Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): Pioneering the Future of Automotive Security
Santosh Kumar, FIP, CISSP, PMP, CISA, CHFI, CIPM,CIPP,AIGP
Cybersecurity & Data Protection Leader | CISO & DPO Expertise | GenAI Architect | Fellow of Information Privacy (FIP) ?? IIT Madras| IIM Indore
Introduction
The automotive industry is at the brink of a revolutionary transformation, propelled by the integration of advanced software and enhanced connectivity features. These advancements offer unparalleled flexibility, continuous updates, and enriched user experiences. However, the increased digitalization and connectivity of vehicles also open new avenues for cyber threats. Enter Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)—a cutting-edge approach designed to safeguard communications and data against the looming threat posed by quantum computers, which have the potential to break traditional cryptographic algorithms.
The Security Challenge in Modern Vehicles
As vehicles become more software-centric and connected, they increasingly become targets for cyber-attacks. Cybercriminals could exploit vulnerabilities to seize control of critical vehicle functions, leading to catastrophic consequences. While current cryptographic measures are effective, they may falter against the formidable capabilities of quantum computers, which can solve complex mathematical problems at unprecedented speeds.
Understanding Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
What is PQC?
Since quantum computers represent a distinct and potentially more powerful paradigm for computing than the classical computers in use today, cryptographic security needs to be reassessed for a world where quantum computers may proliferate, enabling new cryptographic attacks that would not be possible using classical computers.
These attacks may occur in future on data that is being transmitted or stored now known as harvest now, decrypt later, so it is not sufficient to wait until the required systems are available, but to make changes now.
The field of quantum-safe cryptography (QSC) encompasses efforts to identify and develop cryptographic schemes that can withstand attacks both from quantum and classical computing systems. This is also sometimes called quantum-resistant, or post-quantum cryptography.
The development of general-purpose quantum computers poses risks to a number of traditional cryptographic primitives such as symmetric key algorithms, cryptographic hash functions, and asymmetric key algorithms.
The most significant impacts of quantum algorithms occur in the context of asymmetric key cryptography, where Shor's algorithm offers a polynomial-time solution to the prime factoring and discrete logarithm problems. Therefore, asymmetric cryptosystems based on factoring and discrete logarithms need to be replaced by new quantum-safe cryptography schemes.
This is in contrast to the symmetric key and cryptographic hashing protocols impacted by the Grover and BHT algorithms, where the quantum speedups are not super-polynomial. Therefore, in this latter case, existing algorithms such as AES and SHA-256 can be fortified at least in the medium term by ensuring sufficiently long key and hash lengths.
Current Cryptographic Landscape
Symmetric Cryptography: Breaking AES-256: Classical vs. Quantum Perspectives
Classical Perspective: AES-256, the Advanced Encryption Standard utilizing a 256-bit key, is celebrated for its robustness in safeguarding sensitive data. Theoretically, AES-256 provides 2^{256} possible keys, rendering brute-force attacks virtually impractical using classical computational resources. For a brute-force attack scenario where a classical computer tests approximately 1 million keys per second, the estimated time to exhaustively search through all possible keys would amount to approximately 3.67× 10^{63} years. This protracted duration underscores the security AES-256 affords against contemporary computational power, making it a cornerstone of modern cryptographic protection.
Quantum Perspective: Quantum computing introduces the potential to leverage Grover's algorithm, which offers a quadratic speedup for searching through unsorted databases. Applied to AES-256, Grover’s algorithm reduces the effective search space from 2^{256} to 2^{128} operations. Despite this substantial reduction, even under optimistic conditions where a quantum computer performs one trillion operations per second, the estimated time required to break AES-256 would still span approximately 1.08×10^{19} years. This quantum advantage, while significant, suggests that AES-256 remains secure against quantum threats in the foreseeable future, providing a considerable buffer against potential quantum attacks.
Resources:
Asymmetric Cryptography: Breaking RSA-2048: Classical Vulnerabilities and Quantum Resilience
Classical Vulnerabilities: RSA-2048, based on the difficulty of factoring large composite numbers, remains a key cryptographic mechanism. The most efficient classical factoring algorithm, the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS), would necessitate approximately 8.2×10^{22} years to factorize a 2048-bit RSA key. This time complexity highlights RSA-2048’s resilience against classical attacks, assuming no substantial breakthroughs in factoring algorithms.
