My questions on @DBS Bank's  Digital Transformation Metrics
The Asian Banker

My questions on @DBS Bank's Digital Transformation Metrics

As many of us know, Singapore’s DBS Bank. Living, Breathing Asia has been doing a great public relations job on just how "digital" it is.

I had some very hard questions to ask the bank about the way in which it measured its so-called “digital” contribution to its bottom line and performance, and spent an afternoon going through the numbers with CFO @Chng Sok Hui. The recording of the conversation is in The Asian Banker interview with Chng Sok Hui, DBS Bank CFO

I came away with the following impressions:

i. Digital measurements and benchmarks should be set by a neutral party, and not by the institution doing the drum beating. In this regard, there is no one authoritative matrix out there, and so customers, investors and employees may well subscribe to different ones, but still it has to be an external one.

ii. The Asian Banker has been assessing retail banks across more than 30 countries using our new scorecard in the past two years. Our metrics is based on the tracking of the institution's own digital journey ("how digital is one institution over the others") and "what does the customer see?".

a. Our finding was that from a retail finance perspective, China Merchants Bank (CMB), the Australian banks such as Commonwealth Bank even Singapore’s OCBC Bank were far more “digital” than DBS, as seen in our annual The Asian Banker Digital Finance Scorecard and Ranking ranking scorecard started last year. The main reason for this appears to be because DBS is carrying way too much more legacy technology infrastructure, and therefore has too many moving parts.

b. As far as rankings go, there is no bank anywhere in the 50 or so countries we cover in Asia, Middle East and Africa who are anywhere near the new non-banks like China's @Ant Financial Services Group, @Tencent and even newcomer Korea's @Kakao Bank, and understandably so, as these are mostly "only digital" and operate under less operational, regulatory, and capital requirements.

ii. Having said the above, DBS claims are not inaccurate or misleading. All scorecards developed by the institutions themselves are always self-serving – to tell a story to investors and internally as a guide to their own employees as to their own journey. So we have to ask them questions based on their own terms. This is something completely missed by investors at the annual general meeting of the bank recently.

iii. While institution can communicate its own measurements, the fact that the institutional investor community is so mesmerized by DBS Bank. Living, Breathing Asia, as reflected in the spike in its share price since November, is amazing indeed.

iv. In my Conversation with Chng Sok Hui, DBS CFO, the big questions that I had were as follows:

a. Why work on the assumption that only 50% of customers are digital? 50% raises the question of double counting for some metrics. She disagreed. But I still ask this question. In my view, digital is digital and should be all-encompassing.

b. What is the overall “plot” in its digital journey? Where do you want to take your employees, customers and shareholders? A visit to any of DBS offices will reveal thousands of erudite employees all engaged in happy projects designed to make them feel relevant for now, but not realising that digital means many of them will not be needed in the future.

c. Customer value? So, what are the savings, ala Amazon.com, that are being passed back to the customers instead of to the shareholders? I told one of my journalist friends that the question to ask any bank that is boasting is “what does the customer get from all this?”

d. Most of the income from digital appears to be old-fashioned FX fees and NIM. There are no original digital driven fees such as in APIs and competitive pricing for trade and transactions. In fact, I would say that for a digital bank, DBS fee-based income is a bit anemic. These are not easy to derive, but they should be the holy grail. The expectation should be set for banks by an independent observer, and not the banks to sidestep these difficult questions.

e. What are the targets that you have set for yourself. DBS has wisely avoided stating targets. Privately, I believe that giving analysts targets is not a smart thing to do, as we saw in the case of John Cryan of @Deutsche in the past three years. They will hound you for it. But still, I want to know.

iv. While institutions can communicate their own measurements, the fact that the institutional investor community is so mesmerized by DBS Bank. Living, Breathing Asia, as reflected in the spike in its share price since November, is amazing indeed. The institutional investors appear to have been bought in by the high dividends and good investor relations management. But even there, a low ROE, high dividend payouts, low cost-to-income ratio in a low ROA environment is a weird combination that I have not seen before. Something has to give eventually.

