Proposition on How to Build Sustainable Digital Identity Platform

We were selected as one of the three finalists for FDATA Global Open Finance Summit & Awards 2019” held on 4-5/Dec/2019 in Edinburgh in the category of “Best innovation in security management – Who has done the most to protect consumer data”.

This article is a copy of the proposition that we submitted on 24/Oct/2019 to Financial Data and Technology Association (FDATA). We were invited a few days earlier although we are not a FDATA member.

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Latest update on 18/Apr/2020

Pandemic-resistant Teleworking - We started to use this phrase five years ago as a use case of Expanded Password System that provides ‘Hard-to-Forget’, ‘Hard-to-Break’ and ‘Panic-Proof’ digital identity authentication platform, though it was no more than a hypothetical statement at that time.

We now witness the pandemic has assaulted us before we get ready. We were unfortunately late for the current pandemic. When (not if) the next one hits us in 5, 10 or 20 years, humans will probably be yet more heavily dependent on Digital Identity. We or our successors will hopefully be able to make a meaningful contribution to the safe and resilient cyber life.

 While waiting to see what will be happening in the pandemic-overwhelmed cyberspace, we will be steadily progressing Expanded Password System in order to make it readily available to all the global citizens.

 Easy-to-Remember’ is one thing. ‘Hard-to-Forget’ is another. - The observation that images are easy to remember has been known for many decades. It is not what we advocate.

 What we advocate is that ‘images of our emotion-colored episodic memory’ is ‘Hard to Forget’ to the extent that it is ‘Panic-Proof’. This feature makes Expanded Password System deployable in any demanding environments for any demanding use cases, with teleworking in stressful situations included.

Meaningless Comparison of Different Authenticators - It makes no sense to compare the security of a strong or silly password with that of a poorly or wisely deployed physical token. Nobody can have the criteria for a meaningful comparison between ‘knife, fork and spoon’.

 All that can be said about different authenticators are

 1.     Secret credentials, say, the likes of passwords, are absolutely indispensable, without which identity assurance would be a disaster

 2.     Two-factor authentication made of passwords and tokens provides a higher security than a single-factor authentication of passwords or tokens.

 3.     Two-factor authentication made of biometrics and a password brings down the security to the level lower than a password-alone authentication.

4.     Passwords are the last resort in such emergencies where we are naked and injured

5.     We could consider expanding the password system to accept both images and texts to drastically expand the scope of secret credentials.

Added on 17/Mar

This article is not a hypothesis. The versatile practicability of the EPS software is demonstrated by the 5-year use by 140, 000 online shoppers, the 6-year use by 1,200 employees for a corporate network and the trouble-free military use by army soldiers in the field from 2013 till now with the users increasing 10-fold and set to increase further;  photos of toys, dolls, dogs and cats , for example, that our children used to love for years would jump into our eye even when we are placed in heavy pressure and caught in severe panic.

The solid theory of our EPS proposition is also endorsed by OASIS recognition as a standard candidate, publishing by Taylor & Francis and adoption by AFCEA for ‘2020 Solution Review Problem Sets’. 

Updated on 12/Feb/2020

Newer articles “Text Password System to Stay As-Is with Expanded Password System”, “Advanced Persistent Threats in Digital Identity”, "Expanded Password System for High-Security Accounts" and “Technology Obsession and Liberal Arts” are incorporated at the end of this article for the readers’ ready reference.

 We can LAMENT that text passwords are so hard to manage, but it would be silly if we BLAME the text passwords when citizens do not have an alternative solution with which the citizens can achieve the same or better security without depending on the text passwords.

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 Index

Abstract

‘Text-Password’ is subordinate to ‘Password’

Do physical tokens mitigate the password headache?

Does biometrics ease the password headache?

Does PIN help with the password headache?

Something else? 

Why sticking to the memory of characters and numbers?

