Preventing & Mitigating a Complex Crisis: An Advanced Grid and Transport Technology Black Sky Event

Black Sky Events - an Introduction:

Energy security and reliability lies at the heart of America's economic stability. Today every industrial, commercial, institutional and residential function relies on electricity, which flows through the grid, an interconnected network of power generators, transformers, transmission and distribution lines, substations, and other equipment that increasingly include energy storage facilities. Such high technologies optimise reliability in lieu of added complexity with more renewable and distributed generators augmenting and replacing hydrocarbon-based central power plants. When crisis boils, chain reactions resulting from high-risk technologies are a chief cause (Boin et al, 2017). Private and public sector initiatives to ensure reliability and speedy recovery from large-scale disasters are in the works and in place, but insufficient.

The tides of digitisation - converting information and communication to a digital format, coupled with electrification, or powering by electricity, have enabled innovations in industrial and process automation and supervisory controls. These add to the complexity and give rise to highly interdependent and network systems. At the same time, these technological tides are transitioning our societies towards decarbonized and distributed energy generation, and the success of the energy transition is a key policy area for recent and successive US administrations. Thus preventing complex, multi-site, transboundary or landscape black-out disasters or: black sky events involving energy transition technologies is both of great importance to society and policy makers, as it will be incredibly costly in terms of human and economic suffering and take a long time to recover from them.

By some estimates, half of Americans will be driving an electric car in the next ten years (Jerry 2022). Grid digitisation with deployment of supervisory controls that acquire data and are managed by software (SCADA) enables generators, transmission and distribution operators to quickly adjust to the variability of generation caused by intermittent renewable electricity generation, as well as the frequency disturbances that a multitude of renewable, distributed energy resources (DERs) bring to the grid, and react fast to maintain the required 60hz frequency for normal operations. Grid-scale energy storage (ESS)? is rapidly becoming a technology of choice for facilitating the energy transition as it can act as substitute generation, transmission and distribution equipment and more reactively balance peak demand as well as balance the load, reducing the chance of black outs.?

Global deployment of energy storage is estimated now to reach 358 gigawatt, or 1,028 gigawatt-hours by the end of 2030 (BloombergNEF, 2021), more than double the amount it would take to flatten peak electricity demand in the United States (Hittinger, 2021).?

Electrochemical energy storage comprised of several battery cells packed together is the dominant technology used in both ESS and electric vehicles (EVs). A similar control hardware and software of varying design manages both the vehicles and power plants of the future and both are run mostly on lithium-ion batteries. Even the safest of lithium-ion based battery cells can overheat, emit dangerous and explosive gases, propagate and affect other cells in the battery pack, neighbouring racks through the busbar, cause a cascading fire or thermal runaway event and delfragrate. The battery management systems (BMS) that control the charge and discharge of electricity from EV and energy storage systems can be compromised when connected to the internet. EV batteries can also be targets of cyber attack when they are charging while connected to a charge station that is connected to the internet. Cyber attacks on a BMS and SCADA can turn one or multiple EVs or energy storage systems (ESS) into dangerous, detonating devices, or cause them to not function. It can result in a multi-site, transboundary disaster affecting any number of buildings, vehicles or sites. If the compromise affects grid-connected equipment such an energy storage system or SCADA-managed power plant, it can lead to cascading blackouts. Notwithstanding cyber- terrorism causing thermal runaways, EV and energy storage system battery thermal runaway events are a growing concern on their own as they don't happen infrequently.?

The potential of cyber attack to affect a large number of DERs, ESS, EVs and other SCADA -based grid-connected equipment adds them to the list of technologies of concern for possible black sky events, in addition to powerful geomagnetic storms from the sun or manmade electromagnetic pulses (EMP) emitting from high-altitude nuclear detonations or mobile EMP devices. There is a %4 chance of a solar storm and a 0.7% chance of a severe one, called a Carrington event, each year (Chapman, 2020). Both of these types of events would release radio waves that though not harmful to humans, cause instantaneous electrical power surges and damage sensitive electronic devices which are embedded in virtually every fabric of our society from smartphones to computers, sensors and supervisory controls, enabling them to unleash a long-duration, landscape disaster.

Electrochemical batteries and renewable generators are not affected by EMPs or solar flares, and therefore large-scale deployment of EVs, ESSs, DERs and renewable resources can reduce the possibility and the impact of a cascading grid disaster or a black sky event. Improvements in design, data collection and security standards of these emerging technologies coupled with better information sharing with emergency responders, better training of the fire responders, private sector and public will be needed to reduce the inherent danger of using lithium-ion based batteries, and reduce the chance and impact of cyber and EMP attacks.

