The Paradox of Fictional Emotions

Introduction

Watching movies or reading novels is not only a source of enjoyment but also often leads to deep emotional connections with the fictional characters in these works. This raises the question of whether these connections reflect genuine psychological attitudes toward these fictional entities. Kendall Walton cautions that interpreting these connections as genuine can lead to unnecessary confusion and a tolerance of ambiguity (Kendall, 1978, p. 6).

This essay consists of six sections: an introduction, four interconnected sections, and a conclusion. First, I will introduce a fictional character named Charles, who is immersed in watching a horror movie featuring a vicious green slime. Then, I will use this example, in the context of the five defining marks of emotions, to determine which ones apply to Charles’s mental state when he claims to be terrified of the green monster. Additionally, I will explain how a paradox can arise and review Walton’s solution to the paradox of fictional emotions, where fictional emotions are to be understood along the same lines as fictional characters. Finally, I will evaluate whether Walton is successful in resolving the paradox, taking into account the objections raised against his approach.

Charles’s Mental State

In his scholarly work titled “Fearing Fictions,” Walton narrates the story of Charles, illustrating how he “cringes in his seat as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly over the earth destroying everything in its path” (Walton, 1978, p. 5). When the slime emerges from a swelling mass, causing destruction around it, it fixates its beady eyes on the camera and crawls rapidly toward the screen. At that moment, “Charles emits a shriek … [his] heart pounds violently, he gasps for breath, he grasps the chair until his knuckles are white” (Walton, 1978, pp. 5-8). Shocked by this terrifying experience, Charles admits that his fear of the monster was real. The question that arises is: Should we take Charles’s words seriously and say that he was genuinely afraid of the monster? The answer, according to Walton, hinges on our understanding of the distinction between the fictional world and the real world.

Analyzing Charles’s Mental State According to the Five Marks of Emotions

Philosophers generally agree on the essential characteristics that define emotions. Chappell (2014, p. 51) identifies five key features of emotions:

1.???? Physical symptoms: Emotions have physical manifestations. Signs such as trembling, sweating, panting, and muscular tension are all physical indicators of fear.

2.???? Behavioral or motivational symptoms: Emotions affect behavior. Fleeing from a perceived threat is an example of a behavioral symptom.

3.???? Phenomenology: Emotions include an internal sensation or experience, representing what one feels from within.

4.???? Objects: Emotions are directed towards specific objects. For example, if one is afraid of bats, bats become the object of their fear.

5.???? Belief: Emotions involve beliefs, such as perceptions or appraisals. For instance, the fear of bats arises from the belief that they pose a real threat. ?

After reviewing the five identified marks of emotions, we can now evaluate their application to Charles’s mental state when he claims to be terrified of the slime.

We might wonder whether the first three marks of emotions are evident in this case. Clearly, Charles exhibits physical symptoms of fear, such as panting and heart palpitations; behavioral symptoms, as evidenced by his screams and gripping the chair; and a phenomenological or psychological sense of fear. However, the physical and behavioral symptoms, and Charles’s sense of fear, are all undermined by the fact that he does not take an immediate action to escape from the situation he finds himself in. For example, he does not leave the cinema; instead, he remains firmly seated in his chair. ?

On the other hand, the fourth and fifth aspects of emotions apply to Charles’s mental state. His feelings have specific objects (the slime) and include beliefs about that object (the perception that the slime poses a threat). This pattern applies to different emotions, such as joy or sadness, where the distinctive belief involved in any emotion will be related to its object (Chappell, 2014, p. 61). Thus, we see that the five-marker model of emotions provides a useful framework for analyzing Charles’s mental state, with the potential to apply it to a wide range of other emotional or affective states.

Walton’s Approach to Resolving the Paradox of Fictional Emotions

The fear Charles feels toward a fictional creature raises an intriguing issue known as the paradox of fictional emotions. This paradox can be formulated as a question: Given that rational individuals feel emotions such as fear, sadness, or joy when engaging with fictional artworks, and given that these emotions, in their rational form, involve beliefs about non-fiction things, how can it be rational to feel emotions toward fictional entities without adopting irrational beliefs about them?

Philosophically, this issue is viewed as a paradox in which seemingly undeniable premises lead to contradictory or unacceptable conclusions. The paradox of fictional emotions can be formally outlined as follows:

(a) When rational individuals engage with fictional artworks, they feel emotions such as fear, sadness, or joy.

(b) These emotions, in their rational manifestations, involve beliefs about real, non-fictional entities.