Our Proposition – Expanded Password System

Accounts & Corresponding Passwords

Entropy 

Broad Choice

Brain-Computer -Interface

In Conclusion 

About Author

Appendix 1 – Threat of Biometrics to Digital Identity Further Examined

Appendix 2 – Urgent Recommendation of ‘Improvised’ Two-Factor Authentication

Update on 9/Feb/2020

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Abstract

The subject of this article is a fragile digital identity built with a weak password, which makes a grave choke point of the cyber age.

 Secret credentials are absolutely necessary for digital identity in democratic societies. The text password, which is a section of the secret credentials, is known to be too hard to manage. We could look for something other than the text password as the valid secret credential.

 Three big myths are rampant in the sphere of digital identity. These are ‘Higher security to be achieved by removal of password’, ‘Passwords to be killed by the biometrics that is dependent on passwords' and ‘Passwords to be displaced by PIN that is no more than a weak form of numbers-only password’.

 Unraveling these myths, we come to the conclusions that we must look for something really valid in the sphere of ‘Non-Text Password’ and that the identity of 'citizens' cannot be separated from their volition and memory while the identity of 'things' can be handled only technologically.

 Our own autobiographic memory, especially episodic memory, enables us to come up with the most reliable digital identity platform, bidding farewell to the unsafe and torturous identity authentication.

 ‘Text-Password’ is subordinate to ‘Password’

 The word ‘password’ is poly-semantic and context-dependent. Sometimes it’s narrowly interpreted as ‘remembered text password’ and sometimes it’s taken broadly as ‘whatever we remember as secret credentials’. This situation drives some people to allege that the ‘text password’ is hard to manage so the ‘password’ should be removed from digital identity altogether by relying on ‘physical tokens’, ‘biometrics’ and ‘PIN’.

 We can, however, draw a totally different observation from the same assumption that the text password is hard to manage. That is, the text password is hard to manage so we ought to think about ‘non-text passwords’ in our efforts towards an easier-to-manage and yet more secure password system.

 Do physical tokens mitigate the password headache?

 We do not need to take much space to explain the security effect of authentication by a physical token. This schema may be enough.

This cartoon published15 years ago might also help.

 Does biometrics ease the password headache?

Passwords and physical tokens can be deployed on their own and also with other authenticators in the security-enhancing ‘multi-layer’ method, whereas the biometrics cannot be deployed on its own. It can be deployed only in the security-lowering ‘multi-entrance’ method along with a fallback measure.

 Biometrics used with a fallback measure (Password/PIN in most cases) provide the security lower than that of the fallback measure” as outlined in this video.

 Houses with One Door or Two Doors

Which house is easier to sneak into?

 Alleging that biometrics which needs to rely on a password can displace the password is not different to alleging that a baby who needs to rely on its mother can displace the mother.

 With so much money invested and so many products sold, it may be hard for the people of entrenched interests to admit ‘Biometrics has actually brought down security’. But an alternative fact cannot displace the fact for long.

 Does PIN help with the password headache?

 Some people thought of declaring that a PIN is not the password. Say, the password should be removed but the PIN could stay for use on its own or as a fallback measure for biometrics.

 In this world where we live, PIN is no more than a weak form of numbers-only password. When the password (superordinate/generic concept) was removed, the PIN (subordinate/specific concept) has also been removed.

In a parallel world where those people live, the PIN (subordinate concept) can do what the password (superordinate concept) cannot do, as a paper-knife should be able to do something that the knife cannot do. ‘PIN-dependent Password-less Authentication’ may not be a day dream for them, but it is exactly a day dream. 

 Something else?

Hard-to-break long password written on a memo?

- It belongs to the family of physical tokens that we had analyzed.

Pattern-on-Grid?

- It is hard to use multiple hard-to-break patterns without confusion.

ID federations like single-sign-on services and password management tools?

 - Centralization creates a single point of failure. If modestly decentralized, multiple reliable master passwords are necessary.

Two/Multi-factor authentications?

 - They need a reliable password as one of the factors for each scheme..

