Navigating the Depths of AUKUS - Regional Reactions
British Ministry of Defence/LA Will Haigh

Navigating the Depths of AUKUS - Regional Reactions

AUKUS is creating waves across our region. In this four-minute read from OCRT, we look at regional reactions to Australia's submarine announcement with focus on the South China Sea.

Given that the South China Sea accounts for approximately 21% of all global trade, with a value of USD $3.37 trillion in 2016,[1] it isn't surprising that the AUKUS submarine announcement has garnered significant regional reaction. Archipelagic nations characterise the region, along with multinational border congestion, contested natural resource claims, and merchant and military shipping saturation. The result is that many countries are seeking to invest in, and enhance their undersea capabilities to gain competitive advantage.

The South China Sea is bordered by several nations, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, all seeking to maintain freedom from coercion and influence to ensure economic prosperity. Despite their shared reliance on regional stability, since 1991, five of the seven nations have acquired attack submarines and invested in anti-submarine capabilities.[2]

CHINA

China's response to the announcement was predictably critical, voicing concerns about regional security destabilisation and a potential arms race in the Indo-Pacific. This belies the reality that China has acquired the most significant number of submarines in the region since World War II, possessing a fleet of 57 diesel-electric submarines, five nuclear attack submarines, and plans to expand its fleet to 60 diesel-electric boats and at least 16 nuclear attack submarines by 2030.[3] While China warns of an arms race, their increasingly assertive behaviour in the South China Sea has been a driving factor behind Australia's and other regional partners' decision to enhance their submarine capabilities.

PHILIPPINES

The Philippines has consistently supported AUKUS[4] expressing a positive view of the recent announcement.[5] They have had a longstanding alliance with the US and in recent years, have sought to diversify their defence partnerships, engaging with other regional powers such as Japan, India and Australia,[6] including ?building on the success of joint operations such as Operation AUGURY - Philippines in 2017 and the ongoing Enhanced Defence Cooperation Program, which has operated since 2019.[7]

The Philippines' current interest in acquiring French and Korean diesel-electric submarines is part of its modernisation efforts, demonstrating its commitment to enhancing its naval capabilities to protect its interests in the South China Sea. It has also requested joint patrols with the United States and the Royal Australian Navy.[8] This move may be an attempt to enhance the Philippines' deterrence posture against potential aggression and assert its sovereignty in disputed waters. Additionally, this request highlights the importance of regional partnerships and alliances to the Philippines' military strategy in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.

VIETNAM

Vietnam was and remains neutral to AUKUS, reiterating the need for all nations to contribute to peaceful development in the region.[9] For its part, Vietnam received six conventional submarines from Russia in 2016[10] and has been intensifying efforts to bolster its claims in the South China Sea through extensive dredging and landfill operations on its outposts.[11] This move is reminiscent of China's purchase of eight diesel-electric Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 2002 and ongoing island development within the South China Sea.

Vietnam is pursuing a balanced approach to counter China's expansion in the South China Sea, which involves enhancing its military capabilities while seeking greater cooperation with the US and other regional powers to challenge China's dominance. Vietnam is also engaging in diplomatic efforts to draw attention to China's aggressive behaviour in the region. The strategy is focused on military modernisation, diplomatic engagement, and international cooperation to safeguard territorial integrity, ensure freedom of navigation, and respond to China's assertive behaviour.

INDONESIA

Compared to other regional actors, Indonesia presents as the least supportive of AUKUS, its stance driven by the belief that allowing distant stakeholders and their associated tensions to permeate their immediate region would not be in their best interest.[12] Indonesia has consistently expressed reservations regarding a potential increase in regional tensions and the possibility of a hypersonic or nuclear arms race that the AUKUS announcement could trigger.[14]

Indonesia's response to the 2021 AUKUS agreement was tepid and accompanied by a list of concerns. The country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed deep disquiet about a potential arms race in the region, while President Widodo criticised the secrecy of the AUKUS announcement. Despite recent improvements in bilateral ties and increased military cooperation,[14] an Indonesian official proposed that Australian nuclear-powered submarines should not use Indonesia's sea lanes because "AUKUS was created for fighting".[15] This indicates Indonesia's reluctance to be drawn into geopolitical tensions in the region and its desire to maintain a neutral stance.

