Overcoming "Groupthink"on Mt. Fuji
Mohit Bhandari
Professor and Chair, Department of Surgery?Distinguished University Professor?Senior Tier Canada Research Chair? Editor-in-Chief, OrthoEvidence ? Order of Canada
Here's What Happened
July 19, 2019 at 10:55am (or so) myself along with 3 others reached the summit of Japan’s tallest peak, Mount Fuji. Nothing particularly special given this mountain is successfully climbed yearly by thousands. This ascent was particularly memorable, though. At 2am on July 19—the morning of the planned summit push—the lead guide woke all the climbers at our 8th station shelter (3100 m elevation) and said, “The weather is worsening at the summit, it’s too dangerous to summit today, we are all heading down at 5am—Sorry for this news”. At 5am, 24 climbers along with 3 guides descended. Six individuals did not. Our group of four as part of this six. Here’s the story of what happened and the lessons we learned.
"The weather is worsening at the summit, it’s too dangerous to summit today, we are all heading down at 5am—Sorry for this news"
No Stranger to Failing
This climb came almost the day the to the year (July 15, 2017) I attempted a single day push to the summit of Mount Temple (highest peak in Banff, Alberta, 3544m elevation) with 5 other individuals. Grossly under-estimating this mountain, after I gave up around 3200 m. To be more accurate, I ran out of time. We had set 2pm for a turn around time, and it became clear that the scramble up Mt Temple was much harder than I had anticipated. Our guides made the decision and the 8 of us on the climb complied. Nobody summited that day. But we all succeeded in more ways the one.
The Call of Mount Fuji
Mount Fuji, Japan’s tallest peak (elevation 3776 m) was one I had planned to climb in 2018 but deferred until 2019. This climb, one I believed would be much easier, was an opportunity to correct the mistakes of Mount Temple in 2017. I also know that to simply set the singular goal to summit a mountain is a foolish one. No more has the casualty of this ‘summit fever’ been more apparent than Mount Everest (elevation 8,848 meters,29,029 feet). A few months ago at least 11 climbers died while queued above 8000m (the ‘death zone’) en route to the summit. In a CNN report, Adrian Ballinger, a mountain guide commented, “That lack of experience, both with the commercial operators and the climbers themselves, is…where people make bad decisions, get themselves in trouble up high and end up having unnecessary fatalities." I’m not saying that a 3,800m peak is an any way equitable to an 8,800m peak; however, the same principles and psychologies apply.
“That lack of experience, both with the commercial operators and the climbers themselves, is…where people make bad decisions, get themselves in trouble up high and end up having unnecessary fatalities."
Ignoring the Experts
Why did I listen to the guides at Mount Temple and descend when they told us we were unable to summit, but ignore the guides at Mount Fuji with the very same advice? My rationale was twofold, and had nothing to do with actually wanting to summit. In fact, in our group of climbers, I was probably the least focused on summiting that day. But I wasn’t climbing alone, and the 3 others in my group did influence my decision. Evidence, however, was the key turning point. Good data ultimately drove my decision to ignore expert advice—as it should! Experts are fallible. They are not always looking out for your interests, especially if “your interests” are in conflict with their own.
"Good data ultimately drove my decision to ignore expert advice—as it should!"
The Perils of “Groupthink”
When the lead guide gave us the news on July 19th around 2am, I was somewhat relieved. I could hear lots of whispering in our hut among the 30 climbers (some English, some Japanese). It was storming outside all night—the rain was relentless, and the gusting winds were unsafe at this altitude. I thought the matter was settled but it wasn’t. Around 5am, one of the surgeon scientist fellows turned over in his sleeping bag and whispered, “ I just saw a small group of climbers heading up to the summit, it can’t be that unsafe to go if others are going up.” I turned on a small light in our section of the hut and responded, “Are you saying you want to go up?.” At that moment, the other fellow chimed in, “We flew all this way to do this, would be a shame if didn’t summit.” I looked to our third member who’d be quiet until now. “Do you also want to summit today?”, I asked her. “Kinda, yes. But only if it’s safe to do so.” It was 3 in favor and me, as the dissenting voice.
Groupthink is defined as “ a phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome.”
Coined by the psychologist Irving Janis in 1972, Groupthink is defined as “ a phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome.” Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences.