 Why sticking to the memory of characters and numbers?

 The part of our memory for characters and numbers, which we categorize as ‘text memory’ is just a small segment of our overall memory capacity. 

 We have a huge memory capacity for non-text memories – visual, audio, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, which have supported our history over hundreds of millions of years – besides the text memory humans acquired only hundreds of years ago among the large parts of the population.

 Why don’t we think of making use of these deep-inscribed memory capacities, particular the visual memories? We know that the latest computers and phones are so good at handling huge volumes of visual images.

 Among the image memories we could focus on the images linked to our autobiographic memory, episodic memory in particular.

Secret credentials made from episodic memory are ‘panic-proof’. Identity authentication measures practicable in panicky situations are easily practicable in everyday life. The reverse is not true, though.

 Our Proposition – Expanded Password System

In the matrix, there are several known images. We can easily find all of them right away. Or, rather, these known images jump into our eye. And, only we are able to select all of them correctly. This is Expanded Password System. With Expanded Password System we can use both images and characters. It’s easy to manage the relation between accounts and the corresponding passwords. 

 The idea of using pictures for passwords is not new. It’s been around for more than two decades but the simple forms of pictorial passwords were not as useful as had been expected. Unknown pictures we manage to remember afresh are still easy to forget or get confused, if not as badly as random alphanumeric characters. Expanded Password System is new in that it offers a choice to make use of known images that are associated with our autobiographic/episodic memories.                       

Since these images are the least subject to the memory interference, it enables us to manage dozens of unique strong passwords without reusing the same password across many accounts or carrying around a memo with passwords on it.

And, handling memorable images makes us feel comfortable, relaxed and even healed. Torturous login is history.

 Accounts & Corresponding Passwords

 Being able to recall strong passwords is one thing. Being able to recall the relation between accounts and the corresponding passwords is another.

 When unique matrices of images are allocated to different accounts, those unique image matrices will be telling you what images you should pick up as your password for this or that account.

 When using images of our episodic memories, Expanded Password System will thus free us from the burden of managing the relation between accounts and the corresponding passwords.

 Entropy

 Hard-to-break text passwords are hard-to-remember. But it’s not the fate of all the secret credential. It would be easily possible to safely manage many of high-entropy passwords with Expanded Password System that handles characters as images.

 Each image or character is presented by the image identifier data which can be of any length. Assume that your password is “CBA123” and that the image ‘C’ is identified as X4s& eI0w, and so on. 

 When you input CBA123, the authentication data that the server receives is not the easy-to-break“CBA123”, but something like “X4s&eI0wdoex7RVb%9Ub3mJvk”,  which could be automatically altered periodically or at each access where desired

Broad Choice

So far, only texts have been accepted. It was, as it were, we have no choice but to walk up a long steep staircase. With Expanded Password System, we could imagine a situation that escalators and elevators are provided along with the staircase. Or, some of us could think of all those ladders we have for climbing in Donkey Kong. 

 Where we want to continue to use text passwords, we could opt to recall the remembered passwords, although the memory ceiling is very low, Most of us can manage only up to several of them.

 We could opt to recognize the pictures remembered in stories where we want to reduce a burden of textual passwords. The memory ceiling is high, that is, we would be able to manage more and more of them.

 Where we choose to make use of episodic image memory, we would only need to recognize the unforgettable images, say, known images. There is virtually no memory ceiling, that is, we would be able to manage as many passwords as we like, without any extra efforts.

 Brain-Computer -Interface

 As for Man-Machine/Computer-Interface for our Expanded Password System, we already can rely on

 - clicking and tapping on the images randomly positioned

 - typing the characters randomly allocated to images

 We will easily be able to rely on

 - eye-tracking the images randomly positioned

 - voice-recognition of the characters randomly allocated to images

 - voiceless-voice-recognition of the same

 And also

 - tapping secret signals on a pad when hearing the sounds that the users had registered (for the blind people)

 - tapping signals when feeling the tactile sensation that the users had registered (for the blind and deaf people)

 All the above can be achieved by deploying the off-the-shelf technologies.

