Non-Government Resources in a Disaster

We exist in a dependant culture, one where we collectively expect and believe there is an entitlement to public sector support in times of disaster. We fund governments through taxation and the social contract dictates that services are afforded to the public in support of continued societal operations. There is much debate over the current state of public sector disaster organizations, with many voices calling for fundamental changes, myself included.

An interesting piece in The Tyee, provided by a stalwart supporter and friend, entitled, “Canada needs a New Civil Defence Corps”, raised some interesting questions. Considering the current context I want to weigh in and let me be clear, I emphatically disagree with the author, the last thing this nation needs is another organizational addition to emergency management (EM). A bit of background first, followed by a discussion on community collaboration and methodologies to engage everyone in disaster preparedness and response.

The Canadian EM model is constructed upon the division of powers in the Canadian Constitution, delineating the areas of responsibility for the provincial and federal governments. Where there is no explicit allocation of oversight, the constitutional norm is that of cooperative federalism, in that the two levels of government come to agreement on how this policy area will be legislated and resources. In Canada, these agreements are referred to as the federal / provincial / territorial (FPT) agreements, which collectively represent the governance of the EM function across the nation.

In comparison to other parliamentary democracies and across the other cooperative federalism models in the Canadian system, our EM structure is exemplary. The governance model is well resourced, the policy agenda is supported by all three constituents and produces collaborative publications annually. Outside a unitary government or republic, this is globally referred to as a standard for organizational relationships. While that doesn’t always translate into brilliant preparedness or response operations and I have been quite critical on those, any shortcoming in the delivery of the governance function is not a structural one, but a result of the humans in the system - politics. We need only view the family in-fighting over the preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2024 Jasper wildfires. An absolute firestorm of dysfunctional relationships grounded in the need for political posturing.

The colloquial phrase all disasters are public remains true, however in Canada that refers to the provinces. They are the powerbrokers, rule makers and resource allocators for EM in Canada. Municipalities in Canada, while often referred to as a third level of government, are in fact creations of the provinces, under legislation that can alter the local governance at whim. Simply look at Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s 2018 decisions to abruptly reduce the Toronto city council size from 47 to 24 in the middle of a local election campaign. Across Canada, the provinces have enacted legislation covering the EM function, including imposing structure, responsibility and deliverables on their municipalities. Local governments must comply with the provincial statues and do as told, whether additional resources are provided. As such, the real power in governance, resources and operational capabilities of EM lies squarely at the sub-national government. When federal resources are requested, they are provided subordinate to the provinces, the federal government does not assume control of EM operations within Canada, they support.

The FPT relationship is reflected in the allocation of resources. EM at the sub-national government level is funded through direct taxation and to some degree, through federal equalization payments. The local governments access whatever grants are afforded by the provincial department, but are largely left to raise resources through property tax. This places local EM in resource allocation fights with water, sewer, roads, recreation, community programming, garbage, policing, fire, paramedics and a host of other municipal responsibilities - all of which are governed in part by different and often competing provincial edicts. The federal government in Canada maintains the responsibility for continuity of government (COG) operations across agencies and departments, coordination with international partners and the provision of specialist support to provinces through the request for assistance (RFA) process. This usually entails high value assets that are logically resident at the federal level - surveillance, tactical airlift, signals and deployment of military support. The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements(DFAA) outline how the different levels of government will allocate additional resources to assist covering exceptional losses and recovery costs.

In general, I and many scholars argue that the governance system at the FPT level and the allocation of resources / responsibilities within the EM function is fit for purpose in Canada. Always open to marginal or incremental adjustments to levers of public policy, but it is structurally sound. At the local level, the EM function supports the incident commander, through some form of emergency operations centre (EOC), to provide the planning, logistical and leadership support to the affected community. The coordination of response operations, the allocation of scarce resources and the requests for external assistance are all local EM functions.

