NATOs EVOLVING STRATEGY
Sean Ian Fischer, MA, EMBA
Leadership Consultant | Investments Management | International Relations & Crisis Analyst | Veterans Advocate | Personal Sovereignty Advocate at Mustang Leadership Solutions Group? LLC
? Sean Ian Fischer, 18 June 2024. All Rights Reserved. Contributor to Mustang Leadership Solutions Group?, LLC. First written 2 April 2022.
NATO | The Largest Military Alliance in the World | DW Documentary
Introduction
As of this writing there is a war raging in Eastern Europe. Russia invaded the sovereign territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Despite the overwhelming military advantage of Russian military forces, the Ukrainian defense forces and “Territorial Army” made up of civilians have been holding their own but at a steep price. Ukraine lay mostly in ruin after three weeks of non-stop bombing and shelling leveling cities and strategic towns to the ground. The West, and particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have found themselves in a peculiar position. Ukraine is not a NATO member, but since the invasion NATO and the European Union have been flooding Ukraine with weapons systems, intelligence, and training, careful not to trigger a third world war that would pit Russia and NATO in direct conflict. NATO is finding itself pivoting yet again towards new global strategic roles.
“The United States and other NATO members said on Wednesday they would keep helping Ukraine fight off Russia’s invasion, while also adapting the alliance’s own security to the ‘new reality’ triggered by the war (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine)” said a 16 March 2022 Reuters article. “Ukraine has the right to defend itself” said the Dutch minister Kajsa Ollongren in the same article. The war in Ukraine is testing NATO yet again. This will not be NATO’s first transformation.
What NATO fears now is an attack on the Atlantic Alliance itself. The 16 March 2022 Reuters article explains: “Fearing that an attack on NATO territory was also part of Moscow’s broader military plans, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that defense ministers agreed to tell military commanders to draw up plans for new ways to deter Russia…We must reset our collective defense and deterrence for the longer term. Today we tasked our military commanders to develop options across all domains – land, air, sea, cyber and space.” This new posture would involve more troops in Eastern Europe, more air and missile defense systems, more aircraft carriers and submarines at sea and use of defensive weapons on computer networks and in space. NATO is cautious to trigger any Article 5 action requiring the collective defense after one of its members are attacked. NATO prefers to employ “strategic ambiguity” which NATO claims is also a defensive instrument against Russian aggression.
Relevance
NATO is the most powerful military alliance in the world. It has been the military force of choice to enforce United Nation’s (UN) Security Council Resolutions on several occasions during the Yugoslav Wars, the Libya intervention, and Afghanistan to name a few. Although it did not originally intend to be, NATO evolved to become a global military alliance that defends Western values such as democracy, human rights, free markets, and rule of law. It is the praetorian guard of liberal international organizations such as the UN. For these reasons, and others, NATO is arguably the most relevant military institution in the world.
Literature Review
The secondary source literature is not yet written about NATO’s new strategic direction. It appears that NATO’s new roles will be for the collective defense of the liberal international order, free markets, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law against autocratic regimes and states of the world. It is anticipated that NATO will hammer this out at their upcoming summit to be held in Madrid in June 2022. However, what does exist are valuable doctrinal documents that have been textually analyzed below.
GENEALOGY OF NATO – KEY STRATEGIC SHIFTS
NATO had three distinct strategic periods during its history: the Cold War, the Immediate post-Cold War Period, and the Security Environment since 9/11. Figure 1 below illustrates key NATO strategic concepts from 1949 - 1999.
THE COLD WAR 1949 - 1991
NATO was conceived strictly as a deterrent military force to counter an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. NATO conducted no military operations during the Cold War (12 March 1947 to 26 December 1991) though the Alliance did conduct regular annual military exercises as part of their deterrent strategy. NATO has been credited as the “victor” of the Cold War. The Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from their Eastern European bases redeploying back to Russia 1989 through 1991. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union also collapsed. Although NATO was not the sole factor in the Soviet Union’s collapse, it was a key element in that the West’s military production capacity outpaced that of the Soviet Union. This period was characterized by defense and deterrence with a focus and attention to dialogue and détente.
