New pipeline links Baltics to European gas network - Carnegie. Russia’s War in Ukraine Must Change the EU
Al-Arabiya: New pipeline links Baltics to European gas network
Poland and the Baltic states Thursday inaugurated a new gas pipeline that links the north-eastern EU with the rest of the bloc, a crucial step toward reducing dependence on Russian gas.
The 508 kilometer-long (316-mile) pipeline linking Poland and Lithuania’s gas networks will eventually be able to transport around two billion cubic meters of gas per year in either direction.
Thanks to existing links in the region, Latvia, Estonia and even Finland will also have access to the wider European gas pipeline network.
The European Unionrs executive unveiled Wednesday plans for a gradual ban on Russian oil imports as part of a raft of new sanctions to punish Moscow for invading Ukraine.
If approved by member states, the oil ban would be the EUrs toughest move yet against the Russian energy sector, which helps the Kremlin finance its war.
Last week Russia’s Gazprom?halted deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria?as it seeks to sow divisions between European nations that have imposed sanctions.
A cut off of Russian supplies threatens to cause shortages not only in those countries but potentially across Europe.
The growing number of interconnections between gas networks, however, means European nations are better able to prevent Russia putting pressure on one country.
“Today, we are inaugurating our energy independence,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda told a ceremony outside the capital Vilnius.
“This interconnector is a response to blackmail” from Russia, said his Polish counterpart Andrzej Duda.
Poland has said it is ready to completely swear off Russian gas if necessary and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced at the end of last month they were halting imports of Russian gas and would use their reserves.
All the nations are heavily dependent upon Russian gas imports.
The EU funded a large part of the 500-million-euro ($530 million) cost of the construction of the GIPL pipeline.
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Carnegie. Russia’s War in Ukraine Must Change the EU
By Judy Dempsey
Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of?Strategic Europe?
The EU needs to plan now for a new policy toward its Eastern neighbors. It cannot wait for Russia to end its destruction of Ukraine or destabilize other countries in the region.?
The approaching?Europe Day?provides a good opportunity to reflect on the future direction of the EU. It is needed. The war in Ukraine is changing Europe, even if some governments don’t want to recognize the upheaval that is taking place inside and outside the bloc.?
Several changes are happening in ways that challenge how the EU functions.
The first is the eclipse of the?Monnet process?that set in train what is today’s EU. Briefly, this was a method based on the political integration and democratization of the EU that was anchored on the reconciliation between France and Germany after World War Two.
Over the years it has become technocratic and bureaucratic. Wrangling among the member states has marginalized strategic thinking and decisiveness. The destruction of Ukraine and Europe’s response to Russia’s aggression requires European leaders to develop a new mindset.
Second, the age of innocence about Russia is over—at least for several EU member states. Leaving aside Germany’s continuing ambiguity about Russia and lack of leadership under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, this shift is changing the EU’s center of gravity. Until recently, it was fixed on the Franco-German tandem. This is no longer a given.
In its place, France and Poland are taking center stage in a Europe where the Baltic and Central European countries—with the exception of Hungary—are finding their place in the bloc.
President Emmanuel Macron, fresh from?his reelection, is now well placed to assume the leadership of the EU. Some Central European governments may balk at that role given Macron’s determination to keep?some dialogue open?with President Vladimir Putin. But Paris alone cannot change the EU. Together with Warsaw, they could shape a new agenda for Europe.
Poland, with the Baltic states, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, could assume a special responsibility for revamping the EU’s relationship with Eastern Europe. These EU member states understand the difficulties of making the transition to democracy—and the Russian threat.
Furthermore, their empathy for Eastern Europe should be capitalized on, particularly since the war in Ukraine has made the EU’s?Eastern Partnership?almost obsolete. It is going to require immense political will and strategic imagination to integrate Eastern Europe as much as possible into EU structures.
The EU already has?trade?and?visa liberalization?accords with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. But integration needs to be deeper and more systematic. While these countries have recently?applied to join the EU—and since several member states are?less than lukewarm?about the idea (notably Germany)—much more can be done, whatever happens to their applications.
