Preventing the “Lone Wolf” Mass Killer in our Society and Organizations

Recent events have again directed our attention, and often our fear, toward what is commonly called the "Lone Wolf" terrorist attacker.   In spite of the unique challenges of such typically home-grown and relatively unpredictable threats, there are steps that we, as individuals and organizations, can take to help prevent and mitigate harm from these attacks.

Over the last several decades I have been conducting security, counter-terrorism and workplace violence consulting and planning for businesses and organizations throughout the U.S. and Europe.

Since 9/11 terrorism experts have been saying that the greatest terrorist threat was against Europe, over the U.S., largely due to the fact that Middle Eastern and North African immigrants don’t assimilate as well in Europe and that the American intelligence gathering and law enforcement systems are much more coordinated and effective.  That has been borne out by the fact that most terrorist mass shootings and bombings in the U.S., no matter what the inspiring cause, have been carried out by “Lone Wolves” who acted independently of the direction of organized terrorist groups such as ISIS, even though they were often inspired by such groups.  On the other hand, attacks in Europe, like Paris, Istanbul and Brussels, were carried out by organized and trained teams under foreign direction.

A rational discussion of what to do about the increasingly common Lone Wolf mass killing has been blurred by our tendency to go to our corners following an incident to conduct wasteful political leveraging and finger pointing.  We’re stuck in an endlessly revolving series of violence, mourning and recriminations; the worst Groundhog Day ever.

Contrary to what many politicians and news pundits are claiming, these Lone Wolves tend to be mentally unbalanced and angry individuals who find causes, whether religious, racial or political, to rationalize and justify their anger and thirst for violence.  Pick your cause, the Internet is an unrestricted fire hose of vitriolic outrage and fear.  You don’t have to be insane on your own any more, there are many cyber-friends out there who will provide comfort, advice and support.  Just like workplace violence perpetrators, these attackers tend to be loners who sit alone in their homes dreaming up conspiracies, personal wrongs and revenge scenarios. 

So, what can be done to defend ourselves against these attackers on a national and business/organizational level?  I would propose several avenues from national and organizational perspectives:

Vigilance and Reporting - Early Warning

The challenge for law enforcement and other governmental investigative and intelligence gathering organizations is that these Lone Wolves usually present few accessible indicators of their intent until it’s too late.  Not being part of a formal terrorist organization, they function on their own and mostly in their heads.  On the other hand they may have somehow demonstrated to family, friends, employers or co-workers their inappropriate outrage, extreme political or religious leanings, actual or veiled threats, signs of the impending end (like giving away all personal property), sympathy or admiration toward other mass attackers, multiple visits to “test” an intended target, and/or sudden or atypical purchases of weapons or weapon-making materials.  Displaying two or more of these indicators should substantially increase the level of concern.

We encourage, “If you see something, say something,” but there are substantial impediments to reporting, especially if it’s against a relative or close friend.  We talk ourselves out of speaking up:  "What if I’m wrong?"  "Could I get in trouble, too?" " Am I being a snitch?"  "He wouldn’t do that – not him."  Add to that cultural impediments against “squealing” and too many people won’t say anything until it’s too late.

It falls to law enforcement and other governmental agencies, publicized by the news media, to provide safe and reasonably confidential channels to report concerns and to encourage use of those channels.  The challenge will be that most of that reporting will be of early signs of potential violence that might not be addressed directly by law enforcement without possibly exacerbating the situation.  It should fall, then, to mental health caregivers to step in to mitigate the threat by providing early intervention care and support, which happens less and less often.  See more on that below.   

Mental Health    

Traditionally, persons going down a dark road could be provided mental health care before they acted upon their demons.  Most persons don’t become violently insane or radicalized overnight.  Their mental health likely deteriorated over months or years with little or no intervention or care.  And then, after they kill, we wring our hands and wonder why they weren’t recognized and helped earlier – as long as that help doesn’t cost us anything. 

I work with hospitals and police departments across the U.S. and I increasingly hear that local, state and national mental health resources are drying up.  A national shame is that some of our most outspoken political leaders have been quietly cutting mental health funding at the national, state and local levels.  One police chief told me that the mentally ill have only two places they can go for help in his community: jail or the Emergency Room, both of which are not equipped nor trained for proper mental health care.  In some states it is virtually impossible to find any help even for the most extreme cases - until they hurt somebody.         

I believe that much of the failing of our mental health system lies in our misunderstanding and lack of appreciation or empathy for mental illness.  We’ll spend billions on cancer research and relegate mental health to the forgotten back shelf at our peril.

Weapons

While I will tread lightly on this sacred ground, let us consider, from a risk management and vulnerability planning perspective, what the objectives of an intended mass shooter or killer are.  He or she knows that they have a very limited window of opportunity, usually only minutes, to kill and maim as many people as possible before the targets scatter and law enforcement responds.  Therefore, whatever weapon is chosen must meet those criteria, often being bombs, high-capacity assault weapons and/or vehicles.

