“PLA Navy Submarine Leadership—Factors Affecting Operational Performance”: CMSI China Maritime Report #27!

Roderick Lee,?PLA Navy Submarine Leadership—Factors Affecting Operational Performance,?China Maritime Report?27 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2023).

About the Author

Roderick Lee is the Director of Research at the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). Prior to joining CASI, he served as an analyst with the United States Navy covering Chinese naval forces. He earned his Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.?The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, or Department of Defense.

Summary

The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.

Introduction

In the undersea domain, the United States should be seeking to exploit several human factors against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in peacetime, contingencies, and wartime. Individual PLAN leaders with a submarine background may have influence on force development and operational planning in peacetime. By understanding who has influence on PLA undersea capabilities and what biases those individuals might have, the United States can shape said peacetime planning decisions in its favor. In contingencies and in wartime, the United States can try to use those same biases to predict or even influence force employment. The unfortunate reality is that data on PLA senior leadership has grown increasingly scarce, making it difficult to establish a framework for projecting potential influencing factors on senior leadership. The PLA has begun limiting the amount of public exposure that its senior officers receive, and there is even some evidence to suggest the PLA is actively censoring the identity of its flag and general officers. The somewhat opaque decision-making processes of the PLA further complicates the process of determining who within the PLA has influence and how the United States can exploit that influence. Instead of embarking on a glorified tealeaf reading mission, time is better spent on trying to understand a system that is more rigid and not subject to the whims of individuals. To that end, this report examines who makes up China’s submarine officer corps, how they are educated, and how these individuals interact with each other onboard a submarine. Ultimately, this report seeks to understand what exploitable human factors might exist within the PLAN submarine officer corps. … … …

Conclusion

There are no clear and glaring flaws in how the PLAN leads its submarine force. Although its educational system underwent some turmoil in the beginning of the 21st century and continues to encounter challenges today, these challenges do not appear to be substantial enough to dramatically affect operational performance. Likewise, although the interactions of leaders onboard a submarine have the potential to create uncertainty or erode confidence, the structure itself does not present inherent flaws. That said, the PLAN’s leadership approach does possess a few characteristics that may be exploitable both in peacetime and wartime. Doing so could help degrade the PLAN’s ability to employ submarines in an optimal manner. These efforts should mainly focus on increasing the likelihood of human error occurring onboard a PLAN submarine.

The Department of Energy’s?Human Performance Improvement Handbook?serves as a useful framework to understand how one can mitigate the likelihood and effects of errors associated with human performance. It also offers insights into how one might increase the likelihood of said errors. This document specifies that an error-likely event is “a work situation in which there is greater chance for error when performing a specific action or task in the presence of error precursors.”80 Defined as “conditions that provoke error,” error precursors can be categorized into tasks demands, individual capabilities, work environment, and human nature.81 See Table 1 below. ... ... ...

China Maritime Reports are short, focused analyses of topics related to China’s rise as a maritime power.?Written by members of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and other experts, they cover topics as diverse as China’s maritime militia, overseas port development, and amphibious warfare.

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