The pluses and minuses of China’s agenda in Europe
European nations must better leverage their opportunities in Africa and Asia against China’s domination.
ast week, China’s President Xi Jinping undertook a five-day tour of Europe, visiting France, Serbia and Hungary. This selection of host countries might appear odd at first, but it hides a double strategy. Officially, Mr. Xi made commemoration calls: in France, he highlighted its recognition of the People’s Republic of China 60 years ago; in Belgrade, he ruminated on NATO’s “brazenly” bombing the Chinese embassy there 25 years back; and in Budapest, he observed the 75th anniversary of Hungary establishing diplomatic ties with China.
Beijing’s interlocking agendas
The practical issues of the trip are closely linked. France is important as a country that aspires to be a political leader in Europe. President Emmanuel Macron, known for his ambitious personality, is striving to shape the continent’s future according to Paris’s agenda, which traditionally opposes the United States’ leading influence in Europe.
Serbia’s process of accession into the European Union has been bumpy. It is historically close to Russia and a country where Chinese investments are playing an expanding role.
Hungary, an EU member state, opposes several of Brussels’ policies and is therefore singled out as a troublemaker in EU circles. China finances infrastructure projects in Hungary, and a big assembly plant for Chinese electric vehicles is to be built there – a particular rub for Europe’s car-making countries. Despite the controversies, Budapest is assuming the union’s rotating six-month presidency on July 1, 2024.
President Xi’s agenda was to reinvigorate his giant, continent-linking Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and prevent European countries from too closely toeing the restrictive U.S. line toward China. Should Brussels prove amenable, Beijing could follow up with a more pronounced divide-and-rule Europe policy.
Aside from narrow politics, the BRI concept makes plenty of sense. When one looks at the globe, three dominant areas are striking: the huge Afro-Eurasian landmass, the Americas and Antarctica. Some 80 percent of the world’s population lives in Eurasia and Africa. Building connections between their economic centers, linking them to resources, markets and each other, is critical for future development.
Europe’s tough challenge
The problem is China’s penchant for domination and the passivity of European countries when opportunities should be grasped. Given the Middle Kingdom’s hegemonic aspirations and assertive policies toward neighbors and trade partners, the obstacles to the BRI are as much political as they are economic.
China is pushing the initiative by financing infrastructure and transportation projects along the BRI’s different lines, be they maritime or overland. A worried U.S. and Western Europe have scrambled to develop alternatives, but they are likely to come up short. The catch is in Beijing’s approach: it directly identifies suitable BRI projects, finances them (to a significant extent), and, whenever possible, dispatches its construction companies to perform the work. The West, in contrast, offers financing, but only when the recipient parties meet certain values-based conditions. Obviously, the Chinese way is more practical.
Purely for trade reasons, the BRI is as important for Europe as it is for China.
In recent years, the BRI engine has begun to sputter. The Covid-19 pandemic and Beijing’s decision to freeze all activity played a large part in that. Also, some participating governments have grown concerned about their debt to China (not known as a forgiving lender), and rumors have circulated that Beijing no longer has enough money to offer. However, with the China-U.S. rivalry heating up, the BRI has regained its top-priority status, which will invigorate economies and trade. It is also part of Beijing’s broader political strategy of trying to undermine the Washington-led international order while making China’s trade less dependent on the U.S. dollar.
If one considers trade reasons only, the BRI is as important for Europe as it is for China. However, politics poses a challenge here: U.S. and trans-Atlantic relations are crucial for Europe, which is a mere peninsula attached to the imposing Afro-Eurasian landmass. European countries can only address this dilemma with self-awareness and skillfully balanced policies.
How not to talk with China
Against this backdrop, Beijing may have included the vanity of the French president and the uneasy circumstances of Hungary and Serbia in its political calculations. Geographically, the latter two countries can serve as BRI entrance points into the EU. Political differences among European leaders can also help drive a wedge between Europe and the U.S.
In Paris, two sets of talks took place. One was between the two presidents. It was inconclusive, but President Macron could chalk up at least one success: the Chinese market will open again for cognac. While hardly a geopolitical breakthrough, it is a happy thought that France can resume selling and the Chinese enjoying the delicious aroma of the world-famous brandy.
