Neutrality and Polarization in the US and Chinese Strategies for Taiwan
The difference between the Taiwan crisis and the war in Ukraine is that a Chinese-American confrontation over the island nation could have global economic, technological, and financial implications that would test the entire international system. Despite the threat of it turning into a world war and the implications it has had outside Europe from grains to oil, the Ukraine war remains a localized crisis not a global one, at least for now, unless it escalates into a nuclear war between the West and Russia. Another difference is that China is not soliciting solidarity in the conflict and prefers for states to remain neutral, while Russia and NATO are both looking for allies, the latter working to expand the scope of its alliance against Russia in the Ukraine war. Ukraine has tested the United States’ leadership in Europe and its ability to ‘shrink’ Russia’s international decision-making role. Taiwan is putting to the test both China and the United States, each side seeking to cancel the other in a quest to monopolize long-term global leadership and pre-eminence. Meanwhile, the world is watching closely, hoping two titans do not clash because of Taiwan, but many countries are taking precautions.?
The Arab region, especially the Gulf, does not feel compelled to take sides with China or the United States. Taiwan is not their battle, and they will try to maintain neutrality as long as possible unless developments force them to vote at the UN. However, the Gulf’s relations with China, which are advancing on multiple levels, deserve to be analysed along with the reasons for the coolness of Gulf relations with the United States. Perhaps understanding one can help fathom the other.?
It was not a coincidence that Chinese President Xi Jinping chose the words ‘strategic trust’ as the basis of Chinese-Arab and Chinese-Gulf relations during the China-Saudi, China-Gulf, and China-Arab summits in Riyadh. The crisis of confidence with the United States is something US leaders themselves admit to, on account of incoherent US policies that often shift and twist in astonishing ways.?
What’s new is that China has decided that the Arab lack of confidence in the consistency of US policies is an opportunity for it to invest in that trust deficiency. China has decided to attract Arab trust not just in the consistency of Chinese economic, political, and commercial policies but also in the consistency of its belief in the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of, and the nature of systems of government in, these states.?
It will be said that China is an autocracy far removed from democracy, and therefore is uninterested in the ‘values’ the US administration brandishes around the world, seeing them as symbols of arrogant American exceptionalism. This is true. China objects to the US insistence on imposing an agenda of human rights, freedoms, and due process, and insists on its model of government based on communism and limited individualism and individual rights.?
China is fluent in the language of interests, with all the adaptations and bargains it requires. China made this approach the basis of its Belt and Road Initiative, the core of its strategy for international relations. To avoid colliding with issues it considers to be none of its business, China has adopted policies that respect sensitivities, accept differences in ideologies, and insist on non-interference in Arab and Gulf states, with whom trade is worth more than $300 billion.?
By contrast, the United States adopts policies that ignore the ‘exceptionalism’ of others and address the Arab Gulf states with demands written in an American language that do not take into account differences in cultures and norms. For example, US officials have rarely understood the centrality of the Diwan in relations between Gulf citizens and their officials. The Democratic Party in particular boasts of its adoption of ‘human rights’ charter, bearing in mind that it has been used many times for political objectives that had nothing to do with human rights. However, this doesn’t negate at all the fact that the Biden administration is right in many of its stances stemming from principles of freedom and accountability.?
The administration’s incoherence has many manifestations often stemming from a sense of American superiority vis-à-vis the Gulf, and at others stemming from a bad assessment and misreading of policies, or even simply from misspeaking. US President Joe Biden’s remarks on the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, following their agreement brokered by China, is one example.?
The US president made a gaffe, saying after the news: “The better relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the better for everybody”. With these remarks, he appeared to dismiss China’s mediation and Saudi Arabia’s decision to improve relations with Iran, instead of joining the Abraham Accords with Israel, especially since Israel has failed to improve its behavior vis-à-vis the Palestinians and ‘do right’ by the Arab countries that have normalised ties with it. Indeed, Saudi rapprochement with Israel would not be a bigger gain for the kingdom than rapprochement with Iran and China. It would have been better for Mr Biden not to go down this path and reinforce the conviction that the United States doesn’t understand Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.?
Moreover, Saudi-Iranian accords guaranteed and sponsored by China went into immediate implementation – or at least into the testing ground – in Yemen, where US diplomacy failed to resolve the crisis in part because of the kneejerk American hostility to Saudi Arabia. The guarantees provided in the Chinese efforts are exactly what convinced Saudi Arabia to negotiate with Iran. China proceeded with steps for strategic confidence building, as a serious, coherent, and reliable partner able to make achievements.?
All of this does not invalidate the key security ties that bind the United States to the Arab Gulf States. Security of the Gulf is a cornerstone of international security and energy price stability. True, there no longer are US bases in Saudi Arabia, but there are American bases in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Deterring technology has replaced the need for traditional bases, one example of which are nuclear powered aircraft carriers seen for the first time in the Gulf. Therefore, China has not suddenly displaced the United States as an alternative security partner of the Arab Gulf States, whose only security relationship remains that with the United States as part of their long-lasting strategic relationship.?
The resentment or independence being expressed openly and persistently by the Gulf States will not destroy the strategic partnership with the United States, but will definitely have implications for the Chinese-American strategic confrontation and standoff over Taiwan.?
Just like pragmatism has meant that the European partners of the United States in NATO and the war in Ukraine have taken a neutral tone on Taiwan, pragmatism has required the same of the Gulf states. The Taiwan issue is between the United States and China, not the West and China.?
Following his return from a state visit to China, French President Emanuel Macron said that Europe had no interest in escalating the crisis in Taiwan, and must pursue a strategy independent of both Washington and Beijing. Interestingly, Macron said in an interview with Politico: “The question Europeans need to answer … is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction,” adding that Europe must take the time to build up its position as a third superpower alongside the United States and China.??
These remarks are important because of the near total European reliance on the United States in the Ukraine war, which is existential for the continent. They are important because they express European dissent from the US position on Taiwan, despite the US attempt to present the issue of Taiwan as a battle between democracy and autocracy. Europe is in a predicament because it relies on the United States in Ukraine but objects to US provocations of China on Taiwan, at a time when trade between Europe and China is worth more than $500 billion and any crisis would sink Europe.?
Next month, the G7 will convene in Japan. The summit is expected to be the most hostile to China, at the behest of the host country. Europe is anxious not only because a Western confrontation with China would encourage further Chinese-Russian rapprochement, which would impact the war in Ukraine, but also because Europe will ultimately not be able to resist US pressures to take a position against China, because of its dependence on Washington in the Ukraine war.?
Increasingly, Poland, which supports the United States and speaks on behalf of Eastern European and the Baltic states, is positioning itself to become the third pole of the European troika that once comprised Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Poland is seeking to replace Britain in the European troika, which has implications not just for the Ukraine war but also the Taiwan question.?
There is a major risk of a US-Chinese military confrontation because of Taiwan that both sides are preparing themselves for. The Chinese president received the backing of the People’s Liberation Army for a third term based on his commitment to settle the Taiwan question in China’s favor in the next five years. On the other hand, the United States is falling under the obligation of its pledges to protect Taiwan. Both sides are moving towards a serious standoff.?
The Chinese president is asking his friends not to interfere. The US president is doing the opposite, expecting America’s friends to adopt his positions on what he considers a Chinese design to swallow an independent, democratic nation. Through friendly lobbying or crude demand, states will not be able to maintain neutrality if the battle heats up and becomes a direct US-Chinese confrontation. In that scenario, the Ukraine war could look like a picnic compared to the global implications of the Taiwan crisis.