Poaching of the Siberian Mongols for cannon fodder in Ukraine running its course, so College students will be drafted and AI reveals war is loathed
The Kremlin is now upping its chances for ICC trials due to its murderous ways in Ukraine, but the treatment of Russians being dragooned into the front lines will also be held to be a crime against humanity itself. With the Utility of the draft of minorities like the Siberian Mongols for cannon fodder dropping off, this is what is coming next
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But in an authoritarian country, polling is unreliable. While polling works when people are willing to tell the truth, other tools are needed in places like Russia where such openness and access cannot be assumed.
Artificial intelligence can help with this. For the past year, the?Center for Strategic and International Studies?has worked with?FilterLabs.AI, a Massachusetts-based data analytics firm, to track local sentiment across Russia using AI-enabled sentiment analysis.
Sentiment analysis is a well-tested form of artificial intelligence that trains computers to read and understand human-generated text and speech. The analysis evaluates scraped public documents and comments across social media, news media, messenger app groups (including Telegram, which is widely used in Russia), and other popular forums to gauge what people are thinking and feeling at the local level, and whether that sentiment is trending positive or negative.
This data tells a different story about Russian public opinion, especially outside Moscow — a story Putin will not like.
Our analysis shows that the Kremlin is increasingly unable to control public sentiment outside major cities with national propaganda.
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also protests are erupting in areas not of Slavic Russian stock
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With the beginning of?mobilization in Russia, anti-war and anti-mobilization protests broke out in the?Russian Far East, mostly performed by women.?Former Mongolian President?Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj?protested against usage of “The?Buryat Mongol,?Tuva Mongols, and?Kalmyk Mongols" as cannon fodder.?He invited the Mongols to Mongolia.
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what will upp the protests
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The U.S. military has announced a new aid package for Ukraine that is packed with drones and loitering munitions, among other things.
A full list of the new aid package's contents as provided by the U.S. Department of Defense is as follows:
The drones and loitering munitions are clearly the standout items here.
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also the driver as to abusing citizens of the RF as cannon fodder is driven by zero chance for negotiations:
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As such, it’s too hard to tell at this point in time when the war might end.
Both Ukraine and Russia remain firmly entrenched in their positions and are unlikely to budge on any negotiations.
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also this will cause anti war protests in the RF to grow like Kuzu vine in 2023
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Russia is preparing to draft full-time college students to the front lines in its war in Ukraine, according to Ukranian intel.?
Purported documents,?revealed by the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Defense Ministry, show that Russia is "taking measures to ensure the next wave of mobilization."
"Notification offices" are already being set up to help draft the students and ship them to the frontlines, Ukrainian intelligence alleged.
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Russia will resort to drafting college students to throw more troops at the front lines, Ukrainian intel says
Story by [email protected] (Chris Panella)???Thursday
Russian soldiers in St. Petersburg on August 25, 2022. Photo by OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP via Getty Images
??Provided by Business Insider
Russia is preparing to draft full-time college students to the front lines in its war in Ukraine, according to Ukranian intel.?
Purported documents,?revealed by the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Defense Ministry, show that Russia is "taking measures to ensure the next wave of mobilization."
"Notification offices" are already being set up to help draft the students and ship them to the frontlines, Ukrainian intelligence alleged.
"Currently, capacities for the mass mobilization of students of higher educational institutions are being actively increased," the intel said.?
Related video:?Ukrainian defense minister on 1 year of war and what Ukraine needs from its allies?(CBS News)
country. I sat down with Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov
Students and university employees are reportedly working at these notification offices at multiple universities, like Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University and Tomsk State Pedagogical University.?
The intel also said that full-time students are being assigned to work at these notification offices "without their consent or even prior notification."
"It is likely that the mobilization will be carried out by April 1, the beginning of the spring draft for conscription," Ukraine intelligence said.
Russia previously announced a "partial mobilization" in September 2022, according to the intel, but it "was never officially completed," meaning no "additional legal grounds are needed for the next wave of mobilization."
The draft efforts will continue through the next few months, but will finish by the spring, Ukrainian intel said.?
"It is likely that the mobilization will be carried out by April 1 — the beginning of the spring draft for conscription."
Insider previously reported?that Russia's army has dealt with massive losses in the war, according to Ukrainian officials and Western intelligence.
Last Thursday, Ukraine's Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said some Russian units had suffered 80% casualties in Ukraine.?