For example, why not give these countries a special status in the EU’s?Political and Security Committee?(PSC), even limited voting rights? As Russia’s war in Ukraine has shown, these countries are in desperate need of acquiring the tools of security, police training, and participating in EU crisis management missions.
Not only that. Their geographical proximity to Russia, their historical experiences, and the complexities of the transforming their societies would change the nature of the threat perception and security needs inside the EU itself.
As it is, Russia’s relentless destruction of Ukrainian cities and towns, has helped forge a common threat perception among most European governments. Eastern Europe’s participation in the PSC would sharpen and widen that perception. After all, these are countries that are highly vulnerable to Russia’s political ambitions, cyberattacks, and energy blackmail. The EU needs to understand the nature of the threat Eastern Europe faces, the security they need, and how instability in the region affects the stability of the bloc.
A third key issue is the role of the diaspora coupled with the ensuing?brain drain. Both are?robbing?not only EU member states, especially the Baltic states and Central Europe, but also Eastern Europe of talent, not to mention the impact on?demography.
To counter such trends, the EU could create a model influenced by the?Erasmus program?that has given so many young people across Europe the chance to study abroad.
In practice, why not find ways to persuade the diaspora to return home? That’s not an easy task, given low salaries, poor working conditions, corruption, and weak governance in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. But if these countries are to strengthen the rule of law, create a middle class, and set up strong democratic institutions, they are going to need their own citizens to help build a civil service, build a health system, and build a vibrant civil society.
So what about the European Commission finding ways to finance the return of young, motivated, and well-educated individuals to their countries? Erasmus in reverse.
This wishlist may be seen unrealistic or even opposed by some member states. But this is about the EU recognizing that Russia’s war in Ukraine requires a new mindset to replace an anachronistic status quo. Waiting is not an option.
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Soldat und Technik
?Erkl?rstück: Keine Bundeswehr-Marder für die Ukraine?
?Waldemar Geiger
Der Krieg in der Ukraine führt auf beiden Seiten zu erheblichen Personal- und Materialverlusten. W?hrend die russischen Streitkr?fte über Reserven verfügen, hat die Ukraine seit dem ersten Kriegstag vermutlich alles an Kr?ften und Mitteln eingesetzt, was vorhanden war. Eine ukrainische Generalmobilmachung führte zwar dazu, dass die Personalst?rke der ukrainischen Streitkr?fte angehoben werden konnte, materielle Steigerungen sind aber ausschlie?lich über Lieferungen aus dem Ausland realisierbar.
Verst?ndlich daher, dass die Ukraine den Westen um Unterstützung bittet. Der Westen ist dazu auch bereit und liefert. In der Beurteilung, ob bzw. inwiefern die mittlerweile gew?hrte Unterstützung ausreichend ist, ist insbesondere das deutsche Engagement im In- und Ausland in Kritik geraten. Die Gründe dafür sind prim?r in der mangelhaften Kommunikation der deutschen Regierungsbeteiligten auf der einen Seite und fehlendem Fachwissen – auch mit Blick auf die Tragweite einzelner Entscheidungen – auf Seiten vieler Kritiker zu suchen. Dies l?sst sich anhand zweier Beispiele, der Lieferung von sowjetischen Flugabwehrsystemen des Typs S-300 durch die Slowakei sowie der ausgeschlagenen Bitte nach Lieferung von Schützenpanzern des Typs Marder, belegen.
….. Causa Schützenpanzer Marder
Eine ?hnliche und doch andere Logik ist in der Entscheidung der Bundesregierung zu suchen, keine Schützenpanzer Marder aus dem Bestand der Bundeswehr an die Ukraine zu liefern, obwohl die Bundeswehr über mehrere hundert dieser Systeme verfügt.
Kritiker dieser Entscheidung blenden einen gro?en Teil der Komplexit?t dieser Ma?nahme aus und sowohl der Bundesregierung im Allgemeinen, als auch dem Verteidigungs-ministerium im Speziellen, gelingt es nicht, den Gedankengang hinter der Entscheidung verst?ndlich zu vermitteln.
Die Gründe dafür liegen wohl darin, dass man sp?testens dann eingestehen müsste, wie es tats?chlich um die quantitative Einsatzf?higkeit der Bundeswehr steht und welchen Anteil der jetzige Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz in seiner vorhergehenden Funktion als Finanzminister an diesem Umstand hat.
