Operation Jawbreaker and its outcome, A cultural analysis
Operation Jawbreaker
Dennis Nolan
American Military University
5/27/2018
Introduction
After the events of September 11th, 2001, the United States had to respond to this blatant attack by extremists, Afghanistan had been harboring Osama Bin Laden and would become the coming battle ground. In late September of 2001 the CIA better known as the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team dropped into Uzbekistan and began coordinating a strategy to insert into Afghanistan. On the 26th of September, the Jawbreaker team flew in a CIA-owned MI-17 helicopter that was operated by Air Branch pilots. The team flew over the Hindu Kush mountains, into the Panjshir Valley located north of Kabul. This is where the CIA was met by representatives from the Northern Alliance. The team quickly established a base of operations close to Northern Alliance general Barak, with secure comms back to CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC), this would be the launching operation in the coming hunt for Osama bin Laden. The Jawbreaker team established an immediate intelligence cell with the Northern Alliance where they could share intelligence, that of locations of top Al Qaida figures.[1]
The tasks carried out by Jawbreaker included: meetings with key Northern Alliance commanders to ensure their cooperation with the planned US military intervention in Afghanistan. A large part of this consisted of demonstrating the seriousness of American intent. Millions of dollars in cash were handed out to NA higher-ups so they could purchase weapons and supplies. Establishing a joint CIA/NA intelligence cell in order to collect and share intel on the Taliban / Al Qaeda forces in the North. Jawbreaker was particularly interested in the location of Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden, as well as the locations of Al Qaeda training camps.
using GPS devices, Jawbreaker mapped the frontline positions of both the Northern Alliance and Taliban positions. These maps were vital in ensuring that the right targets were struck when US air power was eventually brought to bear. An old British landing strip was converted into a runway capable of supporting Air Branch L100 re supply flights. preparing the ground for US Special Operations forces to enter the Panjshir Valley and begin operations against the Taliban / Al Qaeda. An ODA from the 5th Special Forces Group (ODA 555) inserted into the valley on the night of the October 19th and linked up with Jawbreaker. The ODA had brought SOFLAM Laser Target Designators (LTDs) with them in order to call in precision guided weapons from US warplanes down onto Taliban / Al Qaeda positions along the nearby Shomali Plains.1. Using testimonies, interviews, of those involved in the operation and the objective of the operation itself it is possible to determine success of using indigenous assets to accomplish Operation Jaw Breaker (Task Force Dagger - Operation Enduring Freedom) while considering cultural intelligence as a factor of success or failure for this operation and future operations.
Literature Review
Operation Jaw Breaker was America’s first operation into Afghanistan, this was a complex and innovative plan to be able to quickly strike Al Qaida and the Taliban. The lead up to the insertion of CIA teams and the resources needed to begin the foothold into the so called “graveyard of empires” was a complicated one but all sources agree this was a covert cash fed action. The CIA had been out of the country for decades and the only first-hand accounts that are readily available are from CIA officer’s Gary Berntsen and Gary C. Schroen, and some public knowledge from Unites like the 106th SOAR. Though there is so much limited official information on the operation itself the research of literature and works out there lead to an analysis based on the available information from starting with CIA officer Gary C. Shcroen. The next step would be to review through Gary Berntsen and his accounts of the operation and finally outside sources that have given information about how this operation concluded and lead to the battle of Tora Bora. This review will focus on Gary Schroen’s deal making and building relationships with the Northern Alliance and Gary Bernsten’s implementation of the operation and how relying on these local forces and lack of utilization of cultural intelligence lead to the outcome of Tora Bora.
