west across the Mississippi River.?It would get plenty of immediate press coverage.?Another opportunity is Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.?It is a base that provides one of the entry and departure points for logistics aircraft going to/from the United States.?It has the added symbolism of being in the President’s home state.?Casualties would be a bit lower than Scott, but the base sits right next to the state’s capitol.?The symbolic value may outweigh the fact that a state’s capitol is being taken out.?However, it would also not be all that visible from a populated location.?There are no other significant population centers nearby.?Immediate press coverage will be lacking.?Another option is McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey, home to more aviation logistics forces.?This presents lower casualties than Dover.?Effects could be quickly seen and reported on by news outlets in Philadelphia. There may be some other potential options not mentioned.?Most other options are not ideal.?They are spread out (the big Army bases), too remote, do not directly affect a fight in Europe/support to Ukraine, or they fall into one of the first round “do not strike” categories.

There is a logical path to a strike on the United States itself. While not likely, it should not be ignored. The government ignores it at our risk.

Author’s Note:?With the knowledge provided in hand, the following describes how an attack could play out.?As a reminder, this is a highly unlikely possibility, but in my opinion, cannot be ruled out. The following vignette is illustrative rather than predictive. Outcomes could be very different depending upon the target, size of warhead, and when the strike occurs. Any specific outcome is hard to predict. All outcomes in this event are dreadful.

Putin and his inner circle have gone through their mental gymnastics. Russia will deliver a “wake-up call” to the world.?Russia will be respected.?Aides present targets to Putin and a very small group of advisors.?After some discussion, Putin selects Scott Air Force Base, Illinois as the target.?The situation in Ukraine continues to decline and internal strife continues to build.?Attempts will be made to shore up the failing Russian forces and make attempts to persuade the West. If the situation does not turn around, the date and time of an 800-kiloton airburst will be on Thursday, November 3, 2022 at approximately 10:20 in the morning, U.S. central time (6:20 PM Moscow time).?The missile will launch at 5:39 PM Moscow time.?

At 5:00 PM, November 3, Moscow time, the Russian Foreign Ministry calls the U.S. Embassy in Moscow demanding a meeting at the Embassy front gate between Foreign Minister Lavrov and the U.S. Ambassador to Russia.?The Foreign Ministry states that the meeting will be short, very direct, and the ambassador WILL be there.?Grave consequences for America and the world will occur if the Ambassador is not present.?The Russians know the Ambassador is at the embassy; they do not mince words.?The time of the meeting will be exactly at 5:40 PM.?At 5:32 PM, Minister Lavrov’s car arrives directly in front of the American Embassy.?He sits in his car directly in front of the embassy, waiting.?At 5:36 PM, his driver opens the rear passenger door. Lavrov walks the short distance to the embassy gate and observes the American Ambassador and a translator walking towards him.?He reaches the embassy front gate at 5:38 and waits, not speaking, looking at his watch.?There is no translator. Lavrov speaks English and has practiced the short speech repeatedly. The American Ambassador stands there puzzled. Lavrov remains silent. The American begins to sense something ominous approaching.?

The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and Russian Navy receive a warning to flush all mobile, nuclear armed units, to include ballistic missile submarines, to their distributed sites no earlier than 5:40 Moscow time.?Three SS-25 Topol launchers have been prepared for in-garrison launch.?In this manner, the Russians will not provide visible indications of preparing for this nuclear launch.?Bomber forces are left oriented towards Ukrainian and other daily operations.?The lack of observable nuclear activity at Russian airfields minimizes indications of preparing for a strike against the Americans.?The three SS-25 launchers can launch from their garages.?The roofs are prepared to retract, allowing for elevation and launch within a few minutes.?The SS-25 has been selected specifically because of its age and weapon yield.?The SS-25 is one of the older operational nuclear systems, yet still effective.?Expending one of the older systems will reserve newer, more accurate systems for a potential escalation. Even with the age of the systems, the SS-25 is still expected to land within 200 meters of its intended target.?If the first fails to launch, or there is some immediate post-launch failure, there are two ready back-ups standing by.?If the launched warhead fails or misses, Moscow can still spin the attack as a warning. In any case, while other parts of the Russian military degraded over the years, the strategic rocket forces were kept in working order.?The primary and secondary launchers raise their missiles to launch position.?The launch crews receive the final orders from an underground base in the Ural Mountains, unlocking the warhead’s ability to arm itself in flight.?At 5:39PM, Moscow time, the missile’s first stage ignites, sending it skyward.