A strange discussion occurred between President Xi and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen when she addressed the issue of unfair trade practices and punitive tariffs. The focus was on the automotive industry – specifically, electric cars and green energy technologies. Both Ms. von der Leyen and Mr. Macron studiously avoided such terms as “subsidies” or mentioning other specific forms of China’s mercantilist practices. Instead, they referred to industrial “overcapacity” in China, therefore allowing the Chinese guest to deny wrongdoing in trade. Any export-oriented industry has overcapacities in the context of the home market, and this applies to European countries as well.
The problem with such discussions is that Europe can no longer argue against subsidies and unfair state intervention, as it has also engaged in this kind of toxic malpractice.
It seems likely that, overall, President Xi returned to China having confirmed the view in Beijing that Europe is completely disoriented.
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The China-MENA Newsletter
Lots of CASCF: Xi's speech, a strategic partnership for Syria, Iran behind the scenes, limited western media coverage, and a refinery for Kuwait
By JONATHAN FULTON - MAY 31, 2024
Full text: President Xi's keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the 10th ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum - Xinhua. If you don’t have the time or inclination to read the whole speech, Xinhua also put out this overview.
China’s Xi calls for peace conference to end ‘tremendous suffering’ in Gaza - Al Jazeera. The pull quotes from Xi’s speech: the war “should not continue indefinitely” and “justice should not be absent forever”. The material commitments from Beijing:
Xi said China would continue to help with alleviating the humanitarian crisis and post-war rebuilding in Gaza, pledging to provide another 500 million yuan ($69m) in emergency humanitarian assistance.
Big gap between the rhetorical and material support.
A lot of couverage on the UAE delegation to CASCF has come out over the past 24 hours.
UAE, China: Four decades of strategic partnership, collaboration - Zawya. An overview of the bilateral relationship with lots of details. This bit on FDI I found interesting because I’ve been thinking, talking and writing about China-Gulf investment a lot lately. Not sure where the data comes from but maybe a brilliant reader out there is willing and able to share reliable sources of investment flows:
From 2003 to 2023, UAE investments in China reached $11.9 billion across diverse sectors like telecommunications, renewable energy, transportation, hospitality, and rubber. Conversely, Chinese investments in the UAE totalled $7.7 billion during the same period.
UAE President participates in 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum - Emirates News Agency. A press release that I found interesting just because of the more comprehensive list of delegation participants from the UAE:
Xi holds talks with UAE president - Xinhua. A detailed release from the Xi-MbZ meeting. Among the more interesting lines:
Mohamed said that he was very happy to once again visit China, his second hometown, and attend the opening ceremony of the 10th ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum together with President Xi…
President Sheikh Mohamed discusses trade relationship with China’s Xi Jinping in Beijing - The National. Coverage from the Emirates, not a lot of new details. Frankly, I’m a little surprised that we haven’t seen any big-ticket announcements, but those might come today as the delegation meets with their Chinese counterparts away from the Forum.
Other CASCF stuff:
Wang Yi: China-Syria strategic partnership features mutual trust and support - I’ll have to update my list of Chinese partnership agreements in MENA now that Syria has a strategic partnership. I’m not sure what this means, other than Syria rejoining the Arab League makes it easier for China to start working with Damascus more systematically. There hasn’t been a whole lot of action between the two, natural given war, instability, and high risk for Chinese SOEs that haven’t been enthusiastic about the Syrian market. I wrote about China’s strategic partnership diplomacy in the Gulf region in this excellent 2019 POMEPS collection edited by Marc Lynch and Amany Jamal; I think it holds up well. Last week Alyssa (Yixin) Chen wrote a great explainer for the SCMP on strategic partnerships that’s worth a read.
China May Withhold Support for UAE's Territorial Claim Against Iran - Iran International. Obviously, Iran isn’t participating directly in the Forum, but there’s still some interesting Iran content:
A diplomatic source close to the UAE-China negotiations told Iran International that Beijing has decided not to support the UAE's claim of ownership over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb at this meeting.
Take it for what it’s worth. Seems a little off-beat; there’s plenty of bigger issues for Tehran to worry about than the insertion of the islands dispute in the joint communique. It did cause a pretty significant response in Iran when it was included in the Riyadh Summit from December 2022. With Iran in a very fragile state I suspect the last thing anyone in Tehran wants to see is a story about its most important partner supporting its rivals, so there might be something there.
Western media reporting on the CASCF have been surprisingly muted. I imagine their limited ability to operate in China has a lot to do with it, but I was still expecting more coverage. A sample of what I’ve come across so far:
领英推荐
Xi pledges more Gaza aid and talks trade at summit with Arab leaders - Washington Post.
