Normalization of Valuations in the Public and Private Software Markets

Normalization of Valuations in the Public and Private Software Markets

I’ve written quite a bit about the public market software multiples. They’ve increased to near historic levels with forward revenue multiples approaching 9x. As the public markets have appreciated, something has happened that I didn’t expect. Some public companies are now fetching the mulitples of the most attractive private companies. I thought valuations between the markets would normalize because of a deflation in both public and private. Today, we have the beginnings of normalization by inflation.

In the private markets, high growth software companies are often priced as a function of the ARR at the end of next year. In industry parlance, this is NTM ARR, or next twelve months annual recurring revenue. Sought-after later stage private companies raise capital somewhere between 10x-20x NTM ARR. That’s a broad range. Multiples vary with growth rate, capital efficiency, market size, demand, and other characteristics. It’s dynamic. In the private markets, multiples have been increasing during the last few quarters.

Public market investors don’t use this metric today. Instead, they use NTM Revenue multiple, summing the revenue over the next twelve months or LTM (last 12 months) summing revenue over the last twelve months.


But what if we examined public companies in this way? By annualizing the most recent quarter of subscription revenue (i.e., multiply by four) we get estimated ARR. Then we can project next year’s ARR by using the company’s projected growth rate.

Amazingly, there are nine companies who are valued at greater than 10x NTM ARR. Atlassian, Veeva, Appian, ZScaler, Okta, Coupa, Xero, Alteryx, and ServiceNow. Atlassian and Veeva are valued at 16x NTM ARR. These multiples are similar to those in the private markets.

In retrospect, the normalization does make sense. What is the difference between a late stage private company and a new public company? Aside from compliance efforts, not much. They should be priced similarly, provided the metrics are similar. And that’s exactly what’s happened.

Why do I look at these multiples? I’m not a public markets investor. But these numbers impact the startup markets. Multiples influence acquisition prices and valuations in the private markets. When acquirers consider an acquisition, they evaluate a comparable company data set, also called a comp sheet. Inevitably, these sheets list enterprise value multiples. In addition, later stage investors model new investments based on public trading comparables.

Does this mean that we’re close to the top? We’re at or very near 10 year highs on enterprise multiples for software companies. The bull case: enterprises are moving to the cloud and shifting $1.5T of spend. All these companies will benefit. The bear case: valuations for these businesses assume long term continued success. Shakiness in future prospects of these companies could result in a correction.

Merrill McHenry, MBA, CFA

Senior Financial and FP&A Analyst - Forcasting & Budgeting | Strategic and Tactical Execution | Variance Control | Process Improvement | Manufacturing & Financial Services | AI & ML | CECL /Credit, Public/Private Equity

6 年

Kool Aid anyone? Perhaps you are right, or not(?). I recall top-line valuation metrics during the tech bust early last decade*. They conveniently?ignored lots of germane info (there are reasons "adjusted-EBITDA" is not a GAAP metric and disallowed in some reporting documents). Careful about how one carves out "adjusted-EBITDA". Monolithic metrics often melt. Risks to this include: assuming recurring rev's and margins (that cycle, and can vaporize - recall creative destruction in tech)? Patents being leapfrogged? Mean-reverting?), static comparable margins and static product cycle assumptions? Obviously some like this. I always like to see comps by metrics..., but I may be agnostic on this one. *Attached is an image of unfunded tech capex I published in "Grant's Investor" 12/07/2001 - as the tech bubble was starting to unfold. (Particularly the "dot-com's' which wrongly assumed scale?ad infinitum - see:?"top-line driven valuation Kool Aid.) Clearly, tech capex spending could not continue it's YOY growth rate. (Top-line intra-tech comps would fail to capture this risk. Although my point is for more comprehensive company-specific metrics. This is just to show lots of other factors can drive returns in tech.)

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Ehsan Ahmad Qureshi

Investments - Business Development at AKD Securities Ltd.

6 年

Fahad Majeed

Shahed Ashraf (???? ????)

Business Development Manager at Enterprise Rent A Car

6 年

Great information on this article, Thanks for sharing

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