Indonesia has a fleet of four submarines with plans to triple that number.[16] They have demonstrated a preference for non-alignment with either AUKUS members or China. Indonesia's foreign policy approach has long been guided by the principle of non-alignment, which has allowed the country to maintain economic flexibility and avoid being sidelined in regional affairs. However, as geostrategic competition intensifies, Indonesia risks losing its "ASEAN centrality" and being pushed into strategic limbo. Despite this, Indonesia remains hesitant to welcome third parties into the South China Sea, as it believes that ASEAN can resolve its own geopolitical tensions. This was demonstrated by a recent resolution of Indonesia's longstanding dispute with Vietnam over the boundaries of their Exclusive Economic Zones in the South China Sea.[17]

The responses and drivers of the South China Sea regional stakeholders are complex and multifaceted, with diverse needs, wants, and reactions. The Albanese government's narrative reinforces ASEAN as indispensable and prioritises strategic equilibrium while emphasising the importance of countries making sovereign choices regarding alignments and partnerships. If the AUKUS nuclear capability is to be accepted as a shield rather than a sword, it is important for reassurance to be tailored to the needs of each regional stakeholder. This process will take time and requires delicate diplomacy.


[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/18/five-countries-other-than-china-most-dependent-on-the-south-china-sea.html

[2] https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/submarines-in-the-south-china-sea-conflict

[3] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/06/08/chinas-submarine-fleet-is-huge-the-us-navy-plans-to-whittle-away-at-it-with-mines/?sh=876953b297a1

[4] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/philippines-subs-aukus-inspiration

[5] https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/29484-statement-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-l-locsin-jr-on-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-aukus-enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership

[6] https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1197343

[7] https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2019-11-17/operation-augury-philippines-transitions-enhanced-defence-cooperation-program

[8] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-23/australia-philippines-discuss-joint-south-china-sea-patrols/102011526

[9] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-can-count-on-vietnam-to-support-aukus/

[10] https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/vietnam-gets-fifth-submarine-from-russia/

[11] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-15/vietnam-in-big-push-to-expand-south-china-sea-outposts/101777902

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-malaysia-start-work-travel-corridor-2021-10-18/

[13] https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/nov/03/indonesian-ambassador-warns-australia-aukus-pact-must-not-fuel-a-hypersonic-arms-race-in-the-region

[14] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-10/indonesia-australia-defence-cooperation-aukus/101959330

[15] https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/aukus-created-for-fighting-push-for-indonesia-to-refuse-access-to-subs-20230314-p5crzz.html

[16] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/Indonesia-looks-to-triple-submarine-fleet-after-Chinese-incursions,

[17] https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/after-12-years-indonesia-and-vietnam-agree-on-eez-boundaries/




Dr Stephanie K.

Managing Consultant OCRT

2 年

Very nicely put, Patrick O’Neill CSC

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Jessica Groot

Human Capital and Organisational Development expert challenging process through engagement, innovation and customisation

2 年

Shifting away from the regional reactions, the reactions of Canada and other historical supporters adds an additional lens of how the deal will (potentially) shift alliances and support. Great summary Patrick O’Neill CSC

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Cameron Porter

Space Professional | GEMBA Candidate | Company Director | Adjunct Senior Lecturer

2 年

Thanks for this valuable contribution, Patrick O’Neill CSC.

Christopher Kuznicki

BSc. ISC2 x 10 | GIAC Advisory Board member | PMI x 3 | CompTIA x 11 | GSEC | LPI Linux Essentials | ITIL v4 | CCNA | Microsoft x 10

2 年

History is always a good teacher. Some interesting points to consider. The last time China was engaged in any hostilities was 1979…with Vietnam. So Vietnam’s ambivalence towards AUKUS is not surprising. The Philippines with their recent presidential election has shifted away from an authoritarian leader to one more democratic. The Philippines has been having issues with the aggressive behavior from China for really the last 20 years. Any Philippine officer will tell you their opinion of China, and it’s not a good one. Korea and Japan of late has been bridging closer together and Japan especially has been wanting to do away with some of their passive, defense only constitution towards one that allows more projection of power. There’s obvious concern with Japan taking a more offensive leadership type stance. Much like Germany in the European community, there are memories of the last time Japan took this stance and the result. Granted the geopolitical situation is vastly different than the 1930s. Indonesia is an interesting one. The world’s most populous Muslim country does create an odds with itself at times attitude towards China. On one hand they see the benefit of a stronger China but the Ughyars creates tension.

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