Another contributing risk factor is the interdependence of supervisory control technologies with other networked technologies and organisations, many of whom may be located elsewhere geographically. These combined factors in a rapidly advancing and evolving competitive landscape pose immense complexity for emergency responders. Local, tribal, state, and federal institutions, interagency crisis response structures, and current private-public collaboration arrangements are not endowed with the integrated capacity required to prevent and ameliorate a rapidly deteriorating situation with so many interdependencies, coupling and complexities at play.?

For example, a recent emergency response to an ESS thermal runaway event in Arizona resulted in an explosion and life-threatening injuries to several firemen attempting to put the fire out and secure the perimeters from further deterioration. The unfolding event highlighted shortcomings in data collection and sharing about the state of the facility, procedural delays in transferring the emergency response to the hazmat team, incorrect response to what could have been a routine emergency, and has stalled further deployment of such technologies in that state (Wagman, 2020).?

Source: www.cbo.gov/publication/56083

Complexity and Coupling with Advanced Grid Technologies:

The complexities of being in control in a high technology environment are part of its latent conditions (Reason 2016). Being in control of a complex situation demands the capability to anticipate. Discrepancies tend to accumulate until they are past a certain threshold before they are noticed (Klein 2004). In what has been dubbed the Hollnagel’s test, being control in a multicentric and interdependent system means having the ability to navigate and coordinate over interdependencies; and to increase control requires having the ability to identify and track relevant couplings, and anticipate ways that an anticipated actions will expand and propagate across the interdependencies relative to the desired outcome (Woods, 2010). Emergency responders must have the availability of information and ability to sense-make complex scenarios, have expertise and capability to independently assess and collaboratively anticipate things that could wrong to preventing and alleviate disaster and lessen their impact before or in the very early moments they happen - from zero to one.??

Electromagnetic pulse and solar flares

Military research theorises that future wars are focused on incapacitating infrastructures through cyberattacks and electronic warfare (Kim et al, 2020). These attacks can also be lighting, and to a lesser degree, caused by powerful microwave devices (Kim et al, 2020). During the Starfish Prime high-altitude nuclear test in 1962, the US Atomic Agency and Defence Atomic Support Agency accidentally unleashed an EMP accident over Hawaii, damaging wires, transformers and sensitive electronic devices. Similarly, a 1989 geomagnetic storm knocked out electricity across the Quebec province of Canada which has its own grid network for days. With today's pervasive use of sensitive electronic devices, damage would be far more debilitating to society, causing cellular networks, internet communication, bank machines, government, commercial, industrial and public infrastructures from hospitals to education and water to waste management all to fail.

Prevention and mitigation are far less costly than surge capacity and crisis response. Technical preventive solutions include covering sensitive equipment with a Faraday shield. These technologies are increasingly low cost to manufacture and available, but not used on a large scale. The MIL-STD-188-125-1 standard for H/EMP protection is over 17 years old, though has been a good standard for many years; and shielding wires can provide reasonable protection against such attacks (Radasky 2017). There are no regulations requiring such level of preparation outside of military and sensitive government agency areas. Another prevention or mitigation can come in the form of credible, certain early warning to prompt preparation of the grid with surge capacity, backup, shut down and secure sensitive equipment, The Congressional Budget Office has laid out US plans for acquisition and launch advanced space sensor satellites over the next five and ten years to improve such capabilities and minimise the chance of a costly and politically damaging false alarm. Software defined networking technologies (SDN) being developed through the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have emerged recently as highly adaptive frameworks for implementing disaster recovery efforts and can include backup cellular or satellite backup of data to support a speedy recovery or minimise cascading disaster (Oliveira, et al. 2018).

While investor-owned utilities have their own mutual aid agreements to ensure they have surge capacity, such as sufficient transformers available, as these equipment are damaged by EMP or solar flares, policy makers have proposed incentivising suppliers to have more of them as they take a long time to manufacture. What they have not considered is the emerging rise of behind-the-metre, or at-home and small or commercial energy generation and DERs that are paving a way for a bi-directional distribution-level grid where the utilities are on the receiving end of electricity to redistribute elsewhere as well, requiring additional transformers near a substation. This changing landscape may have the potential to alleviate the need for surge capacity in case of early warning.?

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has enacted Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF #14) that supports private sector, interdependent critical infrastructure sectors and complex supply chains that are disrupted in case of cascading events resulting from an EMP or powerful solar flare. However, training that was due to be provided by the Electric Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council planned before the Covid-19 pandemic stalled and has not taken place yet (Ranger 2022).?

Effects of exo-atmospheric nuclear EMP strike. (Source: IEEE Communications Magazine)

Commercialised high-power electromagnetic waves (HPEM) system (source: https://doi.org/10.3390/su122410669)?

