Power Consolidation Drive of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru: Process & Consequences

The process of consolidation of power is seen as a result of deliberate choices made by various political actors who try to reinforce the arenas of various socio-political institutions, the economy of the land, the rule of law and the civil society into their grip-hold. Unlike any other trial for power consolidation in India, the one by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was dual phased, where he first had to phenomenally raise his position within the Indian National Congress (INC) during the independence movement and then had to strengthen his position as the first Prime Minister of independent India despite having strong contemporaries such as Sardar Vallabhai Patel. He is one of the very few neo-radical neo-nationalists who remained critical during both the periods of freedom struggle and its aftermath. Politically lustrated by the like-minds of MK Gandhi and Motilal Nehru, his father, Jawaharlal Nehru redefined the idea of nationalism through the lens of a unique socialistic pattern derived from his interpretations of classical Marxism and a version of capitalism derived under the aegis of British colonialism. Unlike any other political master of the post-independent India, who were just handling the pre-conditioned nation, Nehru had the responsibility to condition independent India into a sovereign republic, which was earlier subject to centuries of continuous invasions.

From being an armchair politician in the earlier phases of his life to becoming one of the most central figures of the Indian political milieu, Nehru was utterly aware of the acute logistical difficulties that might arise due to the sudden transition from the tyrannical colonial rule to a sovereign independent democracy. Thus he chose to strategise a few ingredients of national integration to consolidate power, which included: (i) Constitution based on consensus and accommodation (sometimes by diplomatically deceiving the opposition); (ii) An unwritten rule of Nehruvian secularism; (iii) Democratic setup & Federalism (however, with the power consolidated with the centre & himself); (iv) Linguistic reorganisation of states; (v) The ideals of Socialism; (vi) The Planning Commission, Five-year plans & the industrialisation policy; and finally (vii) Foreign policy & Non-Alignment.

After taking charge, the primary task of Nehru was to make the constitution acceptable to all sections of the society and to make it accommodative to diverse interests and ideologues. Though this task was primarily performed through accommodative means, a few were done through a narrative of deception, where various oppositions found the policies well at that point of time but could not realise the future implications. A few of such deceptions included the omission of the word ‘Secular’ from the constitution and the stipulations of the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Uniform Civil Code.

Nehru considered his power to be highly sacrosanct. Thus, his implementation of ideal-on-paper policies often turned out with the intentions of appeasements. In such a trial to cover up for his vote bank politics, he converted a religiously Hindu-majority nation like India into such a liberal and secular state that would never want to touch the personal laws of the minorities unless they ask for it, and at the same time, that would never think twice to tamper with the laws of the majority Hindu populace for the sake of ‘communal harmony’, despite the stipulations of Directive Principles of State Policy.

‘Positive Secularism’ is a very politically ideal concept that conceptualises that a state should not tend towards religious and sectarian denominations but should keep itself away from religions in a path towards genuine socialisation. However, in the Nehruvian model of secularism, no one was sure whether the concept was a policy, a strategy, or an expediency of prudence. Despite his own dilemma regarding the term secularism, it is interesting to note that before the forceful enshrinement of the term ‘secular’ in the constitution with the 42nd amendment during the emergency period, the term was neither mentioned anywhere in the objective resolutions nor in the draft constitution; nevertheless, the term was widely accepted solely out of popular loyalty to Nehru and his charismatic personality as a freedom fighter. Such an imposition of Nehruvian secularism into the Indian ethos without any formal inductance, and without understanding it properly has had a humongous effect on the Indian polity. In fact, such a model has developed parochial communal interests among the then minority religious institutions, which saw an opportunity to propagate religion freely. It has been opined in several instances that, with such a view, Nehruvian secularism has, in fact, damaged the Indian ethos with a different form of communalism. Brig. B.N. Sharma, in his book ‘India Betrayed: The Role of Nehru’, writes:

“His [Nehru’s] actions, deliberate and inadvertent, encouraged a separate Muslim identity in the Indian polity whose thoughts and actions were not always co-terminus with the national ethos. By instilling a sense of insecurity in the Muslim minds and thereby encouraging a ghetto mentality and posing as their champion, he berated and denounced the so-called Hindu majority as communal, hoping to create a permanent Hindu-Muslim schism and vote-bank for the Congress… His successors perpetuated the game…”.

Thus, it is alleged that Nehruvian secularism was based on a policy of power consolidation to appease the minorities through the eyes of election benefits and such a regrettable secular attitude towards masses for mere materialistic benefits has deeply affected the socio-politico-legal setup of the Indian democracy. However, it is also true that such deceptions carried out by Nehru also hold a moralistic ground, as he had the mantle to not let the country to chaos immediately after the independence and he had to do something to maintain socio-communal control.

