Pentagon Confusion on GPS Backup / eLoran

Pentagon Confusion on GPS Backup / eLoran

April 28, 2016

In December Deputy Secretary of Defense Work co-signed a letter to five Congressmensharing their concern about GPS vulnerability and the need for a complementary and backup system.  He said that the administration was pursing an eLoran timing network while documenting requirements for a larger positioning, navigation and timing system.

The administration’s decision appears to have resulted from years of work and deliberation by the National Space-based PNT Executive Committee (co-chaired by Deputy Secretary Work). In 2004 NSPD-39 (which was affirmed by President Obama in 2009) identified GPS services as critical to national security and mandated acquisition of a backup capability.

But on the 15th of March of this year, two senior DOD officials testifying before Congress seemed to question the validity of that work and  decision. “Inside GNSS” reported that after the hearing Congressman John Garamendi (D-CA) sent a letter to Space Command’s General John Hyten and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Doug Loverro pointing out numerous discrepancies in their testimony and asking additional questions.

After reading the “Inside GNSS” article, we were intrigued and contacted Congressman Garamendi’s office to ask if they would be willing to share a copy of the letter. Here it is.

https://rntfnd.org/wp-content/uploads/20160413-LoverroHyten-eLoran.pdf

Dave Khanoyan

Senior NAS Operations Specialist at Tetra Tech AMT November 2010 - September 2017

8 年

"[eLoran] has acquitted itself not only as a general-purpose, multi-modal utility but has also amply fulfilled its aviation PNT requirements for terminal and en-route navigation and surveillance. In the United States alone, experts estimate that an eLoran system—with a shelf life of decades—could be built and operated surprisingly swiftly—with an annual budget of around $30 million. The question remains whether there will be the political will necessary to make progress on developing this as a global system." —Aimee Turner, "Worth the Wait," Air Traffic Management, Issue 3, 2015

Dave Khanoyan

Senior NAS Operations Specialist at Tetra Tech AMT November 2010 - September 2017

8 年

More Developments on GPS Backup On January 26th of this year, a software problem threw off the GPS network's coordinated universal timing message off by 13 microseconds, which affected the timing data on GPS's L-band signal and the time provided by GPS timing receivers. The widespread problem "disrupted user equipment globally . . . as the affected satellites traveled along their orbits," reported Inside GNSS, an industry publication. The "glitch" led to renewed calls for a global backup for the position, timing, and navigation functions of GPS and similar satellite systems. In April, hundreds of South Korean fishing boats returned to port, after GPS jamming from North Korea caused them to be unable to locate their nets. In 2013 the U.S. Navy reported jamming of GPS signals on one of its ships sailing near Iranian territorial waters. Interest in a reliable, global backup system for GPS is increasing, after a period in which previous plans seemed to have stalled. As I've reported previously, an inter-agency group coordinated by the U.S. Departments of Defense and Transportation concluded in 2008 that an electronic version of the legacy navigation system Loran would be the most cost-effective overall backup approach for position, navigation, and timing (PNT), and the agencies agreed to move forward with that approach. But that decision was suspended in 2010 by the Obama Administration, and the legacy Loran installations were to be shut down. A similar effort to implement eLoran in Europe, led by Ireland and the UK, was terminated in 2015, when most other EU countries shut off their existing Loran-C transmitters. But the lack of any plan for a comprehensive PNT backup has led to growing concerns in Congress. In 2014, Congress directed the Coast Guard to cease current activities of dismantling and disposing of legacy Loran infrastructure and sites, to preserve them for possible conversion to future eLoran sites. And in late 2015, in response to strenuous efforts led by Rep. John Garamendi (D, CA), the Deputy Secretaries of DOD and DOT informed members of Congress that the Administration was proceeding to develop a near-term solution to GPS vulnerability by establishing a complementary "timing-focused eLoran capability" as a prelude to a "full complementary PNT capability for the nation." In March, the Norwegian Transport & Communications ministry, in response to a request from the British government, agreed not to dismantle its Loran-C transmitters, so as to review with the UK the potential of repurposing those sites as part of a European eLoran network. And in May the South Korean government announced a contract to develop an eLoran system aimed at providing a backup alternative to GPS for PNT functions. The announcement came shortly after nearly a week of North Korean jamming that affected the signal reception of more than 1,000 planes and 700 ships. Reuters' story about the Korean effort noted that India and Russia are also looking into deployment of eLoran as a GNSS backup. Several companies are working on PNT backup systems. The UK's Chronos and US's UrsaNav formed a joint venture company called Taviga last December, whose objective is to provide a commercially operated low-frequency PNT service. Taviga's current focus is on preserving the Loran-C sites in Europe and the United States as potential sites for a global eLoran system. Iridium, the company whose satellite constellation will host Aireon's space-based ADS-B system, announced last month that it plans to offer a global Satellite Time and Location (STL) system, which it has developed with a company called Satelles. Users will be able to purchase an inexpensive microchip the size of a postage stamp to obtain PNT data anywhere on earth, via Iridium's 66-satellite constellation.

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Mitch Narins

Principal Consultant/Owner at Strategic Synergies, LLC

8 年

These "inconsistencies" might be the result of "extremely poor staff work;" however, I believe that the testimony was not merely short on facts, but biased by the same budget office pressures that have blocked eLoran since 2008. Despite a joint 2008 DOT/DHS decision to pursue eLoran, budget office personnel did an end run within the nascent Obama Administration, claiming that Loran(-C) was an aging legacy system based on tube technology) to cut off the multi-Department-level decision to pursue an enhanced Loran solution. Giving those who testified the benefit of the doubt, I respectfully suggest that they determine who "set them up" and take decisive action to clean house to ensure the highest levels of integrity and transparency are restored. When military officers are "spoofed" into fighting political battles of budget office staffers it diminishes not only the service, it diminished us all.

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