Translations by Oleksandr Vynogradov
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2022 Russian Far East protests
1 language
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Further information:?2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?and?Protests against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
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With the beginning of?mobilization in Russia, anti-war and anti-mobilization protests broke out in the?Russian Far East, mostly performed by women.?[1]?Former Mongolian President?Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj?protested against usage of “The?Buryat Mongol,?Tuva Mongols, and?Kalmyk Mongols" as cannon fodder.[2]?He invited the Mongols to Mongolia.?[3]?The Tuvans belong to?Turkic peoples?but are also regarded in Mongolia as one of the?Uriankhai?peoples.[4]
Sakha[edit]
Women protested in Ordzhonikidze Square, in?Yakutsk.[5]?Some elderly men were conscripted by mistake.?[6]
Buryatia[edit]
Small groups protested in?Ulan-Ude?under handwritten signs “No war! No mobilization!” and “Our husbands, fathers and brothers don’t want to kill other husbands and fathers.”?[7]?The?Free Buryatia Foundation?collects appeals for help from families of mobilised men. Alexandra Garmazhapova, president of the foundation, some local people try to go to Mongolia.?[8]
Zabaykalsky Krai[edit]
Marina Salomatova, a member of the “Transbaikal Civil Solidarity”, has been arrested in?Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai.?[10]?[11]
Tuva[edit]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
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AI Can Tell Us How Russians Feel About the War. Putin Won’t Like the Results.
Russian propaganda is good at manipulating public opinion. But its effects aren’t working like they used to.
Data tells a different story about Russian public opinion, especially outside Moscow, about the war un Ukraine — a story Vladimir Putin will not like. | Michael Probst/AP Photo
By?EROL YAYBOKE,?JONATHAN D. TEUBNER,?ABIGAIL EDWARDS?and?ANASTASIA STROUBOULIS
02/25/2023 07:00 AM EST
Erol Yayboke is a senior fellow and director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.?
Jonathan D. Teubner is founder and CEO of?FilterLabs.AI?and visiting faculty at the Harvard Human Flourishing Program.?
Abigail Edwards is a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Anastasia Strouboulis is a former research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Vladimir Putin is notorious for deploying propaganda on Russian citizens, one of the oldest plays in the authoritarian playbook. But does it work?
When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the answer would seem to be yes. At the national level, public polling of Russian attitudes toward the war have shown support remaining relatively stable since the Feb. 24, 2022, invasion: On average, Russians still seem to support the war, even if not with the overwhelming positivity that the Kremlin might suggest. Even dips in national level public support have recovered over time,?as polling showed was the case?after Putin announced the “partial mobilization” in September.
But in an authoritarian country, polling is unreliable. While polling works when people are willing to tell the truth, other tools are needed in places like Russia where such openness and access cannot be assumed.
Artificial intelligence can help with this. For the past year, the?Center for Strategic and International Studies?has worked with?FilterLabs.AI, a Massachusetts-based data analytics firm, to track local sentiment across Russia using AI-enabled sentiment analysis.
Sentiment analysis is a well-tested form of artificial intelligence that trains computers to read and understand human-generated text and speech. The analysis evaluates scraped public documents and comments across social media, news media, messenger app groups (including Telegram, which is widely used in Russia), and other popular forums to gauge what people are thinking and feeling at the local level, and whether that sentiment is trending positive or negative.
This data tells a different story about Russian public opinion, especially outside Moscow — a story Putin will not like.
Standard polling often concentrates on population centers including Moscow and St. Petersburg, which can skew national averages. Outside of those major cities, a more negative picture emerges. Our analysis shows that the Kremlin is increasingly unable to control public sentiment outside major cities with national propaganda.
Kremlin propagandists work iteratively, piloting slightly different messages successively and rolling them out in waves when their analysis signals that they are needed. Since the invasion, Russian state-sponsored propaganda waves elevated public sentiment toward the war for?an average of 14 days?across all regions and topics. As the war in Ukraine drags on, though, these positive waves of public sentiment are getting shorter, particularly outside the major cities, and are needing to be deployed with increasing frequency across Russia.
In other words, Russians appear to be less and less influenced by propaganda from Moscow, especially when it clearly contradicts the struggles in their daily lives. As Putin’s war of choice inflicts personal costs on citizens, Russians seem less willing to swallow the state narratives that are delivered over state television, which remains the primary source of information for most Russians.
Effects of Mobilization
The news is not all bad for Putin. Russian information operations remain formidable in their ability to mobilize and leverage state resources. They are particularly adept at muddling information environments, making people unsure of what to believe, and sapping their motivation.