There is no shortage of academic publishing on the lack of resources for local EM, but again, that is a policy decision at the local level, a trade off. Every additional dollar for local EM is one not available to other responsibilities, a repetitious debate held in legislative halls across the nation. There are real limitations to the ability of local and provincial EM to bring additional resources to the fight, which is why the easy button of asking the federal government for military assistance is so quick and frequently pressed. If you were local leadership, why not request a self-contained, disciplined, resources and free labour force - did I say free? To the locals and provinces yes, while the military is ready to charge for the services, the federal government has determined that it will continue to provide RFA military source free of charge. Hence, there is no incentive to build anything alternate. Many previous Chiefs of Defence Staff have bemoaned the domestic operations and the cost to combat readiness, but politicians need to be seen to be assisting in times of need, hence not making the military available would be a form of abdicating the role of saviour to dependant population, one none will assume.

My personal research is grounded in the resources that are embedded in the local community, ones that are not owned or controllable by the pubic sector. In an emergency, the local government cannot order businesses, not for profit / non-governmental organizations or residents to provide a service. If the local resources are constrained by budgetary restrictions and there is a need for additional assistance in both the response and recovery phases, where are these resources found?

I’ve written a book on four years of analysis of these issues, examining the breadth and depth of resources present in a community, both spatially and geographically defined. Society is subdivided into four non-exclusive areas: public sector, private enterprise, not for profit organizations and the residents. Many individuals have a presence in two or more areas, with social connections spanning many groups. These social networks, our connections, represent the bonds that hold society together. Whether that be a physically defined neighbourhood, or a faith community across a nation, our voluntary formal and informal memberships in networks represent our connectedness, the set of individuals and their embedded resources, that we have access to. If we view our communities as a series of interconnected networks that transcend the traditional boundaries of the four arenas, then we can visualize the totality of resource capital that is available within a jurisdiction. Human (education, skills, training), financial (money, credit) and physical (material goods) capitals are accessed through social capital (connections, relationships, networks). The higher quality and density of connections, the easier the flow of other capitals.

The public sector is limited to the resources provided through taxation, which in many localities is marginal at best. If EM is responsible for the allocation of scarce resources and it only has authority over the limited capital available within the local system, then accessing the greater community capital as potential resources in an emergency would be ideal. The challenge has been the how and often it has materialized in requests for services while in-event, based upon lists of names and companies that might - and I mean might - be verified annually. Relationships, built on trust, are the foundation for social capital and facilitate the subsequent flow of other capitals in times of peace and chaos. Establishing positive meaningful connections with the wider community is necessary to facilitate access to their capital. This cannot be done after the event occurs.

Building those relationships is an investment in time, and if the goal is to integrate the areas of society into the EM structure and plan, then it requires trust and communication. The private sector in both rural and urban areas possesses more physical capital than the public sector, both in people and equipment. The not for profit organizations that already serve the population have systems to deliver assistance to those in need, access to material, and the requisite trust with the population. The residents themselves through membership in the community have a sense of place and seek to ensure the best possible post event outcomes. These three areas of society have established networks, as described before, the key is to join the networks, not replicate them, in order to build trust and gain access to resources.

In times of crisis, evidence informs us that the resources necessary to ameliorate the current situation are likely present in the community, yet not identified by EM. The best governance comparison is the federal government services to refugees and new immigrants. The recipients receive these services from the community organizations and connections, funded and coordinated by the government. The federal government does not establish networks of service organizations, it accesses the current network and contracts with those to deliver services, oversight if you will. In local response operations, the fundamental difference is not a contract for value, but a relationship for service, where the community organizations and the private sector - fuelled by the residents themselves, provide the necessary services to the affected population - not the public sector.

Framed differently than contractual obligations for services in emergencies, it is the leveraging of relationships to permit residents - corporate and citizens, to offer aid to their community in times of need. The public sector cannot order anyone to do anything outside their internal resources, but with positive relationships they can leverage local assets, potentially negating the need for external assistance, without a significant cost burden. My personal research in private industry is concludes that they are requesting three things to assist: access to training to best understand how they integrate in the EM managed response, indemnification from tort, and cost recovery without profit. A simple set of requirements that begins with asking to be alongside the public sector at exercises, TTX and to have a position in the EOC. Imagine a non-decision making seat for the Chamber of Commerce to support EM upon activation. They have access to decades of relationships with the business community, connections to networks EM weren’t even aware existed. Corporations need to protect their interests from being sued in response operations and finally, cover their real and actual expenses in support of the EM mission. Simple, doable and possible. Some municipalities have found it necessary to contract for these in advance, some rely on relationships with the understanding that the three needs will be met.