 The next task is the interfaces for the people who cannot rely on any of the above. Here enters the possibility of BCI/BMI.

 A simple brain-monitoring has a problem in security. The authentication data, if wiretapped by criminals, can be replayed for impersonation straight away. Therefore the data should desirably be randomized as the onetime disposable ones.

 An idea is that the authentication system allocates random numbers or characters to the images shown to the users. The users focus their attention on the numbers or characters given to the images they had registered.  

 The monitoring system will collect the brain-generated onetime signals  corresponding to the registered images.  Incidentally, the channel for showing the pictures is supposed to be separate from the channel for brain-monitoring.

 If intercepting successfully, criminals would be unable to impersonate the users because the intercepted data has been disposed of. 

 In Conclusion

 Expanded Password System that drastically alleviates the password fatigue is supportive of

 – Two/multi-factor authentications that require passwords as one of the factors

 – ID federations such as password managers and single-sign-on services that require passwords as the master-password

 – Biometrics that require passwords as a fallback means against false rejection (on the assumption that users are correctly informed that it is better convenience, not higher security, that the use of biometrics brings.)

 – Simple pictorial/emoji-passwords and patterns-on-grid that can all be deployed on our platform

 * All with the effects that handling memorable images makes us feel pleasant and relaxed

 Furthermore, 

 – Nothing would be lost for the people who want to keep using textual passwords

 – It enables us to turn a low-entropy password into a high-entropy authentication data

 – It is easy to manage the relation between accounts and the corresponding passwords

 – It helps deter various phishing attacks

 – It helps to build practicable Brain-Machine/Computer-Interface

 – It helps with Self-Sovereign Identity and Bring Your Own Identity

 Lastly but not the least, it is democracy-compatible by way of providing the chances and means to get our own volition confirmed in our identity assurance.

 Expanded Password System is now at the stage of Draft Proposal’ for OASIS Open Projects.

 Hitoshi Kokumai

 About Author

 Hitoshi Kokumai is the inventor of Expanded Password System that enables people to make use of episodic image memories for intuitive and secure identity authentication. He has kept raising the issue of wrong usage of biometrics with passwords and the false sense of security it brings for 18 years.

 Mnemonic Security Inc. was founded in 2001 by Hitoshi Kokumai for promoting Expanded Password System. Following the pilot-scale operations in Japan, it is seeking to set up the global headquarters.

 Appendix 1 – Threat of Biometrics to Digital Identity Further Examined

 The writer have repeatedly made clear that biometrics brings down security to the level lower than a password-only authentication where it is used together with a password in a ‘multi-entrance’ deployment, as against a “multi-layer” deployment.

 The first article written in English was “Biometrics & Conundrum” published on 7/Dec/2014 - https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/20141207052655-141508358-conundrum

 The latest one is “Threat of Biometrics to Security and Its Structure” of 23/Sep/2019 - https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/structure-threats-security-biometrics-hitoshi-kokumai

 We have received not a single logical or evidence-based refutation (*1), which led us to suspect that the biometrics people love a one-way propaganda but hate the exchange of opinions.

 They might be prepared to allow people to debate on ‘spoofing’ and ‘data leak’, because they could counter these debates by talking about the eternal endeavor of improving technologies. But it looks like they are aware they cannot afford to be involved in the discussion on the security effect of a 'fallback password’ required against false rejection/non-match, presumably because there is absolutely no way of eliminating the presence of trade-off relation between false match/acceptance and false non-match/rejection due to the nature of the body features inherent in living animals.

 In other words, it looks as though they are afraid that, should they publicly admit the necessity and actual presence of 'fallback measure', a default password/pincode in most cases, the foundation of their decades-long allegation of “Biometrics brings better security than passwords” would evaporate right away.

