Protests Enter Third Month, Iran Under Mounting Western Pressure, Rising Tensions Between Tehran and Baku, and More

This week, we will cover Western sanctions on Iran amid renewed protests, the latest developments in Iran-US Relations, and rising tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan.

In light of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s resolution against Iran and the country’s recent drone attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan, we are featuring the conclusion section of the policy paper titled “Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran and Regional Perceptions” by Darya Dolzikova and Tobias Borck of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), for this week’s Iran Strategy Deconstructed.?

In this new article, the authors argue that “the US, Europe and other like-minded governments need to reassure regional partners of their commitment to supporting the resolution of other regional concerns, independent of the outcomes of nuclear diplomacy with Iran, if the ultimate objective is a stable and secure Middle East.”

Top Stories

Iran-US Relations amid Renewed Tensions in the Middle East

• The Jerusalem Post writes that following the end of the mid-term elections and with Democrats securing a majority in the US Senate, "some experts in Washington believe that the two countries might now try to jump-start negotiations."
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution, censuring Iran for its lack of nuclear cooperation. Iran had earlier warned about the IAEA resolution. In this light, the agency's chief Rafael Grossi is hoping that a technical meeting with Iran later in November could end the impasse over traces of uranium found at undeclared sites.
• The United States Defense Department has stated that its recent dispatch of two B-52 bombers over West Asia was a show-of-force signal to Iran as US and Saudi officials continued to monitor what they perceive as an "imminent threat" to the Kingdom. Another DoD official has stated that “the Iranians have demonstrated that they can walk and chew gum at the same time. They can mobilize an extensive internal repression apparatus to deal with the protests and they can continue to foment instability abroad.”?
• Meanwhile, Washington has voiced concern that a recent successful "test flight of a rocket capable of propelling satellites into space" could help Iran boost its ballistic missile technology. Iran also announced that it has developed a hypersonic missile capable of penetrating “all the systems of anti-missile defence.”
• Amid stalled nuclear talks and rising tensions with Washington, an Israeli-linked oil tanker has been struck by a drone in the Persian Gulf. Israel remains the United States’ main strategic ally in the region and continues to oppose diplomatic rapprochement between the US and Iran. The drone strike comes as Iran frees two Greek oil tankers held since May.?

What Experts Say

Dennis Ross, Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

“The supreme leader won’t be interested in doing a deal so long as the upheaval is continuing...If the upheaval subsides and after a decent interval, he will have an interest in a deal...in the interim, the Iranians will keep pressing ahead with their nuclear program, making Iran even more of a threshold nuclear weapons state. A strategy for [dealing with] that is crucial."

Mehran Shamsuddin, Writer at the Tehran Times (State-Affiliated Media):?

“From Iran’s perspective, the decision by the U.S. and the E3 to table a censure resolution is indicative of the West’s unwillingness to engage positively on the JCPOA. The resolution could further deteriorate the situation around the Vienna talks as Iran is unlikely to move ahead with the talks under pressure.”

??Iran Strategy Deconstructed

Iran’s Regional Challenges, and How to Move Forward

Darya Dolzikova, Research Fellow with RUSI's Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme

Tobias Borck, Research Fellow with RUSI’s Middle East Security Studies

This analysis is part of the conclusion section of the “Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran and Regional Perceptions” article, published recently as part of IPD’s policy paper series, Deconstructing the Changing Middle East Security Architecture.

The states not directly involved in the nuclear negotiations but eager to support regional security in the Middle East – such as Canada and some European states – can play a dual role in this process. On the one hand, they can remind their partners in Washington, London, Paris and Berlin of the importance of holding Iran accountable for its destabilizing regional policies and domestic human rights record. This can assure regional countries that their concerns are taken seriously and not forgotten and delegate responsibilities across Western partners in ensuring both the nuclear issue and other regional concerns are addressed. On the other hand, they can also help facilitate the painstaking multi-level confidence-building process amongst regional states, convening and nurturing dialogue initiatives, and promoting multilateral (i.e. including Iran, GCC states and others) cooperation on areas of mutual concern – from climate change to food security and economic integration. Countries like Canada might have less leverage over regional powers than the US or others in the P5+1, but this can also mean that their involvement in such activities is less politically sensitive and less likely to directly impact nuclear negotiations.

Ultimately, extra-regional actors cannot force the GCC states and Iran to resolve their differences, nor can they dictate the contours of a future regional order; however, they can help provide a framework for regional diplomacy. This includes providing reassurances to Gulf partners, thus allowing them to focus on confidence-building and eventual conflict resolution with each other and with Iran, rather than on hedging against the various possible outcomes of the JCPOA negotiation process or whatever nuclear diplomacy efforts may replace it. In doing so, Western states will need to remain cognisant of both the similarities and divergences in the threat perceptions and interests of individual GCC states and other regional actors vis-à-vis Iran and – just as importantly – each other. Preferences for how to structure regional security discussions, the role that Iran should play in the region and the ways in which extra-regional actors can best address their security concerns vary – sometimes significantly – among the GCC states. Here, too, embracing complexity and nuance will yield opportunities for effective engagement and support and will help to avoid misunderstandings.

