Priorities in Counter-Terrorism

Beginning of September, I attended the World Summit of the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, supposedly the largest and most prominent conference on counter-terrorism. Listening to current and former Israeli ministers, chiefs of the Israeli Defence Forces and the Mossad, ministers, ambassadors and intelligence services from many other countries, heads of UN, NATO and EU bodies as well as renown scholars in the field, I have been asked by many about current threats and developments in (counter-)terrorism. Hence, I won’t withhold my take-aways:

So, what are the major concerns of the counter-terrorism community?

a)      Al-Qaeda’s strengthened network and capacities

b)     Returning foreign fighters

c)      Radicalisation in prisons

d)     Second-generation immigrants as most likely to radicalise

e)     Lone-wolf attacks

f)       Cyber-attacks

g)      For Israel: Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas

h)     New means for attacks (e.g. drones, cars, knives)

a)      IS/Daesh is not considered the largest global threat anymore, but al-Qaeda with its global network is. Yet, the effect of IS’ crimes (migration, destabilisation of countries and so forth) and indoctrination of its members will affect our societies for the foreseeable future. The indoctrination and preparation of women and children for attacks has significantly increased in the recent time, posing new challenges to law enforcement authorities.

b)     The threat posed by returning foreign fighters from theatres in Syria or Iraq is a salient concern of security forces and researchers alike. I found Meredith Stricker’s (Executive Director of the Soufan Center) typology of returnees quite useful (ordered by the increasing threat level):

a.      Early leavers that were barely indoctrinated and had little to no experience with arms.

b.      Those disappointed by the leadership, the objectives or the ideology.

c.      Thrill-seekers who appeased their appetite for violence and are trained in combat.

d.      Forced or captured returnees, who are trained in combat and are likely to recruit more fighters, staying committed to their organisation.

e.      Operational returnees with a mission to conduct an attack.

c)      Magnus Ranstorp noted that those returning fighters that are imprisoned for their crimes conducted in combat represent a high risk as they contribute to the radicalisation of fellow inmates. He advocates trials for those foreign fighters directly in the combat locations. An interesting idea, but probably hard to implement as the respective countries have enough problems with their own extremists already. He also noted that denied asylum-seekers may go underground and represent easy prey for radical ideologists – in particular in times of growing polarisation in our societies. Similarly, isolated registration/first-reception camps for refugees (or ‘Ankerzentren’ in Germany) facilitate radicalisation as well.

d)     Regarding immigration, Prof. Fernando Reinares drew the attention to the attack in Barcelona in August 2017, laying out some causes for why it occurred in BCN: one-third of Muslims in Catalonia are Salafists, 9 out of 10 perpetrators were second-generation immigrants from Morocco and its leader was a known radical. The risk that second-generation immigrants are more likely to be confused and seek identification in extreme ideologies is not very novel and its significance has been shown for many other contexts as well (recently it is argued that it even applies to second-generation East Germans being vulnerable to right-wing populism). However, facing the large number of immigrants to Europe rises concern. Hence, intensified integration efforts should receive much more attention. As Prof Teresa de Almeiida e Silva pointed out, securing borders is only half of the game, when individuals radicalise at home (through social and political exclusion).

e)     Prof. Ariel Merari presented a new study on lone-wolf attackers in Israel in the last years. 85% were male and the average age was just 22 years. In interviews with 45 incarcerated lone-attackers between 2015 and 2017 he found that 67% suffer one or more psycho-pathological abnormalities and 33% had suicidal thoughts. He concluded that the conducted attacks, which were mainly directed against security forces (64%) were often driven by the wish to die. As suicide is forbidden in Islam, the attempt to kill was just the means to an end. This is highly interesting, because it is a remarkable difference to suicide attackers known in the last decades, which were recruited, trained and instructed by organisations. Previous attackers mostly did not show any psycho-pathological abnormalities but were selected for their ‘rational’ behaviour. The different personality types also were visible in the pre-attack behaviours, with previous suicide attackers preparing themselves well in advance and lone-attackers mostly acting spontaneously.

