Pathways to Understanding Cascading Effects of Disasters in Fragile, Conflict and Violence (FCV) Settings

Abstract

Cascading effects in disasters are the new normal; however, current policy frameworks and governance systems do not account for these complexities. This is more so challenging for communities already burdened with preexisting vulnerabilities, such as those in fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) settings. With this, the paper aims to address this gap by offering insights to understand a broader set of factors that can lead to increasing the complexity of disasters and humanitarian crises in FCV settings. Three (3) pathways that influence the cascading effects of disasters in FCV setting are identified: initiating events and preexisting vulnerabilities, targeting and exploiting originating systems, and reliance on single and fragile dependencies. The first emphasizes that initiating events reveals vulnerabilities and systemic weaknesses created by protracted conflicts, political instability, and inadequate social and governance systems. The second focuses on instances where originating systems, such as critical infrastructures, are targeted and exploited to further political objectives in conflicts. The last pathway explores how dependency on single and fragile systems can worsen disaster effects. These pathways highlight that cascading effects in FCV settings are influenced not only by the disaster but also by preexisting vulnerabilities, the weaponization of critical systems, and dependencies on fragile systems. These create mutually reinforcing and interconnected pathways that compound the cascading impacts of disasters in FCV contexts. This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the intersection of conflict and disasters and attempts to provide initial insights into understanding cascading effects in FCV contexts. It aims to inform the development of more inclusive frameworks and policies that account for the unique challenges of FCV settings, ultimately enhancing disaster preparedness and response in these complex humanitarian situations.

1. Introduction

Disasters disrupt the normal functioning of the community and set back development efforts by draining resources, exacerbating poverty, disrupting economic activities, and disabling lifelines vital for essential service delivery. This is more so challenging for communities already burdened with preexisting vulnerabilities, such as those in fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) settings. The Conflict Index Report (July 2024) showed that over 165,000 incidences of conflict and violence were recorded worldwide since June 2023, marking a 15% increase. Further, the report also revealed that one in seven people worldwide is estimated to have been exposed to conflict (ACLED, 2024). Empirical evidence has also shown that disasters are getting more frequent and intense in conflict-affected regions (Ide, 2023, p. 4; Siddiqi, 2018, p. 4). Conflicts amplify societal vulnerability to disasters as infrastructure is destroyed, poverty increases, and long-term investments in disaster risk reduction are deferred.

The intersection of disasters and FCV can result in cascading effects by magnifying existing hazards, increasing exposure, and creating new vulnerabilities in affected communities (Peters, 2021, p. 8; Walch, 2018, p. 240). Cascading effects refer to the dynamics present in disasters in which the impact of a physical event or the development of an initial technological or human failure generates a sequence of events in human subsystems that result in physical, social, or economic disruption (Pescaroli et al., 2017, p. 3). Understanding these potential cascading effects allows for earlier identification and mitigation of threats and their effects, which is particularly important in preparation, prevention, and response and provides primary conditions for civilian defense and protection during conflicts (Wróblewski & Wi?niewski, 2024, p. 238).

1.1. Cascading Effects of Disasters in FCV Settings: Where is the Gap?

Cascading disasters are the new normal; however, existing governance systems, policies, and guidelines do not account for this new normal (NAS, 2022, p. 4, 10). Global DRR policies such as the Hyogo and the Sendai Framework for DRR ignore conflict or see it as a context to navigate, not as a driver of disaster risk (Peters, 2021, p. 3; GFDRR, 2023, p. 11). Moreover, existing frameworks assume that there is always a working institution that guides the implementation of disaster risk reduction efforts, which is totally not the case in FCV settings (Walch, 2018, p. 239). This limited perspective gives minimal space for policy or guidelines that define how disaster risk reduction should be undertaken in FCV settings. Adapting these frameworks - designed for peaceful contexts - to societies grappling in FCV settings remains a challenge yet to be addressed (Peters, 2019, pp. 21-22). In addition, existing frameworks and models for understanding cascading effects are mostly focused on the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to natural hazards and their subsequent consequences to critical societal functions, economic activities, and ecosystem balance (Barquet et al., 2023, p. 2; Hilly et al., 2018, p. 4; Thomas et al., 2020, p. 2). Similar attention has not been given to the cascading effects in FCV settings.