Quantum Advantage: The advent of Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm designed for efficient integer factorization, presents a formidable challenge to RSA-2048. Shor's algorithm operates in polynomial time, significantly reducing the problem complexity. On a sufficiently advanced quantum computer, RSA-2048 could potentially be compromised within a few hours. This capability underscores the need for a transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms.
Resources:
Hash Function: Breaking SHA-256: Hash Function Vulnerabilities
Classical Security: SHA-256, a cryptographic hash function producing a 256-bit hash value, offers 2^{256} possible outputs. This vast space makes brute-force attacks against SHA-256 infeasible with current classical computing capabilities, ensuring robust protection for hashed data.
Quantum Considerations: Grover's algorithm also applies to hash functions, such as SHA-256, providing a quadratic speedup. This reduces the time complexity for brute-forcing SHA-256 from 2^{256} to 2^{128} operations. Despite this speedup, breaking SHA-256 with quantum computing would still require approximately 1.08×10^{25} years, reflecting the hash function’s enduring security.
Resources:
Quantum algorithms and impacts to cryptography
Security Strength : As defined by the?NIST:?A number characterizing the amount of work that is expected to suffice to “defeat” an implemented cryptographic mechanism (e.g., by compromising its functionality and/or circumventing the protection that its use was inSecurity StrengthAs defined by the NIST: A number characterizing the amount of work that is expected to suffice to “defeat” an implemented cryptographic mechanism (e.g., by compromising its functionality and/or circumventing the protection that its use was intended to facilitate). Security strength is often expressed in bits. If the security strength of a particular implementation of a cryptographic mechanism is s bits, it is expected that the equivalent of (roughly) 2s basic operations of some sort will be sufficient to defeat it in some way. tended to facilitate). Security strength is often expressed in bits. If the security strength of a particular implementation of a cryptographic mechanism is s bits, it is expected that the equivalent of (roughly) 2s basic operations of some sort will be sufficient to defeat it in some way.?
The Need for PQC or Quantum-safe Cryptography(QSC)
With quantum computers anticipated to eventually surpass classical computers, there is a pressing need to transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. PQC aims to develop algorithms that remain secure even against quantum computational capabilities.
Basic Principle of QSC
Current prime factorization-based crypto are affected by Shor’s algorithm
Various efforts to find “harder” scheme — NP-hard problems
QSC takes advantage of different area of mathematics
NP-hard problems
While there are many known NP-hard problems, not every such problem is suitable as a basis for cryptographic security. In this context, the notion of??average-case hardness is useful for cryptography. A problem is?average-case hard?if most instances of the problem drawn randomly from some distribution are hard, whereas a problem is?worst-case hard?if it is hard only on some isolated?worst-case?instances. Quantum-safe cryptologists therefore search for mathematical problems that satisfy the assumption of average-case hardness and employ theoretical tools such as worst-case to average-case reductions??to identify suitable protocols whose security and efficiency can be guaranteed.
Computational complexity
Types of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms : Mathematical structures
Cryptologists have put forth a number of different mathematical structures that satisfy the necessary hardness requirements as potential candidates for quantum-safe migration of asymmetric key cryptosystems. Some well-known families include:
Homomorphic Encryption
An innovative concept arising from some PQC algorithms is Homomorphic Encryption. This technique allows computations on encrypted data without decrypting it. Applications include privacy-preserving data analysis and secure voting, offering significant advancements in data security and processing.
NIST Standardization of QSC
Lattice-Based Cryptography
As the name suggests, lattice-based cryptography?(LBC) is based on the hardness of certain problems defined on mathematical structures called lattice.
Of fundamental importance are two computational problems on lattices, namely the?shortest vector problem?and the?learning with errors problem, which we discuss below after some preliminary definitions.
Conceptual Overview:
Further Concepts- LBC
Lattice-basis reductions can be performed in polynomial-time using the?Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz?(LLL).