6 January 1950: The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area
This was NATO’s first strategic concept, and its purpose was to deter predominantly Soviet aggression. It emphasized NATO’s optimal use of resources to counter the numerical superiority the USSR had over NATO, and a reliance on the USA’s nuclear capabilities. Each NATO member’s contribution to the Alliance would be proportionate to its capacity, economic, industrial, geographical, and military.
3 December 1952: The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area
NATO’s strategic goal was to “…ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war…”[1] The invasion of South Korea by the Soviet approved and backed North Korea raised the issue or concept for NATO of a “forward strategy” whereby NATO would place its defenses as far east in Europe as possible and as close to the Iron Curtain as possible.
22 November 1954: The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years
This strategic document explicitly discussed the use of nuclear weapons and the concept of massive retaliation (mutually assured destruction = MAD).
23 May 1957: Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept
NATO did not accept the concept of limited war with the USSR: “If the Soviets were involved in a hostile action and sought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong the scope of such an incident or prolong it, the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO’s disposal since in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets.”[2] Even early in its history, NATO recognized it may be involved in out of area operations that was reflected in a political directive from NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) to NATO’s military authorities on 13 December 1956 saying “Although NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of the dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area.”[3] NATO had the foresight to recognize and understand the nature of global politics and history to envision the possibility of being engaged outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.
16 January 1968: Doctrine of Flexible Response – NATO’s Fourth Strategic Concept
This concept had two key features, flexibility, and escalation. Flexibility was intended to prevent a potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression leading an adversary to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack. NATO deduced there were three types of military responses against aggression to the Alliance, 1) Direct Defense – aim was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight, 2) Deliberate Escalation – this added a series of possible steps to defeat aggression by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear power as a crisis escalated and 3) General Nuclear Response which was seen as the ultimate deterrent.
IMMEDIATE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 1991 – 2001
Two unclassified strategic concepts were issued 1) Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and 2) Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy.
12 December 1991: Directive for Implementation of Alliance’s Strategic Concept
This concept sought to improve and expand the security for Europe through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. It also reduced the use of nuclear forces to a minimum level to preserve peace and stability.
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SINCE 9/11
NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy gave greater attention to 1) The Fight Against Terrorism, 2) Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3) Hybrid Warfare, 4) Emerging and Disruptive Technologies.
12 February 2003: Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance Strategy
This strategic concept was based on the broader definition of security, common defense, peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It identified the new risks that emerged after the Cold War, 1) terrorism, 2) ethnic conflict, 3) human rights abuses, 4) political instability, 5) economic fragility, 6) spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. It explained NATO’s fundamental tasks of security, consultation, crisis management and partnership.
November 2006: Comprehensive Political Guidance
NATO needed to protect its population at home and abroad after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001. NATO vowed to enact major internal reforms by adapting military structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks such as leading the United Nations mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and to deepen and extend its partnerships.
April 2009: Strasbourg-Kehl Summit - Declaration on Alliance Security
An analysis of NATO issues was thoroughly debated rethinking, reprioritizing and reforming the Alliance.
November 2010: Lisbon Summit – Current Strategic Concept
This concept reaffirmed NATO’s values and purpose revolving around three core tasks, 1) Collective Defense, 2) Crisis Management and 3) Cooperative Security. NATO describes itself as an organization with “…a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law…”[4] NATO emphasized Alliance solidarity, the importance of trans-Atlantic consultation and the need to engage in the continuous process of reform identifying capabilities and policies needed to ensure NATO’s deterrence and defense, crisis management abilities and that NATO is equipped to face today’s threats. The concept affirms how NATO aims to promote international security and cooperation by 1) Reinforcing arms control, 2) disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, 3) Emphasizing NATO’s open-door policy for all European countries, 4) Enhancing its partnerships in the broad sense of the term and that NATO will continue its reform and transformation process.