Gary 1: The broker
The story of Jawbreaker begins with Gary Schroen or as he called himself Gary 1, it’s important to make that distinction as Schroen’s replacement had not had ties to Afghanistan himself. The origins of how the operation started across all sources is virtually the same in the mission objective being to first build a cooperation with the Northern Alliance, distribute large sums of money to gain their trust and persuade “Arab guests” to not side with the Taliban. Next would be the utilization of GPS laser targeting of sights for planes to target and destroy Al Qaida and Taliban forces and capabilities. Lastly was to convert an old British landing strip into a way for American forces to funnel in resources and soldiers into Afghanistan. The relationship with the Northern alliance is the beginning of the variation between both CIA officers. Firstly, Gary Schroen explains in his work “First In an insiders account of how the CIA spearheaded the war on Terror in Afghanistan” he had prior relations with Ahmad Shah Massoud from his time as station chief of Kabul in the 1980’s.[2] Massoud himself came from a relatively well-off family in Afghanistan and was well connected his father being a colonel under King Zahir Shah. Massoud was also an acquaintance of Hamid Karzai who came from the well-known Karzai family that resided in Kandahar. Hamid Karzai’s father was the tribal chief of the Popalzai tribe, a member of parliament and had much respect amongst the southern Pashtun people’s.[3] This relationship between Massoud and Pashtun peoples to the south would have been invaluable to the Operation and for that matter and United States involvement in Afghanistan, however that is not how the story played out.
Massoud was a great asset to the CIA coming into Afghanistan unfortunately shortly before they arrived Massoud was assassinated and the Northern Alliance it was not clear whether they would stay together or go to loyalties amongst warlords. However, during the time that Schroen knew and worked with Massoud it was clear they saw Bin Laden as an enemy and the rest of the Northern Alliance shared this view and greeted Schroen’s team on September 26th of 2001. [4] Schroen and Berntsen both make note of the Northern Alliance being Leary of American involvement because of the United States abandoning the nation in 1992.[5] Negotiations in both of these sources are fever pitched, in some cases we have General Tommy Franks even storming out saying “bullshit” to the demands of General Fahim of the Northern Alliance, so a balance of diplomacy and steady flow of cash made things much easier to negotiate in Afghanistan.[6] This was a huge problem and source of friction between the CIA team and the military, in particular General Tommy Frank’s who believed you could not rely on fighters that could easily be paid off, but this was Afghanistan loyalties swayed like the grass in prairies.
Schroen during his time in Afghanistan set the ground work for the eventual operation of Jawbreaker, he was a broker of sorts that set up deals with local leaders including Bismallah Khan who was an almost autonomous figure in the fighting with the Taliban but very well equipped.[7] During these negotiations the general Bismallah remarked about the GPS targeting: “Frankly, I am more interested that you bomb the enemy hard. Perhaps a few of your bombs will fall on my positions. That always happens in battle. We will accept such casualties without complaint if you are hitting the enemy strongly” early on the indication of using local fighters was that their loyalty to the cause was not absolute instead this became some what of a chess game of after the Taliban falls who gets what when the Americans leave.[8]
The large sums of money that the American’s were distributing in the north of Afghanistan did buy loyalty short term, this is because historically Afghanistan is more of a blend of peoples and isolated pockets of ethnic groups than a nation. Gary Schroen remarks in a PBS interview that: “The northern third of Afghanistan is much different than the Pashtun south. There [in the north], these tribal entities ... all look primarily to a single leader, and that single leader can pretty much sway the entire population that he represents. While they may dislike each other, they'll usually tend to work together a lot better than the Pashtuns who live in areas that are cut by mountains, so that you get groups of Pashtuns separated by mountains. Even their languages evolve differently. They don't like each other; they don't get along well; it's a much more complicated tribal structure there. You had to pick one or two tribal leaders down in the south and work with them. There were all kinds of problems. We didn't understand the south like we did the north, ... so we ended up not really winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people but destroying the Taliban and then putting a government in place that hopefully would be able to win the hearts and minds. That hasn't quite happened yet.”[9] The scope and pace that Schroen’s team went into the Panjshir valley is unquestionably impressive and was vital to the mission of Jawbreaker in linking the Northern Alliance and cutting off of the Taliban to the north where the United States would be able to resupply itself and its new allies. The CIA did an official review of Gary Schroen’s work and starts with mentioning that his accounts are a memoir of his time from mid-September to October 2001 when Gary Berntsen lead the Jawbreaker team. The official review by the CIA goes on to mention: “The joint CIA-spe-cial forces teams made short work of the Taliban. Agency officers provided the cul-tural and language expertise, while the military personnel coordinated air and ground fire-support assets. These working relationships remained excellent through the crumbling of Taliban resistance on 6 December” much of the fine details on all of this are omitted in both Berntsten and Schroen’s accounts as much of the operation still remains classified.[10] It was determined early on the bulk work of the elite soldiers for the Taliban were the Arab fighters, and other Al Qaida members General Khan remarks in Schroen’s memoir: “and they do not like to surrender. They fight hard and they fight bravely” so it was clear that they were the first targets to be eliminated.[11]