Den Zustand der Bundeswehr kann man kritisieren und sollte diesen schnellstm?glich verbessern. Die Entscheidung, keine Marder liefern zu wollen, darf man aber erst kritisieren, wenn einem der Preis bewusst ist, den diese Entscheidung mit sich bringt. Und dieser ist hoch, viel h?her als sich manch Kritiker bewusst ist. Denn im Endeffekt würde eine Lieferung der Schützenpanzer Marder bedeuten, dass die Bundeswehr für die n?chsten Jahre – insbesondere dann, wenn der Krieg noch l?nger dauern sollte – einen gro?en Teil der heeresspezifischen Zusagen an die NATO wieder absagen müsste.
Es sei in diesem Zusammenhang an die Aussage des Inspekteurs Heer erinnert, welcher am ersten Kriegstag ?ffentlich erkl?rt hat, dass das Heer abseits der bereits laufenden Engagements ?blank“ sei. Denkt man diese Aussage logisch weiter, bedeutet dies nicht nur, dass das Heer keine weiteren Mittel und Kr?fte hat, um zus?tzliche Engagements der NATO zu übernehmen, sondern es w?re unter Umst?nden sogar erforderlich, laufende Verpflichtungen abzusagen.
Plakativ gesagt: Wenn man nicht in der Lage ist, der NATO eine zus?tzliche Panzergrenadierkompanie, bestehend aus 14 Schützenpanzern, anzubieten, wie soll man dann der Ukraine 100 Schützenpanzer abgeben? Insbesondere dann, wenn man bedenkt, dass es ja nicht nur 100 Schützenpanzer w?ren, sondern entsprechende Ersatzteil- und Munitionspakete für Wochen und Monate Kriegseinsatz, der deutlich verschlei?intensiver ist, als ein eFP-Einsatz im Baltikum oder ein übungsplatzaufenthalt. Denn dort werden die Systeme unter vergleichsweise verschlei?armen Friedensbedingungen durch erfahrene Kraftfahrer und Kommandanten eingesetzt und nicht durch hastig umgeschultes Personal, das die Panzer im Krieg quasi permanent auf Volllast f?hrt. Aber selbst eine Woche übungsplatz führt dazu, dass die in die Jahre gekommenen Panzer anschlie?end einer intensiven Wartung unterzogen werden müssen.
Glaubt also tats?chlich jemand, dass Deutschland sich die Bl??e gegeben h?tte, für die neue Battlegroup in der Slowakei eine J?gerkompanie anzumelden, anstatt gleich ein Panzergrenadierbataillon? Wenn die Bundeswehr dazu durchhaltef?hig in der Lage w?re, dann h?tte man dies sicherlich getan.
Nun werden bestimmt Stimmen laut, dass man die Bundeswehrpanzer ja abgeben und diese dann in wenigen Monaten durch eingemottete Lagerbest?nde der Industrie ersetzen k?nnte, die erst noch betriebsbereit gemacht werden müssten. Wer diese Meinung vertritt, dem sei ein Blick auf den tats?chlichen Zustand der Industrie-Marder angeraten. Mit wenigen Monaten ist es da gut unterrichteten Kreisen zufolge nicht getan. Diese Einsch?tzung best?tigen auch jüngste Presseberichte, wonach die Ukraine bis zum Ende des Jahres knapp 30 Schützenpanzer Marder direkt von Rheinmetall haben k?nnte, wenn die Bundesregierung einem Verkauf zustimmt. Man redet hier also nicht mehr über wenige Monate, sondern über eine Dreivierteljahr und das bei nur einem Drittel der ursprünglich kolportierten Menge.
Und selbst dann müssten die Marder im Kriegseinsatz versorgt werden, sprich eine permanente Ersatzteil- und Munitionslieferung durch die Industrie w?re erforderlich. Dies müsste geschehen, w?hrend gleichzeitig die Engpassbest?nde der Bundeswehr aufzufüllen sind.