June 2021 Brussels Summit: Vision for NATO’s New Strategic Direction
This vision addresses a more aggressive Russia on NATO’s borders, the rise of China and the emergence of disruptive technologies and the impacts of climate change on security to be developed in time for the Madrid Summit in June 2022.
This study will attempt to demonstrate that NATO not only has evolved as an organization in a conventional way to global security threats it has faced since inception but also in an unconventional and asymmetric way as is being played out in the Russia-Ukraine war as of this writing. In the current conflict, Ukraine was invaded initially in 2014 with Russia occupying areas of the Donbas region and Crimea and since February 2022, Russia has further occupied areas of eastern Ukraine establishing a continuous crescent of territory from Kharkiv in the northwest arcing east and southwest along the coasts of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea giving Russia a vast swath of seaborne access that it has not had since the time of the Soviet Union. For Russia, it appears that it calculated, some may say “played” NATO, by making Ukraine ineligible for NATO and European Union (EU) accession because it was engaged in “conflict.” The 2014 moves set up the current phase of Russia’s invasion and occupation plan of the Ukraine. What is unfolding before the world is the methodical and purposeful strategy to destroy Ukraine’s government and infrastructure, occupy territory that Russia feels is advantageous to its national interests, i.e., sea access and the productive capacities and natural resources of eastern Ukraine.
Russia’s moves placed NATO in a “check-mate” position since Ukraine is not a NATO member. Article 5 of NATO’s treaty could not be invoked (collective defense). NATO could not intervene directly. To do so may cause a third world war forcing NATO to “fight” the Russians asymmetrically much like these powers did during the Cold War period.
June 2022 Madrid Summit: NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept
In a 13 December 2021 speech, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explained, “Second only to the Washington Treaty, NATO’s Strategic Concept is key to our success. It sets out a shared vision of the threats, and challenges and opportunities that we face. It helps us prioritise and chart our future adaptation as an Alliance.” Stoltenberg further stated that:
Democracy and freedom are under pressure. Authoritarian regimes are pushing back on the international-rules based order…The Russian regime is aggressive abroad and oppressive at home. It has massively expanded its military presence from the Barents’ Sea to the Mediterranean. Its military build-up on Ukraine’s borders, with around a hundred thousand troops, heavy armor, drones and missiles is of great concern…Any Russian aggression will come at a high price. With serious political and economic consequences for Russia…Meanwhile, China is using its economic and military might to control its own people and coerce other countries.”
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept will focus on 1) NATO’s partnerships with non-NATO member states. This is no coincidence and appears to be in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, 2) NATO’s evolving role in Global Security and measures NATO is taking to both strengthen its posture and support its partners, 3) New and Emerging Challenges for NATO’s Future Adaptation – NATO’s need to combat hybrid and cyber threats, increase the resilience of member state societies and address the security impacts of climate change, 4) Deterrence and Defense – three key components a) strong and capable forces, b) robust, resilient societies and c) a global perspective.
Stoltenberg expanded the vision for NATO’s future role in the same speech saying “We must continue to invest in the capabilities to deter and defend ourselves on land, in the air and at sea. But we must be able to do so in cyberspace and in outer space.” NATO will not only operate globally but also in the cyber-sphere and outer space. It seems evident that NATO will continue to operate ad infinitum.
How can we understand NATO’s strategic shifts to frequently changing threats and challenges from increasingly autocratic regimes globally?
NATO has demonstrated throughout its history that it is an adaptable and flexible organization. Review of its strategic documents through the life of the Alliance reveals that it has effectively countered challenges to the global military supremacy of NATO.