At 5:39 and 40 seconds, Minister Lavrov receives a 10 second phone call.?The launch is successful.?He turns to the Ambassador and hands him a pair of letters, one in Russian, the other in English.?As the Ambassador takes hold of the envelopes, Lavrov states, “The Russian Federation is taking decisive action against the United States. American retaliation will result in an uncontrollable escalation that will destroy America and kill millions.?Russia is used to suffering.?We will endure.?Can you?”?He then turns and leaves without giving the Ambassador a chance to say anything.?Simultaneously, the Russian Ambassador in Washington D.C. is notifying the State Department, by phone, with the same message.?Russian Ambassadors across NATO, Finland, Sweden, Japan, South Korea, and Australia send tailored messages to those governments.?Their notes to the various countries’ foreign ministries threaten dire consequences resulting from continued support to Ukraine and against any retaliation for the Russian attack against the United States. Russian Ambassadors in the People's Republic of China, India, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and selected African states send notes of solidarity and support and provides justification for the defense of Mother Russia against the Americans.

It is 5:42 PM Moscow time.?It is 9:42 AM in Illinois, 10:42 AM in Washington D.C.?U.S. satellites have already detected the single SS-25 launch from southern Russia and noted its northward turn.?Alarms ring at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) outside of Omaha, Nebraska, and at NORAD outside Colorado Springs, Colorado.?A missile launch has been detected.?The automatic systems work as advertised.?The missile is heading to North America.?Within a couple of minutes, analysis determines the type of inbound missile, and it indicates a probable impact somewhere in the central part of the United States.?Phone calls are made, emergency message traffic is released, and a meeting over secure systems is established between USSTRATCOM, NORAD, the White House, the Pentagon, and other stations.

The President is at the White House.?The Secret Service wants to whisk the President Away to safety, but the President’s advisors urge to wait a couple of minutes.?While there is extreme danger, politics still dominates.

As the conference proceeds, the possible area of impact on the screens shrinks.?It is positively determined that the national capital region is not affected.?President Biden elects to stay.?The Vice President is campaigning for candidates in Arizona.?She also elects to stay put.

General warnings go out to various bases in the possible impact zone. There are few.?Some units on Scott Air Force Base and other bases receiving warnings, Some, having prepared for such a contingency, run for their cars, praying the base guards have not closed off the base exits.?Others just sit at their desks in shock.?Others begin preparing for death.?Most do not get any word.?They go about their daily lives, oblivious to the danger.?By 15 minutes before detonation, the computers have assessed the target is in the greater St. Louis, Missouri area. A few seconds later, the systems indicate Scott AFB as the target.?

The President is besieged by advice from USSTRATCOM, NORAD, and his own staff at the White House.?The USSTRATCOM commander recommends launching a pair of missiles against Belgorod and Kupiansk, Russia.?The Secretary of Defense begins countering the USSTRATCOM commander’s advice as being too escalatory.?The National Security Advisor advises waiting out the hit and make a decision later, pending any further Russian launches. The three begin arguing when a desperate call is patched through from the Secretary of State.?Secretary Blinken advises the President on the content of the threats provided by Lavrov and the Washington-based Russian Ambassador.?President Biden asks USSTRATCOM and NORAD if there are any other missiles inbound.?There are none detected.?Is there anything the interceptors in Alaska or Vandenberg can do??No, Mr. President, they are not positioned for this kind of strike.?The President elects to delay any retaliation until the strike is concluded. He wants facts and time. The President asks for nuclear retaliation options, purely conventional retaliation options, and supporting details such as projected numbers of American dead from this strike, projections for Russian and American dead from a retaliation, the risk of escalation from any proposed retaliation, and other data. He then prepares for the inevitable and formulates what a phone call to Putin will look like. Another phone rings in the Oval Office. Putin, through a translator, demands to speak to President Biden.

As American leadership debates, the warhead maneuvers to reach its aimpoint.?High level winds buffet the warhead as it descends.?An unpredictably strong high-level wind shifts the warhead a bit south and east of the intended aimpoint.?The weapon’s onboard systems strain against the gusts, attempting to reach its programmed detonation point. The warhead’s internal logic calculates the potential for detonating on the specified target.?It senses that is almost on target but will not be able to make the specific aimpoint.?The sensors governing the height of burst are also a bit off, but the system does not quite know that.?Instead of detonating directly above USTRANSCOM headquarters, the warhead detonates 350 meters south, 170 meters east, and 15 meters lower than intended.?The missile system’s age and environmental factors pushed the warhead well outside of both its Russian and American assessed CEP.?But with an 800-kiloton warhead, this distance is irrelevant.