Betrachtet man diese Zeitlinien, versteht man auch, welchen Einfluss eine Abgabe von Bundeswehr-Mardern an die Ukraine für die Einsatzf?higkeit der Bundeswehr h?tte. Im Grunde w?re der Preis, dass die deutschen Landstreitkr?fte quasi für l?ngere Zeit nur noch über ein einziges einsatzf?higes Panzergrenadierbataillon, ausgerüstet mit dem VJTF-Puma, verfügen würden. Und dieses w?re dann auch noch bis Ende 2024 im NRF-Auftrag gebunden. Die komplette übrige Grenadiertruppe h?tte dann nur noch vereinzelte Los-1- Pumas – die über keine Einsatzreife verfügen – oder gar kein Gefechtsfahrzeug für übung und Einsatz. Denn die restlichen Pumas sind zur Kampfwertsteigerung auf den Rüststand S1 in der Industrie und die verbleibenden Marder kaum einsatz- und versorgungsf?hig, weil die Bundeswehr aus ihren Best?nden heraus dauerhaft die 100 Schützenpanzer in der Ukraine versorgen müsste. Ein Umstand, der die Bundeswehr bereits heute im Friedensbetrieb teilweise an die Grenzen bringt.
Es w?re auch ratsam, die Zusagen der Industrie kritisch zu hinterfragen, dass man die Bundeswehr-Marder ja durch modernisierte Industriebest?nde auffüllen k?nnte. Wahrscheinlicher ist, dass man auch da alle H?nde damit zu tun h?tte, Ersatzteile etc. für die Marder in der Ukraine zu liefern. Schlie?lich ist es ja nicht damit getan, der Ukraine 100 Schützenpanzer zu liefern und die ukrainischen Soldaten in der Systembedienung und Instandhaltung auszubilden. Man müsste diese auch tagt?glich im Krieg versorgen und dies mit den gleichen unzureichenden Ressourcen, die bereits heute an die Grenzen kommen, 100 dieser Systeme für einen t?glichen Einsatz- und übungsbetrieb einsatzf?hig zu halten.
Denkt man diesen Prozess also?zu Ende, würde die Abgabe der 100 Bundeswehr-Marder dazu führen, dass im schlimmste anzunehmenden Fall – der Krieg dauert l?nger und Industriekapazit?ten w?ren mit der Ukraineunterstützung ausgelastet – praktisch die gesamten deutschen gepanzerten Kampftruppen – deren Leistungsf?higkeit sich aus einem kombinierten Einsatz von Kampf- und Schützenpanzern speist – für eine unbestimmte Zeit nicht einsatzf?hig w?re. Diese F?higkeiten w?ren dann weder für die NATO, noch den übungsbetrieb und den damit verbundenen F?higkeitserhalt der Landstreitkr?fte verfügbar.
?hnlich wie die Forderung nach dem Durchsetzen einer Flugverbotszone über die Ukraine oder nach einem sofortigem Stopp russischer Gaslieferungen, stellt sich also auch die Marderlieferung als nicht so einfach dar, wie sie auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Der mit der Entscheidung verbundene Rattenschwanz ist erst auf den zweiten oder dritten Blick sichtbar. Wenn also der Inspekteur des Heeres sagt, dass das Heer ?blank“ sei, sollte man dies glauben, er hat dies sicherlich nicht leichtfertig gesagt. Und im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Stimmen, die sich in dieser Thematik ?ffentlich ?u?ern, verfügt er über einen qualifizierten Einblick über den Zustand seiner Waffensysteme und der damit verbundenen Logistik.
Fazit
Die deutschen Streitkr?fte wurden über Jahre hinweg vernachl?ssigt und mit unzureichenden Mitteln ausgestattet. Mangelwirtschaft war an der Tagesordnung. Dies war ?ffentlich bekannt und wurde trotzdem über alle Parteien hinweg und auch von der breiten ?ffentlichkeit mitgetragen. Diesem Umstand hat sich auch die nachgelagerte Rüstungsindustrie angepasst und Kapazit?ten abgebaut und Investitionen zurückgeschraubt. Nun ist die komplette Kette nicht mehr in der Lage, schnell und ausreichend reagieren zu k?nnen. Weder die F?higkeiten der Streitkr?fte noch die Industriekapazit?ten k?nnen von heute auf morgen aufgebaut werden. Es gilt schlie?lich immer noch Friedens- und nicht Kriegswirtschaft in Verbindung mit einem Fachkr?ftemangel.