The research methods that will be employed will be textual analysis, analysis of previous NATO strategic concepts, historical and explanatory analysis culminating with predictive analysis of what direction NATO will take in the future. A case study of the current Ukraine-Russia conflict will be used as part of the analysis to showcase how NATO is adapting to the challenge of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Analysis
NATO’s genesis was borne by a fear of a resurgent Germany and an aggressive Russia after World War II. As far as the West was concerned, Germany and Russia posed a clear and present danger. Had not Germany resurrected its military might during the World War I - World War II interwar period? Didn’t the Soviet Union maintain military forces in Eastern Europe after World War II and butt up against the borders of Western Europe satisfying Josef Stalin’s need to create a buffer zone for Mother Russia? These were Realist arguments that had merit. The authors and drafters of NATO’s early strategic documents (as well as subsequent NATO writings) contained constructivist arguments explaining the existential threat that an aggressive Soviet Union posed to the West and the rest of the world.
Most scholars agree that NATO emerged from the Cold War period “victorious.” The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) could no longer sustain its economic and military models in the face of fierce competition from the West. It successfully maintained the status quo and averted a direct military confrontation with the USSR. NATO’s strategic doctrines from 1950 through 1991 adapted to the changing global environment. After North Korea’s Soviet backed invasion of South Korea, NATO responded by stating that the Alliance would seek to destroy the will and capacity of the Soviet Union and its satellites to wage war. President John F. Kennedy and his staff conceived of the idea of “flexible response” during the Cuban Missile Crisis making its way into NATO doctrine later in the 1960’s whereby the USSR (or any adversary) would be denied knowledge of NATO’s intentions and would have to conclude that any action it may have taken would have resulted in its catastrophic destruction. NATO executed limited and mostly defensive deployments to Turkey and parts of western Iraq during Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 again demonstrating its ability to adapt to the fast moving geopolitical situations on NATO’s frontiers.
With the collapse of the USSR and withdrawal of Soviet military forces, a void was left in Eastern Europe. Long-standing ethnic tensions in the Former Yugoslavia/Balkans region erupted into multiple civil wars along ethnic and religious lines. Initially, NATO stood on the sidelines of the conflict. Gradually, European, and international outrage over the conflict, took hold resulting in the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) to halt the largest conflict in Europe since World War II up to that time. The UN put NATO in military command of the enforcement effort to stabilize and secure the region. With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the warring parties ceased hostilities. The UN, however, kept NATO in military command to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions long after the shooting stopped.
NATO’s strategic doctrines of the period 1991 – 2001 focused on working with former Eastern European adversaries and building partnerships. Perhaps this NATO engagement strategy was too successful. Most former Warsaw Pact Eastern European nations opted to apply and accede into NATO (and the European Union) much to the dismay of Russia who considered this region their buffer zone. One could hardly blame these countries for the enthusiasm for which they sought to join the West. Fifty or so years had taught them (former Eastern European states) that the Soviet model was a failure. They could see for themselves that the West appeared to be the more successful of the two systems (capitalism vs. communism). NATO’s “success” however, created real friction and tension with Russia by moving NATO eastward and directly on Russia’s border. This fact would reverberate into future actions by Russia to secure buffer zones for Russia in “Pro-Russian” regions of the former Soviet Union such as Moldova’s Transnistria region, South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of the Republic of Georgia and the annexation of Crimea and de facto occupation of the Donbas region of Ukraine.
With the 9/11 attacks on the United States by groups/individuals labeled as terrorists in 2001, NATO again shifted its doctrinal stance. For the first time in its history, the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – loosely paraphrased – an attack on one member state is an attack on all. NATO immediately deployed combat air and sea patrols of the skies and seas of North America, Europe, and the Mediterranean. For the rest of the early 2000’s and 2000 teens, NATO’s focus was predominantly on global terrorism and their networks with most direct combat action taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO, for the first time deployed outside of its traditional Euro-Atlantic area by taking military command of UN forces deployed to Afghanistan.
In a two to three year campaign, NATO was largely successful in gaining control of the entirety of Afghanistan. However, the effort was fraught with military, logistical, diplomatic, and unrealistic UN objectives complexities gradually eroding the gains made in the country by the Alliance. The Taliban resurrected its power base and began to slowly regain control of Afghanistan ultimately taking the country in August 2021.