The creation of a resupplying runway was critical to the mission of Operation Jawbreaker as the country of Afghanistan is extremely isolated, Schroen describes using what was at one time a German beer brewing facility that had an airstrip. The flow of money continued on with Schroen giving $10,000 to rebuild the airfield so supplies could come in and in the event of a downed aircraft allow for searches for the pilot. According to Defense media network accounts General Tommy Franks took full advantage of the fact that Afghanistan was so hard to enter. Instead of establishing a central command in or near Afghanistan, rather the command structure was a large-scale test of an idea called “reach back” using satellite communications with Washington D.C. to remove an apparent American footprint from Afghanistan.[12]
Gary 2: Implementor
Schroen was an aging CIA officer working towards retirement when much of this was beginning to come together for the Jawbreaker team. In October 2001 Gary Berntsen took over Operation Jawbreaker, he too was approached by Joseph Cofer Black who was head of the Counter Terrorist Center since 1999 and reported to director George Tenet. Black made it clear early on to Berntsen what he wanted done in Afghanistan, he told him he personally wanted Bin Laden’s head in a box to give to the president. In an interview with Men’s Journal Black was asked if he truly gave those orders to Berntsen he replied: “Let me characterize it in a different way. This is not about some kind of grisly decapitation exercise. What it is about is on a Third World battlefield, in the fog of war, being able to prove your actions. With rounds whizzing by your head, are you going to take the time to get out a fingerprint kit, maybe draw some blood for a DNA match, perhaps take a dental impression? If it were me, I’d want something fast.”[13]
Berntsen continued on with the idea of using local assets to complete the mission, but cultural and linguistic problems persisted. The special forces groups could not communicate with the local Afghan’s so again trust was becoming an issue.[14] Like that of the previous commander of the operation Berntsen used cash to smooth over what did not work linguistically with the Afghan populace. Team member dubbed Storm was in charge of giving out a staggering eight million dollars in order to help fund the Northern Alliance further.[15] Between both accounts this seems an apparent problem the steady flow of cash exchanging hands so easily to people who would come back and ask for more. The cash kept things rolling but it was the GPS targeting that really kept faith of the Northern Alliance in that the American’s would be staying this time and could sway the tide of war against the Taliban. Berntsen remarks that General Barbajan and the Northern Alliance celebrated how precise the bombings were and seeing the Taliban in shambles.[16] November 5th, 2001 Berntsen details the beginning of the operation of taking Mazar e Sharif and the absolutely incredible way the U.S. special forces team 595 went on horseback of all methods and had been sweeping their way north towards Mazar e Sharif.[17] What was the deciding factor for these soldiers was the technology they could utilize satellite radio’s to call in air strikes on targets. The utilization of General Dostum and his post-apocalyptic style cavalry units to hit Taliban units after a devastating American airstrike confused the Taliban and destroyed their capability of using tanks and much of their anti-personnel weapons.[18]
During the battle for Mazar e Sharif the United States military implemented MC-130 aircraft made by Lockheed Martin to drop a BLU-82 or better known as a daisy cutter over Taliban positions and absolutely decimated their forces.[19]Dostum and his cavalry Uzbek forces immediately charged what was a crater and it took them some time to come to the realization that in fact the Taliban fighters had been eradicated from one bomb. Famously Dostum got on a military radio and shouted in Dari to the Taliban “I have the Americans with me, and they have their death ray. Surrender or die!”[20] The attitude of the Northern Alliance seemed that of conquerors and the view portrayed by much of Berntsen in his memoir is that they were using the United States to their own advantage and were waiting for the right time for when they could rise to power. Even with the conclusion of the battle of Mazar e Sharif on November 10th, 2001 Dostum lead a precession as a conqueror into the city and the Uzbek people rejoiced by throwing coins to him.[21]
Sights were then set on Kabul, Aref the intelligence collector for the Northern Alliance suggested using a contact that was part of the Taliban who could easily be paid off to enter the city.[22] Once again loyalties shift very quickly in Afghanistan, what may seem like a government that is functional in all likely hood is seen as a passing thing to the Afghan people. The capital was eventually taken, and the United States and Northern Alliance were pushing the Taliban to the Pakistani border. The successful campaign lead to an overall sense of accomplishment in Afghanistan for the Northern Alliance forces and the United States. Though the southern provinces would be a completely different matter and the United States was still under the impression that Northern Alliance forces would continue the push southward and eliminate the Taliban and their Al Qaida counterparts.