With this, there is a need to rethink and redesign the disaster management system to strengthen its capacity to work on multiple disasters across various dimensions, locations, and scales (Moddemeyer, 2022, as cited in NAS, 2022, p. 4). The paper contributes to this by looking into various factors that can increase the complexity of disasters and humanitarian crises in FCV settings. Specifically, this paper answers the question: What are the different pathways that influence cascading effects of disasters in fragile, conflict, and violence (FCV) settings? These findings can be used to develop more inclusive policy frameworks that account for the unique challenges of FCV settings, ultimately improving disaster preparedness and response to these complex humanitarian situations.

2. Methodology

The choice of topic for this paper is based on the researcher’s interest in studying cascading effects, which is also the researcher’s topic for the degree project in the programme. Initially, keywords such as “cascading effects” and “fragile, conflict and violence (FCV)” were used in Google Scholar. However, this yielded limited results, showing that no studies have been undertaken on this topic. With this, the researcher reviewed existing papers criticizing current frameworks on cascading effects, especially infrastructure-based approaches. The paper used a qualitative case study approach to examine the cascading effects in fragile, conflict, and violence (FCV) settings, particularly the 2023 Türkiye - Syria earthquake.

This paper used the cascading effects conceptual model presented by Hasel et al. (2014, pp. 10-11) to guide the paper and discussion. The conceptual model outlines the following key aspects of cascading effects:

? Initiating event (initiator): The first in a sequence of natural, accidental, or intentional events that may affect one or several systems.

? Originating system: A system in which a failure propagates to another system.

? Dependent system: A system that is negatively affected by a failure in another system.

? Dependency: Mechanism whereby a state change in one system can affect the state of another system.

? Interdependency: A mutual dependency between two systems, i.e., system A is dependent on system B and vice versa.

? Cascade Order: The number of stages in propagation from a directly impacted system to a particular system impacted indirectly.

3. Pathways to Understanding Cascading Effects in FCV Settings

The paper introduces three (3) premises for understanding cascading effects in FCV settings. It focuses on three (3) aspects of cascading effects identified in the model: initiating events, originating systems, and dependencies. This suggests three (3) pathways to how cascading effects of disasters can manifest in FCV settings: initiating events exposing preexisting and systemic fragilities, targeting and exploiting originating systems, and dependence on single and fragile systems.

3.1. Initiating events magnify preexisting and systemic fragilities

Identifying the trigger or initiating event is essential in understanding the complexity of the cascading crisis and conflict situations (Hagen et al., 2015, p. 1). Analyzing how such cascading effects are triggered or initiated provides a better understanding of these effects and can be beneficial for developing tools and procedures in crisis management (Ibid, p. 7). One crucial factor in understanding cascading effects in FCV settings is how these initiating events magnify preexisting vulnerabilities and systemic failures.

Despite years of research focused on disasters in conflict-affected areas, this field remains significantly underdeveloped due to the insufficient integration of political analysis into the study of disaster-conflict interactions (Siddiqi, 2018, pp. 1-2). Kelman (2018, p. 173) further highlighted this gap, saying cascading disasters tend to emphasize certain types of hazards as the initiating event, while long-term, chronic, disastrous situations such as social, political, and institutional failures, which underlying factors in FCV settings, are not fully considered within existing frameworks as initiators. This myopic understanding of FCV is particularly problematic as it overlooks the compounded vulnerabilities and systemic failures shaped by prolonged conflicts, instability, inequality, and weakened social and governance structures. As such, in studying cascading effects in FCV settings, there is a need to understand the political and power dynamics and how these contribute to the complexity of the disaster. In this case, we underscore how initiating events expose and magnify systemic fragilities due to power dynamics.