But as the war drags into a second year and as more Russians feel its effects on their daily lives — especially the growing number of men drafted or conscripted into the armed forces — the limitations of Kremlin propaganda are increasingly apparent.
This is particularly true in the regions of Russia most heavily targeted by Putin’s mobilization. Some of the first data FilterLabs gathered after the invasion was from the republic of Buryatia, a mostly rural, underdeveloped region 3,700 miles from Moscow and bordering Mongolia. Many of those?drafted into the Russian army regardless of age, military experience and medical history?come from ethnic minority dominant regions like Buryatia. In April, a national propaganda campaign created a positive spike in local sentiment in Buryatia towards the war that lasted for 12 days before reverting to pre-campaign levels. But by late May, that cycle had shrunk to nine days. By June, as EU sanctions started to impact the economy and as information about western consolidation behind Ukraine and heavy resistance to Russian advances seeped into Buryatia, it took only eight days after a wave of propaganda for public sentiment to drop down to a negative steady state.
These trends are not unique to Buryatia. Significant shifts in Russian attitudes were detected across the country, sometimes over the prosecution of the war itself. For example, when Russian armed forces met much fiercer resistance from Ukrainians in March and April 2022, and reports of high death tolls filtered back into Russia, FilterLabs detected a decrease of support for the war in many regions of the country.
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When the nationwide “partial mobilization” was announced in September 2022, there were demonstrable dips in the effectiveness of pro-war propaganda. We tracked sentiment across Russia’s eight federal districts, from Siberia to the far east, south to northwest, and the drop in public sentiment was clearly visible. Opinions trended negative and efforts to impact those opinions were less effective and shorter lived.
The analysis suggests that Russians, especially outside of Moscow, are not buying the propaganda as they once were. The Kremlin has also been unable to use its propaganda to sustainably mobilize popular sentiment around an affirmative agenda, in this case its war in Ukraine. Muddling the information environment and sowing mistrust has not generated positive support for Moscow’s misadventures.
Regime Fragility
The data suggest that the Russian government could be more fragile than it would like to admit. Corruption and weak institutions have contributed to state fragility in Russia for decades. The war appears to be exacerbating that trend.
In effect, our analysis suggests that the social contract between Russians and the Putin regime is fraying. Bankrolled by high energy prices over the last two decades, the public has acquiesced to Putin’s autocratic rule in exchange for improved living standards and functional public services.
The state propaganda apparatus — which has expanded from print media and TV into online platforms — has been crucial in crystallizing this acquiescence, especially since Putin came to power in the early 2000s. The Kremlin has used information operations to create a more?chaotic, undiscernible media space?and to obscure the regime’s fragile underbelly, adopting “foreign agent” and?“extremism” laws?and?intimidating would-be opposition voices, all while supporting Kremlin-aligned politicians, authorities and policies.
However, the events of the last several years — the 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, the protests spurred by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and the Covid-19 pandemic — have repeatedly demonstrated that propaganda narratives are not enough to cover up diminishing public trust in the legitimacy of the state. And the chaos itself can backfire — or at least quickly diminish its effectiveness — when out of step with lived experience, further undermining legitimacy in the state. Considering all this, telling Russian men and their families that it is in their interest to fight, and die, in faraway Ukraine is a harder story to sell.
It is difficult to get any reliable information out of Russia, but our research suggests the Kremlin’s hold on its people is perhaps not what it is made out to be. Despite Kremlin-pushed messages about high — or even increasing — levels of support for the war as the country marks the anniversary of its invasion of Ukraine, our analysis suggests that people’s overall feelings have changed very little in 2023 and that propaganda still isn’t as effective as it once was.
AI-enabled sentiment data analysis can provide a window into how Russians feel and how fickle public sentiment is. This poses internal threats to Putin’s legitimacy and thus his power. It also signals an inherent mistrust of state institutions that will be part of Russian society — especially outside of Moscow — well after Putin’s reign ends, whenever that may be.
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Ukraine Gets Huge Boost In Deadly Drone Capabilities From U.S.
Anti-tank loitering munitions, long-range strike capabilities, and high-endurance vertical takeoff drones are all in the latest aid package.