 As such we are led to suspect that all that the biometrics people can do is turn a blind eye, cover their ear, close their mouth and keep earning as much quick money as possible before their 'business model' collapses.

 Incidentally, we are also very worried to have noticed that biometrics data is seldom publicized in a logical and scientific manner.

 Quite a few biometrics vendors publicize a part of a fact and do not disclose the other part of the fact, for instance, publicizing a nicely low false match/acceptance rate without saying anything about the corresponding false non-match/rejection rate, which could be alarmingly high, but remains unknown to the public.

 Subsequently, this phenomenon comes with their silence on the need and presence of a fallback password/pincode against the false non-match/rejection, which brings down security to the level lower than password/pincode-only authentication as repeatedly made clear.

 Moreover, we could add that unsubstantiated theoretical data is often presented as if it were the empirical data.

 By ‘biometrics people,’ we mean not just the biometrics vendors but those officials, professionals, researchers, consultants, journalists, etc. who have gained a lot from this dubious way of doing business.

 < Footnotes >

 *1 The counter-arguments that we have so far been given were basically (a) from the people (*2) who would only repeat the unprovable assertion that biometrics is more secure than passwords, or (b) the people (*3) who did not know anything about the trade-off-relation between false acceptance/match and false rejection/non-match or (c) the people (*4) who know the trade-off relation but are apparently ignorant of or are possibly pretending to be indifferent to the opposite security effects of two authenticators used in ‘multi-layer’ and ‘multi-entrance’ deployments.

 *2 A direct comparison would not make sense between a biometrics on its own, which is probabilistic, and a password on its own, which is deterministic. Furthermore, as a matter of practice, how can we select the test samples to compare from among numerous combinations in the broad spectrum in between the two extremes of the securest password vs the least accurate biometrics and the poorest password vs the most accurate biometrics?

 On the other hand, it is just logical and easy to compare (A) a password with (B) a biometrics with the same password as a fallback measure against false rejection/non-match. Logic tells us that (B) is inevitably weaker than (A) as outlined in this short video - https://youtu.be/wuhB5vxKYlg

 This observation is valid however accurate or inaccurate the biometrics may be, and however strong or weak the password may be. It is also valid even if someone comes up with a perfectly ‘spoofing-proof’ biometrics.

 *3 The trade-off relation between false acceptance/match and false rejection/non-match is explained here with graphs – https://www.valuewalk.com/2018/02/biometrics-aadhaar-danger/

 *4 The opposite security effects of two authenticators used in 'multi-layer' and 'multi-entrance' deployments are closely examined here – https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/quantitative-examination-multiple-authenticator-hitoshi-kokumai/

 Appendix 2 – Urgent Recommendation of ‘Improvised’ Two-Factor Authentication

 In view of the grave password incidents ever more rampant, we are urgently suggesting an 'improvised' two-factor authentication that everyone can deploy on their own, on any accounts, right now and at no cost. With it, an extra power would be extracted from the ubiquitous legacy password systems.

We could recommend citizens to combine a 'remembered password' (what we know) and a 'memo/storage with a long password written/stored on it' (what we possess) in line with the following procedure.

 Preparation of 1st factor: Citizens remember a password that they can easily recall, for instance, playedwithXYZ (X, Y, Z could be the initials of their beloved pets and toys in the childhood days).

 Preparation of 2nd factor: Citizens produce a strong random password, for instance, 8ado@Dexfy9$p, and writes it down on a memo or store it on a memory storage.

 When making login: All that the citizens need to do is (1) recall the remembered password, (2) watch the memo with the long password on it and (3) type playedwithXYZ8ado@Dexfy9$ or copy & paste the latter half in the password field.

 That's all.

 The combined password sent out, when properly hashed at the authentication server, would have the kind of high entropy that might well stand very fierce brute force attacks. Your readers would not have to worry so much if their credential hash data got leaked. It goes without saying that a bad guy, who successfully stole or copied the citizens’ memo but does not know what is their remembered password, is unable to attack the citizens’ account.

