“But It Is Only A Laboratory”: The Often Overlooked Hazards Inherent in Laboratory Operations

I often hear researchers argue that their operation is a very low risk using some variation of the phrase “It is only a laboratory not a plant”. And while they are willing to admit some exposure potential due to the toxicity of their materials, I often am dismissed when I raise the potential for a fire or explosion. Common arguments against this being a credible scenario commonly include some variation of small quantities, high ventilation rates, operations in hoods, very skilled personnel among a host of others.

Yet the data does not support this. I track the number of publicly reported fires and explosions in laboratories over each year. I know that these figures are artificially low as many accidents are not reported (I can tell you of 3-4 every year) and many more simply escape my attention. Despite this, the figures are rather sobering.

Year Reported Fires and Explosions

2016 40

2017 43

2018 48

2019 63

Each year about 2/3rds are in academia and 1/3rd in industry. ( This, I freely admit, may be more due to a lack of public reporting for smaller industrial accidents.) The total number of people reported injured ranged from 40-80 each year. Most are less serious but a considerable amount do involve medical treatment or even occasionally hospitalization. Damage ranged from minor equipment damage to entire laboratories parts of the facilities.

So I contend that arguing “but it is only a laboratory” is probably not very viable nor correct.

Almost all laboratories use flammable and combustible materials. Even laboratories whose primary function does not involve flammable and combustible materials often use substantial amounts for cleaning, carrier gas, and other ancillary uses. So, few laboratories don’t have some credible risk or a fire or explosion.

What are the common causes? Many times, the reports are rather vague and incomplete but if I look back over all the hazard analysis and risk assessments, I have participated in over my 40 year career I would say these are the most common potential hazards that arise and are often overlooked or assessed as trivial.

·        Overheating something whether on a hot plate, inside an oven, or in a vessel leading to fires, explosions, or leaks that result in either. For further discussion see my posts Runaway Heaters at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/runaway-heaters-richard-palluzi/ and High or Over Temperature Protection In a Research Environment at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/high-over-temperature-protection-research-environment-richard-palluzi/ .

·        Leaking flammable materials usually, but not always, gases due to poor leak testing and failure to confirm system integrity before use. For further discussion see my posts Testing For Leaks In Pilot Plants at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/testing-leaks-pilot-plants-richard-palluzi/, Locating Leaks in Pilot Plants and Laboratory Units and Equipment at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/locating-leaks-pilot-plants-laboratory-units-richard-palluzi/  and “Not Another Leak!”: Leakage in Pilot Plants, Laboratory Units, and Laboratory Equipment at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/another-leak-leakage-pilot-plants-laboratory-units-richard-palluzi/ and Leak Testing Procedures, (Chemical Engineering, Feb 1988).

·        Improperly vented equipment that ends up escaping the intended (and presumably safe) vent path. This includes relief devices that blow out of hoods, tubing that blows off relief devices, relief devises that vent directly into a laboratory or into too small a system, improperly sized and selected relief devices and similar areas.  For further discussion of just one example, see my post Should You Vent a Flammable Storage Cabinet? At https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/should-you-vent-flammable-storage-cabinet-richard-palluzi/ and Performance Analysis of Small Size Pilot Plant and Laboratory Relief Valves (Process Safety Progress, Sept 2003).

·        Assuming an operation is safe simply because the equipment is in the hood. This often makes the research personnel feel a fire or explosion is not possible despite the several that occur every year. For further discussion see my posts “Why Can’t We Put It In the Hood?” at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/why-cant-we-put-hood-richard-palluzi/,  Ventilated Enclosures: Why Do They Often Fail to Work Properly at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/ventilated-enclosures-why-do-often-fail-work-properly-richard-palluzi/ and “Why Don’t We Just Put It in the Hood?”: Issues with Degrading Hood Effectiveness Due to Equipment Placement, (ACS J. Chemical Health & Safety, Jan, 2020).

·        Improper storage including too much material or materials stored so as to create a safety hazard. For further discussion see my post Hoods for Chemical Storage: The Issue We Would Prefer Not To Discuss at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/hoods-chemical-storage-issue-we-would-prefer-discuss-richard-palluzi/  and Making Sense of Laboratory Fire Codes, (Chemical Engineering Progress, July 2017) .

·        Assuming the laboratory or hood ventilation rate allows a general purpose area electrical classification thus allowing ignition sources near leaks, open transfers, and similar operations. For further discussion see my posts “Ventilation Dilution: A Safe Way to Avoid A Fire or Explosion or a Placebo?” at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/ventilation-dilution-safe-way-avoid-fire-explosion-placebo-palluzi/, Ventilated Enclosures for Lowering Area Electrical Classification at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/ventilated-enclosures-lowering-area-electrical-richard-palluzi/, Laboratory Area Electrical Classification at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/laboratory-area-electrical-classification-richard-palluzi/ and Ventilated Enclosures: Why Do They Often Fail to Work Properly at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/ventilated-enclosures-why-do-often-fail-work-properly-richard-palluzi/ .

·        Failure to understand all the potential hazards of the operations and/or equipment and thus failing to identify and adequately mitigate them. For further discussion see my posts “Do You Think We Should Consider This Risk”: The Need for Making Credible Scenarios in Risk Assessment “ at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/do-you-think-we-should-consider-risk-need-making-credible-palluzi/, “How Could This Have Happened?”: The Often Overlooked Hazards of Moving Chemicals Within A Research Facility at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/how-could-have-happened-often-overlooked-hazards-moving-palluzi/, "But It’s Only an Instrument!”: Issues with Classifying Research Equipment at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/its-only-instrument-issues-classifying-research-richard-palluzi, and Safe Where It Is; Safe Where It Is Going: The Often Unrecognized Hazards of Moving Research Equipment at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/safe-where-going-often-unrecognized-hazards-moving-research-palluzi/  and Spill Containment: An Often-Overlooked Hazard in Research (Chemical Engineering, Sept 2017).

·        Assuming a control system will always keep an operation safe and proving no independent safety system particularly for high risk operations. For further discussion see my posts Pilot Plant Safety Systems Parts I and II at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/pilot-plant-safety-systems-part-ii-richard-palluzi/ and https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/pilot-plant-laboratory-unit-safety-systems-part-i-richard-palluzi/, and Watchdog Timers at https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/watchdog-timers-richard-palluzi/

I hope that 2020 will be a better year in this regard but I think that we all need to try and apply more proactive measures.

For more information on these and similar safety issues you may want to consider the University of Wisconsin course on Pilot Plant and Laboratory Safety which will be given March 3-5, 2020 in Houston. (See https://epd.wisc.edu/courses/pilot-plant-and-laboratory-safety/ for more information.)