领英推荐
In dieser Lage kann man (die Bundesregierung in Verbindung mit den NATO-Partnern) dann immer noch politisch zu dem Schluss kommen, dass man die Ukraine mit Engpasssystemen aus Bundeswehrbest?nden unterstützen m?chte. Man muss sich dann aber bewusst sein, wie hoch der zu zahlende Preis ist. Im Fall der Marder bedeutet er unter Umst?nden den Verzicht auf die kurz- und mittelfristige Einsatzf?higkeit des deutschen Heeres.
Parallel zu der Entscheidungsfindung w?re es jedoch notwendig, an der Au?enkommunikation und der Vermittlung solch komplexer Sachverhalte zu arbeiten. Denn auch beim milit?rischen Fachwissen in der breiten ?ffentlichkeit wurde in den letzten Jahrzehnten massiv ?abgerüstet“.
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japantimes.
Japan and U.S. to deepen ties to deter use of force in Indo-Pacific
Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin listen to the U.S. national anthem during an honor cordon at the Pentagon in Washington on Wednesday. | AFP-JIJI
WASHINGTON –?The defense chiefs of Japan and the United States on Wednesday agreed to align the two countries' security strategies and strengthen cooperation to deter any attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific amid?China's growing assertiveness.
The meeting at the Pentagon took place as Japan plans to update its National Security Strategy by the end of this year, with Russia's war against Ukraine generating a fresh drive in Tokyo toward?beefing up its defense?and deterrence capabilities.
At the outset of the talks, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said Russia's attack on its neighbor is "a serious challenge to the international order" and that "such unilateral change to the status quo by force is a concern in the Indo-Pacific region as well."
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Russia's aggression has implications "far beyond Europe" because of the challenge it represents to the rules-based order.
China's behavior, meanwhile, threatens to undermine the "common norms, values and institutions that underpin that order," he said, in a possible warning over its assertive territorial claims in neighboring waters and?pressuring of Taiwan.
Austin also reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, including extended deterrence backed by the "full range" of U.S. nuclear and conventional defense capabilities, apparently with China's military buildup and Russia's nuclear saber-rattling following its invasion of Ukraine in mind.
According to the Defense Ministry, Kishi conveyed Japan's "strong resolve" to fundamentally boost its defense capabilities, and Austin welcomed the move.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has recently proposed a substantial increase in defense spending — possibly to an amount on a par with 2% of gross domestic product up from the current 1% — and the development of an ability to attack missile-launching sites in an enemy's territory.
Such proposals, if included in the government policy, would mark a major shift in the country's exclusively defense-oriented policy under the pacifist postwar Constitution, and also affect the shape of the decades-old Japan-U.S. security alliance.
"The two ministers confirmed they would align the two countries' strategies through close consultations," the ministry said in a press release.
During the talks, Kishi and Austin underscored the importance of peace and stability over the situation surrounding Taiwan, which Beijing views as a renegade province to be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary.
Russia's invasion of its neighbor has?prompted concern?over whether Taiwan could be the "next Ukraine," with the island seen as a potential military flashpoint that could draw the United States into conflict with China.
A Taiwan contingency could also pose serious security challenges for Japan, a key U.S. ally that is geographically in close proximity to the self-ruled democratic island. Japan has also seen?repeated incursions?into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, a group of East China Sea islets controlled by Tokyo but claimed by Beijing.
Austin reaffirmed that the Senkakus, called the Diaoyu by China, fall within the scope of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, meaning Washington would come to Tokyo's aid in the event of an armed attack against the uninhabited islets.
On North Korea, which has been?repeatedly conducting ballistic missile tests, the defense chiefs agreed that such provocative acts are unacceptable and that they will closely cooperate bilaterally, as well as trilaterally with South Korea, to address the threats.
In March, North Korea test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile, raising concerns over its ongoing development of nuclear-capable ICBMs that could potentially reach the U.S. mainland. It also?fired a missile on Wednesday, as Seoul prepares to inaugurate its first conservative government in five years next week.
Kishi's visit to the United States is his first since assuming the defense portfolio in September 2020. The last time he met Austin in person was in March 2021, when the U.S. defense and foreign secretaries traveled to Japan for bilateral security talks.
