The Problem With ERISA
Barry Zalma, Esq., CFE
Insurance claims expert, consultant at Barry Zalma, Inc. and author/Publisher at ClaimSchool, Inc.
Posted on?August 17, 2022 ?by?Barry Zalma
ERISA Gives the Insurer Discretion to Make Benefits Decision
Carol Stewart sued Hartford Insurance Company to obtain two insurance benefits that she believes it owes her:
In?Carol H. Stewart v. Hartford Life And Accident Insurance Company, No. 21-11919, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (August 10, 2022) the Eleventh Circuit found itself compelled to follow the statute rather than its own conclusions regarding the availability of coverage to Ms. Stewart.
Hartford contended that although she was insured it concluded that she was ineligible for the benefits she sought.
Hartford’s policy, in accordance with the statutory ERISA statute indisputably granted it discretion to make benefits determinations.
In 2007, prominent Birmingham attorney Carol Stewart’s physician diagnosed her with Parkinson’s disease. At the time, Burr Forman LLP, Stewart’s employer, provided her with disability insurance through its ERISA health plan. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which serviced that plan, began paying Stewart partial, and later total, disability benefits. In 2010, Burr Forman cancelled its policy with Sun Life and switched the administration of its ERISA health plan over to Hartford Insurance.
The new Hartford policy contained an exclusion clause specifying that a member of the firm was ineligible for disability-insurance payments if she was receiving:
benefits for a Disability under a prior disability plan that: 1) was sponsored by [her] Employer; and 2) was terminated before the Effective Date of The Policy.
Because Sun Life was still paying Stewart disability benefits, Hartford found that Stewart was “receiving benefits for [a] Disability under a prior disability plan” that had been “terminated” before its own policy went into effect and, consequently, that she wasn’t eligible for Hartford disability benefits.
Hartford also provided life insurance. Its life-insurance policy specified that one who was “Disabled” needn’t pay premiums for coverage, and it defined “Disabled,” in relevant part, as being unable to perform “any?work for which [one is] qualified by: 1) education; 2) training; or 3) experience.”
Hartford determined that Stewart wasn’t “Disabled” within the meaning of its policy and that she therefore had to pay life-insurance premiums.
Stewart sued only to have the district court grant Hartford’s summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
When reviewing a plan administrator’s benefits decision” this Court conducts the following six-step analysis:
Disability
Since the Burr Forman’s plan vested Hartford with discretion in reviewing claims (Step 2), that Hartford’s interpretation of the provision and its decision in Stewart’s case were “reasonable” (Step 3), and that any conflict of interest that Hartford had (Steps 4 and 5) didn’t lead it to make an arbitrary and capricious determination (Step 6) ERISA required the Eleventh Circuit to agree with the district court that Hartford is entitled to summary judgment.
The relevant policy language states as follows, with emphasis added by the Eleventh Circuit:
领英推荐
If You are receiving or are eligible for benefits for a Disability under a prior disability plan that:
1) was sponsored by Your Employer; and
2) was terminated before the Effective Date of The Policy; no benefits will be payable for the Disability under The Policy.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that if it was acting as a trial judge it tended to disagree with Hartford’s decision.
ERISA itself seems to recognize that a “plan” is distinct from the insurance?policy?that services it. However, because this is an ERISA-benefits case, the analysis requires the Eleventh Circuit to consider five more steps.
Therefore, Hartford had discretion to determine whether Stewart was eligible for benefits under its policy, and it exercised that discretion reasonably.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision rejecting Stewart’s claim to disability benefits.
Did Hartford Correctly Denied Stewart A Waiver Of Life-Insurance Premiums.
It did. Applying the plain meaning of the words in the contractual definition, Stewart was not “Disabled” and thus was not entitled to a waiver of premiums.
First, “work.” In this context, it seems clear to us that the term “work” denotes an effort made to attain one’s income or livelihood. Putting it all together, then, to be entitled to a waiver of premiums, Stewart must have been unable (1) to engage in any means of earning income (2) for which she was competent based on her knowledge or skill acquired over time. Since Stewart?was?able to perform work for which she was qualified by her education, training, and experience since she was educated, trained, and experienced as a lawyer. But she also graduated from high school and college and was thus qualified to perform work requiring less specialized skills, as well.
And here, the record shows that Stewart could sit for a couple of hours, stand for half an hour, and walk for half an hour. It also shows that while Stewart suffered from mild cognitive impairment, she retained the ability to perform less demanding tasks that didn’t require high-level analytical or organizational ability.
While Stewart might not have been able to ply her trade as a lawyer, the record supports Hartford’s determination that she could perform less demanding sedentary work was not unreasonable.
Even assuming that Stewart could work only part-time, that counts as “any work.” The word “any,” that is, expresses a lack of restriction when choosing something from a specified class. Because Hartford’s interpretation was not on a new review wrong, the Eleventh Circuit ended the inquiry at Step 1 and affirm the decision.
In any event, as already explained, Stewart’s insurance policy gave Hartford discretion in deciding benefits claims, and Hartford didn’t abuse that discretion when it determined that Stewart could perform “any work” consistent with her training or experience. Interpreting “any work” broadly to mean any work whatsoever was at the very least reasonable.
To summarize, Stewart was not entitled to disability payments because Hartford’s interpretation of the disability exclusion was reasonable, and its conflict of interest didn’t lead it to make an arbitrary or capricious decision. Likewise, Stewart was not entitled to a waiver of life-insurance premiums because she wasn’t disabled within the meaning of Hartford’s life-insurance policy.
ZALMA OPINION
ERISA is a special statute that allows employers to create a thorough and relatively inexpensive series of benefits for its employees. The result may seem unfair but the decision fits the requirements of the statute\
(c) 2022 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
Barry Zalma, Esq., CFE, now limits his practice to service as an insurance consultant specializing in insurance coverage, insurance claims handling, insurance bad faith and insurance fraud almost equally for insurers and policyholders. He practiced law in California for more than 44 years as an insurance coverage and claims handling lawyer and more than 54 years in the insurance business. He is available at?https://www.zalma.com ?and?[email protected] .
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