At 10:20 and 32 seconds in the morning, central U.S. standard time, the SS-25’s 800-kiloton nuclear warhead detonates.?The airburst is designed to maximize overpressure and heat damage over the maximum area possible while ensuring the targeted structures are destroyed.?The day and time of the detonation ensured a maximum amount of personnel on base.?These are the personnel who have been coordinating and synchronizing the transport of arms to Russia’s enemies in the Ukraine.?Should the Americans not be deterred, these personnel must be eliminated in order to degrade any future military transportation to Ukraine as well as degrading transportation of U.S. forces to Europe that would directly threaten Russia.?The timing also allows for the fireball, potential mushroom cloud, and other effects to be observed from St. Louis.?With hundreds, if not thousands of cameras from St Louis’ central west end to downtown, there are bound to be still pictures and video of a fireball erupting behind the St. Louis skyline and the Arch.?It would make for a terrifying and intimidating image. Modern media does not disappoint. Within 45 minutes, stills and video are splashed across internet sites.

Within seconds, the entirety of Scott Air Force Base is destroyed by blast and heat.?The fireball does not touch the ground and there is no crater, minimizing fallout and other radioactive effects.?Within the first 2 seconds, approximately 20,000 people die.?Everyone at Scott Air Force base is immolated or crushed to death in the blast.?Another few hundred die at the commercial side of the airfield.?The village of Shiloh, just to the northwest, is flattened.?Out of a population of about 13,500, more than 85% die. The survivors were out of the immediate area when the attack occurred.?Out to a radius of 7 miles, anyone caught in a direct line of sight to the fireball experiences horrible burns on exposed skin.?3rd degree burns claim thousands of deaths over the next several days.?Retinal burns permanently blind those who looked at the fireball within a second or two of detonation. The flash is bright enough to cause temporary flash blindness to those not even looking at the blast. Those driving at the time cause numerous accidents between Fairview Heights, Illinois and into St. Louis itself as well as in rural areas to the north, east, and south. Numerous fatalities occur in these accidents and snarl traffic throughout eastern side of St. Louis and across the bridges into Illinois.

Throughout the towns of Mascoutah, Lebanon, O’Fallon, and in a significant portion of Belleville, Illinois, wood framed residential structures are destroyed or are significantly damaged.?The sudden pressure waves hurl objects, impaling or crushing thousands with everyday objects and building materials.?Those in front of glass are shredded as window and vehicle glass are turned into shards.?Even as far out as 9.5 miles, windows shatter, injuring those standing nearby.?Two major hospitals are destroyed or rendered inoperative.?Another is substantially degraded, as all the windows facing the blast are blown out.?Casualties will have to be transported over to St. Louis, to small, local hospitals to the rural east and north, or a two-hour drive to Springfield, Illinois for treatment.?Fires ignite all over the affected area, causing further death and injury. Immediate casualties are between 24,000-27,000 dead and another 50-60,000 injured.?Since many families simply ceased to exist at Scott Air Force Base and in Shiloh, the total number of dead cannot be accurately determined.?Due to the volume of injuries, comparative lack of medical care, and the routes to St. Louis blocked, approximately another 5% of the injured die within 96 hours of injuries they should have survived.

As the fires rage in southwest Illinois, the entire country is in chaos. ?As news reports roll in, panic grips a populace unaccustomed to a massive, direct threat to their lives.?9/11, while horrible, has nothing on this attack.?The images of a fireball igniting behind a national monument combined with intense and chaotic media coverage causes rapidly spreading panic.?A sizable portion of the big city population decides to run, with no plan on where to go other than to get away from anyplace they think is a target.?Across the country, there are runs on every consumable.?Grocery stores, gas stations, banks, and ATMs are overwhelmed, with frequent instances of looting and violence.?Hardware and gun stores are also hit hard, as people try to get resources they think will help them survive.

After a phone call filled with threats from Putin, President Biden consults with his own inner circle. Over the next several hours, crushing political pressure comes from every direction, and it does not align along the regular Republican-Democrat divide. Retaliate!?Nuke them!?Ukraine isn’t worth it!?Stand down!?You got us into this!?Peace!?War!?There is no consensus in either of the major political parties.?Military advice is also fragmented. The notes from the Russians are reviewed as well as the transcript from the one-way conversation between Putin and Biden.?The points align, outlining suspension of all aid to Ukraine, rescinding the NATO invites to Finland and Sweden, not increasing the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces, and no retaliatory conventional or nuclear strikes against Russia and Russian forces.?Violation risks renewed attacks. Compliance means no renewed nuclear attacks on the United States or new attacks against NATO countries.?CIA station chiefs at embassies across Europe report that Russia has made overtures to some of the more reluctant NATO countries.?Their governments are already taking them under consideration.

What does the President decide?

Mr. Jason Ziebold is currently employed as an analyst at United States Transportation Command.?A 20-year Navy retiree, he worked in Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) at USSTRATCOM, was stationed in Europe, worked with NATO commands designing exercises to deter Russia, and has had experience in nuclear matters at various duty stations. ?He earned a Master’s Degree in Human Relations from the University of Oklahoma in 2008, studying the psychology of the human interaction.?This article is his own opinion and does not reflect that of the Department of Defense, the University of Oklahoma, or any public or private organization in which he belongs. ?