Nationalism: Imagined, Promoted and Modern

Nationalism: fundamental to human nature, or a development associated with modernisation in the eighteenth century? Contemporarily, the origins of the nation and nationalism have been the subject of intense disagreement. Not only is there contention between the modernist, primordialist and ethno-symbolist schools of thought; there are fundamental discrepancies within the respective factions of nationalism studies. Recently, the genesis of nationalism has been attributed to the unification of language within Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, with support from Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism; to capitalism, particularly in Eric Hobsbawm’s Invention of Tradition; and to state-building by John Breuilly. However, in this essay I will demonstrate that nationalism first emerged in the eighteenth century and diverged across Europe as a consequence of modernisation in three distinct areas: the cultural-educational, socio-economic and military-bureaucratic nexuses respectively. Therefore, upholding the modernist school of thought’s central thesis, that nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Accordingly, I will initially detail, and subsequently highlight the conceptual confusion inherent to the ethno-symbolist arguments of Anthony D. Smith, whom contends that nations did not emerge solely in the midst of modernity, emphasising the centrality of pre-modern ‘ethnies’. Subsequently, I will explore the theory maintained by Benedict Anderson, and shall establish that the interaction between capitalism, mass communication and the unification of language in the eighteenth century onwards, allowed societies to conceptualise abstract others as their metaphorical kinsfolk, spawning the modern ‘imagined community’ of the nation, which operated as the core of nationalism. Following this, I will critique Gellner’s functionalist argument that nationalism, which he interchangeably termed cultural homogenisation, was the distinctively unconscious product of industrialisation; instead, arguing that bureaucratic elites promoted nationalism in order to militarise modern society. Consequently, I will turn my focus to detailing the process by which the respective bureaucrats fostered Andersonian nationalism – an identification with an ‘imagined community – to justify militarism, in order to centralise their authority over their constituents. Cumulatively, these arguments shall affirm that the concept of nationalism is plainly inconceivable without the modernisation which facilitated the emergence and exploitation of national ‘imagined communities.’

A Brief Rearticulation of Ethno-Symbolism

In the place of primordialists, Smith has taken the central position of countering the modernist conception of nationalism, where he postulates a continuity from pre-modern ‘ethnies’ to modern nations. While the primordial school has been driven to obscurity, the ethno-symbolist theory of Smith has gained a worrying amount of intellectual traction. Smith’s argument can be summarised as follows: ethnic culture, religions and social organisations (all three combining to form the ‘ethnies’) were profound and cascaded across Europe prior to modernisation, and nationalism represents the “transformation and universalisation” of these pre-existing affinities (Smith, 1986: 77-78). To Smith’s credit, he demonstrates that there is some degree of continuation from pre-modern ‘ethnies’ to nationhood. Though, he yields that nationalism, as an ideology of unity, identity and autonomy, has its origins firmly in the modernity of the eighteenth century (Smith, 2009: 79). A true nail-in-the-coffin to modernist thought does not come from the religiously or ethnically inspired consciousness that Smith purports as pre-modern. Rather, it would be refuted by explicitly nationalist documents, programmes and movements bourgeoning within medieval society (O’Leary, 1997: 207). The idea that the materials upon which nationalists drew, and which modernity converged upon to create a sense of national identity is indeed nationalism itself, can be disregarded as a conceptual confusion by Smith (Connor, 1978: 379). Conclusively, as Smith fails to refute, and in many cases reaffirms the modernist conception of nationalism, this essay will turn to providing a modernist model.

Nations as ‘Imagined Communities’

The invention of mass printing combined with the onset of modern capitalism operated as a seemingly effortless partnership, converging on the fatality of language heterogeneity to facilitate the emergence of the ‘national consciousness’. This partnership, henceforth termed print-capitalism, defined a fundamental revolution in modes of comprehending the world, which more so than any other factor, made it possible for the citizenry to conceptualise ‘the nation’ (Anderson, 1983: 22). Book-publishing, having produced over twenty-million books by 1500, was one of the earliest forms of enterprise that felt the entirety of capitalism’s incessant quest for markets (Febvre and Martin, 1997: 187). Understandably, the foremost concern of the book sellers was profit – encouraging them to sell their products to the “largest possible number of their contemporaries [fellow people]” (Febvre and Martin: 1997: 259). Unfortunately for the sellers, the initial market was a thin section of the European population – the literate, Latin-readers (Anderson, 1991: 38). Consequently, pressures to peddle cheap books in the vernaculars mounted as the slender Latin market within predominantly monoglot Europe was exhausted entirely by the eighteenth century (Anderson, 1991: 38). Accordingly, new reading peoples were created throughout Europe, as the booksellers exploited cheap, popular editions. The productive relations of capitalism and the technology of mass- communications had therefore generated a substantial “reading public” (Febvre and Martin, 1997: 22, 30). Accompanying print-capitalism and completing the triadic interaction that made imagining nations possible, was the fatality of language heterogeneity. Without the axiom of fatality, the death or reformulation of languages prevented a linguistic unification; a unification required, for if capitalism attempted to exploit each region’s market utilising the unique spoken language, costs would skyrocket, profits would stagnate and the productive relations would have remained meagre (Anderson, 1991: 43). Print-languages expressed through mass- producing capitalism converged the spectrum of spoken-languages within certain limits imposed my grammar, drastically reducing the sample space of vernaculars capable of distribution through the market (Scanlon and Singh, 2006: 20).