The Northern Alliance cheered, and this would seal off the Taliban from the north of the country and United the peoples of northern Afghanistan in the idea that finally the Taliban could be toppled. The rest of Afghanistan however, is much more complex and tribal, and a unified identity is something incomprehensible to the various Pashtun peoples to the south. As mentioned by Schroen in his memoir the Afghani people do not readily have loyalty to a nation, and this is where the methodology of cultural intelligence was absolutely ignored in this operation. This played out rather dramatically in the prison riot at Qala-i-Jangi prisoner of war camp, when Northern Alliance forces who were primarily Uzbek were monitoring prisoners who were Pashtun. The ensuing riot lead to America’s first casualty Johnny “Mike” Spann a CIA officer killed due to the misunderstanding of having Uzbeki people monitoring their rivals Pashtun’s in the prison.[23]
Cultural Intelligence and the battle of Tora Bora
Cultural intelligence is defined as the capability to relate and work effectively across cultures. The American’s that operated and still operate in Afghanistan are continuously facing this challenge, after all we are outsiders in a country that has relatively been left out of the world’s stage. Stan a Russian speaking case officer who was part of the Shomali plains part of Operation Jawbreaker best describes the situation of the CIA and Afghan’s by saying: “The Afghans have instructions to accompany us everywhere. We can’t take a shit alone. This morning, one of our planes was getting ready to land, so I needed to get out to the landing field to make sure it was cleared of debris. As I exited our compound, this Afghan jumped in front of me and tried to block my way. I tried to explain that a plane was coming. He didn’t understand, so I tried to go around him. He grabbed my arm. When he wouldn’t let go, I threw his ass to the ground hard and ran to the airfield, arriving just moments before the plane.”[24] Much of Afghanistan’s ethnic populations were drastically misunderstood and this was shaping up for the battle of Tora Bora in a region dominated by the Durrani, who’s major tribe in the Peshawar region is the Shinwari people a group of Pashtun’s who have ties in Pakistan and cross the border frequently and historically have been at odds with the Uzbek people to the north.[25] What Operation Jawbreaker Juliet did not know as they entered the white mountain region was the people there were ethnic Pashtun’s who were some of the founding tribes of the Taliban. According to Berntsen’s own account of the battle of Tora Bora the battle was more or less a castle siege and in the interior of the fortress was Uzbek forces and special forces troops controlling the walls and surrounding fields.[26] It was then decided that Barbak Nuruddin and his Pashai forces would seal the Al Qaida fighters from escaping to the south into Pakistan. The day that the Pashai forces and Special Forces team were to climb the mountain Berntsen received a radio call from George: “It seems that a member of the Afghan security detail didn’t pack the mules as well as he should have. One of them carrying an RPG-7 round detonated halfway up the mountain blowing the mule to pieces and killing two of Babrak’s men.”[27] The team then had to descend down the mountain and came across Al Qaida fighters, this suggests that perhaps the accidental explosion that required the men to climb down the mountain and slowly go across terrain guided by Pashai guides may have been intentional. Bin Laden abandones his camp at Milawa and heads into the mountain, unfortunately much of these forces had been in communication with Maulawi Mohammad Younus Khalis who had directed the local forces to allow Al Qaida to escape.[28] The factors that played into the failure of capturing or killing Bin Laden at Tora Bora are that of cultural intelligence failures. The United States did not believe that the Pashto peoples of southern Afghanistan would allow for the escape of Osama Bin Laden, however looking in hindsight it is clear now that many of these same people that were in charge of stopping the possible escape route for the worlds most wanted man were actually related to many of the Al Qaida soldiers who crossed the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Evaluation Criteria