(c) Rational individuals do not adopt false or irrational beliefs about fictional representations.

?Various philosophers have proposed different solutions to this paradox. For example, the prominent Greek philosopher Plato challenges premise (c). In his dialogue "Ion," Plato asserts that people do indeed adopt false beliefs about fiction, as they seem to lose touch with reality when immersed in fictional representations. Plato thought that fictional representations could be so powerful and persuasive that they could lead people to mistake fiction for reality. He argued that the emotional engagement with fictional characters and situations could cloud one’s judgment, causing them to temporarily forget the distinction between fictional world and real world.

Kathleen Stock, an expert on aesthetics (particularly in fictional artworks), questions premise (b). For her, “what is required for an emotional response is a lack of awareness, a lack of conscious attention to the fact that this isn’t real” (Stock, 2022).

Walton, on the other hand, resolves the paradox by denying premise (a). He presents a theory that classifies what happens to us when we experience fictional artworks, arguing that we should not view these experiences as real emotions. Walton terms this this physiological and psychological condition quasi-fear, asserting that “[f]ear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all” (1990, quoted in Chappell, 2014, p. 124). According to Walton, quasi-fear lacks the crucial motivational component present in real fear. While quasi-fear may involve physiological responses similar to real fear (such as increased heart rate or sweating), it does not compel the person to take action to avoid the perceived threat. In genuine fear, Walton contends, there is a real belief in the existence of a threat that drives self-preserving behavior. In quasi-fear, this belief and subsequent motivation are absent because the individual knows at a rational level that the threat is not real. For Walton, an ordinary emotion requires a belief that something in the real world is threatening.

Moreover, Walton argues that a real emotion, like fear, “puts pressure on one’s behavior (even if one resists)” (1990, quoted in Chappell, 2014, p. 124). To illustrate why we do not see this motivational pressure on Charles’s behavior, Walton invites us to imagine a child named Timmy. Timmy is engaged in a make-believe game with his father, who pretends to be a scary monster. As Timmy flees from his father, he screams with a grin on his face and eagerly returns for more. Timmy is aware that this is just a game; hence, he is fictionally afraid. In many ways, Charles resembles Timmy, as both are engaged in a game of pretense. When the slime raises its head and crawls toward the camera, “it is fictional in Charles’s game that he is threatened. And when as a result Charles gasps and grips his chair, fictionally he is afraid” (Walton, 1990, quoted in Chappell, 2014, pp. 127-28).

Having taken such a position, Walton nonetheless cautions against trivializing Charles’s mental state by labeling it as mere quasi-fear. The fear symptoms that Charles exhibits do not indicate mere doubt that the green monster is real: “to say that Charles half believes he is in danger and is half afraid, does less than justice to the intensity of his reaction” (Walton, 1990, quoted in Chappell, 2014, p. 121). Thus, Walton distinguishes between instinctive or gut emotions (at the visceral level) and intellectual feelings (at the rational level).

To illustrate this difference, Walton compares the fear that Aaron (another fictional character) feels about flying, and Charles’ fear of the slime. Aaron knows that flying is relatively safe and is familiar with the statistics that support this claim. Nevertheless, he avoids air travel whenever possible and feels tense and anxious when he has to fly.

The difference between Aaron and Charles is that the former takes deliberate actions despite his belief (at the gut level) that air travel is dangerous, while the latter is not inclined to take any action, such as leaving the cinema. Walton thinks that we do not have reasons for things we do not do (for example, trembling, sweating, increased pulse-rate) and concludes that “we can justifiably infer Aaron’s (‘gut’) belief in the danger of flying from his deliberate behaviors … yet refuse to infer from Charles’s automatic responses that he thinks he is in danger” (1990, quoted in Chappell, 2014, pp. 121-22).

Critical Evaluation of Walton’s Solution

Walton’s approach to resolving the paradox of fictional emotions faces a number of objections. Personally, I disagree with Walton’s assertion that emotions require belief in the existence of their objects to be considered real. This assertion seems to oversimplify the complex nature of emotional experiences.

