Public Service Reform: A Multiple Fiefdoms Theory*

Almost every country has experimented with varieties of public service reform. However, the results have been uneven across countries. One possible explanation for this is the failure to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Except in a few cases, the tendency has been to react to momentary challenges and to embark on the search for ‘instant’, situation-conditioned, time-bound, solutions, meaning solutions that are not preceded with abstract, deductive, reasoning or presented as a formal theoretical proposition.

Ordinarily, public service reform seeks nothing less than the attainment of standards that are anchored on the following four indices of governmental effectiveness:

(a)???????????? Rising output-input ratios (increasing rates of return);

(b)??????????? Falling input-output ratios (decreasing cost, declining debt-service obligations, rising economy of scale);

(c)???????????? Steadily increasing time-and-motion gains;

(d)??????????? Rising public trust in the quality, reliability, cost-effectiveness, and timeliness of services delivered.

With one common and recurring goal (performance improvement or constant increases in, and accumulation of, welfare gains) as the point of departure, reform can be approached from at least four conceptual angles, viz, the structural innovative, the structural-consolidative, the integral-innovative, and the integral-consolidative angles.

One question that each of the four model answers in its own way is what makes ‘improvement’ possible (or impossible). What are the enablers as against the disablers of beneficial change? Does either reside in the formal organization or in the informal networks?

The focus of both the structural-innovative and the structural-consolidative reform perspectives is the formal organization, hereafter referred to as the ‘soft’ environment. However, where the structural-innovative model places strong emphasis on the creation of a broad range of “modern” organization structures, and the application of cutting-edge management processes and techniques, its consolidative opposite number is less confident about the profitability of investment in structures and processes.

The structural-innovative model’s tilt towards massive investment in structures is of course understandable. One justification for advocating the creation of a broad range of organization structures is the mammoth, probably, daunting, development (or ‘modernization’) challenge facing the public service in developing and under-developed societies. For these societies to ‘catch up’ with the early starters in development (that is, with the technologically advanced economies) the public service of new states must create a plethora of agencies to handle specialized functions and respond to multiple and unfolding challenges in various areas, notably, education, health, physical infrastructure, food and agriculture, industry and mining, money and currency, law and order, and defense against external attack, etc. The staff of these agencies must also be trained to perform their tasks ‘efficiently’ and effectively, to imbibe alien values of professionalism and efficiency, and to apply the latest decision techniques. A Big Push in structural innovation is, undoubtedly, an absolute necessity in a public service that is faced with a ‘revolution of rising expectations’.

Standing in contrast with the structural-innovation reform model is the consolidative ideal-type. Like the former, the latter is interested in a public service that is capable of accomplishing development and ‘modernization’ objectives. However, the structural-consolidative model disagrees with its innovative opposite number’s contention that the public service needs a wide range of organization structures, or the adoption of sophisticated processes and techniques, to achieve its performance improvement and welfare gains accumulation objectives. According to the structural-consolidative school, investment in new structures, processes and techniques calls for resources which the average under-developed economy does not have. Lacking the wherewithal to accomplish its ‘modernization’ objectives, and chronically short of executive capacity, the under-developed society which is anxious to proceed with full-scale ‘modernization’ and reform of its public service would be obliged to rely on external foreign financial and technical assistance. This option, according to the structural-consolidation school, is hardly viable or sustainable, much less, consistent with the aspirations of a truly sovereign state, or with the spirit of ‘self-reliance’. Besides, structures and practices that work perfectly in a developed society are likely to be difficult if not impossible to clone or be grafted onto new states, more so, as these states subscribe to mores and values totally different from their “modern” counterparts. Considering the institution transplant challenges that come with wholesale replication of advanced economies’ structures in developing countries, the structural consolidative model canvasses a less ambitious, specifically, an unbalanced, structural modernization strategy. This warrants the creation of a few agencies (like the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the O&M branch of the Ministry of Establishments) to engrain and propagate ‘modernization’ habits, while at the same time mainstreaming, reform across the entire public service.

