Nuclear “Minsk”. Five unprincipled principles of the IAEA

?Here comes a simple question - why do we need an operation to appease the aggressor, and increase the powers of someone who has already fulfilled his “extremely important and necessary” Mission for Ukraine, after a year of the failed IAEA operation to create a demilitarized zone around the ZNPP?

TThe russians can bring the reactor to a critical statend operation at power, and then they will say that this did not contradict the five principles of the IAEA, since it is needed for power supply to essential consumers of the plant. In this case, even after the reactor is shut down, the level of decay heat will rise from 1.46 MV to 15 MV. And if the russians trigger a complete loss of power supply, then the countdown will go not to ten days before the damage to the core, but to hours. Here is the russian lever of influence on Ukraine and the World.

This mission is accomplished, and we will forever be grateful for that to the IAEA, because we managed to bring the reactors from operation at power into a safe state of cold shutdown.

Safety of the ZNPP is the main focus, and the most terrible weapon at the ZNPP that the russians brought is the russian armed people and Rosatom specialists armed with knowledge, advising the military and managing the degree of risk as a lever of influence on Ukraine and the world. Nevertheless, the responsibility for their actions still lies on the shoulders of Ukrainian operators with Ukrainian licenses, which each time are forced to level and eliminate the risks artificially created by russian specialists together with the russian military.

All this informational noise is nothing but a shift in emphasis and vigorous activity contrary to the current international Agreements, Conventions and the Law of Ukraine.

There is no need to be afraid of specific requirements - this is the safety of nuclear power plants. And playing with words does not make any sense.

The main issue is the complete control of the ZNPP, and not weapons.

The main goal is to protect and keep people and equipment in a safe condition.

Even having taken russian weapons from the site, but without ability to fully control the Zaporizhzhya NPP from the side of Ukraine, we do not have operational control, regulatory policy and physical protection.

If we talk about something, then only about the Ukrainian agenda and action plan.

At the first place of Ukrainian requirements, there should be a clear and logical sequence of requirements, which is:

1.?????The ZNPP should be completely dismissed without any conditions for the presence of military or civilians of the russian federation on the territory of ZNPP and returned under the full control of the competent authorities of Ukraine in accordance with the current Law of Ukraine on the use of nuclear energy and radiation safety. The current state of the ZNPP and its licensed operational personnel, as well as management by the licensed management of the operating company, do not meet the fundamental principles of safety and are in conflict with the Law of Ukraine on the use of nuclear energy and radiation safety, i.e. ?Articles 4, Articles 5, Articles 15, Articles 22 - parts 3 and 4, Articles 23 - parts 2, Articles 24 - parts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Article 26 - part 4, 5, 6, article 33, article 46, article 47, article 60, article 61, article 62, article 63.

2.?????Ukraine insists on guarantees for the restoration of ZNPP backup power supply from the controlled territory of Ukraine and the equipment of ZTPP and ZNPP open switchgears and power transmission lines and their physical protection from damages. The conditions of logistics must be ensured for the supply of spare parts, equipment, mobile power supply and diesel fuel to maintain the nuclear safety of the ZNPP in accordance with current legislation of Ukraine.

3.?????Provision of a humanitarian corridor for the completion and rotation of the Ukrainian NPP managing, operational and maintenance personnel to operate the Zaporizhzhya NPP in a safe condition.

4. The Ukrainian side insists on the inclusion of clear elements and criteria that would reflect the completeness of the implementation of the IAEA resolutions on the situation in Ukraine, to a possible new resolution, which may be proposed for approval at the next session of the IAEA Board of Governors (June 6-9, 2023, Ukraine). Vienna) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

5.?????Ukraine draws the attention of the Director General of the IAEA and the Board of Directors of the IAEA to the violation by the russian side of international Agreements and Conventions and international regulatory documents in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The violatin by the russian federation inlcudes military attacks on nuclear installations on the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine and violation of barriers the safety and security of nuclear installations by the physical seizure of nuclear installations with the loss of control over nuclear materials and nuclear installations by Ukraine, in particular:

§a Military seizure of the ZNPP and destructions due to russian shelling, mining of the NPP site and systems, as well as the presence of military men and military equipment of the russian armed forces.

§b Destruction of the ZNPP physical protection system.

§c Stealing of the ZNPP into the ownership of the russian federation.

§d Torture, pressure, coercion to cooperate and coercion of Ukrainian ZNPP personnel to shift under the jurisdiction of Rosatom.

§e Intervention and modification of ZNPP equipment and systems designs.

§f Intervention of russian personnel in the management of the reactor plant under a valid Ukrainian license.

§g Certification of systems and equipment according to russian nuclear and radiation safety standards.

§h Theft of technologies and documentation, which is the property of Ukraine and the USA.

§i Violation of international regulations in the field of the nuclear energy use for peaceful purposes.

The plan proposed by the IAEA to reconcile the aggressor will not work, and this is not about safety, but about something else:

1. The agreement is void, because it undermines everything that the safety of nuclear power plants in the world is based on.

2. The initiative is completely useless, because there is no mechanism for its implementation and control over the actions of the parties.

3. The russians remain on their positions, and Ukraine misses the opportunity to take active efforts to liberate the south of Ukraine and gain control over the ZNPP.

4. It is impossible to equate the Ukrainians with the russians in the matter of ensuring safety of the ZNPP. This is leveling of the aggressor and the victim and a call on the responsibility of the victim to the aggressor. The russians are the aggressors, and they are the only source of danger.

5. All demands should be addressed solely to russia. Ukrainians should not be forced perceive and agree to nothing else, unless the aggressor and violator of the Law is recognized with consequences for him.

6. If someone wants to cancel the foundation, which the management of the peaceful use of nuclear technology is based on, going beyond the existing Norms, Laws, International Conventions and Agreements, then let him first agree this by at least 75% of the IAEA Member States.

7. Regarding Ukraine, this is a violation of the Law of Ukraine on the use of nuclear energy and radiation safety, but if these are changes to the Law, then they must be agreed with the Ministry of Justice and approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, because this is the nuclear constitution of the State that survived the worst nuclear accident in the history of mankind.

Therefore, before suggesting anything to the IAEA General Director, one should ovehaul what is the spirit and the letter of international Agreements and conventions, which unequivocally show that it is impossible to negotiate with someone who violates international Law. One must follow the law, and not change the rules in the game, which even the kids in the sand do not allow themselves.

Georgiy Balakan