Thermal Runaways

Virtually all the batteries used in EVs and ESSs are prone to overheating and thermal runaway. This can take place in less than ten minutes if uninhibited, and can be delayed by more than an hour when battery pack modules are well-designed, or arrested entirely from propagating other cells (Mueller et al, 2022). By using a simple converter, the safety of the design can also be greatly improved (ibid). Commercial lithium-ion compositions range from a more unstable cobalt and manganese, less explosive but hydrogen emitting lithium iron phosphate, less dangerous but still hazardous lithium titanate chemistries. Other technologies such as vanadium batteries can build up undetected hydrochloric acid that can damage life nearby. Solid-state batteries use highly reactive metallic lithium and oxygen from selenium at increased temperatures (Chen, et al 2020). Most thermal runaway causes can be averted with thoughtful design. Propagation of thermal runaway cannot take place when the state of charge (SOC) of a cell is low. NFPA855 sets the fire code for battery storage in the US, and New York City has its own procedure for permitting energy storage (Rosewater 2022). Other hazard mitigations that are voluntary or vary from state to state for ESS include explosion venting and forced ventilation (Mueller et al, 2022).??

Source: Fire Rescue1 (A screenshot from a YouTube video shows a Tesla Model S on fire as a result of a battery fire.)

Sense-making is dependent on sensors and data from the operators and their BMS, which can be unreliable. Lithium phosphate cells for example agglomerate with water and immediately become dangerous, while for all the different cells, water vapour, which builds up as thermal runaway in a cell begins, can potentially get hydrolyzed in the process and release explosive hydrogen gas (Mueller 2022).? Other gases formed when a thermal runaway and propagation event takes place are the release and build up of hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen cyanide and hydrocarbons (Energy 2019). A number of factors such as cost-based procurement decision making, product design shortcomings, early detection flaws, not sharing information with emergency responders early on or at all are among factors that can lead to fire, explosion and risking the lives and properties of people nearby, firemen and emergency response personnel. Fire responders are typically trained to quickly determine either a defensive or offensive strategy for addressing the emergency; such as either going into the site or dealing with it from the outside (Brunacini 2002).?

When emergency responders arrived within 10 minutes of a dispatch call at the McMicken BESS site near Phoenix, they were alerted over two hours earlier by a "bad smell". Consultation with the utility about the course of action led to elevation of the response to the hazmat team, and it took two hours before an offensive action was taken to open the door of the container, hours after the propagation and build up of gases had begun, resulting in an explosion that swept the firefighters several feet away, and badly injured (Wagman 2020). This event could have been treated like a routine emergency had the data and equipment been properly tested, its data vetted by independent experts, and safety related data and information had been shared with the hazmat and fire department nearby. Had the utility designed its own teams as a high reliability organisation (HRO), that regularly looked for errors and tested for failures against hypothetical situations, these issues could have been possibly mitigated. Moreover, the fire department personnel were acting on the information and training they had. In hindsight, a defensive strategy should have been undertaken, while the responders acted heroically to a danger they didn't know enough about.

By contrast in Australia's state of New South Wales where %1 of all fire calls in the first quarter of 2022 were thermal runaway from lithium ion batteries, such emergency response has become more or less a? routine emergency (Fire+Rescue 2022). Its Safety of Alternative and Renewable Energy Technologies (SARET) research program, has seen firefighting, hazmat equipment and capability to include: channel NI data acquisition system, probe-type and surface-type thermocouples, heat flux sensors, load cells and platforms, optical sensors, fire detection control and indicating equipment, flow metres, pressure sensors, high resolution thermal imaging equipment and cameras, Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) gas analysers and portable Gas Chromatograph Mass Spectrometer (P-GCMS) (ibid).

Moreover, in the United State Incident Command System (ICS) training vary across jurisdiction, and emergency response handling of lithium-ion based battery fire concerns and issue is not evenly addressed on a national basis (Pfeifer, 2022).

Source: DNV (https://www.dnv.com/Publications/2019-battery-performance-scorecard)

Cyber attacks?

A battery management hardware for EVs and ESS are similar in that the control detects voltage in various cells and harmonises charge and discharge rates and functions in connection with the power demand from the driveshaft in case of an EV or from the utility trading desk in case of an ESS. A hacker can cause a degradation of the cells by overriding controls and also cause them to overheat. hacking could be that by accessing the networked software or application that manages a few to tens of thousands of EVs an ESSs, the hackers may have the potential of conducting a multi-site, transboundary terrorist attack by causing many batteries to go into a thermal runaway and deflagrate.?

The Department of Energy (DOE) is in the process of introducing a new standard, dubbed P26286 for BMS equipment, which will be going into effect by 2025 (Rosewater 2022). These new standards require more robust physical security as a critical element of cybersecurity, recommendations for allowing access control to users, such as improved password and authentication methods, and more secure software update management and algorithm update methods (Rosewater 2022). However, at the current pace of development, a sizable amount of energy storage and EVs will be operational by the time these standards are at large.?

