On June 24, 2024, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held a hearing in the community of East Palestine, Ohio to release the results of their investigative report
of the Norfolk Southern derailment in that community on February 3, 2023.
The NTSB findings concentrated on railcar wheel bearing heat detection, the efficacy and safety of the legacy DOT 111 railcars, making hazmat transportation data more readily available to emergency responders and increased hazmat training for those responders. A very focused part of the review concentrated on the vent and burn decision, with several recommendations being pointed toward that decision-making process. Interestingly, there was no mention or recommendations related to the use or effectiveness of incident management system (IMS), specifically the functioning of the Unified Command structure.
Although the full final report and recommendations are pending publication, there are a number of recommendations that are likely to affect the fire service and hazmat response communities. Specific to fire, hazmat and emergency services, the following is a summary of the NTSB recommendations.
- That the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) distribute public versions of the 2007 vent and burn reports to emergency responder associations, including the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association of Firefighters, and the National Volunteer Fire Council.
- That the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) require that railroad placards be able to survive fires and accidents and remain legible during such emergencies long enough to fulfill their functions as described in the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).
- That PHMSA obtain the necessary legislative authority and accelerate the deadline for removing specification DOT-111 tank cars from flammable liquids service.
- That PHMSA revise the definition of high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) to account for differences in survivability between tank car specifications and to include hazardous materials other than flammable liquids, such as combustible liquids and Division 2.1 flammable gases, that can contribute to cascading hazardous materials releases; if necessary, obtain legislative authority to act on this recommendation.
- That PHMSA distribute the Federal Railroad Administration’s most current guidance on the vent and burn method to emergency response agencies by referencing it in the next edition of the Emergency Response Guidebook.
- That the State of Ohio amend the firefighter training statute and revise the volunteer firefighter certification standards to meet the NFPA 1010 standard for professional firefighters.
- That the American Association of Railroads (AAR) revise the definition of key train in Circular OT-55 to designate as a key train any train containing tank cars transporting hazardous materials that do not meet the DOT117 standard.
- That the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) identify barriers to adequate fire and emergency response training for volunteer firefighters, particularly for situations where hazardous materials are present, and publish actions states, municipalities, and the private sector can take to provide the flexibility necessary for volunteer firefighters to obtain training.
- That the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and NVFC advise members of the circumstances of the East Palestine derailment and fire, identify fire departments whose personnel are not trained to the NFPA 1010 standard for professional firefighters, recommend that these departments adopt training that meets this standard, and inform them of funded training opportunities available through private, state, and federal programs.
- That the IAFF, IAFC, and NVFC advise members of the circumstances surrounding the vent and burn at East Palestine, the importance of obtaining information from the shipper when considering a vent and burn, and the availability of federal guidance on when the vent and burn method may be appropriate.
- That the Chlorine Institute (CI) review and revise Pamphlet 171 to ensure that its safety messages about vinyl chloride monomer polymerization in tank cars are accurate and adequately support determining whether a rail accident poses a risk of polymerization.
- That the American Chemistry Council (ACC) and Chlorine Institute (CI) advise members of the circumstances of the East Palestine derailment and fire and the need for shippers to ensure their expertise is communicated to and shared with the full incident command.
- That Norfolk Southern Railway (and by relation all railroads) review and revise your procedures to immediately provide emergency responders with an accurate copy of the train consist upon becoming aware of an accident.
- That Norfolk Southern Railway (NSR) adopt policies to ensure that emergency response contractors keep detailed records of information used to make decisions involving hazardous materials, and share this information with shippers, relevant chemical associations, and other entities that provide hazardous materials guidance.
- That NSR develop a policy to ensure that the expertise of manufacturers and shippers of hazardous materials involved in transportation accidents or incidents is communicated to on-scene representatives and contractors and shared with the full incident command.
This preliminary report comes on the heels of the PHMSA release of the final rules of the Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information. Given these recommendations, the American fire service and hazardous materials responders can expect these recommendations to have both short- and long-term impacts on training and response to hazardous materials incidents.
Director Specialty Services, ECO-Tech USA
4 个月I’m still confused why all FD and EM agencies are on board with the NTSB and their bashing of RR hazmat managers and SME’s in this actual field. I read 100’s of these opinion posts but I’ve not seen one comment that asks the actual questions that were taken into consideration. The reason is because they don’t know the questions to ask. The NTSB is not the be all end all for rail car response. There is a very short list of SME’s for a situation like this in North America, and none of them are the commenters on these posts. They were all there. As a professional firefighter for 16 years and now a private sector contractor, they both care about life safety. That has never been taken into consideration.
Senior HSE Specialist
4 个月The average person making negative comments about this emergency response knows about as much about VCM as they do about rocket science.
HAZMAT INSTRUCTOR & Retired LT/HMRT Coordinator
4 个月All I have to say is "B L E V E"
Semiretired Emergency Response Instructor/Consultant
4 个月Kent is 100% correct. Once again peoples suffering is politicized. The railroads and their contractors go above and beyond on incidents to bring the incident response and closure to an end putting it back the way it was and in this case over and above. Any incident, be a Railway, Highway, pipeline or industrial can have a positive outcome if the responsible party and the public "work" together and keep both the politicians and media out of it
V.P., AFC International Inc. a (WBE)/Gas and Vapor Detection Instrument and Respiratory Protection Specialist
5 个月How about looking into preparedness when it comes to air monitors for the surrounding cities and towns? The AccuSense as an example, can be custom configured to detect most of the gas/ vapor chemicals running though communities, with the addition of chemicals used in specific county’s. Tier one and commodity flow studies can help. Incidents will happen, and a plan needs to be in place. The old response methods, although they work at a hazmat responder level, just don’t work when it comes to community safety. East Palitine is a perfect example of this deficiency.