Current and Future Outlook
Adoption of PQC:
Risks and Challenges:
Practical Implementations:
Module-LWE and the CRYSTALS suite
The learning with errors (LWE) problem, introduced in a simplified form above and generally valid on arbitrary lattices, has been extended to algebraic?rings?within the so-called?Ring-LWE?framework primarily to improve the efficiency of resulting cryptosystems. However, the extra algebraic structure of Ring-LWE may be potentially exploitable, even though no such exploits are currently known.
Two of the four finalists in NIST's QSC standardization process — namely, the??CRYSTALS-Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and the??CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature protocol — are based on structures known as??Module lattices and the related Module-LWE?.
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and CRYSTALS-Kyber
Traditional asymmetric key cryptosystems are most heavily deployed for their key-exchange and digital signature functionalities and as such, the NIST standardization process sought to develop quantum-safe alternatives for these two functionalities.
The CRYSTALS-Kyber protocol is therefore designed as a dedicated Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) rather than as a general-purpose encryption scheme such as RSA.
IND-CPA and IND-CCA security in lattice-based cryptography
§Traditional cryptosystems whether symmetric (such as AES) or asymmetric (such as RSA) use deterministic functions to implement encryption operations. This means that a given plaintext, combined with a given encryption key will always encrypt to the same ciphertext. Such deterministic cryptosystems are vulnerable to?chosen plaintext attack?whereby an adversary is able to extract information by requesting encryptions of arbitrary plaintexts of their choice from the deterministic encryption function.
To achieve IND-CPA security in this context,?additional randomness?is introduced at encryption time either through?initialization vectors?or?padding. For instance, AES is only IND-CPA secure when used in? Cipher Block Chaining(CBC) or Gaolis/ Counter Mode(GCM) modes of operation?that use random initialization vectors. Similarly with RSA,?OAEP padding?is need to ensure IND-CPA security.
In contrast, lattice-based schemes for encryption are inherently randomized due to the problem definition itself. In particular, in the LWE based encryption scheme outlined above, there are two distinct elements of randomness:
(1)?The error (or noise)?ε?drawn from the distribution? X
(2)?The random binary vectors?r∈{0,1}N?used for encrypting each bit in the message.
The errors ε contribute to the security of the public key, ensuring that it's computationally hard to deduce the secret key s. The random binary vectors r on the other hand provide the essential randomness needed for making repeated encryptions of the same plaintext bit non-deterministic. Thus, LWE based schemes are considered IND-CPA secure without the need for external mechanisms such as padding.
Modern cryptosystems aim to achieve so called??IND-CCA security which stands for?indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack. In this setting the adversary has the ability to obtain decryptions of a non-trivial set of ciphertexts of their choosing with the aim of extracting information to subsequently break the cryptosystem. A scheme is IND-CCA secure if, even with this capability, the adversary cannot do better than random guessing when trying to distinguish encrypted messages. IND-CCA is a stronger security notion than IND-CPA and subsumes it.
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Quantum safe KEMs such as?Kyber?are designed to be IND-CCA secure. This is achieved in two steps:
-An IND-CPA secure public key encryption(PKE) scheme is defined. In the case of Kyber such a PKE is based on?Module-LWE.
-A variant of the??Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform (FO) is applied to obtain a CCA-secure KEM. The FO transformation is a generic method to convert encryption schemes that are IND-CPA secure into ones that are IND-CCA secure. For details we refer readers to the? Original papers.
For more information on the security features of?Kyber?and?Dilithium, -?CRYSTALS suite documentation.
Quantum-Safe Cryptography: Future Directions
The looming threat of quantum computing necessitates the development of quantum-safe cryptographic standards. Researchers are exploring several approaches to ensure cryptographic resilience against quantum attacks:
Resources:
Implementing PQC in Automotive Systems
1. Assessment and Planning
Implementing PQC necessitates a comprehensive assessment of the existing cryptographic infrastructure in vehicles. This includes identifying potential vulnerabilities and understanding the quantum threat landscape. The planning phase involves:
2. Integration into Vehicle Systems
The integration of PQC into automotive systems involves several key steps:
3. Post-Deployment Monitoring and Maintenance
Continuous monitoring post-deployment is crucial to maintain the security and performance of PQC implementations. This includes:
Challenges and Considerations
1. Performance Impact
PQC algorithms can be computationally intensive, potentially impacting vehicle system performance. Optimizing these algorithms to ensure they do not degrade user experience is a critical challenge.