Nehru, on a popular conscience, was a true democrat who kept a firm faith in the principles of parliamentary democracy and federalism. In spite of such a popular notion, he has very cleverly established for himself, the political imperatives established by Nehru could not let the democratic setup of India function in the way the constitution was envisaged. A strong advocate of a powerful centralised authority of power, Nehru has established an unquestionable one-party dominance from the Indian National Congress in the Indian federalism in such a way that no other leftist, rightist, or regional party could even come closer to its level. A couple of very evident examples of the same could be the invocations of Article 356 in the Punjab and East Patiala States Union against the Gian Singh Rarewala’s (who later joined the Congress soon after his dismissal) government (the only non-Congress government in the then independent India) in March 1953, and in the state of Kerala in July 1959 against the E. M. S. Namboodiripad’s government (the first-ever elected communist government, the removal of which led to a massive rise of communism in the Indian political scenario). Such an undemocratic and regressive encroachment of Nehru’s central authority over federal constitutional units and political parties has put a massive barricade on the formidable rise of the ‘Indian Opposition’, regrettably, the same thing that the present-day INC falsely whines about, blaming the BJP led government.

Nehru was politically sound to foresee the legitimate organisation of the Indian Union and was successful in setting up the States’ Reorganisation Commission in 1953 following the movement led by Potti Sriramulu for a separate state of Andhra Pradesh. However, he did not allow the linguistic reorganisation of Punjab to not let a Sikh majority state on the borders of Pakistan. Though some people argue that this was a causal effect of the emergence of the Kashmir problem in 1953, this argument cannot be wholly held true, as this problem was, in turn, a sight of negligence from Nehru, as he was very well aware of the fact that Punjab was the only buffer region between the National Capital Region of Delhi and the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, with the creation of regional committees in 1956 for addressing the Punjabi Suba and Haryana Prant demands, Nehru could have easily foreseen the dangers of the demands of the Sikh Homeland movement of 1969 and the Khalistani movement of 1984. However, for the reasons of gaining materialistic political benefits, Nehru chose to show voluntary negligence towards the same, which are, in the present days, causing considerable troubles in the border regions of Punjab with even the most unfortunate infiltration of Khalistani forces into the Red Fort in the guise of farmers and the desecration of the most sanctimonious ground. Even though it is pertinent to establish that the Khalistani problem is the outcome of the failure of the Akali Dal and the negotiations of Indira Gandhi, the root cause of this issue sown by Nehru cannot be unconsidered.

Even though Nehru was a huge advocate of Socialism in India, it is arguably assertable that the notwithstanding exhibition of socialistic principles of Nehru and the INC was nothing but the building of an absolute independent capitalistic framework in the disguise of socialism. It is interesting to note that the term ‘socialist’ was added to the preamble of the constitution only with the 42nd amendment in 1976 during the emergency period, along with the word ‘secular’. For example, considering the agricultural sector, even though the legislation of progressive land reforms such as the abolition of the Zamindari and Ryotwari systems by the Nehru government were effective, they have been highly alleged that these reforms were virtually accountable for the growth of the agricultural sector on the lines of capitalism. Furthermore, it was established in the Report of the Second Agricultural Enquiry (1956-57) of the Planning Commission that Nehru could not dare apply strict land ceiling against landlords and big farmers with the least concerns towards the legitimate rights of small farmers towards lands. Furthermore, some of the critical recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Commission too were conveniently left out of adoption, such as the levying of annual tax on total wealth and ceiling on net income. Such a reading of essential facts wipes out the celebrated portrayal of Nehru and his INC as flagbearers of socialism and establishes how their strategies of power consolidation by deceiving the agrarian society have had a long-lasting impact on the current agricultural milieu.

It is popularly conceived that the idea of ‘national planning’ is always central to Nehru’s socio-economic ‘revolution’. Propagation of a notion that Nehru possessed a modernising ideology and a definite policy programme, right from the pre-independence era, has, in fact, helped Nehru form a formidable strength-hold in the Indian political structure. It was propagated even within the Congress that the ‘planning’ programme of Nehru was radical in intent and had the potential to attract both western intelligentsia as well as the oppressed minorities towards them. However, after coming to power, the desire of the Congress to radically reform India was overridden by Nehru’s hunger for power stability. One of the finest examples of this is the Industrial policy of Nehru in 1948. Unlike Gandhi, Nehru was a staunch advocate of industrialisation. However, opposite to what it was popularly conceived, this policy of Nehru was neither socialistic nor was it a revolution. It was made clear that his government’s economic activity of public ownership would be confined to only those areas where private enterprises were not active: in simple words, atomic energy and railways (an existing state monopoly). When this was contested in the Constituent Assembly questioning his ‘socialistic’ principles and ‘nationalisation’, he replied that India should not injure the existing structure as there has been enough destruction, and he was not brave enough to destroy anymore. Such acts of Nehru are conclusive that his entire approach to the so-called ‘planned development’ is almost entirely emotional and that he had almost no substantive regards about the socio-economic functioning of the society. While it is agreeable that the decisions made were circumstantial, it is also to be duly noted that better approaches could have been opted for.

