One Decision Trap You Can Avoid

In July of 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson had finally run out of excuses for delaying the decision. Having inherited military involvement in Vietnam from his predecessor President Kennedy, he had begrudgingly agreed earlier in the year to scale up the United States’ involvement there from ‘military advisement’ to ‘active participation’ in the form of American airplanes dropping bombs on North Vietnam. However, it was becoming clear that the bombing would not have the desired impact because the South Vietnamese were ineffective in fighting their Northern counterparts.  

To accomplish their mission, military leadership believed they needed American soldiers on the ground.

Johnson was hesitant to send in ground troops. He had long sensed that getting involved in Vietnam was a slippery slope that would lead to ever increasing commitments. He also knew that sending soldiers across the Pacific Ocean would likely be unpopular and a distraction to a Congress that he was lobbying to pass his landmark Great Society legislation. To delay as long as possible, he had asked for more study and analysis over the Spring. Now the time for a decision had come.

Taking one last review of his key advisors, he found near unanimity in their counsel. The “domino theory” (the belief that any Asian country falling to communism would inevitably lead surrounding countries to do the same) was so universally accepted that it no longer merited discussion. Any remaining debate was largely about the extent of the damage to world security and the credibility of the United States should Vietnam be allowed to fall to the Communists. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs all agreed – it was time to send in American soldiers to quickly deal with the North Vietnamese.

Of all the president’s advisors, only two counseled against escalation in Vietnam – George Ball (Under Secretary of State) and Clark Clifford (Chair of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board). Presciently, Ball warned Johnson that America would face a long struggle that it would not be able to win and would cause serious problems domestically.   

As respected as Ball and Clifford were, they were outnumbered and outranked by everyone else advising Johnson. So, despite his own doubts, he acquiesced to the military request and sent the first of what would be hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to a country few had even heard of. It was a pivotal point in a chain of events that resulted in the deaths of thousands of American and millions of Vietnamese lives in the coming years.

Looking back with the benefit of hindsight at that crucial moment in the Oval Office, it is easy to see the mistakes that led to these disastrous decisions – group think, an inability to recognize or challenge commonly held beliefs, crowding out of dissenting voices, over consideration of sunk costs, loss aversion, and, significantly, lack of recognition of and honesty about the motivations of those involved in making the decision. This whole story is the ultimate case study in how these traps lead to bad decisions.

It is vital that we learn from the mistakes of those who come before us so we can make better decisions and avoid the bad outcomes that will result if we don’t.

The vast majority of leaders today are not faced with whether or not to start a land war in Asia, but the environments we face in decision making are not that different than the one faced by President Johnson. It is vital that we learn from the mistakes of those who come before us so we can make better decisions and avoid the bad outcomes that will result if we don’t.

The challenge is that applying these lessons in real-time is much more difficult than merely recognizing the problems in past situations.  

It is easy to sit here today and say that the President should have listened to Ball and Clifford, but how do we know which dissenting voices we should listen to? How do we know which assumptions to challenge and which are common knowledge because they are, in fact, true? How can we discern when people are giving us advice based on ulterior motives? Theoretically, it is possible to know these things, but an understatement to say it is incredibly difficult.

So, what is a leader to do? Certainly, it is helpful to know what decision traps are as a first step in learning to recognize them. For example, sensing that a team may be moving into group think provides the opportunity to change the environment and look for alternate information and dissenting opinions to consider.

However, I would suggest starting with something that is much more personal, yet potentially more difficult: being honest with yourself. Many decisions are made by people who have deluded themselves into thinking that they are pursuing something for reasons that are far from reality. We convince ourselves onto ill-advised paths by pretending that we have noble intentions while we are really trying to achieve something far different.

President Johnson later acknowledged that admitting defeat in Vietnam by pulling out in 1965 would have been an irreparable blow to his political standing and pride. “Losing the Great Society was a terrible thought, but not so terrible as being responsible for America’s losing a war to the Communists. Nothing could possibly be worse than that.”  

How many failed business acquisitions have been negotiated under the guise of strategy that were really driven by a leader seeking the prestige and attention associated with doing a big deal? How many failed projects have been continuously pursued in the name of innovation, but are actually an attempt to salvage a reputation? How many times have we put off dealing with a poisonous team member by deluding ourselves that we are trying to help them, when we are actually just trying to avoid confrontation?

It may be difficult to recognize the traps that other people cause in decision making, but you should be able to at least trust yourself. The next time you are faced with a decision, start by really, truly being honest with yourself about what you are trying to accomplish and why. It may not always change your decision, but at least it’s one less decision trap to have to deal with.

*For more information about the many lessons on decision making to be learned from the Vietnam War, I recommend Brian VanDeMark’s fantastic book Road to Disaster.