Now is the time for researchers to come to the aid of the real estate asset class
Alan Patterson FRICS
Real Estate Economist and Strategic Investment Advisor at VARE Consulting Ltd
Alan Patterson MSc FRICS, VARE Consulting Ltd
In the wake of the dot-com excesses of the early 2000s, regulators belatedly started to recognise that equity market analysts had, in some instances, become part of the sales operations of the stock brokers who employed them. As part of the subsequent reforms, analysts were required by US regulations to certify – under penalty – that they were not remunerated based on their buy/sell recommendations. The certification wording was crass, but the objective was right: ensuring that clients received impartial advice.
Such regulations did not, however, apply to the direct real estate market and there has been no oversight of the output of the researchers employed by the agents and fund management houses. While some fund managers did implement a system of deferred bonuses, mimicking those of the banking sector, these typically did not apply to researchers who were not – strangely – recognised as part of the client advisory function. In a ‘bull’ market, such as we have seen for real estate in most of the last 10 years, it is perhaps inevitable that researchers came under pressure to support the transaction activities of the firms and assist with product marketing.
This has been most evident in the retail investment sector, when some researchers were apparently unwilling to caution against the pricing of the assets despite the obvious extremely poor prospects for the high street and shopping centres. At the extreme, we even saw some researchers suggesting that the sector was positively attractive. More generally, while the asset class was being promoted, the quoted property stocks’ pricings were signalling that the equities markets simply did not accept the valuations of their portfolios. The ensuing gap in pricing was generally ignored by the researchers.
Of course, few investors foresaw the implications of the current coronavirus crisis and, no prices (adequately) reflected the risk of such an event. But there was little cushion in the pricing to protect against anything other than the (generally optimistic) outcome built into the appraisals/projections. Almost all economists accepted that there was still a business cycle and most accepted that an economic downturn, while not inevitable in the short-to-medium term, was a distinct possibility. While the impact of the current coronavirus restrictions on the economic output in the western world will almost inevitably trigger a subsequent deep recession, there is an argument that they have only brought forward something was likely to happen soon anyway.
It is still too early to say what will be the full effect that the recession will have on property values, but we can take a view from what is happening to the quoted real estate sector. For many of the larger REIT stocks, prices have hit not just cyclical lows, but historic lows. One interpretation is that retail sector assets are approaching a zero value. This may have been an over-reaction, but the direct market cannot continue to ignore such messages.
It is very likely that the reaction by fund management real estate clients will be similar to that expressed in the aftermath of the 2009 downturn and there will certainly be some embarrassment by researchers that they were not, at least, rather more circumspect about the advice that they were giving. Yes, the coronavirus may have shifted sales from the high street to the internet and increased the amount of home working, but these were trends that were already in place and the virus will have largely – once the restrictions are removed – just accelerated the trend.
The reaction of the direct real estate markets will undoubtedly be one of investors refusing to sell at the prices that purchasers are willing to pay. Liquidity will dramatically drop. Reflecting that, redundancies in the real estate industry are actively being considered and, in some instances, already being implemented.
Now is the opportunity for the real estate researchers to redeem themselves. By making the case for appropriate pricing levels to reflect the medium and long-term prospects for property, they can assist both vendors and purchasers to converge on pricing. Obviously, few researchers will agree on pricing levels, but merely establishing rational values will stimulate debate and lead to investors taking more realistic approaches. By doing so, they will be bringing forward the inevitable hit on pricing but, this acceleration of the process will benefit their clients, their businesses and the industry as a whole. Managers of agencies, advisors and fund managers need to give them the scope to do this.
The good researchers will attract clients for their businesses, just as equity analysts attracted clients for the stock broking firms, at least before the advent of Mifid II. They will becoming valuable assets to the businesses that employ them – far more valuable than they would be as salesmen.
David Booth said "much of the financial services industry is geared toward making people think they can avoid uncertainty." What you are suggesting is that researchers who work for fund managers should actively tell prospective clients that their products are much riskier than the perspective client perceives them to be. I would suggest this would lead to a short career as a fund manager researcher. It is the consultants who are employed as fiduciaries for institutions who should help their clients understand the risk associated with investments. I would also make a suggestion to researchers working for Blackstone, whose BREIT just purchased the MGM and Bellagio in Las Vegas and employers 65% leverage. Telling clients that all of their equity in those recent acquisitions is probably gone based on REIT pricing signals would not be a real smart thing to do. If this plays out anyting like the GFC, liquidity for open end funds largely went away for open ended funds for around two years until the fund marks reached an equilibrium such that contributions and distributions would largely net themselves out. It took another year for opportunistic fund to take the mark downs that reflected what their properties would likely sell for. I am not sure why this would be any different.
Head of Research at Link REIT
4 年There are several aspects to the problem. The biggest is not being able to appropriately understand the risk charateristics of the asset class relative to other asset classes. We can make an educated guess, but available performance indices can, and are quite misleading. The development of transaction based indices offer a partial way forward, but are not timely, skewed by lump sales data, and too broad to do detailed sub-sector analysis. I'm not convinced that big data analytics offers a way forward either unless the industry (ie brokers and others) can come together to create large scale datasets. The tools for analysis exist, such as international CAPM, but the inputs available are mostly poor.
Head of European Real Estate at Fidelity International
4 年Alan - I couldn't agree more, but I have a suggestion:? perhaps to 'unlock' the flaw you've identified in our market needs a more radical re-set.? Researchers can and should follow your clarion call but isn't the bigger picture here one of data and skills?? If you are an investor trying to analyse multi asset portfolios, understand relative pricing and behaviour of the different asset classes, and allocate over long time periods, real estate does a poor job of providing the basic data to allow them to do that.? Labelling investments as 'core' or 'value add', for example, without any real underpinning of data behind those labels is faintly ludicrous (as an industry, we couldn't show simple things such as tracking errors for those 'segments'?for example, never mind other analytics).? The continued anchoring to sector and geography as the only 'factors' which determine performance is also deeply flawed.? Allocating to 'retail', or 'UK retail, or 'French retail' etc etc, or even drawing conclusions as to the pricing of 'retail' in general has been shown up to be a blunt tool for understanding the wide variety of risks, cashflows and opportunities in the sector.? There are such wide varieties of income duration, economic sensitivities and exposure to online/physical retail risks.? So my suggestion is this:? we need to 'own' this problem across our industry and be open minded about inviting in skills and ideas from elsewhere (maybe we can even persuade Phil Ljubic to fall in love with?the direct market?again?!).? We need corporate finance thinking, quants analysts, behavioural economists and many others from different fields and different asset classes, to bring their skills to bear.? We need MSCI and INREV to measure things completely?differently and provide different indices and analytics.? The researchers have a job to do, but they can't do it alone.? I'm aware also that I need to get off my behind and do more...!?Thanks again for the article.
Aiming to be the Norm Macdonald of LinkedIn
4 年There will need to a lot of reform in the investment world. The quality of reporting is getting worse with too much marketing and not enough numbers. The UK should drop the BS about director remuneration way too much waffle there. More disclosure in the face of the financial statements rather than hiding it in the notes. Stricter rules on cash liquidity and restraints on share but-backs. And for real estate I think it is time to call time on putting property revaluations through the income statement.