NUKE POSTURE S/B ACTUARIAL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In my professional opinion, U.S. nuclear posture, going forward, could benefit from certain simple logical and/or semantic fine-tuning. This effort, which is more than mere word smithing, could be applied to what the policies are, and to how, within U.S. Government documents, they are expressed to the world. The global audiences for such indispensable nuclear-peacekeeping information include near-peer competitor states, rogue states, and adversary non-state groups such as terrorists, as well as various electorates and private citizenries in America, our friends and allies and partners, and in neutral or “nonaligned” states.
This is a very worthwhile exercise. Our tactical and strategic nuclear deterrence effectiveness is the last bastion against ever suffering a nuclear or other WMD attack, with the terrible burden of then having to order a retaliatory nuclear strike. Effective nuclear deterrence is also a strong – and essential – dissuader against major conventional wars. This article details four recommendations, expressed in bold type below, that are derived from actuarial first principles of cause-and-effect about identifying and controlling any basic risks inherent to human existence and the survival of civilization. Such research techniques form a key part of what I've dubbed "actuarial contingent timeline analysis." These suggestions are offered here after a brief retrospective on some aspects of prior and current U.S. Nuclear Postures, as discussed in the unclassified literature. This ought to demonstrate the value, even the necessity going forward in a dangerous world, of the nuclear deterrence community learning to see and think as actuaries do.
Prior Nuclear Postures
Since the end of the Cold War, there have so far been Nuclear Postures updated and issued three times: by the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations. The Trump administration has promulgated its own, updated nuclear posture. The Clinton and Obama postures had nonclassified versions. The Bush posture was classified but portions were allegedly “leaked” and discussed in the media. Each in its own manner and style included an appreciation of the strategic threat environment in the world. Where they, strictly speaking, might have relied on less than fully rigorous thinking was in making the causal link that, because the Soviet Union was no more and Russia was now rather unlikely to nuke American interests, the U.S. did not need as large a nuclear arsenal as when NATO and the Warsaw Pact stood in direct, bipolar opposition. The Trump Administration's nuclear posture review's unclassified version somewhat makes up for this shortcoming, but still is subject to whipsawing due to its lack of a long-term actuarial view.
There were really and are two distinct things in play here. One was whether or not Russia (and/or another entity) would soon be nuclearly bellicose, or not. The other, the focus of this article, is whether said short-term bellicosity being high or low has anything to do with adequate (as opposed to excessive) U.S. nuclear arsenal sizing.
The fact is that arsenal rightsizing, being a very “sticky” statistic – one that takes years to either increase (by building more nukes under real world constraints) or decrease (by safely and securely dismantling excessive existing warheads) – should ideally not be changed with the latest, possibly incorrect or overoptimistic perception of possible adversary threatening-vice-benign behaviors. For instance, some commentators in the 1990s were concerned that modern, post-Communism Russia might become as confrontational and/or belligerent as the USSR had been at times, if not even more so. In addition, new threats of a nuclear nature might emerge, and might emerge faster that American’s nuclear deterrent arsenal’s ability to keep up. Exactly such bad things have indeed happened.
Rightsizing Versus Overkill
There is a fundamental difference between 1) reducing nuclear arsenals because a prolonged arms race has led to unnecessarily huge nuclear weapon inventories, and 2) reducing an arsenal, perhaps on sheer momentum and under anti-nuclear political pressures (fed by covert adversary information warfare), to the point that too few nukes are held to severely enough damage an enemy state after it first launches a devastating first strike against American interests. Eliminating overkill is very wise for all sorts of solid reasons – though in hindsight, it would have been much better to not build tens of thousands of excess nuclear warheads in a wild contest for illusive “nuclear supremacy” and then spend even more funding on dismantling most of said warheads.
But to reduce America’s arsenal below a certain minimum effective number, which is near or in fact at the current New START Treaty level of 1550 accountable warheads deployed, each for the U.S. and for Russia, is potentially very destabilizing: An aggressor might think that in this case a nuclear war is survivable, because the damage would not be completely devastating to whoever struck first. Remember that sociopath despots are not casualty averse; they will tolerate huge losses among their own populace for large geopolitical gains and perceived permanent job security.
The distinction between eliminating overkill excesses, and weakening an arsenal too much for effective nuclear peacekeeping, is very important indeed. In this context it is particularly important that American decision makers not fall for the fatal trap of psychological mirroring. In this behavioral phenomenon, an American unconsciously (and very wrongly) takes for granted that all foreign people and peoples see everything in life and in the world in exactly the same (naive, idealistic) way as he/she does. In fact emotional "cultures" and cognitive "operating codes" can vary considerably in a single nation let along a sovereign state made up of many nations, and also can vary considerably between different sovereign states.