 As stated above, all that citizens need to do is take a small trouble of combining a remembered password and a memo with a long password written on it. Economically it absolutely costs nothing to both citizens and their service providers. It can be started right now, on their own, on any password accounts and anywhere in the world. The global cyber space would be not a little safer than it is now depending on how quickly this suggestion spreads out.

 We are advocating Expanded Password System that we believe is the best and final solution to the password predicament, but it might well take some more years before it becomes readily available to every citizen on the globe whereas the damaging password incidents show no sign of abating while we know that removal of passwords and broad adoption of biometrics are only making it worse. It is why we wish to urgently suggest this simple affordable stopgap solution to all the citizens worldwide.

PS

Unraveling the myths of biometrics is an integral part of our proposition. I have separately posted a comprehensive myth-debunking article titled ‘Negative Security Effects of Biometrics Deployed in Cyberspace’

< Demonstration Videos >

Simplified Operation on Smartphone for consumers (1m41s)

High-Security Operation on PC for managers (4m28s)

Simple capture and registration of pictures by users (1m26s)

< Interview by Risk Group LLC >

 Risk Roundup | Episode #222 | Expanded Password System 

< Related Article >

For Achieving Solid Digital Identity on Information Security Buzz (Mar/2021)

Summary and Brief History - Expanded Password System

What We Know for Certain about Authentication Factors

Update: Questions and Answers - Expanded Password System and Related Issues

Update - History, Current Status and Future Scenarios of Expanded Password System

Publication on EDPACS of Taylor & Francis

Entertaining Security Topics

Text Password - Lamentable, Not Blamable

Pictorial Presentation of Phishing Detection by Episodic Image Memory 

#identity #authentication #password #security #biometrics #ethic #privacy #democracy #finance #FDATAsummit2019

< Update on 12/Feb/2020 >

Text Password System to Stay As-Is with Expanded Password System

- No need to replace or re-build the existing text password systems for implementing Expanded Password System for achieving higher security as well as better convenience-

 Expanded Password System accepts non-text memory objects such as visual images as well as texts. Hearing it, some people are led to suppose that they need to consider a big investment to replace or re-build the existing text password systems. 

 It is not the case. All that they need to do is ensure that the password system accepts very long passwords, desirably hundreds of characters, for obtaining very high-entropy hashed values that can stand fierce brute force attacks.

 Then, they would be free to opt to

 1. recommend the security-conscious users to try a simple two factor authentication made of a remembered password (what we remember) and a memo/storage with a long password written/stored on (what we possess), which they can use right away at no cost.

 2. recommend the users who want both higher security and better convenience to consider the ‘Image-to-Password Converter cum Entropy Amplifier’ software when Expanded Password System that we advocate becomes readily available to all the citizens in the near future. The ‘Image-to-Password Converter cum Entropy Amplifier’ software can be offered as a plug-in module either for the server or the user’s device.

Advanced Persistent Threats in Digital Identity

You may have heard this disturbing news report - Chinese hacker group caught bypassing 2FA - Chinese state-sponsored group APT20 has been busy hacking government entities and managed service providers.

 We were amazed by the capability of those cyber attack forces, which might possibly be backed up by huge budgets and irresistible means to bribe and threaten the insiders of target organizations.

 Well, we could make meaningful contributions in such areas as (1) preventing the compromise of an OTP token from affecting the overall security of 2F authentication, (2) preventing the OTP token from getting compromised in the first place and (3) preventing the inside jobs.

 Below are the conclusions that we reached.

 1.      Our proposition of the simplest 2F authentication could help. 

 We could consider an extremely simple two factor authentication made of a remembered password (what we remember) and a memo/storage with a long password written/stored on (what we possess), which we can use right away at no cost.

 If properly hashed, the resulting high-entropy hashed value can stand fierce brute force attacks. Theft/copy of the memo/storage alone would not affect when the remembered password is unknown to the criminals.