Consequently, and in two observable ways, print-capitalism laid the seeds for a national consciousness to emerge. Firstly, by creating unified fields of communication, print- languages allowed speakers of the diverse vernaculars (Frenches, Englishes and so on) to understand each other via paper – generating an awareness of the colossal communities within their respective language arena. Specifically, print-languages made it possible for the modern readership, who were almost entirely unaware of one another, to imagine and relate themselves to others within new, ‘imagined communities’ – nations (Anderson, 1983: 24, 26). This ‘imagination’ in Andersonian context does not suggest the fabrication of the nation, rather, it refers to the ability to envision something which cannot be seen (Breuilly, 2016: 629). A homogenous sense of time, or the idea that acts performed within the territorial boundaries are inter-functioning and abide by “the same clocked, calendrical time” made it possible for readers almost entirely unaware of each other, to imagine themselves as belonging to a new national community (Anderson, 1983: 25-26). Secondly, a new sense of permanency to language was established and provided the citizenry with the ability to build the idea of their national antiquity, central to nationalism (Anderson, 1991: 44-45). The new mass-produced texts were no longer subject to the heterogeneity of language. Essentially, what was written in the thirteenth century was effectively unintelligible to the mass population of the eighteenth century, while what was written in the time period surrounding the eighteenth century was easily accessible in the nineteenth and remains so today (Anderson, 1991: 46). Acting as a symbol, the nation provided citizens with existential meaning, while encouraging social integration (Turner, 1970: 101; Hobsbawn, 1990: 46).

Conclusively, the convergence of print-capitalism on the death of language heterogeneity in the eighteenth century generated an ‘imagined political community,’ which formed the underpinning of modern nationalism, where a nation is “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,” and which is not coterminous with mankind (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 37; Anderson 1992: 6-7). Although, despite developing the new ‘imagined political community’, the rapid materialisation of nationalism within ‘the masses’ was not simply a semi-conscious emergence, stemming for the socio-economic turn of capitalism and language unification alone. Rather, once the modern concept of nations as ‘imagined communities’ was made cognitively possible, this sense of identification was fostered and utilised by elites as an effective means of centralising their authority through the military.

The Failure of Gellnerian Functionalism

In clear distinction with Gellner, though reaffirming that nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomena, the argument advanced here is that nationalism – a collective identification with an ‘imagined community’ – was intentionally fostered within populations by bureaucratic elites. However, prior to developing this argument, it is crucial to detail the shortcomings of Gellner’s argument in order to smoothly introduce the role of bureaucratic agency in the modern origins and spread of nationalism. Although frequently adopted, Gellner’s (1983: 101-102) argument, that nationalism is a product of modernisation, of the transition from agrarian to industrial society – the latter requiring a state that can produce and be maintained by one common, literate and accessible high culture, is inconsistent with reality (O’Leary, 1997: 198). The breakdown of Gellner’s functionalism can be attributed to an excess of counterexamples, whereby nationalism pre- dated industrialisation in Europe (Mann, 2013: 139). Prior to mass-industrialisation across the European continent, the citizenry’s identification with their respective ‘imagined communities’ was expressed virulently. Eighteenth century France, as well as early nineteenth-century Prussia, and Habsburg lands resembled nothing of a Gellnerian industrial society. Yet, incontrovertible displays of nationalism were evident in wartime, particularly when the French Army claimed victory against a Prussian March on Paris. The existence of nationalist fervour within the French ranks is undeniable, with cries of ‘viva le nation,’ and ‘the country’s in danger’ (Mann, 2014: 140). Analogously, implicit nationalism can be identified within the unprecedented popular mobilisation of the French army – which Lynn (1987: 73) attributes to the stunning distribution of seven million national journals among the army, corroborating Anderson. Similarly, the existence of pre-industrial nationalism can be found in nationalist revolutionary movements spanning Europe, in defiant resistance to the French, whereby national movements emerged in Prussia and the ‘backward Habsburg lands” (Mann, 2013: 140).