Some Technical-Mathematical Clarifications Could Help Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence
Examining from first principles the fundamental cause-and-effect mechanisms behind events, as actuaries do in their work, can be edifying. This is especially true regarding the issues of effective nuclear deterrence. It is important to consider separately, and in balance, two basic steps that though separate, work together. The first factor is maximally discouraging anyone – including one’s own self – from making a nuclear first strike (other than in response to a genuinely overwhelming existential threat). This is done by a rigorous, vigorous campaign of communicating about nuclear posture and deterrence theory and practice; it is a matter of diplomacy, communication, and education about policy. The second factor is to very publicly possess all the military capabilities and capacities to prevail via nuclear retaliation – along with well-prepared attempts at nuclear-usage limitation after the enemy first use – against an adversary who ever dares to start a nuclear war. This latter factor, or dimension, is all about fielding sufficiently numerous, dispersed, redundant, robust and survivable hardware and command-and-control. Both these dimensions of the nuclear deterrence infrastructure are indispensable. They are also somewhat independent: Different policies can go with different hardware sets, and vice versa.
Much of American national attention, and national spending, have gone into the vital second factor, without which no superpower-like entity can claim to have achieved effective nuclear deterrence. But the first factor, achieving full clarity and impact as to all and every means of decisive discouragement of nuclear aggression and unbounded escalation, seems in some ways to have been relatively neglected. This neglect of deterrence intellectual product has, just maybe, been particularly prevalent at times since the end of the Cold War.
Thinking along a protracted and volatile future global timeline, as actuaries always do and as we all must, it appears that this vital first factor of U.S. Nuclear Posture could be strengthened by more technical rigor of formulation, and completeness and clarity of statement. By taking a more proactive perspective on risk mitigation, a close read of the 2010 (Obama) and earlier Nuclear Posture Review Reports and related U.S. government documents – with a close reading between the lines – leads to several suggestions for possible future nuclear posture review updating. This can be achieved at fairly low expense, by a refinement of key wording. None of these four suggested changes, below, would alter the proper intent of any current posture clauses. Nor would these four points call in question (or modify) America’s current hardware and procedural Triad modernization matters.
These suggested sorts of logic and wording would avoid the real danger of “telegraphing,” perhaps inadvertently, to actual or potential adversaries, as well as allies and partners who demand assurance, some over-optimistic U.S. expectations about relations between states, some misunderstandings of how geopolitical forces can mesh dangerously along the timeline, and some reluctance to live up to burdensome but inescapable nuclear peacekeeping responsibilities. The positive assurance of allies, that America’s nukes are sufficiently numerous and stand always ready, is absolutely vital to nuclear peacekeeping and non-proliferation efforts, which also crucially support nuclear counter-terrorism.
Nuke Deterrence Should Not Be Shy That It Is About Punishing Aggressors Who Deserve Punishment
Effective nuclear deterrence requires both the ability to deny an attacker his/her political goals, and the ability and will to punish him/her further for committing the attack. Otherwise, an aggressive "gambler" has no disincentive against gambling. The worst is that their attack goals fail, and the only immediate military cost to them would be those assets they expend in making the attack, plus those they lose absorbing the proportionate and discriminating counterattack. Merely promising unspecified "massive damage" or “unacceptable costs” to an enemy via nuclear retaliation is not strong enough. Nuclear deterrence as a tool of global nuclear peacekeeping is far too important to America and to humanity to allow any deterrence effectiveness-undermining semantic/mirroring loopholes to creep in.
These stark reckonings of costs, benefits, and punishments must include more than just the immediate military (and civilian) damage of such attacks and counterattacks themselves. The long lasting, broader political and geopolitical gains and losses to both sides must also be included. In some cases, an attacker might obtain lasting geopolitical benefits even if they clearly “lose” the immediate nuclear exchange that they started. Using Iran as a hypothetical example, Tehran could achieve great leverage over its perceived enemies via mass fear, along with a great gain in status and legitimacy among rogue-state peers and sub-state terrorists, for having shown the courage to take on “the Great Satan.” At the same time, the U.S. and NATO might “lose face” terribly, by the fact that they suffered a destructive and lethal nuclear attack from some upstart state – regardless of the ultimate defeat and regime change of the attacker. Perhaps just as bad, or even worse in the long run, the U.S. would suffer widespread condemnation for “allowing” its nuclear deterrence to fail. A great propaganda and morale victory would be handed to advocates of mayhem and destruction all over the world, both state (such as North Korea) and non-state (terrorists).
Nuke Posture Must Not React Impulsively to Political or Geopolitical See-Saw Fluctuations
Temporary softening of nuclear deterrence messaging, and gaps in decisive readiness accepted to save some money, are terrible ideas. They degrade the effectiveness of the deterrent, thus provocatively inviting attack, or blackmail. If the probability (inclination or temptation) of any enemy to make a nuclear attack – or simply commit a serious case of nuclear blackmail – is at any point(s) in the foreseeable future greater than zero, then the need for both factors of an effective deterrent-in-being at all times is not a rising/falling function of that perceived (or actual) probability rising or falling. The deterrence need will always be for 100% certainty. I.e., "a little nuclear deterrent" doesn't go a long way. It goes nowhere but to perdition.