Having said that, the digital transformation agenda is a much more disruptive one than we are imagining right now, as I will elaborate in my book to be launched by October 2018.

It is my opinion that everything that DBS is commendably doing right now does not guarantee it, or any other traditional bank, survival in the digital age. The film distributor Kodak entered the digital film industry in 1987, and its share price went up right up to 1997 - a good 10 year run, before it started unraveling. (The link to my 2017 presentation on Banking's Kodak Moment has some points on this.)

PS: In the meantime, I posted a second photo of a long queue at a DBS ATM for cash withdrawal a few weeks ago on my fb version of this post. I have another photo of a sign inside a taxi taken at the airport saying "cash only" next to a @Paylah logo. If there were no Chinese banks, banks like DBS could get away with saying that they are digital and yet ask us to excuse the long queues in its branches and ATMs and practically no transformational change in its digital money programmes. But @China Merchants Bank (CMB) has 100m customers, as against DBS 5m, and no queues in any one of its branches or ATMs. In fact, they don't even think that their story is anything spectacular. This is the kind of benchmark set by "digitalised" players in today's Asia that DBS has to measure up to, not some number it set for itself.

Kok Kiang Lee

Senior Vice President @ DBS Bank | Business lead for Global Financial Market

6 年

Disagree with your statement, “digital is digital and should be all encompassing”. As much as DBS would like to go digital as it lower the cost-return ratio, DBS does not start off as a digital bank where the customers knew what they are “subscribing” to, i.e. a digital only approach in banking. DBS have a long history and we have customers that are in their 80s. Do we leave them helpless by going all digital?

Jason Zhou

Head of Sales & Client Management, Global Transaction Services, DBS Taiwan

6 年

I think there are several dimensions to the comparisons of the ATM queues of China Merchant Bank vs DBS. One, the chief reason for visiting the ATM is to withdraw cash. The Chinese society has leapfrogged into a largely cashless one with the pervasiveness of Alipay and WeChatPay. Singapore, on the other hand, people still tend to like cash, which could be due to the lack of a true digital bank-agnostic e-payments provider. GrabPay is trying to do that, but until it builds up a sufficient “Network effect”, people are still going to use cash, hence ATM queues. Second, by virtue of being the largest bank in Singapore, DBS has also the largest retail customer base. I often see UOB ATM queues shorter than DBS, but that does not mean it is any more “digital” than DBS.

Mark Snodgrass

Experienced Global Cloud Executive

6 年

I love your question on "What is the plot?". Is it Digital for Digital's sake, or is there a payoff, to either the banks shareholders or customers. A few analysts have called 2018 the year of truth for digital initiatives (although that's been called a few years previously as well), where they must actually deliver "something" from the investments made.

Chandrakumar Natarajan

Founder & CEO | Transforming Lives through Artificial Intelligence | Singapore PR | Keynote Speaker

6 年

Great Read!

回复
John S.

Strategic change professional..

6 年

I have read your 2018 digital bank ranking. Ant Financial it’s relatively a monoline FS company, contrasting universal/commercial banks having multi lines of the business. The profitability dynamics, balance sheet, TSR/ROE, cost structure, etc are quite different between these two segments of FIs. Hence one would expect that the kinds of priority and strategic thrusts adopted by FIs in these two segments would be different when it comes to the digitisation of business strategy and organisation transformation, albeit there are certain commonality. I’m not familiar with your scoring model used to rank the maturity of the FIs on their digital journeys, however trying to compare the FIs across all these different segments in the FS industry without accounting for the abovementioned differences would run the risk of comparing apple with orange. For example if one KPI is to measure the % of organisation wide investment and resources focused on digitalisation, there is a high chance that a monoline, online pure play firm will score a high percentage than a commercial bank with substantial conventional/legacy assets as there is a need to protect current revenue during the digital transformation.

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