Prof. Randall Rogan further develops an exciting model for explaining what makes people perceptible for extreme ideas and actions: the quest for significance. Individuals have the ambition for recognition. Violent acts may provide for some persons a tempting option as they believe it generates symbolic (being remembered as martyr) and literal immortality (live forever in paradise). Hence, for some individuals joining an Islamist terrorist group and seeking death yields the control over one’s own destiny. This quest for significance is an important factor for any radicalisation tendencies, as has been shown for right-wing extremism as well.

f)       The relevance of the internet of things is stale news. However, the striking vulnerability of our infrastructures remains a huge – if not the most pressing – issue. All IT specialists were united in their apocalyptic prediction in that “winter is coming”, because cyber attacks are low cost and can have a high impact. Why would anyone pick up a gun in the future, if an attack from the home-office is so much more convenient?

g)      The threat Hezbollah poses to Israel was a prevalent topic at the conference. I found it intriguing how openly ministers and chiefs of staff of the Israeli Defence Forces warned of an imminent war. Everyone I’ve listened to unequivocally claimed that Hezbollah’s capacities should be diminished rather sooner than later. It was argued that the current period of relative calm is bought at a very high price, as the organisation is constantly upgrading its fire power. However, the inevitable war will be costly and devastating. I was particularly surprised as politicians and the military are aware of the plight Israel is caught in:  It either protects itself and destroys Hezbollah’s arms depots in Lebanon, which will cause many thousand civilian fatalities, because the weaponry is hidden in residential areas. Or it continues to buy time, which increases the costs later in the conflict. One minister emphasised the necessity of preventive attacks: “The best place to meet a terrorist is at 3 am in this bedroom and not at 9 am at the train station where he blows up.” Other high-ranking government advisors addressed directly the role of Iran and demanded that if Iran uses any of its proxies to attack Israel, Israel must retaliate directly against Teheran. My impression was that a military conflict in Lebanon indeed seems inevitable.

The capacities of Hamas in contrast are not viewed as a vital threat to Israel. The organisation is even considered to be weak and isolated, which may facilitate the conclusion of an arrangement. Yet, the weakness of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is a problem for Israel, and the fights for his succession are expected to trigger radicalisation tendencies within the Palestinian community.

The political and academic discourse at the conference and in my experience also in the wider public is relatively tough and intolerant – to put it gently. While Western Europe has been experiencing a shift in ‘politically correct’ forms of expression to a more polarised discourse, I was quite surprised to listen to realist Manichean friend-foe classifications of politics. A case in point is Tzipi Livni’s comment on negotiations with the Palestinians (former Foreign, Justice, Agriculture, Housing and first female Vice Prime Minister; since it was twittered, I can poste it here too): “I don’t care about the Palestinian state, I care about maintaining the Israeli state – which is democratic and Jewish.” Willingness to approach the Palestinian authorities is to my impression quite limited as is a critical reflection on the settlements in the West Bank, although any solution necessitates the approval of and cooperation with the Palestinians. Evidently, the political context forms societal norms and morale quite significantly.

In contrast to the usual framing of the current ‘wave’ of Islamist terrorism in a Huntington west-against-the-rest-style,  a former MI6-spy in al-Qaeda said that “there is no war between Islam and the West […] but a civil war in the Muslim world fought by four factions: 1) Arab nation states, 2) the political Islam, 3) the militant Sunni Islam and 4) the militant Shia Islam.” This is particularly interesting considering the framing of Islam in the West as threat to our societies.

Considering the rather dark picture painted at the conference, I think it is important to take new insights into account, but to never sacrifice or subordinate our liberty rights and democracy to or under the promise to accomplish security. Absolute security is an illusion. I think we have arrived at a point where the costs for achieving a little more security grow exponentially and have been infringing on our freedom. Brian Jenkins formulated it nicely when he said “terrorism is the manipulation of perceptions”. Obviously, we should not underestimate destructive objectives of individuals or groups. At the same time, we should not overestimate terrorist capabilities based on their fantasies. Ultimately, we have the agency to determine how much power terrorists can exert on our minds. It is us who construct anxieties.

Obviously, this is valid for any extreme ideologies. Therefore, it is important to take perceived concerns seriously and recognise sorrows of our fellow citizens. But we should never appease those that spread hatred. We should not play down alarming developments, which we encounter world-wide and in many European societies. It is us who form this world.

Disclaimer: This post reflects my personal views only.