The criteria needed to evaluate the success or failure of this operation with the research conducted was based on the objectives stated earlier and the success of cultural understanding in Afghanistan. Those being: meetings with key Northern Alliance commanders to ensure their cooperation with the planned US military intervention in Afghanistan. A large part of this consisted of demonstrating the seriousness of American intent. Millions of dollars in cash were handed out to NA higher-ups so they could purchase weapons and supplies. Establish a joint CIA/NA intelligence cell in order to collect and share intel on the Taliban / Al Qaeda forces in the North. Jawbreaker was particularly interested in the location of Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden, as well as the locations of Al Qaeda training camps. Using GPS devices, Jawbreaker mapped the frontline positions of both the Northern Alliance and Taliban positions. These maps were vital in ensuring that the right targets were struck when US air power was eventually brought to bear. Using an old British landing strip was converted into a runway capable of supporting Air Branch L100 re supply flights. preparing the ground for US Special Operations forces to enter the Panjshir Valley and begin operations against the Taliban / Al Qaeda. An ODA from the 5th Special Forces Group (ODA 555) inserted into the valley on the night of the October 19th and linked up with Jawbreaker.. The ODA had brought SOFLAM Laser Target Designators (LTDs) with them in order to call in precision guided weapons from US warplanes down onto Taliban / Al Qaeda positions along the nearby Shomali Plains.1 These objectives in cooperation with creating ties with different ethnic groups would determine the success and/or failure of the operation.
To determine the success of cultural intelligence in the operation a series of steps have to be presented, first is CQ drive or showing interest, confidence and drive to adapt cross culturally. Second would be to show CQ knowledge is described as understanding cross cultural issues and differences. Third is CQ strategy this is the awareness and ability to plan for the coming cross-cultural interaction, or how dealing with indigenous people in relation to this population was strategized. The final step is CQ action is the ability to adjust behavior to improve performance or in the case of operation jaw breaker what steps were taken after the operation to increase the performance of cross cultural intelligence.[29]
Discussion
Through the operation of Jawbreaker, it is determined that it had failed, however the operation was a success in many ways but based on its original objective and that of gaining cultural intelligence the operation did not succeed. The Northern Alliance the United States first point of contact showed the United States that Afghanistan is a complete battleground that alliances and loyalties are constantly shifting and changing and more importantly these are not ethnically all one people. Through researching this operation, the idea of cultural intelligence and its capabilities in the theatre of war and covert actions has presented itself as a key tool in the fight against terrorism. It is a common misconception to believe that Afghanistan has always been Islamic, in fact much of the countries religious history is very diverse this presented itself in the literature research that was conducted and the historical elements to the reason for such radicalism in Afghanistan. Political Islam in fact did not emerge in Afghanistan until the 1920’s from Egyptian texts brought to the Universities in Kabul that were being written by authors like Hasan al Banna the found of the Muslim brotherhood. The idea of using Islam in a political fashion was something relatively new in Afghanistan and took time for it to take root. One such student of this particular politization of the religion came up named Abdul Rab Rasul Rayef who was a Islamic scholar in Kabul and helped orchestrate the moving of Osama Bin Laden to Afghanistan after his financial woes and ousting in Sudan.[30] Much of the militant side of the religious extremism was orchestrated and trained by Brigadier General Naseerullah Babar of Pakistan, who also trained the later Northern Alliance leader Massoud.[31]
Firstly, the United States began with the first step in CQ assessment in showing interest in understanding the people of northern Afghanistan through contacts in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who all have cultural and ethnic ties to these people. The short coming of this was the United States showed no interest in the peoples of the southern plains and desert regions of Afghanistan and relied on communication primarily with the Northern Alliance who are ethnically Uzbek. This leads into the second step of CQ that revealed itself in the research of this operation. During the operation it was assumed that the Northern Alliance would head south with U.S. forces after the capture of Kabul, however they showed little to no interest in this. This is because they were frequently at odds with the Pashto peoples of the south and it even culminated in a violent prison uprising at Qala I Jangi when Uzbek peoples were charged with the care of Pashto peoples their ethnic rivals. Third was the overall strategy of CQ was that using indigenous resources we could find and capture Osama Bin Laden at Tora Bora, however the forces we had available that were no longer Northern Alliance soldiers were related to the very people on the other side of the border in Pakistan. Lastly, this operation has served as a teaching tool for further conduct in Afghanistan and how American forces and NATO allies can build stronger lasting relationships with the local people.