In Syria, even before the earthquake, the prolonged conflict had destroyed state capability and legitimacy, resulting in fragmented governance among various parties, including the central government, opposition organizations, and external powers. The conflict has damaged government systems, resulting in inadequate enforcement of building regulations in the earthquake-affected districts. This resulted in the reconstruction of war-damaged structures using low-quality materials or whatever was available in the area (Naddaf, 2023, p. 399). Furthermore, following the earthquake, the Assad regime failed to respond to the disaster effectively and instead used it to further its political agenda. There was no quick mobilization of resources to address the aftermath of the disasters. The Assad regime did not call for international humanitarian assistance to support the affected people. In areas occupied by opposing parties during the earthquake, the regime imposed strict security approvals and restrictions hindering local efforts to gather funds, pool resources, and volunteers, and distribute relief (SCPR, 2023, p. 9). The Assad regime basically weaponized the distribution of aid, which caused already vulnerable populations to experience further displacement, food insecurity, lack of medical care, and exposure to harsh environmental conditions. These political dynamics that fueled disaster response have caused avoidable deaths and injuries and increased the incidence of malnutrition and communicable diseases, exacerbating the fragile humanitarian situation (Jabbour et al., 2023, p. 803; Daher, 2023, p. 12). Furthermore, the politicization of the disaster response led to the marginalization of vulnerable communities living in areas occupied by opposing forces. This perpetuates systemic inequalities, making them more vulnerable to other disaster risks. The case of Syria illustrates that although the earthquake was the initiating event, its impact cascaded into a broader humanitarian crisis. The protracted conflict created conditions of vulnerabilities and fragilities that, when compounded by a trigger or shock, will produce cascading effects. The weaponization aid, corruption, and weak governance all contributed to the delay in delivering humanitarian assistance, thereby exacerbating the impact of the initiating event.

3.2. Originating Systems are Targeted and Exploited

The UNISDR (now the UNDRR) (2017, p.7) emphasized that to improve disaster risk management, there is a need to develop approaches to anticipate cascading effects before triggering and initiating events occur. This involves the identification of sensitive nodes that generate secondary events and rapidly scale up a crisis. Originating systems serve as critical nodes in the chain of cascading effects, making them particularly susceptible to targeted attacks and exploitation to disrupt the system. In FCV context, the vulnerabilities of the systems are often deliberately manipulated for strategic, political, or economic gains. Infrastructures and other critical originating systems have been the central targets of the parties in conflicts (Peters, 2021, p. 6). Targeting infrastructure allows state or non-state security forces to displace and terrorize civilian populations, expand territorial control, and redraw demographic balances in favor of particular identities (Sowers et al., 2017, p. 411-412; Wisner et al., 2004, p. 27). Exploiting these systems often amplifies cascading effects, as the failure of one critical system can ripple across networks, expanding the scale and complexity of the crisis.

Article 54 of the Geneva Convention provides explicitly that conflict parties are “prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population … for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or the adverse Party.” However, despite these provisions, critical infrastructures are often targeted and deliberately attacked in conflicts to weaken the authority and legitimacy of rulers and indirectly as collateral damage (Al-Saidi et al., 2020, p. 7). These have been observed in conflict regions in Syria, where critical infrastructure and resources have been weaponized for economic and political reasons. This pattern of weaponization of essential services and commodities has continued until now, such as the deliberate destruction of critical healthcare facilities (Ibid). Reports showed that there have been 600 incidents of attack on the healthcare system, affecting at least 350 health facilities and killing 930 health workers (Ekzayez, 2021, p. 12). Meanwhile, in opposition-controlled areas, the Ministry of Health based in Damascus withdrew support for the healthcare system, prompting local providers and non-government organizations to establish a parallel healthcare system with ad hoc interventions. Syria became known as the most dangerous place for healthcare workers, and healthcare itself was said to have been weaponized in violation of international humanitarian law (Ibid, p. 13). Even before the earthquake, the region was already grappling with a protracted humanitarian crisis and conflict, resulting in a weakened health system, limited access to healthcare services, and a shortage of medical supplies and equipment. The impact of the earthquake was further complicated by the destruction or overflow of patients, making many hospitals and clinics unable to fully function and deliver the necessary medical care to the victims (SCPR, 2023, p. 7). Likewise, health facilities lack the necessary equipment and resources to handle the surge and demand for medical services, while healthcare workers are already overstretched and exhausted. The attacks on healthcare have wide-ranging cascading effects on healthcare delivery, including long-term health consequences, economic losses, and an erosion of trust in healthcare systems (Haar et al., 2023, p. 14-15).

This shows how critical infrastructures, such as healthcare systems, serve as critical originating systems for cascading effects. Cascading effects occur when a failure in this originating system propagates and impacts other systems. As shown in the case of Syria, the deliberate targeting and exploitation of these systems create an additional layer of complexity that existing frameworks of cascading effects fail to consider. Existing frameworks often highlight failures and cascades that occur due to the dynamic interactions between natural and built environments, not by intentional attacks (Guo et al., 2024, p. 13). This is more so critical as the current discourse on systems thinking recognizes that systems affected by intentional attacks may experience a more catastrophic situation when cascading failures happen (Babaei, 2011, p. 527). The implications of these intentional disruptions necessitate the need for a robust model that considers these scenarios.