Nehru’s government then constituted the National Planning Commission in 1950, through which he started what are called ‘five-year’ plans. Though the planners argued that the first five-year plan (1951-56) of public works and agriculture was a success, it is to be established that it was only an objective success and was clearly unambitious. Furthermore, after the Avadi Resolution of 1955, when the second five-year plan was launched for industrial development, it was established that it would adopt an industrial pattern of the society. Even here, there was neither an explicit mention of ‘nationalisation’ nor was a liberal hand given to the private enterprises which had to work ‘within the national framework’. Moreover, with the drastic impact of weather on harvests, imports requiring foreign exchange were banned, and new taxes were imposed, raising the taxes on consumer goods. Such performances of both the five-year plans, especially the second, have revealed that the essential weakness of planning in India is none other than the profound influence of Nehru and his political hunger. With his pseudo-socialistic ideals, which always aimed for power, Nehru took hold of the chairmanship of both the Planning Commission and the National Development Council simultaneously. This had a lasting effect on India’s planning legacy until the constitution of NITI Aayog in 2015.

Nehru always advocated for India’s strong position in geopolitics, and he himself has played a considerable role in international affairs. He was one of the primary pillars of the celebrated principles of Panchasheel (the five principles of peaceful coexistence) and the foundations of non-Alignment. Derivatives of these pillars, according to Michael Edwardes, sum up Nehru’s approach to foreign affairs: an apparent awareness of the purpose of foreign policy, a high moral tone, and a general air of unreality. Apart from the regular criticisms that it drew – that the foreign policy was Gandhian and Buddhist/pacifist, there is a substantive establishment to be made clear. It was the Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai who introduced the five principles for the first time during the Indo-Sino bilateral talks of 1954. It was only that the leader of the Indian delegation accepted that though India did not formulate these principles, it has been followed since their independence. Whatever the case, though partial success could be attributed to this policy, it is an arguable fact considering the current geopolitical setting that Panchsheel was more or less a moralistic claptrap that was a derivative of Nehru’s perversive anxiety to see himself embedded in Indian history. It was highly panglossian to establish the status quo of the situation between India and China, despite the ‘Hindi-Cheeni Bhai-Bhai’ jargons that were propagated throughout. Not helping in any way with the local defence, all it could do was raise hopes among Indians, which it could never fulfil. Only if Nehru had a clearer vision of the border tension that could arise with the Chinese (which he conveniently ignored to embark himself as a non-violent politician), New Delhi would never have seen such tense border tensions with Beijing.

Speaking of the policy of non-Alignment, as a policy of friendship (which was even applied to China), no matter how well it was propagated for the rest of the world, it did not apply to Pakistan. Constant tension formulated at the borderlines with Kashmir let Pakistan enter miscellaneous western treaty organisations, the membership of which gave it a massive number of American weapons, which it could have never afforded. All of this was conveniently ignored by Nehru. To make it worse, not only did Nehru agree to a so-called ‘fair and impartial plebiscite’ in 1947, the Indian delegate at the UN Security Council in 1948 claimed that “the accession of Kashmir to India was not irrevocable and that after the emergency was over, the people of Kashmir would be free to ratify the accession, or accede to Pakistan or even to go independent if they so wished”. After making such huge statements, Nehru refused to proceed with the plebiscite after Mountbatten’s departure, citing legal excuses. Now the questions remain: Why did Nehru promise a plebiscite?; Why was the issue taken to the United Nations?; How did Mountbatten have an impact on Nehru’s stance of having a plebiscite?; Does it have something to do with the Mountbatten Papers that the UK is hiding? Was the commitment made without adequate thought, after all the exoduses of Kashmiri Hindus, even after it was so clear of the result as predicted by the Indian Intelligence and the first UN Commission for Kashmir? Had there been a better solution for the Kashmir problem, which would have been solved by now, if not for Nehru? All remain for us to speculate.

Such was the legacy of Nehru, and the impact of his self-ascertained politics on Indian history. While a good amount of success could be attributed to his presence and his hard work in the Indian Independence movements, one should also be aware of the facts mentioned in the arguments made in this article, before making a fair judgement on the power consolidation processes in the history of Indian democracy.

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