Emotions, particularly in response to fiction, do not necessarily require a belief in the real existence of their objects to be genuine. Our capacity for empathy and imagination allows us to feel real emotions toward fictional scenarios. These emotions can be just as intense and meaningful as those provoked by real-life situations. Moreover, the fact that we do not act on these emotions in the same way we might in real life does not negate their authenticity. Instead, it demonstrates our ability to engage deeply with fictional worlds while maintaining an awareness of their fictional nature. For example, I recently watched Douglas Sirk’s drama movie “Imitation of Life,” and there were some scenes where I could not resist crying. It seems unreasonable to categorize these emotions as mere “quasi-sorrow” just because the object of my sadness was fictional. While the mother who suffered from her daughter’s indifference and mistreatment in the movie was not my own mother, I could imagine the fate of any mother if she were in a similar situation. ?

Although many of our imagined scenarios are figments of our imaginations, they can be grounded in real-life experiences or plausible real-life situations, which lends a sense reality to our imaginative responses. Beliefs are indeed crucial for any emotional response. For example, it would be impossible to react emotionally to a fictional scenario if we simultaneously believed it could not possibly exist. One can vividly imagine their child being harmed and still experience strong emotions, even if the scenario is purely fictional. As Stock (2022) aptly puts it, “we seem to have strong emotional responses to imaginary situations in lots of contexts … It’s just that in the case of fiction someone else has provided the material, as it were, for our emotions to hook onto.” ?

Chappell (2022) raises a further objection to Walton’s solution, arguing that when we watch a tragic movie, without knowing whether the events represented were real or fictional, and it is only at the end of the movie that we learn that they were fictional, the emotional experience that we undergo during the movie is the same. According to Walton’s perspective, however, this distinction is crucial for differentiating between quasi-fear and real fear: “Given all the differences between a state of emotion and one of quasi-emotion, surely we can tell which of the two kinds of state we are in?” (Chappell, 2014, p. 54).

Stock (2022) offers two responses to Chappell’s objections. First, she points out that most viewers have some awareness of the nature of the events they are watching, meaning their emotional state is not entirely neutral. Second, Stock argues that Walton’s theory does not imply a change in the viewer’s phenomenological experience or in distinguishing between real-life emotions and quasi-emotions; rather, the experiential state might remain the same. Thus, we should not assume that quasi-emotions are necessarily weaker or less valuable than real emotions. The key issue is how these emotions are classified, not how they are evaluated.

Conclusion

Walton explores the boundaries that separate the worlds of fiction from the worlds of reality. Through his use of a fictional character, he evaluated the defining marks of emotions that apply to Charles’s mental state. Walton contends that Charles’s claim of being terrified of the slime was weakened by the lack of motivation to take real actions (that is, to leave the cinema), leading to the characterization of his mental state as quasi-fear, which can be understood as a blend of physiological and psychological factors. According to Walton, it is essential not to misinterpret such experience as genuine emotional experiences. ?

Charles’s emotional state gives rise to the paradox of fictional emotions. This paradox asks how it can be rational for people experiencing fictional representations to react emotionally to people and events they do not think are real. Walton attempts to resolve the paradox of fictional emotions by denying statement (a) and presents a philosophical theory that classifies what happens to us when we experience fictional artworks, maintaining that emotions require beliefs in the existence of their objects to be real. Personally, I do not support this view, given the strong emotions that fictional representations can generate in many people’s imagination.

Chappell and Stock are critical of Walton’s theory. Chappell argues that our emotional experiences while watching a movie remain consistent, regardless of the reality of the events depicted. On the other hand, Stock affirms that we can respond emotionally to an imagined scenario even if we realize it does not exist. These perspectives challenge Walton’s position and highlight the complexity and depth of our emotional engagement with fiction.

This debate has significant implications for our understanding of emotions and fictional engagement. It challenges us to reconsider the nature of emotional experiences. Moreover, it highlights the importance of fictional narratives in our emotional lives and raises questions about the value we assign to emotions evoked by fictional scenarios. Understanding these dynamics can inform fields beyond philosophy, such as psychology, literature, and media studies, potentially influencing how we approach art, entertainment, and even virtual reality experiences.

References

Chappell, T. (2014) Truth in Fiction, Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Chappell, T. (2022) “Stock on the Paradox of fiction (Part 3)” [Audio], A333 Key Questions in Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2.open.ac.uk/course/view.php?name=A333-22J (Accessed: October 17, 2022).

Stock, K. (2022) “Stock on the Paradox of fiction (Part 3)” [Audio], A333 Key Questions in Philosophy. Available at: https://learn2.open.ac.uk/course/view.php?name=A333-22J (Accessed: October 17, 2022).

Walton, K. (1978) “Fearing Fiction” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. 1978), pp. 5-27. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2025831 . (Accessed: October 15, 2022).

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