A Note on the "Afghanistan Papers"

The Afghanistan Papers - a set of internal documents from the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) – obtained and   recently published by the New York Times, only confirms the widely debated flaws, misperceptions and inconsistencies in the way of waging the war by the US and the NATO in Afghanistan under changing conditions. The miscalculations were often articulated in numerous studies and report on the US war in Afghanistan since 2001. Here are some excerpts from my recent book[1] outlining the main factors that contributed to the security downturn in Afghanistan:

• Nation building on the cheap;
• Tactics without strategy;
• Failure to integrate domestic authority structures;
• Competing regional actors.

Nation Building on the Cheap

For the United States and its international partners, the main purpose for which they went to war was achieved in less than three months<-->the al-Qaeda network was disrupted, and the Taliban regime was overthrown. It was an accidental short war for the allies but became a long process to their responsible exit<-->a process that would take another decade and may take longer. The challenge was how to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a source of terrorist threats to the United States and its allies in the West. The notional response was to assist Afghanistan in stabilizing itself and to help other regional powers to stem the menace of transnational terrorism and violent extremism. This required a long-term strategy of nation building that the Bush administration did not favor ideologically. When George W. Bush ran for president, he dismissed “nation building,” but in April 2002 he announced that the United States would lead an international effort to rebuild Afghanistan on the model of the Marshall Plan for Europe after World War II.[2] Nevertheless, sufficient resources were not committed coherently to implement this ambitious project. By December 31, 2015, the United States alone had appropriated approximately 113 billion dollars for Afghanistan,[3] which surpassed the 103.4-billion-dollar cost of the Marshal Plan (1948<->1952);[4] but the US aid in Afghanistan came incrementally with no clear strategy. A great chunk of the aid never left the donor country. The aid was largely militarized, as nearly 60 percent) was spent on building and sustaining the Afghan army and police. Furthermore, most of the monetary assistance in support of counterterrorism efforts empowered nonstate power holders and warlords who were only interested in building up their patronage networks at the expense of developing legitimate state institutions. What further minimized the impact of the aid was the allocation of more than 90 percent of it outside the government’s budget and institutions. A large amount of American aid was spent by international contractors who charged outrageous overhead costs throughout multiple levels of subcontracts. This increased the cost of rebuilding Afghanistan enormously. What reached the intended recipients was often not more than 15 percent of the allocated funds. An official of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) reported in January 2012 that the NGO’s overhead was rarely kept under 70 percent, leaving only 30 percent of the aid for development, only half of which reached the intended recipients. The remainder, he stated, was “lost, stolen or misappropriated by Afghan workers and officials.”[5]

Thus, from the outset, the planning was flawed, the reconstruction goals were too ambitious, and the resources dreadfully limited. An under resourced and inconsistent state-building drive amid a rising insurgency failed to match the real challenges and realities on the ground. The situation dashed the high hopes of the Afghans, whose expectations were not managed by the donor community.

Tactics without Strategy     

The US-led coalition in Afghanistan comprised numerous countries that came to Afghanistan with uneven levels of commitment, varying degrees of resources, and differing procedures and priorities without a shared vision and a clearly defined strategy. Consequently, the domestic and foreign actors scrambled to respond tactically and in piecemeal fashion to the emerging challenges, at the expense of long-term priorities. The absence of a shared vision and strategy blurred the distinction between means and ends. Means too often defined goals, tactics too often drove strategy, supply too often determined demands, and short-term necessities too often took precedence over long-term priorities. This also led many to question whether the US-led operation was aimed at securing Afghanistan, reshaping the whole of South Asia, or simply setting the conditions for a responsible exit plan. An American warrior of the Vietnam War famously once said that America had not been fighting the war in Vietnam for 12 years, but for one year 12 times.[6] The same can be said in Afghanistan, where the international forces inconsistently fought many one-year wars.

Failure to integrate domestic authority structures

In Afghanistan, political leaders missed emerging opportunities and failed to rise above factional and ethnic rivalries in the interest of building national institutions, upholding the rule of law, and stabilizing the country through democratic solutions. Despite significant progress in state building and steady economic growth, the politicization of donors’ aid and the donors’ alliance with abusive power brokers and warlords in the war against terrorists and insurgents undermined the development of effective state institutions and the rule of law. As in other similar cases in conflict areas, donors and aiding agencies found it more convenient and easier to implement their aid programs through connecting with Afghan power holders on the ground, bypassing the nascent state institutions. The absence of the centrality of the state to coordinate the effort led to the reinforcement of patronage networks and warlordism that undermined the legitimate authority for years.

Consequently, the government lacked credible institutional and political muscle to offset the influence of local power brokers. The situation promoted corruption, which permeated not only governance but also the political and economic sectors and became a major hurdle in achieving security and development. The inability of the government to deliver services and exert influence throughout the country began to erode.

competing regional actors

In spite of the Good Neighborly Relations’ Declaration of December 24, 2002, signed by all Afghanistan’s neighbors reaffirming “their commitment to constructive and supportive bilateral relationships based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual respect, friendly relations, co-operation and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,”[7] Pakistan missed a golden opportunity to improve regional stability through cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan at a time when substantial international support for regional stability and security was available. Pakistan further contributed to instability in Afghanistan by providing a haven for the ousted Taliban regime, supporting it as it regrouped, rearmed, and trained, and then beginning to use it as an instrument of pressure for gaining influence in Afghanistan.[8]

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The first three years after the fall of the Taliban offered the best window of opportunity for reconstruction. The enemy had disintegrated, public support for the policies of the government was overwhelming, and international military forces had the hearts and minds of the population. In many cases, the people willingly cooperated in fighting the remnants of terrorist pockets. This willing popular support was squandered. The Unites States’ shift in attention and resources to Iraq came at a time when the global Jihadists had refocused their attention on a weak Afghan state.  Admiral Michael Mullen precisely summarized the challenges facing the international community in Afghanistan when he told the US Congress in 2007 that “in Iraq, we do what we must. In Afghanistan, we do what we can.”[9]  Besides, the Afghan government failed to act for long-term stability, opting instead for short-term deals with nonstate power holders who had their own interests. The result was a weak government with incompetent security forces and a poor and corrupt justice sector. The Afghan Government’s failure to protect rural communities, to respond to the legitimate needs of the people, and to fight corruption rejuvenated the insurgency.

[1] A military History of Afghanistan from the Great Game to the Global War on Terror, University Press of Kansas, 2017

[2] “Afghanistan’s Marshal Plan,” New York Times, April 19, 2002.

[3] “Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2016, - 46

[4] The cost of Marshal Plan was 13.3 billion dollars, which equates to 103.4 billion in today’s dollars.

[5] James R. Petersen, “Was $73B of Afghan Aid Wasted?” Politico, January 11, 2012.

[6] John Paul Vann (July 2, 1924<->June 9, 1972) was a lieutenant-colonel in the United States Army, later retired, who became well known for his role in the Vietnam War. He tried to push the army away from massive bombardment and toward counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong. Vann died when his helicopter crashed in the jungle.

[7] Afghanistan: Good-Neighborly Relations, December 24, 2002. Other UN Document: UN Security Council No. S/2002/1416. The countries signed included China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

[8] In an interview with Jon Boone of the Guardian (February 13, 2015), former the Pakistan president Parvez Musharraf admitted that when he was in power (1999<->2008), Pakistan sought to undermine the government of former Afghan president Hamid Karzai because Karzai had “helped India to stab Pakistan in the back.”

[9] Gerry J. Gilmore. American Forces Press, US Department of Defense, December 11, 2007.