In a virtual meeting of the Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense chiefs in January this year, they?shared their concerns about China's moves?to undermine the rules-based international order and vowed to "deter and if necessary, respond" to what they view as destabilizing activities in the region.
Kishi and Austin agreed to "swiftly" flesh out ways to beef up the alliance's deterrence and response capabilities, as agreed in January, the Defense Ministry said.
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Carnegie.
We’re Thinking About the Indian Ocean All Wrong
Last year we launched Carnegie's Indian Ocean Initiative to facilitate conversations and research to better understand the region and its implications for Indo-Pacific policy. A key focus of this initiative is to highlight the Indian Ocean region as one distinct theater along with its regional dynamics in the twenty-first century. Since the launch of the initiative, we have striven to showcase the diverse policy perspectives of the region and to develop new tools to highlight the region for a wider audience.
Today, we are thrilled to announce the release of Carnegie’s interactive Indian Ocean map, “The Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean,” to visualize the different elements of the region. Geography is an important element in understanding regional dynamics, and artificial divisions of this ocean have led to a fragmented understanding of the Indian Ocean. This interactive map visualizes the key data points, facts, geographic implications, and players in the Indian Ocean region.
The first phase of this map lays the foundation of visualizing the geographic scope of the Indian Ocean region as one theater. This phase maps out the region’s littorals and island states, marks the choke points connecting nations and regions beyond the Indian Ocean, and draws out the vast, exclusive economic zones along with their maritime boundaries and territorial seas. It also maps maritime disputes across the region and marks every island territory in the Indian Ocean that generates an exclusive economic zone. The map also lists the five key trading partners for all the region’s island nations and provides basic information on all Indian Ocean littoral countries' GDPs, populations, and sizes of their exclusive economic zones.
Finally, this map highlights the most commonly cited fact about the region—that it is a key trading route connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. To visualize this crucial fact, we built an additional layer to map the actual movement of energy vessels in the Indian Ocean between January and December 2021. This layer places into perspective regions such as the southwest Indian Ocean given the density of traffic and movement of goods across the region.
The future phases of this map will build on this foundational understanding of the region, drawing on analysis, research, and data on what this means for the Indian Ocean and the wider region.
I hope this interactive map provides the opportunity for policymakers, scholars, experts, and students interested in the subject to engage in a deeper discussion about the strategic importance of the region and its future. I believe it is time to modernize our understanding of the region and examine the Indian Ocean in its entirety instead of its parts.
Please find below our analysis accompanying the release of this map, underlining the key takeaways from this phase.
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Major powers view the ocean as three regions, but that outdated understanding hinders their ability to assess its strategic importance.
The Indian Ocean has been a critical trade route for centuries, enabling the global shipping of spices, foods, metals, and now energy resources that fuel major economies. Of the?ten countries?that supply three-fourths of China’s crude oil, nine rely on a safe, secure, and stable Indian Ocean to transport their goods. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India also rely on Indian Ocean shipping lanes to receive critical energy resources, and other important commodities like coal and seafood are transported across the Indian Ocean region.
?Despite the Indian Ocean’s importance, there is limited understanding of the geography of the region and its key players. This shortcoming hinders our ability to fully assess its importance to global competition.?
The Indian Ocean is often split among the South Asian, African, and Middle Eastern regions, but these artificial divisions emphasize the landmasses and push the maritime domain to the periphery. Further, they move the concerns and priorities of island nations, which otherwise would act as important regional players, under the challenges of their continental counterparts. Under this framework, Sri Lanka and Maldives are considered part of South Asia, while Mauritius and Seychelles are considered part of Africa. Though these regional divisions suggest these nations have major differences in economic goals and security needs, they are united on issues such as climate change, the importance of multilateralism, and the pursuit of sustainable development by promoting the blue economy.?
But now, to fully monitor and absorb key developments in this strategic maritime domain, the Indian Ocean must be viewed as a single region. To address the artificial division of the Indian Ocean and facilitate study of the region, the Carnegie Endowment’s Indian Ocean Initiative has launched?a digital, interactive map?that aims to modernize our foundational understanding of the region. The first phase of the map features layers on maritime boundaries, trade, disputes, shipping routes, and regional players.