 Furthermore, ‘Image-to-Password Converter cum Entropy Amplifier’ software could be considered for better balance of security and convenience at a higher level when Expanded Password System becomes readily available. The ‘Image-to-Password Converter cum Entropy Amplifier’ software can be offered as a plug-in module either for the server or the user’s device.

 These schemes are closely explained in the "Proposition on How to Build Sustainable Digital Identity Platform" selected as a finalist for ‘FDATA Global Open Finance Summit & Awards 2019’

 2.      Our proposition of 2-channel authentication could help. 

 With our 2-channel scheme, the onetime code can be recovered and sent to the server only by the legitimate user who retains the secret credential in their brain.

 Further details are provided in this slide “2-Channel Authentication with No Physical Tokens and No SMS” for the specifics.

 It is also referred to as a powerful phishing deterrent in “Targeted/Spear Phishing and Expanded Password System”

 By the way, this 2-channel scheme is not just a concept, but was actually implemented in the real world for corporate use. 

 3.      Our proposition of Authority-Distributed Authentication could help.

 With this scheme, an encryption key gets reproduced by any combination of 3 registered operators and gets eliminated after operation as outlined in this slide “On-the-fly Key Generation from Our Memory”. It would be extremely hard to quietly bribe or threaten 3 people at a time

 Again, this scheme is not just a concept but the prototype software proved to work.

Conclusion

 We are confident that we could make significant contributions to mitigating these 3 problems of

 preventing the compromise of an OTP token from affecting the overall security of 2F authentication,

 preventing the OTP token from getting compromised in the first place

 and

 preventing the inside jobs.

Expanded Password System for High-Security Accounts

We could offer a data-separation solution, with which the pictures stay in the user's device while the hashed credentials of extremely high entropy that can stand fierce brute force attacks is stored on the online authentication server. 

Bad guys would have to steal the user's device and find the correct images quickly before the user who noticed the loss of their device gets the accounts blocked. It would be next to impossible with the high-security version of Expanded Password System that comes with such a function as follows.

-Distinguishing certain errors that we are unlikely to commit from the errors that we are apt to make often. This function is expected to screen out bad guys accurately and quickly, while largely mitigating the user's stress.

-And, quietly sending a duress code/signal that is practicable in a panicky situation. There have been a number of suggestions of duress code, but the earlier ones have all been no more than a pipe dream because they are not practicable when we are caught in panic in such a situation as at gun/knife point. Only the memorable images associated with our unforgettable episodic memory enables the practicable duress code.

Technology Obsession and Liberal Arts

‘PIN’ is an abbreviation of ‘Personal Identification Number’, which is unexceptionally used as an authenticator, not an identifier.

‘Password’ is defined by the central police agency as ‘Personal Identification Code’ in a country where I was grown up.

Quite a few people utter such a word as ‘Password Identification’ here and there.

 This awkward phenomenon is found not only in the general public but among the ‘professionals’ of cyber security and identity management, although the difference between ‘identification’ and ‘authentication is unmistakably clear; ‘Identification’ is to give an answer to the question of ‘Who is he/she?’, while ‘Authentication’ is to answer ‘Is he/she the person who claims to be?’

 How on earth would it be possible to mix them up? Our hypothesis is that the field of cyber security and identity management is too heavily populated by single-mindedly technology-obsessed people. 

On the other hand, there are quite a few people who talk about the vulnerabilities of biometrics. But the real problem is well beyond it. Biometrics is not only a major vulnerability but a grave threat to cyber security. 

And yet, there are still so many security professionals who promote biometrics for ‘achieving higher security’.

This deplorable situation has urged me to write a comprehensive analysis of the real picture of security-lowering biometrics - 'Negative Security Effect of Biometrics Deployed in Cyberspace'

Conclusion: We wish to see the people in security and identity management to be more interested in liberal arts or common sense. Digital identity is a problem of philosophy as well as technology.