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PUBLISHED?FEB 24, 2023 6:31 PM
JOSEPH TREVITHICK
The U.S. military has announced a new aid package for Ukraine that is packed with drones and loitering munitions, among other things. This includes?AeroVironment Switchblade 600s?and?Jump 20s, CyberLux K8s, and Area-I?ALTIUS-600s. This appears to be the first time the latter three types have been included in a tranche of American military assistance for the Ukrainian armed forces. The ALTIUS-600s, especially, could give Ukrainian forces all-new long-range precision strike capabilities, among other potential benefits.
The Pentagon?formally announced?the new aid for Ukraine's military, which is valued at approximately $2 billion in total, earlier today. The U.S. government is providing this particular package as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Unlike U.S. military assistance that comes in the form of?so-called 'drawdowns,'?which involve transferring materiel straight from its own stocks, USAI provides funds to make direct purchases to support Ukraine.
A full list of the new aid package's contents as provided by the U.S. Department of Defense is as follows:
The drones and loitering munitions are clearly the standout items here.
The Pentagon has previously announced plans to acquire Switchblade 600s for Ukraine under USAI. Jump 20s, ALTIUS-600s, and CyberLux K8s have not been included in any prior U.S. military aid packages for the Ukrainian armed forces, at least according to what the Pentagon has disclosed to date.
The Switchblade 600 anti-tank loitering munition
AeroVironment's Switchblade is evolved from the company's smaller?Switchblade 300s, examples of which Ukraine has also received straight from U.S. military stocks. Both Switchblade types are man-portable, tube-launched loitering munitions, also referred to as kamikaze drones.
The Switchblade 600 offers even very small units a useful aerial surveillance capability during the day and at night that also comes with the ability to conduct immediate precision strikes on any threats that might be uncovered. "Patented wave-off and recommit capability allows operators to abort the mission at any time and then re-engage either the same or other targets multiple times based on operator command,"?AeroVironment's website says.
AeroVironment says that Switchblade 600 has a range of at least 40 kilometers (just under 25 miles) and can remain aloft for 40 minutes or more, depending on its exact flight profile. This is significantly greater range and endurance compared to the original Switchblade 300, which can only reach targets around 10 kilometers (just over six miles) away and keep flying for 15 minutes.
In addition, the Switchblade 600 carries the same warhead as the?Javelin anti-tank guided missile, giving it heavy anti-armor capabilities that its predecessor does not have. The drone's range and highly automated targeting capabilities give it significant advantages over the?multitude of infantry anti-tank missiles, including the Javelin, that Ukrainian forces have access to now. The biggest advantage is that they can fly well behind the front lines and hunt and kill main battle tanks, even ones that are hiding behind cover. This is a vastly different capability than anti-tank guided missiles that need line of sight from the individual firing the weapon or the platform to work.
In other words, Switchblade 600 leaves Russia's heaviest armor vulnerable up to two dozen miles behind enemy lines and virtually anywhere in Russian-controlled territory when operated by clandestine forces located behind enemy lines.
The vertical takeoff and landing Jump 20
The Jump 20 is a vertical takeoff and landing capable design primarily intended for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Contractor-operated examples of the Jump 20 have?supported U.S. special operations forces?for years now, and the type was selected?last year by the U.S. Army?as part of its replacement plan for the aging?RQ-7 Shadow.
The drone has a single propeller at the front driven by a small gasoline-powered engine for use in level flight and four electrically-powered vertically-oriented propellers for takeoff and landing. It has a maximum range of 185 kilometers (just shy of 115 miles) and can remain aloft for at least 14 hours,?according to AeroVironment's website.
Originally developed by a company called Arcturus UAV, which was?acquired by AeroVironment in 2021, the drone has a maximum takeoff weight of around 215 pounds and features a modular payload bay. Arcturus and AeroVironment?have said over the years?that this uncrewed aerial system can be fitted with various electro-optical and infrared cameras, compact radar and laser imaging systems, signals intelligence suites, and communications relay packages.
A line-of-sight data link gives the drone the ability to send data back to operators or other nodes in near-real-time. Control can be handed off from one node to another to help extend its operating range, as well.
Jump 20 has a demonstrated capability to drop expandable payloads, too. This includes?the ability to air-launch?AeroVironment's Switchblade 300 loitering munition?and employ?Northrop Grumman's?Hatchet miniature precision glide bomb. Last year, the company said it was working on a concept to allow a Jump 20 to release a Switchblade 600.
So far, there are no indications one way or another about how the Jump 20s for Ukraine might be configured or if they will come along with any kind of weaponry. As already noted, Ukrainian forces?have received Switchblade 300s already.