Markus Hallgren in a thoughtful review entitled, “Groupthink in Temporary Organizations” uses a tragic mountaineering example (the ill-fated 1996 Everest Expedition) to illustrate the perils of Groupthink ---especially as it relates to poor decision-making in temporary organisations. A climbing expedition –even one as relatively small as our climb of Mount Fuji- manifests all the issues associated with “Groupthink” in a temporary organization. A qualitative study of team managers from Walden University reported, “Groupthink can lead teams to advance flawed decisions that may cost people their jobs or result in loss of life (John Reaves, 2018, PhD Dissertation). “
Characteristics of groups that are prone to "Groupthink" are as follows: 1.A tightly knit group, 2.Insulation from external input 3. Leaders who promote their own preferred solutions, 4. Lack of clear decision-making process, 5.Homogenous composition of group, 6. Presence of an external threat, and 7. Members (and particularly, influential members) have low self-esteem because of previous failures in similar situations. *referenced from https://eight2late.wordpress.com/2010/09/14/groupthink-in-project-environments/
My biggest fear in ignoring the advice of our expert guides and especially giving in to what seemed like an irrational desire to summit despite unsafe conditions was being complicit in a “dysfunctional decision-making process”.
Of the 7 risk factors, our group situation met all of them. Our guides were ‘promoting their own agendas’, our decision-making was more gut-feeling than systematic, we were generally a homogeneous group with a goal of summiting, there was real threat of environmental conditions further clouding our judgments, and I seemingly had a greater weight of influence on the group ( and my prior failure on Mount Temple, was likely driving my reticence to summit).
Towards Functional Decision-Making: Better Data Driving Better Decisions
Around 6am or so, I agreed to go with the group’s plan to summit if we had believable satellite data on real-time conditions at the summit. The validity of any projections in weather in whatever source we found would need to be tested ‘real time’. For example, the hourly conditions reporting from our projections would need to match “exactly” what we were seeing outside our hut. Rain was projected at 7am and a weather window around 830am (no rain, lower winds). If any of these two projections from our dataset failed, we agreed to call it quits and descend. We further asked individuals ‘outside’ our guide group for advice on the weather conditions and our projections. Lastly, we brainstormed plausible reasons why our guides were so adamant on descending. We were re-assured on multiple counts.
What We Did, And How it Turned Out.
At 840 am, July 19th, 2019, four of us started our climb to the summit. Having considered alternatives, ensured council from other independent climbers or guides, and developed a clear “data-driven strategy”.
The weather window worked out as predicted allowing us to summit later that morning. We overcome the ‘Groupthink’ mentality by following a few simple strategies (https://eight2late.wordpress.com):
1. Brainstormed all alternatives , 2. Played devil’s advocate – consider scenarios contrary to those popular within the group, 3. Avoid prejudicing team members’ opinions (I listened to them before I spoke), 4. Bring in external experts (other climbers, guides), 5. Discuss ideas independently with people outside the group
In the end, we ignored the advice of our expert guides, but also narrowly avoided a trap of ‘Groupthink’. Good data drove a decision that ultimately turned out to be exceptional.
Disclaimer: I travelled with 3 others (Franca Mossuto, Herman Johal, and Raman Mundi) who may not have seen the events in the same way, or my perceptions of the decisions we made. I accept this account as a personal one and not necessarily reflective of others’ experiences in my group.
Professor of Orthopedic Trauma at University of Calgary
5 年When I first met you, I thought that you were quite amazing in your accomplishments. But now I see that you are much much more than what I first saw. Wisdom in so many areas of life that is rarely spoken about. Never seen "groupthink" spoken about before and I really learned something. Thanks again Mo.
Advocate for Patient Experience - Passion for Support Advancement - Solutions Oriented Partner
5 年Good post thank you, ...? It is great to see this happening Mohit! Group think is at epidemic levels in the OR. It becomes its own frenetic form of ethos within each setting. What makes it a phenomena is not so much its existence, but that it is tolerated in the first place ... especially when patients' lives are at stake. This is what makes it mind boggling. Throwing instruments and behaving with anger and abuse against those assisting is not a demonstration of strength but profound self righteous weakness. Moral injury resulting from toxic group think is a reality that doesn't take a psychologist to remedy. The centrality of servant leadership with a mutual goal of promoting the care of the patient as the ideal is a positive place to start, .... and can be infectious.
Joseph Marranca Photography: stills + motion
5 年Well written Mo, a logical decision based on fact and not a “mass hysteria” type scenario
Senior Clinical Fellow, Critical Care
5 年Congratulations to the team on successful expedition beating the odds! A Great Read.
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5 年Bucket List ??. Congratulations!