And now for something completely different:
Kuwaiti emir officially inaugurates country's largest refinery facility - Nothing to do with CASCF, but a short bit on Kuwait, which like I mentioned earlier in the week, doesn’t feature frequently in China’s Middle East affairs. This Xinhua article about Kuwait’s Al Zour Refinery, which has a capacity of 615,000bpd, was built with “extensive participation of Chinese companies”:
Over half of the project contracts were awarded to Chinese companies. Notably, Sinopec Fifth Construction Company completed six refining units by 2021, while Sinopec Luoyang Engineering Company, acting as a general contractor, finalized 15 core units in 2019.
In other China-Kuwait news, a Chinese delegation was in Kuwait this week, which would explain the ‘Xinjiang is a wonderful land’ performance. From Kuwait Times:
The two sides held in-depth discussions, focusing on the necessity to cement technical, development and economic ties in the realm of executing mega development projects in Kuwait. Moreover, they addressed the need to offer proposals and the aspired perceptions for attaining aspirations of the supreme political leadership to press ahead with laying the foundations of a future plan to launch common strategic ventures, namely Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port.
I’ll file this one under ‘I’ll believe it when I see it.’ There was so much talk of China in the Silk City project between 2017-2019 and since then, not much movement.
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The China-MENA Newsletter
Joint Statement of China and Arab Countries on the Palestinian Issue (Full Text)
By JONATHAN FULTON - MAY 31, 2024
The official translation of the joint declaration hasn’t been made available yet, but a friend sent me this Chinese statement from MOFA and I did a quick and by no means professional translation. It is really what one would expect; China has doubled down on Palestine and seems to have no illusions about getting the relationship with Israel back to pre-October 7th levels. Not that they were in great shape then. I wrote here that I have been working on an essay about China in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but decided to hold off until after the CASCF wrapped since I knew it would be front and center of so much of the Forum. I’ll try to get something together for next weekend. For now, here’s the translation of the declaration; I imagine the official one will be out soon enough.
Joint Statement of China and Arab Countries on the Palestinian Issue (Full Text)
2024-05-31 13:09
On May 30, 2024, the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum was held in Beijing, and the two sides had in-depth discussions on the Palestinian issue.
The two sides believe that relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, including Security Council Resolution 2728, must be fully and effectively implemented, and joint efforts should be made to promote an early ceasefire and cessation of war in the Gaza Strip and promote an early comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. The two sides reached consensus on the following:
1. The two sides condemned Israel's continued aggression against the Palestinian people. 125,000 Palestinian civilians have been killed and injured in the Gaza Strip, most of whom are women and children. The Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip have been forced to suffer deadly famine and blockade, cutting off all their livelihoods. Residential areas, hospitals, schools, mosques, churches and infrastructure in the Gaza Strip have been systematically destroyed, and thousands of Palestinian prisoners have been detained and abused.
2. The two sides condemned the invasion of the city of Rafah, the bombing of refugee camps and the control of the Rafah port.
3. Both sides oppose the implementation of plans, intentions and actions to forcibly transfer the Palestinian people outside their territory, which will destroy the peace opportunities in the Middle East and lead to the expansion and deterioration of regional conflicts.
4. Both sides demand that the Security Council issue a binding resolution to achieve an immediate, comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, stop the forced transfer of the Palestinian people, ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the entire Gaza Strip, implement relevant Security Council resolutions, and return life in the Gaza Strip to normal. Both sides condemn the United States for using its veto to prevent Palestine from becoming a full member of the United Nations.
5. Both sides support the provisional measures orders made by the International Court of Justice on January 26, March 28 and May 24, 2024 in the case of South Africa suing Israel for violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and believe that Israel should abide by relevant legal provisions, especially international humanitarian law. Both sides emphasize that Israel, as the occupying power, is responsible for the dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza.
6. The Arab side stressed that the resolution adopted at the Arab-Islamic Joint Extraordinary Summit held in Riyadh on November 11, 2023 should be implemented, including breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, so that humanitarian aid materials provided by Arab, Islamic countries and the international community can immediately enter the entire Gaza Strip by sea, land and air. China expressed its understanding.
8. Both sides call for the convening of a larger, more authoritative and more effective international peace conference as soon as possible to launch an authoritative peace process based on recognized international principles. The above process should be carried out within a determined time frame and under international guarantees until Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, and the remaining occupied territories in Lebanon ends.
