A Paradox of Trust - Exploring the UN Cybercrime Convention (A/79/460) in the Age of Global Cooperation (a reflection)

In a historic moment, the 193 member states of the United Nations recently adopted (December 24, 2024)[1] the first-ever global Convention against Cybercrime (A/79/460)[2] . After five years of negotiations, this landmark agreement aims to combat the misuse of information and communication technologies for criminal purposes, foster international cooperation, and create a robust legal framework to address the burgeoning threat of cybercrime. This consensus is a rare achievement in a world increasingly polarized by geopolitical tensions.

Yet, beneath the surface of this diplomatic triumph lies a troubling paradox[3]. Some of the very states that have signed this convention actively engage in state-sponsored cyber activities—ranging from espionage and sabotage to disinformation campaigns—against other nations. These covert operations represent a form of underground warfare, conducted without clear frontiers, and challenge the principles of the convention itself. This article delves into this paradox, exploring the nature, implications, and ethical dilemmas it poses, and proposes ways to address these challenges.

??A Framework for Cooperation, a Shadow of Conflict

?The UN Cybercrime Convention marks a watershed moment for global governance in cyberspace. It establishes a shared commitment among member states to prevent and combat cybercrime, enhance international cooperation, and standardize procedures for exchanging electronic evidence. The convention’s ambitious framework is intended to close legal gaps that have historically hindered efforts to combat cybercriminals operating across borders.

However, the adoption of this convention raises an uncomfortable question: How can states champion international cybersecurity norms while covertly deploying the same tools and tactics they seek to regulate? State-sponsored cyber operations—aimed at stealing intellectual property, disrupting critical infrastructure, and influencing political outcomes—are a growing concern, often conducted with plausible deniability. This contradiction undermines the spirit of the convention and jeopardizes trust among nations.

?Understanding State Cybercrime

?State cybercrime encompasses a range of activities orchestrated or supported by governments to advance strategic interests. These include:

·??Cyber Espionage - The theft of sensitive information, often targeting government agencies, defense contractors, and private enterprises.

·??Infrastructure Sabotage - Attacks on critical systems such as power grids, transportation networks, healthcare facilities, and submarine cables.

·??Disinformation Campaigns - The use of digital platforms to spread false narratives, manipulate public opinion, and sow discord in other nations.

Unlike traditional cybercrime, state-sponsored operations are often shielded by layers of obfuscation, with governments attributing them to independent hacker groups or private entities. This ambiguity complicates efforts to hold perpetrators accountable.

??Implications for the Convention’s Effectiveness

?The existence of state-sponsored cyber activities raises significant concerns about the efficacy of the UN Cybercrime Convention. While the convention provides a framework for addressing crimes such as hacking, fraud, and digital extortion, it remains silent on the role of states as potential offenders. This omission creates a loophole that could be exploited by signatories.

Moreover, the convention’s reliance on mutual trust and cooperation is at odds with the realities of cyber geopolitics. In an environment where states are both collaborators and adversaries, the implementation of the convention’s provisions may be fraught with challenges.

The convention also falls short in addressing modern cybersecurity concerns specific to critical infrastructures, such as submarine cables. These infrastructures, essential for global internet connectivity and financial transactions, represent a unique combination of physical and digital vulnerabilities. As submarine cables increasingly become targets for sabotage, the convention’s lack of explicit provisions for their protection underscores a critical gap. Addressing this issue through amendments or future protocols should be a priority, reflecting the urgency of safeguarding these vital systems.

Risks to the Convention - The Ratification Challenge

?Despite its adoption, the UN Cybercrime Convention faces significant risks that could undermine its success. These risks are rooted in the ratification process and its implications. First, the complexity of domestic legislative processes could lead to significant delays in ratification. While the convention has been adopted, it must be ratified by each member state to become binding. Countries with internal political or legal challenges may struggle to align their national frameworks with the convention’s requirements, further prolonging the process and hindering timely implementation.