The country's armed forces have already been using a variety of commercial quad and hexacopter-type drones?to drop improvised munitions?on enemy vehicles and personnel. More recently, they have begun to use modified examples of these kinds of small uncrewed aerial systems directly as improvised kamikaze drones.
The tube-launched ALTIUS-600
The ALTIUS-600 is another tube-launched drone developed by Area-I, now a subsidiary of Anduril Industries. The uncrewed aerial system, which is recoverable and reusable, has a maximum range of around 440 kilometers (276 miles) and can remain airborne for at least four hours,?according to Area-I's website.
The drone, which has become increasingly popular within the U.S. military in recent years, can be?air-launched?via a?Common Launch Tube?(CLT) or deployed using various?types of launchers on the ground?or even at sea. While the default configuration is geared toward ISR, featuring a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared cameras, the design is modular, as well.
Area-I says that it can be set up to carry signals intelligence systems,?electronic warfare?and counter-drone payloads, or even a small warhead. Last year, its new parent company Anduril also announced?a purpose-built loitering munition derivative?called the ALTIUS-600M.
U.S. Army testing has also demonstrated the ability of ALITUS-600s to be operated in large numbers?as a networked swarm. Such a swarm could conceivably consist of drones in multiple different configurations, giving the entire group the ability to perform various missions simultaneously.
As with the Jump 20s, it's unclear at present how the ALTIUS-600s for Ukraine might be configured. It's also not clear how Ukrainian forces might already be planning to employ them, but ground and air-launched modes could be possibilities.
The mysterious Cyberlux K8
There do not appear to be any readily available details about the Cyberlux K8. The company's?"Unmanned Aircraft Solutions" webpage?shows a variety of other small tri and quadcopter-type designs, a number of which are fitted with commercial still and video cameras.
There is no indication of any connection between Cyberlux's K8 and a toy-like commercial quadcopter with the same model nomenclature from a Chinese company called Qinux that is readily available through online storefronts?like Alibaba.
Cyberlux, which started off as a supplier of LED lights, currently has a number of different divisions. An?investor relations presentation from 2021?shows that it has secured a number of U.S. military contracts in the past, including with U.S. Special Operations Command, primarily for?portable airfield lighting equipment.
As has?already been pointed out, Ukraine's military already makes very good use of commercial quadcopters and similar designs. Ukrainian forces employ them now for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, to help direct artillery fire, as platforms to drop small improvised munitions, and as improvised kamikaze drones.
Expanding Ukraine's drone capabilities
Altogether, the array of drones in this new aid package look set to give Ukrainian forces a number of different tiers of additional capabilities. In particular, the Jump 20s and ALTIUS-600s represent a significant leap in terms of range and endurance over many drone types that Ukraine has already received from the United States and other international partners. Many of the uncrewed aerial systems that Ukrainian forces have received to date are smaller commercial quadcopter types or similar designs.
Considering the payload possibilities and performance these new uncrewed aerial systems come with, they will give Ukrainian forces all new capabilities and offer additional options for carrying out various mission sets. This could include striking targets at extended ranges.
When it comes to the ALTIUS-600, in particular, with its stated range it could become one of Ukraine's longest-reaching strike assets. Right now, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on an ad-hoc mixture of?longer-range commercially-available remote-controlled aircraft?transformed?into strike weapons?and?missile-like Soviet-era reconnaissance drones?refitted?with warheads?to work as impromptu cruise missiles to conduct long-range stand-off strikes.
Even with only a limited explosive payload, ALTIUS-600s could still be extremely useful for striking a variety of important targets over long-distances, including fragile radar dishes and antenna arrays,?ammunition?and?fuel dumps, lightly armored vehicles, aircraft on flightlines, and small groups of soldiers or even?specific individuals. Depending on the networking capabilities that come with them, the drones could potentially be employed against dynamic targets hundreds of miles away. Even without an operator-in-the-loop link, they could still be directed to strike fixed targets with great precision based on static coordinates over very long distances.
The vertical take-off and landing capability of the Jump 20 and the tube-launched nature of the ALTIUS-600, as well as the Switchblade 600, provide added flexibility to all of this, too. These drones can be launched relatively quickly from small physical spaces with no significant infrastructure requirement. The launch points could be very close to the front lines or even?behind enemy lines.
If nothing else, this new aid package underscores how significant uncrewed aerial systems have been for both sides of the conflict in Ukraine. This, in turn, reflects broader trends?in the growing integration?of?various tiers of drones?across?modern militaries around the world, and the very real threats that even?commercial-type designs?present. These are realities?The War Zone?has been highlighting?for?years now.