9. Both sides support the Palestinian government in fulfilling its duties in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in accordance with recognized international principles. The Gaza Strip is an integral part of the State of Palestine. Both sides emphasize their support for the Palestinian government's relief efforts in Gaza. Both sides reaffirm that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and call on all Palestinian factions to unite under the banner of the PLO and assume their respective responsibilities in a national partnership under the leadership of the PLO.
10. Both sides welcome the adoption of Resolution A/RES/ES-10/23 by the United Nations General Assembly on May 10, 2024. The resolution recognizes that the State of Palestine is eligible to become a full member of the United Nations, and requires the Security Council to review and support Palestine's accession to the United Nations and grant the State of Palestine more rights and interests.
11. Both sides called for support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to prevent it from being shut down. They welcomed the resumption of funding by some countries to the agency and called on countries that had frozen funding to resume their support for the agency. They welcomed the results of the independent investigation into the agency's work, recognized its neutrality and professionalism, and believed that it was indispensable and irreplaceable.
12. Both sides welcomed the recent recognition of the State of Palestine by many countries, and stressed that this was a driving force for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and international and regional peace, security and stability, and called on countries that had not yet recognized the State of Palestine to do so as soon as possible.
13. The Arab side appreciates China's long-standing position in supporting the Palestinian issue and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in bilateral and multilateral occasions, appreciates the propositions put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping on resolving the Palestinian issue, and a series of initiatives and propositions put forward by China on the Palestinian issue; appreciates China's adherence to fairness and justice on the Palestinian issue and its unremitting efforts to promote the peace process; appreciates China's support for Palestine in improving people's livelihood and developing the economy, providing humanitarian assistance to Palestine, and its commitment to promoting the State of Palestine to become a full member of the United Nations.
14. Both sides stressed that Israel's unilateral measures aimed at changing the status quo in Jerusalem are invalid, support the Hashemite family's protection of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in occupied Jerusalem, support its role in protecting the Arab, Islamic and Christian attributes of Jerusalem, and maintaining the existing historical and legal status of Jerusalem and its holy sites. Both sides emphasized the adherence to the existing historical and legal status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
15. Both sides condemned the Israeli government's continued promotion of targeted settlement plans, which are aimed at changing the existing historical and legal status of the occupied Palestinian territories and the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.
16. Both sides support the efforts of His Majesty King Mohammed VI of Morocco as Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee.? Both sides emphasize the important role played by the Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee and the efforts of the Jerusalem Wealth House, an institution under the Committee.
17. Both sides support Egypt in taking all measures to respond to the impact of the aggression in the Gaza Strip and rely on Egypt's efforts to deliver relief supplies to the Gaza Strip immediately, continuously and in sufficient quantities. Both sides express support for the measures taken by Egypt to safeguard its national security, which is also a fundamental component of Arab national security.
18. Both sides support the joint efforts of Egypt and Qatar to promote a lasting ceasefire and return life in the Gaza Strip to normal. Both sides support the role played by Egypt and Algeria in achieving reconciliation among Palestinian factions.
19. Both sides appreciate the role played by Algeria and the UAE in Palestinian issues during their tenure as non-permanent members of the Security Council, including their efforts to promote the adoption of relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to promote the State of Palestine to become a full member of the United Nations.
20. Both sides appreciate the call by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar for immediate action to help all Palestinian orphans who have lost their parents and families due to the aggression in Gaza.
21. The two sides appreciate Algeria's efforts to support the Palestinian issue at the political and material levels, and appreciate President Tebboune's active efforts, especially the convening of the internal reconciliation conference among Palestinian factions on October 13, 2022 and the adoption of the Algiers Declaration, which is a positive step on the road to achieving national unity in Palestine.
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5 个月Very important article;
Certainly comment that as a minimum suggests some introspection by western leaders if not occurring, would be most appropriate, particularly the U.S. This and other commentary in the forum does suggest that the current CCP leadership is pursuing a more comprehensive and sustained strategy across all components of the competitive geopolitical landscape that brings into question the adequacy of the West's comparable effort and its consistency and effectiveness of effort over extended time. All leadership in the western community in this time of "opportunity" to sustain what has been achieved in form of liberty and freedom, as just one aspect of societal and governmental achievement, would be wise to fully understand the strategic objectives of the CCP in this grand geopolitical campaign for dominance and what the likely consequences may be if effective counterpoint is not achieved.