Second, the lack of universal adoption poses a major threat. If some states fail to ratify the convention, its global impact could be diluted. Non-ratifying states might become safe havens for cybercriminals or resist cooperation in investigations, ultimately undermining the convention’s effectiveness.

Third, the limited timeframe for ratification adds pressure. The convention is open for signature until December 31, 2026[4], creating a de facto deadline for states to take action. Failure to meet this timeline could result in fragmented adoption, leaving gaps in the global cybercrime framework and weakening the overall effort to combat cyber threats.

Finally, accountability and enforcement gaps present another challenge. The convention lacks clear mechanisms to enforce compliance or hold states accountable for failing to ratify or implement its provisions. This could erode trust among member states and weaken the spirit of international cooperation, as the absence of enforcement tools undermines the convention’s credibility and effectiveness.

?Ethical Dilemmas and Strategic Considerations

?The dual role of states as both signatories and perpetrators of cybercrime presents a profound ethical dilemma. Can a state genuinely advocate for global cybersecurity while engaging in offensive cyber operations? The answer is not straightforward. Many states justify their actions as necessary for national security, arguing that cyber capabilities are essential tools for modern warfare and diplomacy.

This rationale, however, risks normalizing a cyber arms race, where offensive capabilities are prioritized over defensive measures. The lack of clear international norms governing state behavior in cyberspace further exacerbates this issue, creating an environment where mistrust and escalation are inevitable.

??Toward Greater Accountability

Addressing this paradox requires a multi-faceted approach:

·??Strengthening Transparency - States should commit to disclosing their cyber capabilities and doctrines to build mutual trust.

·??Enhancing Accountability - The convention could include mechanisms for independent investigations into alleged state-sponsored cyber activities.

·??Establishing Norms - International agreements, such as the Tallinn Manual[5], provide a starting point for defining acceptable state behavior in cyberspace. These norms should be integrated into the convention’s framework.

·??Promoting Confidence-Building Measures - Initiatives such as bilateral agreements and regional cybersecurity pacts can help reduce tensions and foster collaboration.

·??Amending the Convention - Specific provisions addressing the protection of critical infrastructures, such as submarine cables, should be introduced in future amendments. These amendments would acknowledge the unique vulnerabilities and global importance of such systems, ensuring that their security becomes a shared international responsibility.

??A Call to Action

?The UN Cybercrime Convention represents a significant step toward a safer and more secure digital future. However, its success depends on the willingness of member states to confront their own contradictions. As cyberspace becomes an increasingly contested domain, the need for unified global action has never been greater. Nations must prioritize the spirit of the convention over short-term strategic gains, recognizing that unchecked cyber aggression ultimately undermines collective security.

?The paradox of state cybercrime is not insurmountable. By addressing these (and other) challenges with honesty and determination, the international community can pave the way for a more cooperative and resilient digital world. The inclusion of critical infrastructure protection, particularly for submarine cables, in future amendments would strengthen the convention’s impact, ensuring that it evolves to meet the most pressing cybersecurity challenges of our time. The question remains: Will states rise to the occasion, or will the shadow of conflict continue to loom over this historic agreement?

Top image: M.C.Escher, Drawing Hands, 1948

[1] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2024/December/un-general-assembly-adopts-landmark-convention-on-cybercrime.html | https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158521

[2] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/372/04/pdf/n2437204.pdf

Article 1

Statement of purpose

The purposes of this Convention are to:

(a) Promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat cybercrime more efficiently and effectively;

(b) and combating cybercrime; and Promote, facilitate and strengthen international cooperation in preventing

(c) Promote, facilitate and support technical assistance and capacity-building to prevent and combat cybercrime, in particular for the benefit of developing countries.

[3] The?Paradox of Trust?refers to a situation where trust is both essential for cooperation and simultaneously undermined by the very actions of those expected to uphold it. It embodies a contradiction where the entities involved—often states, organizations, or individuals—claim to commit to building or maintaining trust but act in ways that erode it.

[4] Article 64

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature in Hanoi in 2025 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until 31 December 2026.

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tallinn_Manual