Conclusion of Findings
The struggle to win hearts and minds is a difficult case in a place like Afghanistan, NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was chosen as a case study and the data were collected through interviews with an expert group of 45 individuals. What the study had concluded is that military and political leaders should not neglect cultural intelligence and rely solely on deal making and military might.[32] Studies in Afghanistan and the lesson’s learned from Tora Bora and how the military and intelligence officers interact with the local Afghan people suggest that learning their language is not enough rather an understanding of the region, valleys and history of the different ethnic groups that make up Afghanistan will create cooperation. According to the global ECCO (Education Community Collaboration Online), Culture is best taught as a factor across full-spectrum operations, an enabler supporting other capabilities, rather than an "a la carte" supplement to conventional warfighter knowledge and skills. Future strategic challenges may include multiple engagements around the world with a greater reliance on partner relationships and expanded cultural breadth and agility will be required if we are to meet those challenges.[33] The reliance on a people who have no interest in fighting targets like Al Qaida and trying to capture Bin Laden, is much apart of learning cultural nuances in Afghanistan and what lead to the eventual escape of the worlds most wanted man.
The after effects of this operation resulted in the Taliban effectively losing its grip on the government of Afghanistan and lead to a new government. The importance of seeing the events after operation Jawbreaker can help determine how future operations can be conducted and be more successful. The formation of the interim government has complicated issues to this day with the overwhelming majority of power going to the ethnic Uzbek’s of the Northern Alliance and subjecting the Pashtun south to their will in the Bonn agreement.[34]The cultural intelligence failures of this operation can be seen in the escape of Osama Bin Laden and the creation of an interim government that was fraught with incompetence and subject to bribes. Further into the creation of a somewhat coherent government in Afghanistan was the formation of a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) the idea from the international community in rebuilding a functional government in Afghanistan was novel and well hearted but is still impractical. The country of Afghanistan is so diverse of peoples and isolated geography that it could be suggested that it be turned into separate nation states. The 2004 election in Afghanistan has sown some doubts amongst the people of Afghanistan with the United States backed presidential candidate winning the election amid reports of possible voter fraud. This caused a boycott of the election as many Afghani’s do not have much faith to begin with when it concerns the government, this plays into the very confusing cultural nuances of Afghanistan.[35]
The election as it turns out in 2004 gets more confusing through researching the aftermath of operation Jawbreaker, the director of the joint management board for Afghanistan was a former Guantanamo detainee. This was leaked by the New York times that Zakim Shah had been detained for a year in Guantanamo based on information he took part in a rocket attack at U.S. Fire Base Salerno and fled in a taxi. This is also very confusing that this man came out of detention just in time to help put Hamid Karzai into office in 2004 a fellow Pashtun.[36] This information got to the Afghani people and many to this day are very skeptical of the government, the United States and its allies were trying to do a de-Talibinization of Afghanistan but did not understand how deep the trust issues are in the cultural lines that make up Afghanistan. Operation Jawbreaker should serve as a teaching model for any future operations or policy in Afghanistan in how we can avoid putting at odds groups in government with power over one another.