Contemporarily, this is acknowledged by academics, to such an extent that Gellnerian scholars O’Leary (1997: 205) and Mann (1992: 145) suggest remodelling Gellner’s functionalism, whereby nationalism occurs entirely beyond human agency, to a filter explanation – with the central thesis that modernising bureaucrats understood that nationalism was essential for contemporary state-building. To his credit, understanding the origins of nationalism requires that Gellner’s process of conceptualising nationalism as an ideology which needs the extensive communication of expansive literacy, be taken seriously. It is this conceptualisation of nationalism, which corroborates heavily with Anderson’s sense of the nation as an ‘imagined community,’ that implicitly introduces the role of bureaucratic agency. Incorporating this, the eventuation of a homogenised and impersonal high culture on society – in place of diverse and complex agrarian cultures – required the conscious diffusion of a bureaucrat-mediated vernacular, organised to meet the communication standardisation of modernity (O’Leary, 1997: 206). Nevertheless, numerous scholars, many Gellner’s admirers, manipulate this proposition further and attribute the genesis of nationalism to the conscious education and standardisation of Europeans by respective state-bureaucracies, operating independently from, and prior to, industrialisation (Hall et al., 1992: 147; Mosse, 1975: 87- 89; O’Leary, 1997: 205). Hence, a true modernist theory of nationalism must recognise the role of militarisation in the nationalising process (Conservi, 2008: 1307).

The Role of Bureaucratic Agency

Bureaucratic elites pursued cultural homogenisation through the militarisation of society by promoting an identification to the ‘imagined community’ of the nation between their constituents. Fundamentally, nationalism enabled mass-militarisation, and consequently, bureaucrats were able to homogenise their often-divided population, which further centralised their bureaucratic authority. To recognise this, the significance of cultural homogenisation within respective populations must be understood as a net positive to the bureaucrats. Cultural homogenisation was identified by elites as crucial toward modern state-building as it promoted state centralisation by unifying and standardising the boundaries of the citizenry with the ruling bureaucrats (Conversi, 2008: 1289). Without a homogenised constituency, the elites were unable to effectively consolidate their authority: to raise taxes, to borrow extensively, to raise an army and build their respective states (Conversi, 2008: 1301). However, the elites came to appreciate that a society organised for military conflict was an incubator of homogeneity (Conservi, 2008: 1289). Suitably, the militarisation of society became the “cast and guide” for generating this homogenisation, through the moulding of an Andersonian national consciousness, which has already been established as reliant upon the modernisation of the eighteenth century (Tilly, 1985: 15). Militarisation was justified via the purposeful, bureaucratic development of ‘egalitarian nationalism’, or more appropriately and in Andersonian form, the citizenry’s imagined sense of community and shared equality (Conservi, 2008: 1306). Egalitarian appeals were fundamental to promoting the shared sense of time and actions which developed the identification with the ‘imagined community’ inside the military and later the citizenry. Once the creation of a communal shared equality was purported by elites, the idea of “sacrificial equality in war” followed (Levi, 1997: 144). Put most succinctly by Weber (1976: 334), the nationalisation of the masses – the duty to defend the ‘imagined community’, to die for it, to obey the government, to work for it, learn for it and pay taxes, was a construction generated to justify militarism and ipso facto, achieve the desired centralisation around the elite.

This militarism-nationalism-homogenisation nexus is clear when evaluating the modernising European continent. The principal mass-army, namely the French, depended upon the newfound sense of nationalism which stressed the equality inherent to the ‘imagined French community’ (Posen, 1993: 82-83). Consequently, the French levee (conscription) en masse of 1793 and simultaneous government mobilisation of labour towards militarism was enforced under the guise of egalitarian-nationalist propaganda, contending for equality in sacrifice to protect the country (Levi, 1997: 144). Similarly, the education system in Revolutionary France sought to imbue the youth with patriotic virtues and shape them into loyal arms of the state. Likewise, the peasantry was indoctrinated with the French language and mythical histories, resulting in them developing a French identity – fostering a sense of ‘shared time’ (Weber, 1976: 315-317). The fear propagated by elites, that France was on the cusp of violation from rival states, inflamed patriotic fervour and as a consequence, the soldier became the expression of the collective ‘national will’ while war became the ultimate means of homogenisation, whereby soldiers and civilians alike shared responsibilities for their ‘imagined community’ (Tilly, 1996: 300). Militarisation became the method by which bureaucrats centralised their authority and homogenised a previously ideologically, economically and religiously divided society (Conversi, 2012: 1298). As Prussia followed in an almost identical manner, the promotion of nationalism proliferated across Europe, reinforcing countless state-drives towards cultural homogeneity (Kitromilides, 1989: 153). Prior to any commencement of industrialisation, and as far as the Greek Peninsula, elites implemented cultural homogenisation by fostering the citizenry’s affinity with the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, out of ethnic and religious heterogeneity (Smith, 1998: 36). Cumulatively for Hale (1998: 44), without the modern identification forged with the nation, “that seeks and provides momentum for wars... we cannot speak in the pre-nationalist period of a militarised society” that centralised the control of elites. Conclusively, the dissemination of nationalism, which has been established as dependent on modernisation, was utilised and proliferated by the bureaucratic elites.