Circling back to the article at the beginning of this prose, the author calls for more formal organization of the civilian population for disaster response. We see similar efforts in Ontario with the newly minted Ontario Corps and in Nova Scotia, with the 2024 announced Nova Scotia Guard. Many other provinces are considering or announcing similar volunteer organizations, offering training in first aid, sandbagging and a host of other skills. These organizations are similar to the internationally popular community emergency response team (CERT) and the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). The difference here is that the goal of THW and CERT is to provide the community with the training and physical resources to aid itself, outside the formal public sector response. When a community response needs assessment demonstrates a skill gap or training shortfall, these organizations provide this service to the community. CERT membership not only respond in their local area, but they facilitate the training to the local community.

The idea of the Ontario Corps and Nova Scotia Guard is to be an asset to the public sector to be employed in a response operation. I argue this is a simply replacement for the decision to not provide for paid positions in a public sector capacity, a free labour pool from which to draw, while there is a skilled workforce present in the private sector. Choosing to build something to replace a capability already present in the community is fairly pointless, costly and I argue, a waste of resources. A culture of preparedness is not found in creating a formal organization, but by a shift in communications, by empowering the community to conduct response operations. As quoted repeatedly, “a resilient community is one where EM is the redundancy”. Simply put, when a community is enabled and encouraged to connect internal resources to support itself, then the EM resources are the secondary, the potential assets that observe and assist as requested / required. Imagine the business community coordinating with local service organizations to deliver aid to the population, without requiring public sector guidance or command. We saw several examples of this in the pandemic, some of which I highlighted in my 2022 PhD dissertation, where PPE and support equipment was acquired, managed, distributed and disposed in communities without the involvement of public health or local governments.

The article calls for the identification of embedded resources in the community, which is similar to social network analysis, the process by which we understand who knows whom, the different capitals present and create the enabling environments for them to coordinate - a collision of the best communities have to offer. The argument in the piece is that this requires a formal organizational framework, some government intervention. My research counters this idea, that the community only needs the public sector to set the conditions for success, often through provision of enabling environments and local programming. The community is well connected, with strong networks and will ramp up a response operation when chaos reigns. In every disaster, each of the four areas conducts response, the ideal situation is to coordinate those in advance, to support each other, not a command and control argument from the public sector.

Far too much of this article focusses on the geographical / geo-political situation that Sweden, Finland, Norway and others face, that is substantially different from Canada. We are not at risk of a ground invasion from the US Army, that is a fanatics view of Trump derangement syndrome (TDS). The reality is that the risk profile for Canadians doesn’t mirror that which is addressed by a Cold War civil defence capability. The author is correct that those conditions did exist in the 1950s, but now with the majority of interest in local surge responses to compartmentalized events, a broader force is lethargic by nature and logistically illogical. The idea that Ontario Corps will move volunteers from one location to another to aid the residents is baffling, when to date, I can find no evidence where the local labour pool was insufficient to address the demand. It has always been a question of coordination in advance, seen in the Ottawa tornadoes of 2018, the floods of the Saint John river over decades and a host of other recent events.

Note the floods in Quebec in 2017 / 2018 as noted in this Narwhal article, the military deployed over 2000 soldiers with equipment. The Quebec government pressed the easy button, brought in free labour and equipment and of note, all of which was available in the local construction and labour industry - including the boats to rescue folks, but private industry was not engaged. Was it the cost, the lack of being seen to do something or simply a lack of preparation and relationship building in advance of the event? Not disclosed, but this is representative of what is failing to occur across municipalities in Canada and abroad. The resources to ameliorate suffering and loss, to rebuild society at all but the extreme financial capital levels are likely resident in the affected region. To leverage this is to engage, to build formal relationships with the served community, to understand the resources embedded in the networks, to build trust with the possessors of capital - so that when the balloon goes up, a coordinated response operation occurs, with all four sectors assisting. The public sector has a mandated responsibility for EM, but it cannot be successful without the cooperation - not compliance - of the all societal sectors: private enterprise, not for profit organizations and the residents.

So no, we don’t need new organizations, we need local engagement and partnerships, to build community.