Additionally, when EVs are connected to a charge station, vulnerabilities in the firmware, mobile and web application are shown to enable hackers to take control of the vehicle's battery systems (UTSA 2022), or? use the auxiliary components to deplete and permanently damage the batteries, while of course attackers are constrained by time for being detected (Sripad 2018).On top of it, SCADA systems used in energy, power and a wide range of industrial uses are vulnerable in a host of ways, and will take a long time to refine and secure them robustly.

The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) promotes information sharing among the over 2000 utilities and provides alerts and warnings to the industry. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which is an operational unit with the DHS are continuously detecting and defending the US infrastructure against intruders. However, the recent SolarWinds hack which affected thousands of organisations including government institutions and major corporations including Microsoft, still remain unsolved, and the hackers, who remain at large while being supposed to be state-backed by China and Russia, have found new ways to override security keys and updated authentication modes (Waldman 2022).

Recommendations

James Reason's swiss cheese accident causation model can be used to show a host of active failures and latent conditions that makes America vulnerable to cascading, landscape disasters and black sky events arising from a cyber attack on battery-based transport and energy infrastructure facilities and unpreparedness by policy makers, responders and the private sector in case of a geomagnetic storm or an electromagnetic pulse attack. While progress is being made, rising geopolitical tensions post-pandemic with so many vulnerabilities in the vastly complex and interdependent network that is the North American grid and its extended family, the electric vehicle fleet is vulnerable to adversary or natural events that can trigger a very large and complex disaster.

Recommendations at the policy level include immediate and expansive training of emergency professionals through FEMA, the federal agency that peovides financial, infrastructure and training support for EMP and solar flare - caused disaster recovery, as well as making a checklist of upgrades to wiring, equipment protection and gamify it with a digital badge. Policy makers also can liaise with the venture capital sector and promote investment in software and hardware innovations that can address EMP recovery, such as the initiatives already proving fruitful through DARPA. Companies handling sensitive technologies used by the masses, such as servers and communication satellites and towers would be well-advised to be incentivized through social nudging and grants to upgrade and get certified status against? magnetic interference.

Active membership and collaboration from the private sector, public announcements through social medias and free training can help the public learn and get more prepared as a large scale disaster such as a black sky event will require a concerted, coordinated, distributed response, and making such an emergent system which will come to rescue the nation more adaptive through feedback - which can come from online training, product adoption and scenario building, among others (Johnson 2001). Massive open online courses such as ones offered by Coursera are among channels available. Examples of such initiatives already exist with the planned but stalled SEF #14 online training through the EIS Council.? Handling a black sky event cannot be achieved top-down, or with activation of the Incident Command System (ICS), as the disaster recovery requires high technology data recovery and distributed energy networks, advanced preparation and equipment surge capacity. It would take years of wait to replace damaged electronic equipment due to a backlog of demand.

Next, electric energy is regulated at the federal and state level, with little oversight at the local level besides permitting around siting and environmental reviews so long as operators have met the fire code. However, when it comes to emergency response in the age of energy transition, it is the local police and fire department that are the first to respond, while having no stake or right to be informed about the state of the charge at energy storage facilities. Having more transparency and real time data and greater stakeholder engagement at the permitting level can slow things down even further at a time it needs to speed up. ESS operators are also well-advised to get to know their emergency responders, offer training as well as train their own team more expertly, and voluntarily share data that may be relevant to emergency responders. It is imperative for early detection and response to be conducted either by the operator's time in the absence of a highly skilled firemen, specifically trained and equipped with tools that enable them in better informed sense-making under a highly complex, dangerous and rapidly deteriorating situation.

The rapid proliferation of software as a service (SaaS) for grid, battery and electric vehicle technology management operations runs the risk of infecting a multitude of users, which can result in a multisite emergency that is complex in a situation requiring rapid communication and sense-making by multiple agencies and governments across city and state boundaries. Many of these software products are designed and developed using interdependent modules, and could expose transport and the energy sector to dangers. Thus a word of caution prevails, and integrating with EVs, the grid, DERs and ESS should require a similar process as obtaining a UL for such technologies. For the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC), a non profit company endowed with the responsibility to ensure grid reliability has information sharing initiatives through subsidiaries like E-ISAC, its concern of coupling and complexity with increased digitisation poses many unknowns. More integrated processes with incumbent generators entering the grid, increasingly smaller in size, less experienced and running a more automated and understaffed organization will reduce the risk to the grid through a joint industry entity for innovation in security and resilience.

The utility industry has widely adapted the ICS model and has demonstrated capability to be responsive, but it lacks industry collaboration to improve supervisory control standards, and be ready for such a high number of electric vehicles as anticipated on the road in the near future. Fire departments are well advised to take heed from the examples in New South Wales and be able to treat most cyber attack and thermal runaways as a routine emergency, lest it spiral out into a disaster and impending crisis.

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