POSTMORTEM AFGHANISTAN: WHY THE USA AND WESTERN ALLIES LOST THE WAR

On October 7, 2001, President George Bush declared war on Afghanistan as a legitimate response to September 11, 2001 terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on the United States. Within two months the Taliban had been driven out of power, its Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups scattered, and a US-backed new transitional government established in Kabul in early 2002.

Thus began the longest war in its history, a war which four American presidents ( Bush, Obama, Trump, Biden) had to grapple with, and one that would be ended by President Joe Biden on August 31, 2021. The Taliban are back in power, just as they were before they were overthrown by the US-led invasion in 2001.

The 20-years Afghan war has been extremely expensive in terms of American, coalition and Afghan lives lost or injured, and treasure spent. The shock and awe of the successful US-led invasion of 2001 sharply contrasts with the last days of August 2021 of a hasty, dangerous and disorganized evacuation and withdrawal: the lighting moves of the Taliban to take over the country in just ten days, the meltdown of the Afghan government and the security apparatus the US and allies had built over 20 years, the pandemonium and dramatic scenes as desperate Afghan civilians chase and cling to a US military plane on the runway, the deadly terrorist attack at Kabul Airport that left 200 dead including 13 servicemen and women, and the obvious feelings of fear and abandonment by millions of Afghans ( especially girls and women) who now stand to lose the rights they had gained.

It is often said success has many fathers and failure an orphan. The blame game rages on, and the debate as to what went right or wrong will feature in foreign policy and military academies for years and decades ahead.

First, the open-ended US and allied foreign military intervention ended up being perceived as foreign occupation, emboldening fierce resistance from the Taliban and only lukewarm transactional commitment from Afghan allies.

Second, the grand designs by the US and its allies to re-invent Afghanistan was bound soon or later to hit a dead end. Legitimate, inclusive and sustainable nation-building is a perpetual endeavor, undertaken by a nation's citizens because they have imagined a community to which they belong, a cause for which they are willing to kill and die for. It was the fourth time in history for the British to fight a war in Afghanistan, and the second major war for the US after Vietnam. Lessons are abundantly clear if only people listen to the footsteps of history.

Third, the politicians in US and Western capitals, alongside intelligence officials and generals who shaped the course of war became victims of groupthink. Anomalies in the conduct of war, which would have been the basis of finding innovative ways of fighting terrorism and helping Afghan people to be on their own, became a recipe for getting more mired into investing more lives and treasure in a loss-making venture.

Fourth, although marketed initially as a joint effort by the US and its allies that had a blessing of the international community, with the extended stay it essentially became a US problem. With time, most coalition allies had symbolic commitment, while regional actors ( like Pakistan) and big powers (Russia and China) took advantage of the American Afghan problem. The United Nations, whose written mandate is supposedly to prevent and end conflicts, and take a lead in supporting country-driven nation building, is, as usual hostage to the whims of big power interests or else an ineffectual talk show.

Fifth, the Afghan war gradually was influenced by US domestic politics, election cycles and the perennial Republican-Democratic divide. If, as military strategists defined it, war is a continuation of politics by other means, the powerful and courageous US military was fighting amidst protracted political strife at home. No amount of additional money, lives of men and women, and time could rectify the self-inflicted American political deficit.

Sixth, and finally, most of the 7.9 billion inhabitants of this world in their 195 nations of this era look at the US and the West sometimes with awe and amazement at their accomplishments, and often with confusion as to their values and how to engage. In the tough neighborhood of Afghanistan, a governance deficit prevails and persists as a rule, not an exception. By no small measure the US and the West have historically contributed to the creation and maintenance of this status-quo, for strategic and geopolitical reasons. For many of the ordinary people and genuine voices of change, touting a values-driven foreign policy by the West is a difficult sell. It is in the mosques, madrasas and social networks that the battle lines are drawn in the struggle to influence hearts, minds, and action. Violent and religious extremism finds fertile ground in the marginalisation of people. Foreigners. high technology, money, and military might are not sufficient, nor even primary way, to effect fundamental change.

It is time to revert to the drawing room, to burn more midnight candles in search of good questions to answer in a changed and fast changing world. This is the best way to honor the dead and maimed in the Afghan war, and to re-engage with the Afghan people.