The commitment needed to obtain a level of trust amongst populations regardless if it is Afghanistan or any other nation should be part of any strategy. The possible solutions to retaining soldiers in programs as previously described should be an increase in pay, which should be no surprise and an allocation of time to come back to the United States and increase their methodology through scholarship research at Universities. This has been previously stated in another research paper but is still valid in regard to operations in Afghanistan or for that matter any country. This policy would provide two needed solutions, one it would allow for the soldier to have time to hone their skills in a place that subtle nuances can mean life and death and allows them time to come back be with their families and provide financial incentive to continue in the pursuit of a career in this path.
The focus of future research needs to be on the education of these brigades themselves what exactly they are learning, and what incentives are made for these young men and women to continue in service in such a difficult atmosphere. In Afghanistan as the primary role for this program, the necessary knowledge of which tribe, or ethnic group does not cooperate well with one another will be absolutely key to keeping Afghanistan being a training facility for extremists. The future success in any place in the world for the United States will need to be winning the hearts and minds of the people we interact with, we must not be seen as occupiers but rather liberators. I believe if we are to hold to the notion of what Thomas Jefferson said to James Madison: “we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation: & I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self-government.”[37]
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Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809
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Yal??nkaya, Haldun, and Yusuf ?zer. 2017. "Another lesson learned in Afghanistan: the concept of cultural intelligence." International Peacekeeping (13533312) 24, no. 3: 434-460. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed May 13, 2018).
[1] "Jawbreaker - CIA Special Activities Division," American Special Ops, , accessed May 17, 2018, https://www.americanspecialops.com/cia-special-operations/jawbreaker/.
[2] Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insiders Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2007).p.62
[3] Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). P.4
[4] Ibid. P.63
[5] Ibid. p. 92. Jaw Breaker Gary Berntsen, p.92
[6] Jawbreaker, p.92
[7] Schroen, p.123
[8] Schroen, p.122
[9] PBS, , accessed May 13, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/interviews/schroen.html.
[10] "First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan," Central Intelligence Agency, June 26, 2008, , accessed May 13, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/War_on_Terror_9.htm.
[11] Schroen, p.125
[12] Greshamj01, "The Campaign Plan - Special Operations Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom," Defense Media Network, , accessed May 13, 2018, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-2/.
[13] "Cofer Black Interview: Out of the Shadows," Men's Journal, December 05, 2017, , accessed May 13, 2018, https://www.mensjournal.com/features/cofer-black-out-of-the-shadows-20131120/.
[14] Berntsen, p.105
[15] Berntsen, p.107
[16] Berntsen, p.112
[17] Ibid, p. 133
[18] Ibid, p.135
[19] Ibid, p.137
[20] Ibid, p.138
[21] Ibid, p.139
[22] Ibid, p.145
[23] Ibid, p.252
[24] Ibid, p.128
[25] Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). P.25
[26] Ibid, p.256
[27] Ibid, p.261
[28] Ibid, p.275
[29] "CQ Assessments," Cultural Intelligence Center, , accessed May 22, 2018, https://culturalq.com/products-services/assessments/cq-assessments/.
[30] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2005).p.112-113
[31] Ibid. p.114
[32] Haldun Yal??nkaya & Yusuf ?zer (2016) Another lesson learned in Afghanistan: the concept of cultural intelligence, International Peacekeeping, 24:3, 434-460, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1244485
[33] "Cultural Intelligence: Archiving Lessons from Afghanistan - GlobalECCO," Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Neglected Secret CT Weapon - GlobalECCO, , accessed May 14, 2018, https://globalecco.org/ctx-vol.-3-no.-1-article-5.
[34] "AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN," United Nations, , accessed May 22, 2018, https://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
[35] "Afghanistan Election Results - 2004." VR Statistics. Accessed May 22, 2018. https://www.iec.org.af/public_html/Election Results Website/english/english.htm.
[36] The New York Times, , accessed May 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/898-zakim-shah.
[37] Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809