The two preceding models’ limitations are obvious. Preoccupied as they are with formal structures, the structural-innovative and the structural-consolidative models ignore the hard environment’s impact on the public service.? It is up to the integral-consolidative and innovative models to rectify this omission.

The first (the integral-consolidative model) sees the public service as the best organized, the most ‘modern’, and therefore, the most powerful institution in developing societies. It is, after all, the institution that applies the most recent technology, and employs the best educated as well as the best trained. It is also one that, besides keeping custody of vital information, controls key communication channels, and advises on the formulation of policy. The wide discretionary powers conferred on career officials (like a police superintendent, a customs inspector, or an immigration officer) most frequently place them above the rest of society.

Therefore, instead of canvassing additional investment in the creation of new public service structures and the importation of ‘modern’ techniques into new states, the integral consolidative model is content to have the wings of the public service clipped. As a ‘balanced’ social growth strategy, it favours slowing down the public bureaucracy so the rest of society can catch up with it and hold it accountable. It advocates strengthening the oversight capacity of elected officials, and the watchdog role of civic groups.?

The integral consolidative model started as the theory of prismatic society (as formulated by F W Riggs as far back as 1964). It was soon embraced, with suitable modifications, by the public choice theory, and given political backing in the form of Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and the Bretton Woods institutions’ minimalism. The structural adjustment programme that was adopted in many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s owes its origin to the integral-consolidative reform thinking.

One factor that has so far been overlooked in the reform equation is leadership. It is taken lightly by both the structural innovative and consolidative models, and completely distrusted and then dismissed by the integral-consolidative approach. The integral-innovative model by contrast identifies it as a critical factor in reform. However, the integral innovative conception of leadership is different from the customary definition of the term. First, leadership is not always coterminous with the incumbency of make-or-break positions in government. Second, the integral-innovative model equates leadership with the task or process of envisioning a life in which pains are constantly mitigated, that is a life that is increasingly pleasant, fulfilling, and devoid of suffering. Leadership truly manifests when visionary men and women from different backgrounds come together to dream of a better society and conquer challenges hitherto deemed intractable. Among these challenges are endemic corruption, cronyism, indiscipline, banditry or plain terrorism. Structural consolidation (as in, structural adjustment or downsizing) may slow down and even cripple the public service. That, as far as the integral innovative school is concerned, is about all the minimalist state can accomplish. Unlike its active and reasonably interventionist opposite number, the ‘mean and lean’, do-little, state cannot enhance the capacity of a materially deprived and grossly demoralized public service to engineer growth and mitigate suffering.

With specific reference to reform, the integral-innovative model underscores the role of leaders in championing the cause of change. If public service reform has failed to happen or to make a substantial difference in the life of a people, it is partly because a coalition of reforming minds is yet to be formed, but to a large extent, because of the leaders’ failure to de-link the formal practices of the ‘soft’ environment from the toxic influence of its hard counterpart. This is the crux of the multiple fiefdoms theory, a sub-set of the integral-innovative reform model.

The central argument in the multiple fiefdoms theory is that ethno-religious and other divisions in the ‘hard’ environment are natural, and may if properly managed, be edifying. However, where such divisions lend themselves to easy manipulation, that is, where they provide cover for the gratification of private urges at public expense, the chances are that the day-to-day operations of the public service will be governed not by uniform rules of rationality and morality, but by rival wills. In such circumstances, the desires of multiple fiefdoms will always clash with one another and with the commonweal. Ensuring that the commonweal prevails in the conduct of government (and, in public service reform) is the essence of the multiple fiefdoms theory (Balogun, et al, forthcoming).

Do we have to put ongoing reforms on hold until a reforming coalition is formed, and the coalition embarks on the task of bringing the capricious hard environment under the effective control of its soft counterpart? The answer to this is a categorical no. Reforms will continue, and islands of efficiency gains will continue to be showcased. However, insofar as the sustainability of isolated, stop-go, incremental, gains cannot be guaranteed, strong emphasis must be placed on the establishment and constant reinforcement of the reforming coalition, as well as on the transfer of the coalition’s precepts across alternating regimes.

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* Extract of a study sponsored and financed by the Aig Imokhuede Foundation, Nigeria.

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