Part 1. Musicians of Mars: A Symphony of Deceit

The United States Army frequently channels the thinking of one of its most famous World War II Generals, George S Patton. A few of his famous phrases resound through the halls of the institutions that turn out future Army leaders. In his famous "Blood and Guts" speech, Patton charged his men with, "You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you. You must, each of your own volition, see to it that you come into this concert at the proper time and at the proper place." However, in today's US Army, aspiring leaders wait for the band leaders to signal before playing and march to their desired tune instead of contributing their creative perspective and playing their own notes.

Where Patton envisioned Army leaders orchestrating a symphony of destruction, today's leaders orchestrate a symphony of deceit. By the end of the 'best year of my life,' as leaders often describe the year at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), I recognized again, in my military journey, that rigor and accuracy were subservient to winning buy-in with the intended audience of a staff product and brief. CGSC teaches an excellent curriculum, and the rigor of the curriculum exposes those who do not possess the requisite knowledge but are still excellent communicators and rising stars. For example, in one class, we examined the different factors in the Gulf War with a question focused on regional actors. The instructor asked what Israel's role was and why Patriot Missiles were placed in Israel. An officer who resides at the top of his year group immediately responded that Israel executed much heavy lifting as an ally of the United States, insert buzzwords - inoculate, case in point, seamless, adjudicate, prosecute, blah blah. The officer did not know the answer but forged ahead with a learned verbal dance. For a moment, truth and reality succumbed to a beautiful, believable, verbose fa?ade. But why?

The military culls officers as they move up the ranks to select the best for command. Unfortunately, those officers who learn to compose the most melodious tunes for their senior leaders/ raters emerge as the top prospects for future leaders. These politically adept officers fashion the tune according to what their boss (s) want to hear. Often, a leader's off-hand remarks and random thoughts spoken aloud become a cornucopia of insight for motivated officers. Instead of anchoring rigorous staff work on problem framing within a realistic environment, senior leaders often get a brief focused on how the staff thinks the senior leader views the problem and what solutions are amicable for his intent. Because senior positions are often two-year assignments, one can imagine the turmoil this causes for future planning and procurement. While the average officer hardly goes to work each day intending to deceive, approaching problems through the revolving lens of the leader's personality, who happens to wear the leadership mantle at the time, divorces military planning from reality. Leaders who grow up in this environment manifest two traits that translate to national security threats because clear military assessment is not given to civilian leaders. First, these leaders wait for detailed guidance before planning or constructing courses of action. They do this because a proactive stance could put them at odds with their superior's idea of the situation. Second, when planning commences, it focuses on the partiality of the senior leader in terms of various ideas, concepts, and solutions.

When considering future initiatives, intellectual drift is inevitable in this system. Instead of continuous focus and refocusing on the problem, staff focus on adjusting momentum for the solution to match what each subsequent decision maker envisions. The problem is now the last leader's vision, and the solution rests on the new leader's intent. The impact of this milieu creates a tremendous waste of resources. But everyone knows what is happening: staff officers, general officers, contractors. Therefore, it is especially egregious when today's organization paints castles in the sky that fade into cost overruns and awkward implementation for tomorrow's leaders, staff, and force. My 9-year-old self remembered that the United States helped defend Israel against Scud attacks to keep it out of the Gulf War for political reasons due to watching Gulf War coverage. My adult self knew that watching a mid-career officer eloquently describe the inverse of what happened in 1990-1991 was simply a symptom of a more significant rot that must be removed from today's officer corps.