The "foreseeable future" planning horizon is directly related to the time in years realistically required to reactivate a country's full nuclear weapons manufacturing infrastructure, after mothballing, dismantling, and neglect, to the point of producing many hundreds of new, fully safe and reliable modern warheads and delivery platforms. Allowing for funding challenges, various technology risks, key civilian and military skills redevelopment, and bureaucratic/political inertia in recognizing and responding to international crises, this planning horizon for the U.S. is now longer than a decade.
Deterrence Arsenal Rightsizing Is Not a Function of Perceived Near-Term Enemy Attack Likelihood
The adequate sizing of an effective nuclear deterrent force, i.e., the second fundamental factor detailed above, is not a function of the perceived probability of an enemy attacking soon. It is not solely (or even much at all) a function of how many nuclear weapons potential adversaries possess. It is mainly a function of the overall size of the potential enemy's most prized (and ethically/morally targetable) resources, such as military, leadership, political control, industry, and land assets.
Arms reduction to avoid excessively large “overkill” arsenals is highly desirable; hence the mutual ratification of the New START treaty by the U.S. and Russia. But it is very unwise to continue further reductions on sheer momentum. Excessive nuclear disarmament, whether unilateral or multilateral, erodes arsenal size to the point that mutual deterrence against both nuclear and conventional big war is very dangerously compromised.
Even with parity (rough equality) of nuclear warhead numbers between peer competitors, too-small nuclear arsenal sizes would fail to deter a gamesman belligerent who is not very casualty-averse. He/she might see the retaliatory damage possible with any “minimum” – and thus perforce very limited – U.S. nuclear arsenal as akin to an acceptable exchange of queens in chess, i.e., as being to their strategic advantage. They might not see this minimum retaliation as at all akin, in contrast, to the ultimate deterrent with an effectively sized (larger) arsenal, of them risking uncertain but plausible unlimited Armageddon – human extinction triggered by their attack.
There are three important underlying processes at work here. The first is that, given American nuclear weapon-factory mothballing after the Cold War, the number of workable U.S. nukes is very “sticky” against upward changes in desired warhead counts. The second is that American perceptions of the probability of an enemy attack can be badly wrong. The third is that even American actions based on a momentarily-accurate perception of enemy attack probability can trigger enemy reactions, raising that attack probability in very detrimental ways.
Deterrent Arsenal Rightsizing Must Provide for Multiple Wars on a Very Long Timeframe
The adequate sizing of an effective national nuclear deterrent force must include a secure, sustainable reserve against possibly having to deter or fight more than one nuclear war over the full timeline of the 21st century and beyond. Otherwise, an earlier nuclear war in the future, though survived, could have already seriously eroded America’s existing deployed and stockpiled nuke arsenals (via use, or combat destruction), and also thoroughly destroyed our (currently largely mothballed or dismantled) nuclear warhead and delivery platform new-manufacturing infrastructure and personnel. Thus we could be left defenseless against some future nuclear-armed tyrant regime, at an all-too-foreseeable time when the global norm against nuclear weapon combat strikes has already been shattered.
In addition, beyond needing to deter any and all nuclear attacks and nuclear blackmails against us and our allies, for decades to come in a very unpredictable world, we require something further. We must have an extra margin of secure nuclear weapon stocks today, to protect us against and/or credibly intercede in nuclear war(s) that might occur in the future, between other nuclear weapon possessors at war with one another. Modern Game Theory warns us that conflicts involving more than two parties can be extremely unpredictable. But an outside party that steps in to end a two-player conflict, not turn it into an ongoing three-player one, benefits everybody. This places a solemn duty on America’s shoulders that we can never escape. There is a powerful onus on us to lead the world in ongoing nuclear peacekeeping and peace-restoration, since we led the world to nuclear weapons in 1945 and we are the only country to ever use them in war.
Similarly, we must have a strong reserve of additional deliverable nuclear warheads surviving, after any “first” nuclear war against us in the future, because once U.S. vital interests and defenses have been significantly weakened in that war, another adversary might opportunistically be tempted into starting a “second” nuclear war against us – wherein their own nuclear arms and defenses, and their society, are all (so far) fresh and intact, and ours aren’t. The violation of that ultimate nuclear taboo by the first aggressor could open the floodgates to yet more aggression. In fact, blatant American unpreparedness for at least two future nuclear wars could leave us open to multiple adversaries colluding or manipulating each other into delivering an insurmountable one-two punch against world freedom.