Is PLA Leveraging Science in Decision to Scrap SSF
Charles Davis National Policy/Strategy Analyst
Master Trainer/Instructor | Strategic issues, Global Trends impact
PLA Strategic Initiatives to Outpace the US #china, #PLA, #Strategic Support Force, #complexity science, #technology warfare
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Two strategic military initiatives, within China’s PLA, surfaced in April 2024. Cindy Hurst of the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) crafted an interesting piece on China’s intent to weaponize Complexity Science.[1] Additionally, China has dissolved the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and elevated the subordinate commands to direct reports within the Central Military Commission.[2] ?At face value they may seem unrelated. However, I believe the restructuring and elevated efforts to leverage new technologies with military objectives are two lines of effort in a common end-state. ??
The former components of the SSF; the Military Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, and the Information Support Force now join the Joint Logistics Support Force as directly subordinate commands within the Central Military Commission. Jamestown Foundation analyst, Michael Dahm, suggested the move may be in response to senior level corruption within the PLA, operational effectiveness and/or bureaucratic infighting.[3] ?Each of these observations have merit and may have contributed to decision-making. It is also possible, elevating these commands provides better opportunity and more transparency when evaluating new technologies in warfighting. Expectations can be set, and budgets allocated in phased development and integration of science and technology in each domain (space, cyber, information). ??
The Aerospace Force is expected to maintain responsibilities for ground-based space surveillance; satellite telemetry, tracking, and control; space launches; manned spaceflight; space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and ground and space-based kinetic anti-satellite capabilities.[4] ?Science and technology innovations within this realm were highlighted in GEN Whiting’s remarks to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on February 29, 2024. GEN Whiting expressed concerns regarding advances in dual use developments in satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration.
Additional comments highlighted China’s increased ability to monitor, track, and target US and Allied forces, both terrestrially and on orbit, as well as substantial improvements in domestic space launch capabilities, reusable rockets and mass production of sophisticated space systems.[5] Each of these lines of effort reinforce China’s focus on complexity science. ?
The Cyberspace Force will continue its’ missions of cyber reconnaissance, cyber espionage, offensive cyber operations and operational preparation of the battlespace, and strategic electronic warfare (including non-kinetic anti-satellite measures).[6] It will also likely maintain authority over 311 base psychological warfare mission. The 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving PRC indicates; “The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.” It further reinforces the growing sophistication of cyber enabled espionage as well as threats to and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.[7] The 2023 Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated: “China’s cyber pursuits and its industry’s export of related technologies increase the threats of aggressive cyber operations against the U.S. homeland, suppression of the free flow of information in cyberspace—such as U.S. web content—that Beijing views as threatening to the CCP’s hold on power, and the expansion of technology-driven authoritarianism globally.”[8] Jen Easterly, head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), described Chinese cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure as the most serious threat to the nation she has seen in her 30-plus year career.[9]
The Information Support Force is expected to remain defensive, focusing on “informatization” and “information support” (i.e. communications facilitation) rather than the more offensive and intelligence-related capabilities associated with information warfare. Its mission likely includes the maintenance of military networks, strategic communications and backbone infrastructure, management of communication satellites, cyber defense, cybersecurity, and information security for military communications, and strategic spectrum allocation and management.[10]
In Hurst’s piece on Weaponized Complexity Science (CS), she points out that China sees CS is both offensive and defensive in nature. “Offensively, the article explains that destroying a key node of an opponent’s network information system, the glue that holds together the joint operations system, can serve as a force multiplier. In defensive operations, to protect their own systems, PLA commanders need to completely understand the emerging nature of complex war systems so that they can predict or anticipate where the adversary might attempt to degrade their systems.”[11] The PLA article[12] discusses complexity in Command and Control as well as impacts of complexity on the adversary’s decision-making process.
Restructuring strategic support operations in a way that they can be best focused and funded as force multipliers may allow the PLA to create a destruction multiplier effect of 100-1=0. The US military would consider the numeric 1 as a center of gravity. If China can outpace the US through a faster and more effective application of science and technology, they elevate their chances of economic and military dominance significantly.
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Chief Strategy Officer (CSO) | Defense, Procurement, Secure Logistics & Security Services, Strategy Implementation.
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