While the weapon is only a part of the mass killing or terrorism equation, it is a necessary part, and should be openly and fairly discussed.

Protection Measures – Your Organization’s Planning and Roles

So, what can businesses and organizations do to protect themselves from such attacks?

With the foundation of a strong working relationship with local law enforcement and, as needed, state and federal law enforcement agencies, I believe that comprehensive security and workplace violence programs will still be effective, except for those facilities or sites that might be considered high risk terrorist targets including large public venues. 

We must always keep in mind, of course, that there is never 100% secure.  We still need to live our lives and do business, so we must accept some risks and must plan for those unlikely worst-case scenarios.  After all, fear is what they most desire from us.

A comprehensive security and workplace violence program that will, in most cases, address the domestic terrorism threat should be composed of at least the following components:

• Perhaps above all, fostering a strong sense of vigilance, protectiveness, awareness, ownership and engagement by all employees.  Even many on-site security or law enforcement staff will not see and hear everything.  Your people are the true front line and all employees should be part of the Safety and Security Team.  See more below on early warning indicators.
• Strategically planned and synergistic physical and procedural security measures that address your true risks, threats and vulnerabilities and that reflect the Layers of Protection approach – ideally the attacker must pass through one or more layers before accessing his/her intended target(s).   Security and violence/terrorism vulnerability assessments can help determine those risks and vulnerabilities and evaluate existing and planned preventive, mitigation and response measures.
• What has turned out to be a key tool in the investigations of these attacks has been video recordings of the suspect(s) movements before and during the attack.  Because these video records have been widely publicized following these attacks it could be assumed that the visible presence of cameras could be a deterrent in themselves.  It therefore behooves organizations to consider:
•        Do you have video cameras that can view and record all likely approaches to and within your campus or facility?
•        Has your video system been upgraded in recent years to assure a proper level of resolution and clarity?
•        Do you record these views for at least two weeks, ideally for a month?
• Staff training including recognizing the early indicators of potential violence and terrorism as well as suspicious behavior, de-escalation techniques, how and why to report, safely managing confrontational and threatening behavior, fostering security and safety awareness and ownership, and safe response to active threats and attackers. Especially remember to train and protect your front-line “gatekeepers” such as receptionists.
• Management and supervisory training including the above as well as openly accepting and passing along employees' suspicions and concerns, assuring that staff understand their responsibilities, how and when to communicate the threat, safely managing the triggering or precipitating event, etc.
• Team-based mitigation and threat management processes to identify and safely manage the problematic and potentially violent employee, contractor, patient, family member, customer, resident, patron, etc. especially if they may be facing a precipitating event such as a termination, refusal of service or other bad news
• A blend of internal communications media to, as best as possible, assure all persons understand and hear what to do during an active threat that could include public address, intercoms, mass/blast texts/emails/calls, computer banners and pop-ups, etc.
• Physical response and protective systems that could include quick and remote lockdown capability, safe rooms/shelters (to buy time), bollards and other barriers, panic/duress buttons and call boxes, video surveillance and recording, access and egress control, competent and visible security/police staff, alarms, lighting, visitor management and screening, contraband detection, facility and environmental design, etc.
• Consider: why would your facility or site be chosen over another?  Planning in reasonable levels of deterrence, or making yourself less attractive as a target, is essential.  Terrorists, like most criminals, are opportunists and choose targets they can most easily enter and compromise.
• Unified Incident Command considerations including how to and what to communicate in those critical first few minutes, the roles of law enforcement and other emergency responders, keeping all constantly informed and supported including those proximate to the event, the rest of the people in the building and all people in the organization.  Note that the nature of threats can vary substantially and appropriate responses can vary which could include shelter in place, partial or full evacuations, partial or full lockdown, etc.
• Active Threat training, table-tops and drills.  Note that most violent events, including active shooters and terrorists, take place in less than five minutes, seldom more than ten, so training and drills should mostly focus upon what to do before law enforcement responders arrive.

Early warning indicators of a potential domestic terrorist attack could include comments supporting or sympathetic to Jihadist causes such as ISIS, Internet and social media browsing of Jihadist sites, "scoping out" a site or facility, noticeable changes in attitude, testing or questioning of existing security measures, etc.  

It should be noted that, like any workplace violence, the nature of the active killer or terrorism incident will vary by the nature of your organization.  Typical attacks and attackers and their methodologies differ, for example, among schools, healthcare, retail, manufacturing, theaters, etc.  There should be no cookie cutter prevention or response planning.    

Bottom line, while we cannot prevent every act of violence or terrorism, there are things we can do if only we have the courage and if only we value our safety and nation above political posturing.  We put a man on the moon, we can do this.