Conclusion

In summary, nationalism emerged in and spilled across eighteenth century Europe as a result of cultural, educational, socio-economic and military bureaucratic modernisation. Hence, the general modernist thesis, that nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon has been established, though not conventionally. Initially, Smith’s theory which held pre-modern ‘ethnies’ as central to nations was summarised and dismissed through Smith’s own dialogue and clear conceptual confusion. Subsequently, I demonstrated that the interaction between modern print-capitalism and the homogenisation of language in the eighteenth century provided populations with the cognitive ability to conceptualise themselves as interconnecting members of a national ‘imagined community’. Following this, the inadequate modernist theory of Gellner, specifically, the industrial-nationalist functionalism was refuted, and the role of political agency in promoting and spreading nationalism was established. Suitably, my focus shifted to explaining how bureaucratic elites fostered a communal, imagined identification with their respective nations, with the purpose of militarising society to centralise their authority. The conclusions made within this essay are of vital importance to dealing with nationalist movements of contemporary times, which humanity has seen divulge into genocide. Understanding nationalism as a factor which is not innate to the human psyche, or civilisation, but rather a result of cultural-linguistic, socio-economic and military- educational variables allows solutions to be discussed and implemented. Future investigations in international relations should turn to purporting solutions to prevent the hostile consequences of nationalism, an ideology on the rise.

References

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 427-449.

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities, revised edition. London and New. Anderson, B. (1992). The New World Disorder. New Left Review.

Breuilly, J. (2016). Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities: A symposium. Nations and Nationalism, 22(4), 625-659.

Connor, W. (1978). A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a.... Ethnic and racial studies, 1(4), 377-400.

Conversi, D. (2008). ‘We are all equals!’ Militarism, homogenization and ‘egalitarianism’ in nationalist state-building (1789–1945). Ethnic and racial studies, 31(7), 1286-1314. Conversi, D. (2012). Modernism and nationalism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 17(1), 13- 34.

Febvre, L., & Martin, H. J. (1997). The coming of the book: the impact of printing 1450- 1800 (Vol. 10). Verso.

Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. NYU Press.

Gellner, E., Hall, J. A., & Jarvie, I. C. (1992). Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth, and Belief. Cambridge Univ Pr.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). Echoes of the Marseillaise: two centuries look back on the French Revolution. Rutgers University Press.

Kitromilides, P. M. (1989). 'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans. European history quarterly, 19(2), 149-192.

Levi, M. (1997). Consent, dissent, and patriotism. Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2013). The role of nationalism in the two world wars. Nationalism and war, 10(2), 172-96.

Mosse, G. L. (1975). The nationalization of the masses: Political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich. Howard Fertig Pub.

O'Leary, B. (1997). On the nature of nationalism: An appraisal of Ernest Gellner's writings on nationalism. British Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 191-222.

Posen, B. R. (1993). Nationalism, the mass army, and military power. International

security, 18(2), 80-124.

Smith, A. D. (1986). The ethnic origins of nations. John Wiley and Sons.

Scanlon, C., & Singh, M. (2006). Theorizing the decline of linguistic diversity. International

Journal of the Sociology of language, 9(182), 1-24.

Smith, A. D. (2009). Ethno-symbolism and nationalism: A cultural approach. Routledge. Spencer, P., & Wollman, H. (2002). Nationalism: A critical introduction. Sage.

Tilly, C. (1996). The state of nationalism. Critical Review, 10(2), 299-306.

Tilly, C., Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press.

Turner, V., & Turner, V. W. (1970). The forest of symbols: Aspects of Ndembu ritual (Vol. 101). Cornell University Press.

Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. Stanford University Press.?