Policy Shaping Civilian-Military Interactions: Churchill's Example

Strategy is an instrument of policy. Its requirements are subservient to the decisions made by civilian leaders. In Western democracies, political representatives believe that their actions carry ethical weight. Military leaders must trust how political leaders implement policy to shape military strategy and influence desired ends.

Policy influence at various levels of military operations

First, politicians make decisions intertwined with moral effects that permeate all levels of operations. Consequently, politicians often craft and implement a utilitarian policy that supports the greatest good while accepting some suffering. Second, policy often deserves arbitration on a higher moral plane from military leaders' subsequent action or non-action since prima facie examination often misinterprets ploys for plans.

Winston Churchill provides an excellent example of political decisions and policies encompassing military operations. While debating the tactical use of airpower before Operation Overlord, he insisted that civilian casualties account for less than 10,000 people. When Air Marshall Tedder forecasted an estimated 160,000 casualties because of the operation, Churchill remarked, "You are piling up an awful load of hatred." His statement reflected his duty to balance postwar diplomacy with present military efficiency.?

Churchill often injected himself into the tactical level of military action.??

When considering using metal chaff to disrupt German radar, Churchill had to balance the increased efficiency and safety the bombing formations would complete their missions. Conversely, he had to assess the risk to British civilians, and air defense should the Germans copy and implement the same tactic. It was an air tactic and technique made and managed correctly at the prime ministerial level because these policy questions involved direct risk to British infrastructure and civilians. The exact correlation arises in Churchill's decision to withhold some intelligence provided by the Ultra program to prevent the Germans from realizing the vulnerability of their codes. Allied convoys suffered attacks from German submarines due to this policy decision. Churchill claimed moral responsibility for this decision because he could not expect his tactical commanders to remain inactive if they received this intelligence.?

Policy: Ploy or Plan??

Eliot Cohen fails to judge Churchill on a higher moral level in his article, Churchill and his Generals. He drives this analysis with negative observations made by Churchill's general officers, who also misread Churchill. Cohen misinterprets his information in his largely apologetic argument for Churchill's worth as a wartime leader. Cohen states of Churchill, "many of his schemes and persistent clamor for operations against northern Noway did not meet the test of military practicality." Cohen's analysis miscarries for two reasons. First, the British military conducted deception operations that involved convincing Germany that the Allies would undertake the invasion of Norway. The London Controlling Section, formed in 1941 to conduct strategic deception operations, specifically used Norway to misdirect German planners.?

Second, the London Controlling Section initially relied on actual war plans but transitioned to radio traffic and overt means for which false information traveled to the world. Whereas Cohen attributes Churchill's "clamoring" for Northern Norway as a failed policy, his public statements were likely a ploy linked to four named deception operations between 1942 and 1944.?

At face value, the suggestion that policy should remain isolated from certain military operational levels fails because morality is inherently interwoven into western conduct of military operations. National policymakers directly influence military echelons through strategic appraisal and Western moral ethics. Achieving the appropriate moral equilibrium inspires political leaders to extend policy towards every level of operations. This symmetry will ensure that the manner of waging war makes waging peace less tempestuous.??