Protests in Lebanon - What the Data Tell Us (Part 2)

As the political elite in Lebanon decides how to respond to the wave of protests, the data we have gathered on social tensions in Lebanon over the past two years provides several indicators on what that response may look like, including for Syrian refugees in the country.

In all likelihood, political parties and their leaders will be to seek to co-opt popular protests by (a) claiming that their party's goals and actions align with popular demands and then (b) calling for the party to participate in the protests. And thus far, many parties have done exactly this, in one way or another, frequently without success as witnessed in Lebanon's second city, Tripoli, and elsewhere.

The elite strategy that most often accompanies attempts to co-opt popular protest is scapegoating. For Lebanese elites targeted by these protests, the obvious options are first, foreign actors with ‘interests’ in Lebanon (but this is getting ’tired’; it’s been the elite refrain for years), and second: Syrian refugees. It is a dangerously easy argument to make — ‘the West imposes austerity measures; Saudi and Iran seek to destabilise; Israel is a threat; meanwhile, refugees are taking jobs, all the aid, and the country’s resources….'. In short, its not our fault. 

Whether the Lebanese buy that or not (again) is another thing entirely.