3.3. Dependencies on Single and Fragile Systems

Another concern in understanding cascading effects in FCV settings is how deliberately targeting humanitarian aid and infrastructure transforms dependencies into single points of failure. This is particularly interesting in FCV settings where dependencies are often built on already fragile or degraded systems. Preexisting governance failures, lack of redundancy, and limited resources make dependencies more prone to failure. In FCV settings, most communities in conflict zones rely on a single critical component. For example, a region may have only one functional supply route for food and medical supplies. If this route is blocked or destroyed, entire communities are cut off from aid and other essential services. The assumption is that government capacity is generally weak in states classed as fragile and conflict-affected – and that the combined effect of government incapacity and insecurity forces communities to rely on short-term and often single humanitarian intervention (Taylor, 2014, p. 2).

The effects of the ongoing war in Syria pushed communities to rely on a limited number of critical lifelines, such as humanitarian aid and supply routes (Fouad, 2023). Coupled with weak governance, the destruction of critical infrastructures, and limited resources, communities have no choice but to depend on single and fragile systems. For instance, the Bab-al-Hawa is considered the only humanitarian crossing between Türkiye and Northwest Syria and thus serves as a critical dependency for humanitarian operations. This crossing allowed vital humanitarian aid and essential needs to be delivered to the region. However, this route was jeopardized as roads leading to the border were damaged, delaying humanitarian and medical aid into Syria (Kanwal, 2023, p. 10). Failure in these systems can trigger a chain reaction and further complications. Moreover, this was aggravated by the delay in obtaining Al-Assad’s permission to open two alternative crossings had the immediate cascading effect of postponing the much-needed delivery of assistance to the conflict-affected areas of Syria. This delay affected critical aid operations and the search and rescue response (Santarisi et al., 2024, p. 2). For instance, the delay of medical supplies may lead to further complications and deterioration of the health conditions of injured victims without access to medical care. Moreover, the inability to provide proper medical care also increases the possibility of secondary health risks such as infections and waterborne diseases. In this case, the dependence on single and fragile systems, such as the Bab al-Hawa crossing, is not a choice but rather a consequence of the conflict.

4. Conclusion

While the study of cascading effects in disasters is not new, the cascading effects of disasters in FCV settings remain understudied and poorly understood. The case of Syria following the 2023 Türkiye – Syria Earthquake provides a perfect backdrop for discourse on understanding conflict and cascading effects in FCV settings. As discussed, cascading effects in FCV settings can be explored through three (3) pathways: initiating events and preexisting and systemic fragilities, targeting and exploiting originating systems, and dependence on single and fragile systems.

The first pathway underscores how initial events expose vulnerabilities and systemic failures shaped by prolonged conflicts, instability, and weak social and governance structures. While disasters such as the Türkiye-Syria Earthquake serve as the initiating event, vulnerabilities and fragilities perpetrated by the ongoing conflict significantly shape the succeeding consequences. The second pathway, meanwhile, focuses on critical infrastructures as originating systems and how these systems are deliberately targeted to gain political objectives. Disrupting these systems affects the delivery of essential services needed by communities affected by the disaster. Lastly, the third pathway addresses dependencies on single and fragile systems when other structures and systems are destroyed. Years of conflict had already weakened infrastructure in Syria, forcing communities to depend on limited systems, such as the Bab-al-Hawa border crossing, for humanitarian aid. The dependence on this single and fragile system without any alternative means that any failure or disruption in this single dependency can lead to immediate and severe consequences. Together, these pathways create mutually reinforcing and interconnected pathways that may aggravate the cascading effects of disasters in FCV settings.

This paper is a contribution to the emerging body of literature on the nexus of conflict and disasters, providing initial insights on how to understand cascading effects in FCV settings. The insights can provide a basis for establishing a specific framework of cascading effects that consider the unique situation and distinct challenges in FCV settings. However, the paper also acknowledges that one limitation of these pathways is that it does not define how much cascading effects are worsened in FCV contexts. Finally, common among the pathways identified is how they affect, delay, and weaponize humanitarian aid, which in turn cascade to broader social impacts. Additional studies are needed to investigate other pathways and causal relations associated with other systemic consequences, such as resource scarcity, economic decline, or environmental damage.

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