?The tool has exposed four key points that further support the need to consider the region holistically:
?CHOKEPOINTS
The Indian Ocean is home to three chokepoints critical to energy shipping: the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. The Mozambique Channel is not classified as a chokepoint, but it is a key trading route where backups can occur, so we’ve labeled it as such. The map’s shipping routes layer demonstrates the importance of these chokepoints to international trade and how disruption of one can have drastic impacts on transportation through another.
Consider, for instance, the blockage of Egypt’s Suez Canal for six days by the ship?Ever Given?in March 2021. While the canal was blocked, some ships considered re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope. But such an endeavor would have been expensive and dangerous (the area is notorious for?shipwrecks), and it would have added approximately?ten days?to the voyage. Most ships chose to simply wait for the Suez Canal to reopen rather than attempt the alternate route. This decision, too, came at a price—delayed deliveries of cargo resulted in?late fees?of up to $30,000 a day per container.
Approximately?1 million barrels?of oil pass through the Suez Canal per day. Imagine, instead, that a similar crisis had occurred in the Strait of Hormuz, which transported?21 million barrels?of oil each day in 2018, or the Strait of Malacca, which transported?16 million barrels?of petroleum and other liquids each day in 2016. Such an event could severely alter global trade as countries who rely on these flows seek new sources or routes for their supplies.
These chokepoints are also important militarily. The ability to protect or disrupt shipping lanes through these zones will provide significant strategic advantages to regional players. A nation’s ability to keep sea lines of communications (SLOCs, or maritime routes for trade and military deployments) free and open during peacetime also allows them to disrupt these zones during conflict. Take the U.S. Navy’s ability to disrupt Japan’s SLOCs during World War II, which granted it a significant competitive advantage. Conceptualizing the Indian Ocean as a single region instead of in silos will allow navies to better formulate a cohesive Indian Ocean strategy spanning from the coast of Africa to the western coast of Australia.
BEYOND CHINA
While China is often considered the primary trading partner for the Indian Ocean’s island nations, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) frequently outpaces China, India, and the United States in both exports from and imports to these countries. The UAE is both the primary importing and exporting country for Seychelles, and it ranks in the top five importers or exporters for every Indian Ocean island nation. Middle Eastern countries, European countries, African countries, and South Asian countries also all have historical and trading ties to these important islands, and new players like Qatar and Turkey are likely to join the fray. Considering the region holistically allows researchers and policymakers to better identify the frequency with which smaller players are engaging in the Indian Ocean. Put simply, China is not the only player beginning to understand the importance of the Indian Ocean islands.
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
The Indian Ocean’s fifteen ongoing territorial disputes reflect the region’s complicated colonial legacy. For example, France has multiple disputes lodged with Comoros and Madagascar in the Western Indian Ocean over the control of small islands. Similarly, Mauritius and the United Kingdom continue to debate the status of the Chagos Archipelago, despite a ruling from the International Court of Justice that?ordered?the islands returned to Mauritius’s control.
These sovereignty disputes with the West open the door for islands to deepen their relationship with China. While assertive in the South China Sea, China has no territorial disputes in the Indian Ocean region, seeking instead to balance Western influence. Each island involved in a dispute has grown its economic relationship with China in recent years, from?free trade agreements?to?Belt and Road?investments.?
KEY REGIONAL PLAYERS
India, Australia, and France each have island territories in the Indian Ocean, making them natural partners in future collaborative projects. These countries share common objectives in both military and trade security and should consider how to best compete with other regional powers. The priorities of Indian Ocean countries—such as?maintaining the blue economy and combating climate change—will be essential to achieving their regional goals.
Examining the Indian Ocean as a single unit allows us to draw more connections across this vast area. This phase of?the map?focuses on creating a foundational understanding of the region by highlighting chokepoints, trading partners, shipping routes, and territorial disputes. The next phase of the map will visualize the military presence and capabilities in the Indian Ocean to underline the traditional and emerging players in the space. Through building and expanding on this project over the coming months, we hope to shift the understanding of the region’s key players to a more accurate paradigm: the consideration of the Indian Ocean as one theater.
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