NATO and the United States, in a poor exit strategy and sloppy tactical execution, withdrew from the country as it descended into chaos. Despite this setback, NATO did demonstrate that it was able to adapt its strategy to counter terrorist organizations out of its traditional Euro-Atlantic area of operations. NATO demonstrated it could mobilize its forces to a land-locked country and execute military operations for over a decade over long distances and with minimum losses of life.
In NATO’s Brussels Summit in June 2021, the Alliance readjusted its vision to counter big nation competition focusing on an aggressive Russia and a rising China. Typically, NATO’s strategic concept is updated every ten years to ensure the Alliance is prepared for the future. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is quoted as saying that “The Madrid Strategic [June 2022] will reflect the new security environment, recommit to our values, and reaffirm our unity, ensuring that our Alliance is fit for the future.”
Case Study: Russo-Ukraine War February 2014 - Present
The Russo-Ukraine War began February 2014 with the Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity” focused on the status of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, both internationally recognized as part of the Ukraine, but annexed (in the case of Crimea) or taken over by pro-Russian Separatists (Donbas). The Ukrainian military have been fighting these Russian-backed separatists since 2014. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized two self-proclaimed separatists’ states in Donbas (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic) openly sending Russian troops into the region. On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.
The Russo-Ukraine War presents an interesting challenge for the Alliance. Ukraine is not a NATO member, but it has been a partner of NATO. NATO and the United States have been careful not to provoke or engage in a direct confrontation with Russia. To reassure member states, NATO deployed additional troops, combat patrol aircraft and warships to those states bordering Russia. Simultaneously, NATO has been supplying Ukraine with anti-tank and anti-aircraft hand-held missile systems, small arms weapons for troops, intelligence, logistics, training and recently, Germany announced it will send German-made tanks to Ukraine’s military. All of this war materiel has so far enabled the Ukrainian forces to remain in the field despite the odds in favor of Russia for the past seventy days as of this writing.
What does this say about the Alliance? The Russo-Ukraine war presents another strategic shift for the Alliance. This war combines conventional elements in defense of NATO territory but also asymmetric warfare in how war materiel is being funneled to Ukrainian forces ideally to give Ukraine the ability to stem the tide of the Russian onslaught.
Conclusion
Despite NATO’s many challenges and shortcomings, the Alliance has proven to be highly flexible and adaptable to the world’s most complex military challenges. NATO engaged itself in all forms of warfare to date, less nuclear power. In each case, NATO has been able to change its strategy and achieve the objectives it set out for itself or of that of the UN. NATO is a learning organization. As long as the Alliance continues to adapt as the situation dictates, it will succeed in conventional war and unconventional war for the foreseeable future.
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https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315000701/european-crisismanagement-defence-hans-christian-hagman
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203884416-9/european-unionnato-shrewd-interorganizationalism-making-johannes-varwick-joachim-koops
https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/2008393/Unstrategic_Partners-with-cover-pagev2.pdf?Expires=1636748652&Signature=P6V-2x5CeDvgkB7BXdl4w-ChRCGecLxmvcWGrytv0cxs4XRLMXnfMea8jIHybpbjtAW3lAeL-N-SeSkfCy9crvZVyyxs~9VqGP4v10JEMiVErdWI8qcGhyjtMjJiIHpp~Xojj7L2BpMVSybkPD~2YLUrrclhYEzZfprtQRyo6PJwuUElSoqvvKyPY1MHzAskYGyYfvKvG~v9XdCwXiopMfKbLzOjnl~bmML08oxQxSpNVjIDDS76hOtQ4TlgoLmwS6RaKVV5~zM2GQXoWx99Gi4vPZ~xun00vslk~1Fz-0o-82m6SnXe92nQhZIgjZ6AlodSeAH6USSCDnIxQWA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA