Press Conference of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on 31.08.2024 – Analysis, Part I

On August 31, 2024, the long-awaited press conference of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan took place, where he addressed current issues. This press conference became the shortest during Pashinyan's tenure (a little over 2 hours) and was attended by a minimal number of journalists. In Part I, a detailed analysis of the Armenian Prime Minister's statements regarding domestic political issues in Armenia and Armenian-Russian relations will be presented.

I. On Concepts of Statehood and the Return of Armenians to Karabakh (Azerbaijan)

In response to a question about the upcoming goals of the Armenian government, PM Nikol Pashinyan stated that balanced foreign policy and peace programs would be one of the ultimate tasks.

The Armenian PM also mentioned the concepts of "Homeland - State" and "Present," which, in his opinion, are recognized by Armenian society. According to Pashinyan, Armenia is not a tool for serving any larger country but exclusively a tool for ensuring the well-being of its own citizens (1).

This opinion can be interpreted as a message to the revanchist forces in Armenia, who still entertain the idea of "returning Karabakh." The confirmation of this is that, in another question about the likelihood of Armenians returning to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, the Armenian PM described this as unrealistic and contradictory to the state interests of Armenia, urging Armenian displaced persons from Azerbaijan not to emigrate and to apply for citizenship of the Republic (2).

Another interesting statement about Karabakh (Azerbaijan) was the PM's remark that he did not sign the decision to dissolve "Nagorno-Karabakh" (3), once again throwing shade at representatives of the "Karabakh clan" in the person of Samvel Shahramanyan. It is worth noting that Pashinyan's unofficial conflict with the "Karabakh clan," represented by figures like Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, is no secret and has always been on Armenia's domestic political agenda. His response once again confirms that not only does Pashinyan not intend to support any revanchist plans, but he will also suppress any provocative actions on their part.

The third confirmation of this is his response to a question about the so-called former "State Minister of Karabakh," Ruben Vardanyan. Pashinyan indirectly, but once again through Vardanyan, criticized the Russian authorities, referring to the fact that it was the Kremlin that initially sent him to Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and then distanced itself from him (4).

II. Russian-Armenian Relations, CSTO, and the 102nd Russian Base in Armenia

Nikol Pashinyan's statements about relations with Russia at this stage were quite remarkable. It is worth noting that throughout almost the entire press conference, journalists periodically expressed an openly anti-Russian stance, asking questions as if expecting anti-Russian remarks from the Prime Minister. However, the head of the Armenian government not only refrained from criticizing Russia but also responded diplomatically in several instances.

For example, when asked about Armenia's participation in the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), the PM responded that he considers Armenia's decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO to be sufficient at this stage (5). He added that he could not specify the exact day or timeline for Armenia's withdrawal from this military block. Regarding the functioning of the Russian military base in Gyumri, Pashinyan stated that he had "no issues" with it (6).

Concerning the departure of Russian customs officers from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport, the Armenian prime minister remarked that this event was not a "conflict issue" with Russia but rather part of a "partnership and mutual respect." He referred to Russia’s limited capabilities, particularly "in the current situation" (likely referencing Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine).

As for the popular assertion within the Armenian community that Russia "begins to get nervous" as the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia approaches, Pashinyan categorically rejected this notion, stating that it is inappropriate to speak insultingly or sarcastically about other countries, especially a country like the Russian Federation. According to the prime minister, his relationship with Vladimir Putin is based on mutual respect (7).

The tone of Pashinyan's responses about Russia was interpreted by the Armenian expert community as an attempt by the prime minister to realign Armenia under Russia’s influence, given the government’s unfulfilled expectations from Western partners.

Resume

• It is confirmed that the current Armenian leadership is not interested in playing revanchist cards against Azerbaijan. It is important to note that this approach also contradicts the current situation and negotiation agenda with Baku.?
• It is confirmed that Nikol Pashinyan has not changed his stance toward former representatives of the so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh," some of whom are currently in Armenia (particularly Samvel Shahramanyan, Serzh Sargsyan, and Robert Kocharyan).
• It is confirmed that Pashinyan will frame any potential competitor (for example, Bagrat Srbasian, who is driven by revanchist ideas) as part of the "pro-Russian influence network in Armenia." This approach aligns with Baku’s stance as well.
• It is plausible that Pashinyan does not wish for the return of the leaders of the Karabakh separatists, including Ruben Vardanyan, and is unlikely to take any initiatives regarding them.
• It is confirmed that Pashinyan's government will not escalate relations with Russia further, at least until early 2025, preferring a balanced policy. However, the Armenian government will limit itself to fully freezing its activities in the CSTO and will continue this trajectory, favoring military exercises with Western partners such as the U.S.
• It is possible that Pashinyan's remarks about respectful relations with Russia are merely diplomatic moves. At this point, it would be naive to assume that Armenia will rely on Russia’s perspective in solving its key foreign policy issues.

Sources:

1. ?? ????????????? ????? ????????? ? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ?? ??????????, ???????????? ?????????????? ???????? ????????? ??. ???????? – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1198716?

2. ?????????? ?? ? ???????? ? ?? ??????? ???????. ????????? ?????????? ? ?? ??????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???? ??????????????? – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1198720?

3. ???????? ???????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ?? ??? ?????????. ???????? – https://verelq.am/hy/node/149175?

4. ??? ?????? ??????????? ????????? ??, ??, ??? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ???? ?? ?. ????? ???????? – https://www.panorama.am/am/news/2024/08/31/????????-?????????/3047375?

5. ????-?? ????? ????? ?? ? ??? ??? ????? ????. ???????? – https://news.am/arm/news/840241.html?

6. ???????? 102-?? ???????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??????? ??????? ???????? – https://www.aysor.am/am/news/2024/08/31/?????????/2322046?

7. ?? ?????? ???????????, ???????? ??????? ????? ??? ????????, ???????? ??–? ???? ????? ?????. ???????? – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1198734?