The PLA Army Amphibious Force: Missions, Organization, Capabilities, and Training

Dennis J. Blasko,?The PLA Army Amphibious Force: Missions, Organization, Capabilities, and Training,?China Maritime Report?20 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, April 2022).

This report examines the amphibious forces of the PLA Army and their preparations for large-scale amphibious operations, particularly concerning Taiwan.

About the Author

Dennis J. Blasko is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel with 23 years of service as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. He was an Army Attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong from 1992–96. He served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Headquarters Department of the Army (Office of Special Operations), and the National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. Blasko is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military, along with the book?The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

Summary

The PLA Army’s (PLAA) amphibious units would serve as the core of any joint force charged with invading Taiwan. As a result of the 2017 reforms, the PLAA now possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades distributed across three group armies (the 72nd, 73rd, and 74th). During a cross-strait invasion, these brigades would likely receive support from other elements of the group armies to which they belong. This could include fire support, air defense, air transport, aerial fire support, and electronic warfare/cyber-attack. Due to its large composition of two-year conscripts, the PLAA amphibious force has traditionally spent the first four months of every year developing basic individual and team skills, although a recent shift to a twice-a-year conscription cycle could allow for more complex training throughout the year. An analysis of the available reporting on 2021 training events indicates that amphibious training occurs frequently from March to October but mostly involves units at or below the battalion level. Despite efforts to bolster the PLAA’s amphibious capabilities, the force currently lacks the capacity to execute a large-scale assault on Taiwan.

Introduction

One of the most important missions assigned to the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is to?provide forces equipped and trained to enhance China’s military posture to deter further steps toward?Taiwan independence. All four services, the PLAA, PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF),?and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), plus the Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force,?have a role in this effort. If deterrence fails, one military option available to the senior Chinese?Communist Party (CCP) leadership is to order the PLA to conduct an extremely difficult and?complex operation known as a joint island landing campaign, which would be supported by a joint?firepower campaign. Although a traditional over-the-beach amphibious landing likely will not be the?first military course of action to be undertaken in a campaign directed against Taiwan, the PLA is?clearly preparing for this possibility should other options fail.

The core of the PLAA’s contribution to the Taiwan deterrence and warfighting missions resides in?six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACAB) assigned, two each, to the three group armies?stationed closest to Taiwan in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands (TC). Reforms?undertaken since 2017, including increasing the capabilities and capacities of PLAA helicopter units?and special operations forces (SOF), long-range multiple rocket launchers and air defense weapons,?and non-kinetic electronic warfare and cyber-attack units, have greatly expanded the options?available to PLAA commanders to conduct joint island landing and joint firepower campaigns.

If ordered to conduct operations against Taiwan or its offshore islands, the six amphibious combined?arms brigades will work in concert with elements of their parent group armies and theater commands?in an operation that likely will be reinforced by additional Army units from outside the region. Any?PLAA action against Taiwan will be coordinated with units from the other services and forces and?will also involve militia forces and civilian assets in support. The dispersion of forces in peacetime,?however, will require days, if not weeks, to move and assemble units within striking range of Taiwan?and prepare them for launching an assault.

Once these forces are ashore, Taiwan’s topography is not optimal for rapid, large-scale offensive,?mechanized movements. Only a few beaches along its west coast are suitable for amphibious landing?and behind them the terrain soon becomes mountainous and checkered with rice paddies and urban?sprawl. Given the restrictions imposed by the terrain, the PLA leadership perhaps sought to?modernize PLAA capabilities, as well as capabilities in the other services, to shift the decisive phase?of a joint island landing campaign from a traditional over-the-beach amphibious assault followed by?a mechanized ground movement inland to a series of airborne (parachute) or airmobile (helicopter)?assault operations to seize ports of entry on the coast, airfields, and other key terrain/objectives closer?to the center of gravity of Taiwan’s defenses to allow for the rapid insertion of second-echelon?follow-on forces by sea and air.1 Nonetheless, a large-scale assault by multiple amphibious combined?arms brigades remains a major component of China’s deterrence posture and any joint landing?operation.2

This report first addresses the current status of the PLAA’s amphibious combined arms brigades and?the support they are likely to receive from their brother Army units. It then discusses training and?examines PLAA amphibious and sea-transport exercises and drills conducted in 2021 involving both?amphibious and non-amphibious PLAA units. This analysis is consistent with, and supports, the U.S.?Department of Defense’s assessment in 2020 and 2021 that

“Both PLAA and PLANMC [Marine Corps] units equipped for amphibious operations?conduct regular company- to battalion-level amphibious training exercises, and the PLA?continues to integrate aerial insertion training into larger exercises… The PLA rarely?conducts amphibious exercises involving echelons above a battalion, although both PLAA?and PLANMC units have emphasized the development of combined-arms battalion?formations since 2012.3” … … …

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