Canada, UK, and EU Impose More Sanctions over Iran Protests?

• Amid ongoing protests in Iran, the country’s courts have sentenced several people to death, alleging that the individuals were responsible for arson, blocking traffic and causing terror, knife attacks, and killing security forces. Human rights activists have characterized the trials as unfair. According to a Norway-based Iran Human Rights NGO (IHRNGO) group, the death toll has risen to more than 325 people, including women and children, with the government also claiming that more than 40 security force members have been killed in the unrest.?
• Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and the European Union have imposed additional sanctions in response to "Tehran’s widespread use of force against peaceful protesters." The European Union’s sanctions package targeted 29 individuals and three organizations. Among those sanctioned include the squad responsible for arresting Mahsa Amini, several high-ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members, and the country's Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi.?
• British sanctions targeted Iran’s Communications Minister Issa Zarepour, and the chief of its cyber police, Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid. Zarepour and Majid were responsible for disabling WhatsApp and Instagram amid anti-government demonstrations.?
• In its fifth sanctions package against Iran, Canada has also imposed sanctions on two Iranian drone manufacturers for allegedly supplying drones to Russia amid its aggression against Ukraine. The sanctions package also targets six government officials and supporters over the country's "gross and systematic human rights violations" inside and abroad.?
• French President Emmanuel Macron has characterized the protests in Iran as a "revolution" and said that the crackdown will make it harder to revive the agreement. On the other hand, Macron said that he will continue to engage Iranian leaders and is working on a regional meeting that includes Iran by the end of the year, hoping to revive dialogue and find a broader framework for nuclear talks. Currently, seven french nationals are held in Iran.
• In his latest speech, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei mainly blamed the West for the continuation of the protests and unrest in Iran, suggesting that the two-month protests “is to make the authorities tired.” He said that they {the protests) will be put to an end soon”, which can be viewed as a green light for a more violent crackdown.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
• Amid the protests, Iran has targeted the headquarters of an Iranian Kurdish militant group, labelled as a terrorist group by the Islamic Republic, in Iraq's Erbil. The rocket strike killed one person.

Rising Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan

• During the 9th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States, a pan-Turkik institution advocating for Turkish unity and integration, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev characterized Iranian Azerbaijanis as his "compatriots" and called on the organization to help protect their "rights."?
• In response, a group of Iranian lawmakers fiercely criticized the Azerbaijani president, with Parliamentarian Seyed Alborz Hosseini stating that Aliyev's remarks are unrealistic and that if not for the Golestan Treaty, Azerbaijan would have still been a part of Iran.
• The Azerbaijani government has also announced the arrest of five Azerbaijani nationals over spying for Iran. The two countries have recently summoned one another’s ambassadors as tensions continue to rise.
• Meanwhile, in a phone call with his Azeri counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian criticized "unrealistic remarks" made by the President of Azerbaijan, arguing that diplomacy remains the best way to settle differences between the two countries.
• Azerbaijan's parliament has also approved the establishment of an embassy in Tel Aviv. While the two countries have long enjoyed a close bilateral relationship, this latest development will likely further irritate Iran. Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan, is also set to improve ties with Israel in light of Benjamin Netanyahu's return to power.?

What Experts Say

Eldar Mamedov, writer for Amwaj Media:?

"With bilateral ties steadily deteriorating, more actors in Iran will likely come to see Azerbaijan in the same light they do SaudiArabia & Iraqi Kurdistan—namely, a security threat in cahoots with arch-rival Israel.”

Benyamin Poghosyan, writer for The Armenian Weekly:?

“In the 1990s and 2000s, there was little, if anything, uniting the Karabakh conflict with the Iran-Israel rivalry. The situation started to change around 2010 when Azerbaijan launched its strategic defence cooperation with Israel and began buying billions of US dollars worth of armaments from Israel, including loitering munitions, advanced anti-tank missiles and reconnaissance drones...as negotiations to restore the Iranian nuclear deal reached a deadlock and Israeli officials started publicly circulating the possibility of Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, Azerbaijan-Israel military cooperation started to threaten Iran’s vital national interests. Not surprisingly, Iran launched several large-scale drills along its border with Azerbaijan in October 2021 and again late last month.”

Iran Under the Radar

• The upcoming matches between Iran’s national football team in the World Cup have met increasing controversy with calls for boycotts from regime change activists outside the country. Nonetheless, the Iran football team is reportedly ready to play, while politicization of these games is expected in support of the Iranian people.
• Oman's Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr bin Hamid Bin Hamood Al-Busaidi met with Iranian foreign minister Hussein Amir-Abdollahian. Given Iran’s dire conditions at home and abroad, this visit may well be a way of de-escalating the tensions as Oman has traditionally played a mediating role between Tehran and Washington.
• The Manama Dialogue, annually held in Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain, has included harsher rhetoric against Iran from regional and international players–highlighting Iran’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war and its leadership’s response to anti-government protests. It is expected that the EU-Gulf relations move further toward security and military cooperation, as Europeans are more united to punish Iran for supplying Russia with Iranian-made drones, reportedly being used in the war in Ukraine.

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