2. Standardization and Interoperability
The field of PQC is still evolving, with multiple competing algorithms. Ensuring interoperability between different systems and adhering to emerging standards is crucial for widespread adoption.
3. Future-Proofing
Quantum computing is a rapidly advancing field, with new threats likely to emerge. Continuous research and development in PQC, alongside staying updated with advancements in quantum computing, are necessary to future-proof vehicle security.
Use Cases Learnings in Automotive Systems
Scheme Suitability
Given the challenge posed by Shor's algorithm in breaking asymmetric keys, it is crucial to evaluate two primary features and their corresponding post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes:
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM): CRYSTALS-Kyber and Saber
Digital Signatures: CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON
CRYSTALS-Dilithium: Renowned for its robust security, CRYSTALS-Dilithium is especially suitable for environments where security is a top priority, even at the expense of longer execution times. Due to its larger memory requirements, it is optimal for high-performance electronic control units (ECUs) or multifunctional embedded systems that have access to substantial resources.
FALCON: Known for its rapid verification times and smaller key and signature sizes, FALCON excels in settings that demand fast cryptographic processes, such as secure boot processes or real-time secure communications. Its minimal stack consumption and reduced code size make it an excellent option for dedicated embedded ECUs or contexts where operational efficiency is essential.
Benchmarking Post-Quantum Cryptography in Automotive Embedded Control Units
As the automotive industry evolves towards greater connectivity and automation, ensuring robust data security becomes increasingly vital. With the advent of quantum computing, traditional cryptographic schemes face new challenges. To address these, post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes are being evaluated for their performance across various embedded control units (ECUs) commonly used in automotive systems. This article explores the implications of these evaluations, focusing on execution time, stack consumption, and code size across different hardware platforms.
Understanding Automotive ECUs
Three category of ECUs were taken for the experiment as classified based on their function and performance characteristics:
High-Performance ECUs: High-Performance ECUs
For high-performance ECUs, post-quantum schemes like CRYSTALS-Dilithium are suitable due to their robust security features and compatibility with larger memory and processing capabilities. However, the choice depends on the trade-offs between security requirements and resource availability.
Multi-Purpose Embedded ECUs:
For multi-purpose systems, FALCON might be preferred due to its smaller key and signature sizes and faster verification times. This efficiency makes it a strong candidate for applications where moderate resources and quick processing are required.
Single-Purpose Embedded ECUs:
In single-purpose ECUs, FALCON's efficiency in terms of stack consumption and code size makes it particularly suitable for real-time operations, such as secure boot, where quick verification is crucial.
Performance Metrics for Cryptographic Operations
1. Execution Time (ms): Execution time is a critical factor for real-time applications. It refers to the time required to perform cryptographic operations. For automotive systems, minimizing execution time is crucial, especially for tasks that demand immediate response, such as secure boot processes.
2. Stack Consumption (bytes): Stack consumption measures the memory required for cryptographic operations. Efficient use of stack memory ensures that the ECU can handle complex operations without running into memory constraints, which is especially important for systems with limited RAM.
3. Code Size (bytes): The code size includes the .text, .data, and .bss sections of the compiled binary. Efficient code size is essential for compatibility with embedded systems, which often have strict memory limitations.
Evaluating post-quantum cryptographic schemes on various automotive ECUs highlights significant differences in performance, memory requirements, and code size. High-performance ECUs, with their substantial processing power and memory, can accommodate more complex algorithms like CRYSTALS-Dilithium. In contrast, multi-purpose and single-purpose ECUs require cryptographic solutions that balance efficiency with available resources. Lets check there performance for specific use case:
Key Management Systems (KMSs)
Use Case: Secure Key Distribution
In automotive contexts, ECUs (Electronic Control Units) require secure key material from backend systems. The process involves:
Use Case: Enhanced Security in Manufacturing
During manufacturing, ECUs receive key material through secure channels to ensure authenticity and integrity. Implementing algorithms like CRYSTALS-Dilithium or FALCON enhances security, despite increased memory and processing demands.