"Giving Ukrainians the [uncrewed] capability, both from a strike standpoint, but then also from an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance standpoint" is "critical," Pentagon Press Secretary U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder said at a press conference today. "So that is part of the modern way of warfare. And so it's a capability that they will be able to employ, [that they] have been employing to great effect, and we will continue to support them in that regard."
As this is a USAI-funded aid package rather than a transfer of assets straight from American stocks, it very much remains to be seen when any of these drones may start arriving in Ukraine. The Pentagon has so far declined to say how many of each type in total Ukraine should be expecting to receive.
What is clear is that drones are already an important component of Ukraine's now year-long fight against invading Russian forces and that its capabilities in this regard are now set to expand even further.
Contact the author:?[email protected]
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War in Ukraine: Five common questions about Russia’s year-old invasion
BY?
?- 02/24/23 5:38 PM ET
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine one year ago marked the beginning of the deadliest war in Europe since World War II and heightened U.S.-Russia tensions to a level not seen since the Cold War.
Both the Ukrainian and Russian people have suffered tremendous losses while the war has rattled the global economy and shaken up the international order.
Here are answers to five?common questions about the ongoing war.
When did the Ukraine war start?
Russia invaded Ukraine in the early morning hours on Feb. 24, 2022. Moscow had been massing troops at the borders for weeks.
But the roots of the conflict actually go back nearly a decade.?
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Why did Russia invade Ukraine?
To understand why Russia launched a conventional war with its neighboring country, you have to understand a bit of history.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, member nations, including Ukraine, broke up into independent states.
At the turn of the century, Russian President?Vladimir Putin,?a former KGB officer, won election for the first time.?Putin, who has railed against the U.S. and the Western security alliance NATO, has sought to reclaim Russian might and restore his country as a great power. He has served as either president or prime minister of Russia since 2000.
At the same time, Ukraine was slowly moving toward joining the Western economic bloc, the European Union.?
In late 2013, when pro-Russian President?Viktor Yanukovych?suspended plans to sign an association agreement with the EU, Ukrainians erupted in protests called the Maidan Revolution that eventually forced Yanukovych to flee the country.
In 2014, Moscow reacted by illegally annexing the Crimean Peninsula and fomenting a rebellion of separatists in the eastern Donbas region.
Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed separatists have fought in the Donbas region ever since.
In December 2021, shortly before the invasion, Russia also submitted a list of demands to NATO that included rolling back military activity in eastern Europe.?
The demands were rejected by the alliance.
Is the Russia-Ukraine war over?
No.
One year in, Russian forces and Ukrainian troops remain locked in tense combat in eastern Ukraine.
But the war has condensed. Russia sent troops marching toward Kyiv in western Ukraine at the beginning of last year, before its forces were pushed all the way back to the eastern part of the country in the ensuing months.
Still, Moscow conducts regular missile and drone strikes that hit critical infrastructure in cities across Ukraine.
When will the Russia-Ukraine war end?
Bringing an end to the war will depend on several nations and government leaders, as well as various extremely complex factors.
As such, it’s too hard to tell at this point in time when the war might end.
Both Ukraine and Russia remain firmly entrenched in their positions and are unlikely to budge on any negotiations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed to retake all territory occupied by Russia, including the Crimean Peninsula.
And Putin is unlikely to give up the four territories he illegally annexed last year: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Peace proposals and attempts to get officials from both sides to the negotiating table have failed.?
There’s also a lingering question of whether U.S. and NATO allies should engage in separate negotiations with Russia.
Who is winning the Russia-Ukraine war?
The war has brought victory for neither side, only deep suffering, death and a mass wave of refugees.
Still, Ukraine has won multiple, decisive battles and has inflicted serious casualties on the Russian army. By some U.S. estimates, Russia has lost around 200,000 troops.
In the first phase of the war, Ukrainian troops pushed Russia out of the western part of the country.
The second phase saw Russia condense operations in the eastern Donbas region, made up of Luhansk and Donetsk. Russia also has fortified positions in occupied Zaporizhzhia.
In the third phase, Ukraine carried out successful counteroffensives that liberated the southern region of Kherson and most of northeastern Kharkiv.
Brutal fighting?continues?mostly in Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia launched a massive offensive to retake the Donbas this month but has struggled to make significant progress.
Ukraine is likely to launch a counteroffensive of its own in the coming months.
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Andrew Beckwith PhD