Secure Boot
Use Case: Firmware Integrity Verification
Secure boot ensures firmware integrity using asymmetric cryptography:
Use Case: Post-Quantum Secure Boot
Adapting secure boot processes to post-quantum cryptography involves managing increased key sizes and verification times. Hardware acceleration may be necessary to meet boot time requirements.
Secure Diagnostic Access
Use Case: Preventing Unauthorized Access
Secure diagnostic access prevents unauthorized ECU access:
Use Case: Efficient Vehicle Production
Securing diagnostic access efficiently is crucial to maintaining productivity. Choosing algorithms like FALCON, which balance security and performance, helps manage verification times.
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Use Case: Secure Vehicle-to-Backend Communication
TLS secures vehicle-to-backend communication:
Conclusion
As the automotive industry accelerates towards increased connectivity and advanced digital integration, the imperative for robust cybersecurity measures becomes undeniable. The integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) emerges as a pivotal strategy to fortify vehicle systems against the formidable threat posed by quantum computing capabilities. With traditional cryptographic defenses likely to falter under quantum advancements, PQC offers a beacon of security, ensuring that automotive technologies can withstand future cyber threats.
In this landscape, the adoption of specific PQC schemes such as CRYSTALS-Kyber, Saber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and FALCON is tailored to address the diverse security needs of modern vehicles. Each of these algorithms brings unique strengths: CRYSTALS-Kyber and Saber excel in key encapsulation with their efficient, lattice-based frameworks, making them ideal for protecting real-time communication within vehicular networks. Meanwhile, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON enhance digital signature applications, with FALCON's rapid verification capabilities being particularly crucial for operations requiring swift cryptographic responses, such as secure boot processes.
The transition to PQC not only aligns with the evolving technological landscape but also underscores a proactive approach to cybersecurity. By embedding these quantum-resistant algorithms into the fabric of automotive systems—from key management to secure boot and diagnostic access—manufacturers ensure that vehicles remain secure, functional, and resilient against the quantum threats on the horizon.
As the field of quantum computing continues to mature, ongoing research, rigorous testing, and adaptation of PQC will be critical. The automotive industry's commitment to this innovative cryptographic paradigm not only safeguards its technological advancements but also reinforces the trust and safety of its end-users, steering towards a secure, quantum-resistant future.
Leadership| Strategy| ICT| Digital Transformation| Program Management| Operations and Supply Chain Management| Cyber Security
7 个月Good article Sir
CSM, CEH, SSGB, ISO 27001LA, RUSC, HRBP| Product Security Consultant (life Cycle) | Cybersecurity Practitioner | Technology Enthusiast & Marathon Runner | Managing Cybersecurity of #Bosch Digital Twin Industries
7 个月Very insightful and informative article Santosh Kumar sir ????
Head of engineering | Program Manager - Cyber Security Engineering at Bosch Global Software Technologies
7 个月Great article Santosh Kumar
Cybersecurity & Data Protection Leader | CISO & DPO Expertise | GenAI Architect | Fellow of Information Privacy (FIP) ?? IIT Madras| IIM Indore
7 个月?? Issue of Latency Implementing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in vehicles introduces several latency issues: ??? Computational Intensity: PQC algorithms, like lattice-based cryptography, require more processing power, leading to longer cryptographic operation times and affecting real-time performance. ?? Increased Data Transmission Times: Larger PQC key sizes slow down secure communication protocols, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). ? Longer Verification Times: PQC digital signature schemes delay secure boot processes and diagnostics. ?? Hardware Constraints: Lower processing power and limited memory in some ECUs exacerbate latency issues, causing delays in executing cryptographic functions and managing memory allocation. ?? Integration Challenges: Adapting software to include PQC requires additional code layers and new cryptographic libraries, which can be time-consuming and complex. Some ECUs may need hardware upgrades, further contributing to latency. Mitigation strategies: ?? Optimize PQC algorithms ?? Use hardware accelerators ?? Incrementally deploy PQC ?? Leverage parallel processing to reduce overall latency
Head Cybersecurity and Blockchain @ Spiro I Strategy, Planning, GRC, Sec Operations and L&D in Information Security | Systems Engineering and R&D
7 个月Shall be glad to hear your comments in this field sir, in an environment where latency is a big issue.